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H-#2

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date _____

To: _____

Subject:

Luttwak

— B, Luttwak, 3801 Conn Ave
363-0715

— Edward Luttwak,
4510 Drummond Ave
Chevy Chase —
656-1973

— Edward N. Luttwak (Dalwy)
951-0750

625pp

~~Edward N. Luttwak~~
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12816

CONDUCTED ON 22Jul92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REFINED BY OADR

REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]

APPROVED BY [REDACTED]

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SEARCHED
[REDACTED]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

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REVIEW ON OADR H-3

DERIVED FROM Multiplesources

DIA, JP

H-3

NOV 1986

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

G Subject: Meeting With [REDACTED] (U)

E (U) G 1. (TS) During previous discussions with [REDACTED] he has offered to provide support such as:

a. (TS) The establishment of a [REDACTED]

b. (TS) Provide contact with three foreign nationals (FN's) who assisted the Simons rescue effort

c. (TS) Establish a [REDACTED]

A, C (U) G 2. (TS) Recommend that the third item (para 1c) be discussed with [REDACTED] as the existence of such a network would be a definite mission plus without sacrificing security.

G (U) G 3. (TS) Note: The following are examples of support [REDACTED] has already provided in the area of general assistance:

(U) G a. (TS) Assisted in arranging Bell OH-58C skid modification program directly with Mr. Bell, General McKenney (USA Ret.)

b. (TS) Assisted the [REDACTED] and provided contact assistance [REDACTED] and one of the Foreign Nationals that assisted in the Simons Rescue attempt

c. (TS) Provided at no expense to DOD, the [REDACTED] performed by one of 3 FN's who assisted in the Simon effort

d. (TS) Provided this same individual [REDACTED]

(U)
e. (TS) Made known to DOD personnel a "financial angel" willing [redacted] to support hostage family needs. This "Angel" has establish a \$10,000 trust fund for this purpose

(G) (U)
f. (TS) [redacted] has himself donated anonymously funds to establish the "Scholarship Fund" for the children of the eight deceased members of the last attempt

(U)
g. (TS) Arranged with Dallas Cowboy Coach to have video cassettes of the 1979 Cowboy Football games mailed to hostages as morale booster

C

V G

H. (TS) [redacted]



TOP SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

H - HS
14 July 19

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 13526
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
BY BENNETT/CLEY DDAN MCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO Secret
BY DDA ON 0 ADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

Subject: Field Survey

Guidance: Pursuant to NCA guidance to develop a plan for rescue and extraction of the hostages in one night, the JTF Commander, TF Snowbird, requested that Major [REDACTED] and I develop a plan to survey/conditions in countries near Iran. This survey was to determine if conditions in these countries would enable the introduction of elements of a future hostage rescue force and/or other persons in support of such a force. In accordance with guidance, we were not to contact any official of a foreign government, but rather to conduct the survey on a low-key, unobtrusive basis. We were to use extreme caution to preclude any possibility of disclosing our true purpose to persons who did not have a strict need-to-know.

Planning and Coordination: In coordination with the [REDACTED] other elements of the Washington intelligence community and others, we developed a plan to survey [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Our plan entailed travel to key cities in each country where we would contact persons we believed could assist.

[REDACTED] or were personally known to me to be loyal and trustworthy. Conceptually, we hoped, in [REDACTED] to be able to outline a structure and provide a means of double checking the structure once infiltration was attempted. We also planned to determine the feasibility of [REDACTED]

contact was established in [REDACTED] however, required [REDACTED] assistance.

Execution:

On 17 June, [REDACTED] and I departed Washington for [REDACTED] where we established for 18 June, a meeting with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] outlined a requirement [REDACTED] sometime in the future. He stated that such activities were common and that he would meet with us on the following Monday in [REDACTED] to arrange a meeting with a person who engaged in such activities on a routine basis, [REDACTED]

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E (b) On 19 June we flew to [REDACTED] During the period between our arrival and our next meeting with our [REDACTED] contact, we set about making arrangements for the "parallel net," i.e. a means to ensure that all phases of any actual infiltration would be checked continuously. These arrangements were made through personal contacts of my own and other persons to whom I was directed.

(b) (5) By the time the meeting took place on 23 June, I was reasonably certain that follow-on checks could be facilitated. Following our initial meetings with the individual, and as details of his area of operation became more clear, we were able to solidify the "parallel net" so that it would be in operation in the same location.

E (b) We were introduced to [REDACTED] We outlined our requirements and were assured that such infiltrations could be made, and in fact that [REDACTED] was a way of life.

C E (b) [REDACTED] and uses the ability of most of the [REDACTED] who operate there on a regular basis. For our effort, he would work through a [REDACTED] throughout that part of [REDACTED] This [REDACTED] existence and participation in [REDACTED] was subsequently independently confirmed.

C (b) [REDACTED] asked that we meet 2 days later, during which time he would make the needed contacts. In the second meeting he stated that his contacts had told him that they could [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and that "depending on the nature of the cargo" might be able to guarantee movement all the way to Tehran.

C (b) [REDACTED] suggested that the next step would be a survey of the area in question. He said that he would put 4 "engineers" to work on developing a detailed plan, which would then be subject to our approval. Concurrently, he would arrange with national authorities [REDACTED]

C (b) [REDACTED] myself or [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He estimated that planning and survey costs would be approximately \$10,000. We then told him that we needed to discuss these next steps with the President of our company and that we would advise him of the results within a few weeks.

E (b) In [REDACTED] our activities were limited to [REDACTED] and a check of the harbor and the types of vessels seen in the Persian Gulf. We were advised that the most commonly used [REDACTED]

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E [REDACTED] and arranged a meeting
Following the meeting we decided that there
was little probability of establishing a network in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and left to return to the US.

Results/Findings:

E It is possible to infiltrate goods and/or people into Iran from [REDACTED]. The skeletal structure of such a network is in place, and requires only a go-ahead and money to set into operation.

(u) A means of checking such a network could be set up in parallel with very little additional effort.

(u) E The variety of vessels in the Gulf is such that the use of ships to move large equipment items close to the Iranian coast is a most viable option.

(C) Any efforts to use [REDACTED] should be abandoned. From all indications, it is unlikely that any [REDACTED] could be found who would support us, and more importantly, such activities might damage efforts in support of Afghan rebel forces.

Recommendation:

E (u) That an appropriate US intelligence agency take additional action to affirm the indicated potential for introducing elements of a future rescue force into Iran through [REDACTED] and exercise this option on a test basis as soon as possible.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12815
CONDUCTED ON 22 July 92
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14 SEP 1992 BY [Signature]
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THE JOINT STAFF

H - #6
G

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC [REDACTED] (cc)

Subject: Liaison Trip to EDC (Ross Perot)
8-9 June 1980

X G (U) (F) On 9 June, Major [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] visited EDC in order to accomplish the following:

C, G a. Ascertain the current status of [Mr. Perot's] [REDACTED]

b. Determine the degree of support which could/would be forthcoming from [REDACTED]

c. Set up contacts with [REDACTED] in support of an [REDACTED] to be conducted by [REDACTED]

C, E, G

C, E, G

C, G, E [REDACTED] were provided a list of [REDACTED] by Perot. He indicated that these gentlemen were useful because they know the area around the border. They also apparently are cognizant of smuggling operations across the Turkish-Iranian border.

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5. [Perrot] will set up a meeting between his people and some

C/G
of a

will attend this meeting under [REDACTED]
This should give the JTF a handle on

[Perrot] was apprised of [REDACTED] trip to the near
east and concurred in the notion that this is the only way
to obtain factual operational data. He arranged the meeting
with [REDACTED] and suggested the [REDACTED]
for [REDACTED]. He also will arrange a meeting with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] during the upcoming trip.

C/G
E

G [REDACTED]
Major, GS
USA

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEWED BY DR. DENNIS MCCARTHY
DATE REVIEWED 24 JULY 92
DERIVED FROM MICROFILM

2 June 1982

DG
CJ
TB
JR

H-#-

Subject: Commercial Assistance Coordination

1. On 2 June 1980 the undersigned met with several businessmen in the private offices of Mr. Ross Perot in Dallas, Texas. All conversations were conducted under very tight physical and telephonic security and were recognized as very confidential and sensitive. The topics discussed were:

(u) [REDACTED] d. The modification of OH58C helicopters to allow them to be rolled on/rolled off C-130/C-141 aircraft without any dismantling. Discussed only with General McKinnon, executive of the Bell Aircraft Corporation and Mr. Pierot.

Private travel to [REDACTED] Discussed only with Mr Perot.

4. Development of a financial "Angel" to support and coordinate hostage gift program in association with a program of assisting the families.

[REDACTED] This was discussed with Mr. Perot and Mr. [REDACTED] who performed a similar function for the [REDACTED] Vietnam POW families.

2. All discussions ended in a positive note; offers of support from each of the principals concerned. A summary of the results follows:

at Bell can and will modify one OH58C within days and make it available for test. Once we are assured the modification will suffice, Bell technicians working in their production facilities ;or working with Army Helicopter Specialists at Corpus Christi can provide 15-20 sets of modified skids by 20-24 June 1980. General McKinnon will forward engineer drawings of modifications by Wednesday. Data will include model numbers for the gun kits that can be attached to the OH58C. General McKinnon also stated the civilian equivalent to the OH58C, the Jet Ranger, comes in a longer (L) model with greater passenger capacity and depending on production schedules, upwards of six of these airframes conceivably could be made available, if we saw a need. General

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McKinnon also said they could provide flight training on 214's (min required for Huey pilot) but advised against assuming use of IAF 214 as reliable procedures were not adhered to.

E
G
C, G
✓

b. Regarding a visit by Mr. [REDACTED] in a civilian capacity [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
pending a face to face assessment of Mr. [REDACTED]
Meeting time to be determined by mutual agreement. (I did not mention the following to Mr. Perot, but believe Mr. Perot would more readily sponsor this particular venture if either [REDACTED] were to accompany Mr. [REDACTED]).

C, G
c. In discussing the matter of support for the hostage families [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] both Mr. Perot and Mr. [REDACTED] believe a well coordinated program could be developed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
of moral support both for the hostages and their families. Mr. [REDACTED] was going to talk it over with two "Financial Angel" candidates and would be back in contact later in the week. [REDACTED]

(iv) (f)
d. During discussions with General McKinnon, the General made several other points/suggestions:

(iv) (f)
a. Use, fly and test our own equipment.
(v) (f)
b. Bell has several senior technical people on its flight line that would be willing to provide maintenance expertise if needed.
(vi) (f)
c. Believed older Army WO maintenance types could also do the job.
E
(vii) (f)
d. Suggested we move a unit of CH-47's into Europe, the Med then [REDACTED] and leave them or rotate and consider using 47's with auxilliary fuel tanks as principal lift birds.

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
~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

(u)

a. Mentioned 30-40 million dollars of spare parts ordered by IAC but unpaid for that remain embargoed by Treasury Department.

(u) ~~(S)~~

f. Believed that a IAF 214 and Cobra are at Ft Rucker.



Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

b7c G

CLASSIFICATION
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/MCC
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REVIEW ON JAD 2
BERIVED FROM multiple sources

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H-4

Item Number: 1

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Identification/Acquisition of Farsi Linguists to

A

~~Support SFOD-D~~

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - March 1980

SUMMARY:

A 1. ~~(S)~~ COMJTF directed that US military personnel who speak Farsi be obtained to support ~~(SFOD-D)~~ phase for RICEBOWL night no. 2. Minimum of 12 required.

2. ~~(S)~~ Linguists would ~~[redacted]~~ Iranian ~~[redacted]~~ to insure that they did not disclose true nature of ~~[redacted]~~ if stopped at Iranian ~~[redacted]~~

A, C 3. Due to paucity of Iranian ~~[redacted]~~ some monitors subsequently became ~~[redacted]~~

4. ~~(S)~~ Initial lists of 3-listening/3-reading qualified personnel (maximum levels possible through language schools) obtained through JTF Service and DIA POC's. Additional names provided by JTF personnel who were acquainted with Farsi linguists.

5. ~~(S)~~ Likely individuals brought TDY to Washington, D.C. for interview by JTF/J2 personnel (posing as DIA representative searching for linguists to support DIA Iranian Task Force).

~~[redacted]~~ provided Farsi linguist used at beginning of interview to test subject's conversational Farsi.

6. ~~(S)~~ Subjects not considered qualified during the interview, or those who failed to volunteer for an unnamed hazardous ~~[redacted]~~

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mission requiring Farsi linguists, signed a security statement and were returned to their units.

A,C
7. ~~(S)~~ Subjects who were qualified and who volunteered entered the [REDACTED] SFOD-D [REDACTED] training program. Subjects were continuously assessed during this training period.

A
8. ~~(S)~~ Approximately 50 personnel of all Services were interviewed. Eight personnel met the qualifications and volunteered. Of those, only 6 completed [REDACTED] training and were ultimately integrated into [REDACTED] for training.

COMMENTS:

1. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Services do not have rapid means to obtain accurate lists of language-qualified personnel. Further search was always required.

2. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Native linguists who have not taken a language test are not included in such lists. Nor are OSI personnel and personnel on the DA Special Roster (DASR).

3. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Personnel with a recorded 3/3 capability are often totally incapable of conversing in their foreign language.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

G
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Maj [REDACTED] ODCSOPS, DA.

POINTS OF CONTACT:

- a. Service and DIA POC's.
- b. HQ OSI, Mr. [REDACTED] 767-5144.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Interview form.

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INTERVIEW FORM

PHASE I: (language test)

PHASE II:

1. General physical condition/characteristics:
2. Opinion of Iranian/hostage situation:
3. What should US action be?.
4. Opinion of possible US military action against Iran:
5. Family problems/money problems:
6. Impact of immediate extended TDY:
7. Citizenship (Iranian personnel only):
8. Family in Iran: (Iranian personnel only)
9. Feelings towards Iranians (Iranian personnel only):
10. How and why did you leave Iran? (Iranian personnel only):

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PHASE III:

1. Willing to work for junior personnel:
2. Arduous training and physical testing:
3. Danger involved:
4. Psychiatric evaluation/stress:
5. May not be accepted into the program, but still "locked in":
6. Why do you wish to participate?
7. Knowing the little that you have been told, do you wish to volunteer for this assignment?

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H-12

Item Number: _____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY DIA/JS
CONDUCTED ON 22 Dec 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY JS/ON MCC
 DECL CI-DOWNGRADED TO Just
REVIEW ON CADR
DERIVED FROM multiple Sources
DIA/JS

SUBJECT: Exercise Intelligence

TIMEFRAME: July 1980-December 1980

SUMMARY:

(U) 1. (S) J-2 became actively involved in Exercise Intelligence with Poison Dart. Exercise Trade Winds and Storm Cloud followed with Exercise Intelligence utilized.

(U) 2. (S) Intelligence planning for the exercises took place 1-3 days prior to the operational planning.

(U) 3. (S) J-2 established a presence at all critical points of the exercise. Attendance at site surveys greatly enhanced the role J-2 could play in the exercise information phase.

COMMENTS:

(U) 1. (S) Map needs are the first major requirement that creates problems in operational exercise planning. An adequate supply of large and small scale maps must be on hand for the planning conference. The maps must cover the sites as well as routing.

(U) 2. (S) Intelligence must press J-3 for their preplanning ideas prior to the operators planning conference. Intelligence ~~needs~~ can only be determined if J-3 provides information on planned sites/routes prior to the operators planning conference.

(U) 3. (S) Photography of the sites as well as proposed turn points on the routing will be required for operational (SAFETY) planning. J-2 presence ~~on~~ the site/route planning is essential to help provide this information.

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(U)

4. (S) OPSEC was a major problem on the first exercise planning conference. Although the problems were rectified on the spot, the same control access procedures, secure areas, unsecure telephone line use and inadvertent disclosure problems can all easily arise again.

(D)(U)

5. (S) Because accurate distance/time planning factors from the real world situation were automatically included into the operators figures, [threat rings, radar detection areas, altitude restrictions] and other intelligence factors were added in after initial operational planning. While this is admittedly backwards, the main reason ^{for} of the exercise was to test operational feasibility against already known real world parameters. This method of intelligence planning should be used only in rehearsal or real-world-connected exercises.

A

6. (S) ISOW provided the majority of the map/photo support for several of the exercises for all participants. This responsibility should not be automatically placed on their shoulders ^{without their prior knowledge and consent} but should be provided by [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (S) J-2 participate actively in all phases of ^{MISSION Readiness} planning, including site surveys.

2. (S) J-2 act to provide all map/photo support for ^{MISSION Readiness} planning.

3. (S) J-2 provide a roster of pre-mission intelligence briefers for all units. The majority of these briefers should be from the J-2 shop and the burden should not be placed on the individual units.

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(u)

3. (u) J-2 coordinate with J-3 well in advance of the operator's planning session. Exercise areas, routing, threat analysis and parameters should be agreed upon prior to the operators planning session.

(u)

4. (u) J-2 create a situation which will provide a cover story for all units involved in the exercise. The situation should be realistic but not connected to the real world.

~~During connections between real world and exercise names, places, actions and codes created numerous OPSEC problems~~

(u)

5. (u) Exercise Poison Dart intelligence section provided assumptions close to the real world. However, ~~Operations~~ Trade Wind and Storm Cloud provided enough similarity in exercise needs but were dissimilar enough to be misleading if the exercise mission were disclosed (see Atch 1).

G

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Maj [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

Maj [REDACTED]	1SON A2	AV 872-6498
Capt [REDACTED]	101st	AV 635-4546
Maj [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	AV [REDACTED]
Maj [REDACTED]	AWACS	AV 735-4126
Maj [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	354-1821
Maj [REDACTED]	DELTA	AV

A, G

ATTACHMENTS:

1. POISON DART INTEL SECTION
2. TRADE WIND INTEL SECTION
3. STORM CLOUD INTEL SECTION

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OPORD POISON DART

TASKED ORGANIZATION: (S)

JTD
JCSE DET

1 SOW

MAC

SAC

RANGERS

DELTA

101ST AIR ASSAULT

552 AWAC WG

U.S. ARMY QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL AIRBORNE (RIGGERS) COL [REDACTED]

1. (U) (S) SITUATION:

A. (S) GENERAL: SINCE THE TOPPLING OF THE KILOGRAM GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN THE PAST HAD BEEN FRIENDLY AND HAD SUPPORTED U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS REGION, THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE, DOMINATED BY RADICAL LEFT WING GROUPS, HAS DIRECTED CONSTANT PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BLAMING INTERNAL PROBLEMS ON U.S. INTERFERENCE IN KILOGRAM'S AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONTROL OVER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THIS RESULTED IN A STAGED POPULAR TAKE-OVER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LEMONADE (TERRY), A CONSULATE IN GOULASH (GERMAN VILLAGE) AND A U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN DIOXIDE (ROSWELL WET). U.S. PERSONNEL WERE CAPTURED, HAVE BEEN HELD AT THOSE SITES, AND ARE TO BE TRIED AND POSSIBLY EXECUTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE NCA HAS DIRECTED THAT PREPARATION FOR A RESCUE EFFORT BE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED.

B. (S) ENEMY: THE COUNTRY OF HEMSTEAD AND CHESTERBROOK BORDERING KILOGRAM ARE HOSTILE TO THE U.S. AS WELL AS KILOGRAM. HOWEVER, HEMPSTEAD, DUE TO ITS EXTREME ANTI-U.S. NATURE, WOULD WARN KILOGRAM OF ANY U.S. ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE U.S. CITIZENS. ALTHOUGH KILOGRAM ARMORED FORCES ARE NOT FULLY PROFICIENT IN UTILIZING AND MAINTAINING ALL OF THEIR AVAILABLE MILITARY ASSETS THEY HAVE A REASONABLE CAPABILITY TO PROTECT KILOGRAM FROM INTERVENTION BY WELL ARMED NEIGHBORS AND PRESENT AN EXTREMELY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT TO THE U.S. RESCUE EFFORT.

C. (S) FRIENDLY: THE COUNTRIES OF SHAMROCK AND VENDETTA ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE U.S. AND HAVE GRANTED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND STAGING FACILITIES AT HURLBURT FIELD (SHAMROCK) AND FT HOOD, (VENDETTA).

Atch 1

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(U)
2. (S) MISSION: JTD POISON DART WILL PENETRATE THE COUNTRY OF KILOGRAM AND CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS GROUND AND/OR AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO RESCUE THE U.S. CITIZENS BEING HELD AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

U.S. EMBASSY LEMONADE (TERRY AUX): 30 CITIZENS
U.S. CONSULATE GOULASH (GERMAN VILLAGE): 11 CITIZENS
U.S. MAAG DIOXIDE (ROSWELL WET): 11 CITIZENS

(U)
3. (S) EXECUTION:

(U)
A. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: JTD POISON DART FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO AND OPERATE FROM SHAMROCK (FIXED WING/SUPPORT) AND VENDETTA (ROTARY WING/SUPPORT). JTD FORCE WILL THEN PENETRATE THE COUNTRY OF KILOGRAM AND AT "H" HOUR (28/0836Z), CONDUCT THE SIMULTANEOUS RESCUE OF U.S. CITIZENS BEING HELD AT THE U.S. EMBASSY AT LEMONADE, THE U.S. CONSULATE AT GOULASH, AND THE U.S. MAAG AT DIOXIDE. PRIOR TO OR IN COORDINATION WITH THE RESCUE AT H-HOUR, JTD FORCES WILL SEIZE AND SECURE THE FOLLOWING AIRFIELDS TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE RESCUE:

SPEAKEASY (DUGWAY DIRT STRIP)
LETTERHEAD (MICHAEL AAF)
SOMBRERO (CONDRON AAF)
CHICKORY (CANNON AFB)

(U)
(1) (S) GENERAL:

(A) (S) LEMONADE (RESSE AFB/TERRY AUX) EMBASSY ASSAULT: FOLLOWING MC-130 RANGER AIR ASSAULT AND SEIZURE OF CHICKORY (CANNON AFB), A COMPOSITE FORCE OF RANGERS AND DELTA WILL BE AIRLIFTED BY H-53 AND H-60 HELICOPTERS TO RESCUE THE U.S. CITIZENS AT LEMONADE (TERRY AUX). THIS FORCE WILL AIR LAND AT KEY LOCATIONS ON LEMONADE, ARRIVING AT H-HOUR. THE GROUND FORCES WILL SECURE THE AREA, NEUTRALIZE OPPPOSITION AND LIBERATE THE PRISONERS. BOTH THE GROUND FORCES AND THE LIBERATED PRISONERS WILL BE AIRLIFTED VIA HELICOPTER TO CHICKORY (CANNON AFB), TRANSLOADED TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND EGRESS THE HOSTILE TERRITORY.

(B) (S) DIOXIDE (ROSWELL) MAAG ASSAULT: FOLLOWING MC-130 RANGER AIR ASSAULT AND SEIZURE OF CHICKORY (CANNON AFB), THE HELICOPTER ASSAULT FORCE CONSISTING OF H-53 AND H-60 AIRCRAFT WILL AIRLIFT A COMPOSITE FORCE OF DELTA AND RANGERS TO RESCUE THE U.S. CITIZENS HELD AT DIOXIDE. HELICOPTERS WILL AIR LAND THE GROUND ASSAULT FORCES INSIDE THE COMPOUND AND EGRESS THE AREA TO THE PZ/EZ. THE GROUND ASSAULT FORCE WILL SECURE THE COMPOUND, NEUTRALIZE THE OPPPOSITION, LIBERATE THE PRISONERS, AND ESCORT THEM TO THE PZ/EZ WHERE THE ENTIRE FORCE IS LOADED ON THE HELICOPTERS AND FLOWN TO SOMBRERO (CONDRON AAF) FOR TRANSLOADING ABOARD FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND EGRESS THE HOSTILE TERRITORY.

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(U) 6. (S) INTELLIGENCE:

A (U) (S) STRATEGIC SETTING: JOINT TRAINING EXERCISE POISON DART WILL BE HELD UTILIZING HURLBURT FLD, FL; FT HOOD, TEXAS; TERRY AUX AFLD (REESE); ROSWELL WET SITE (ROSWELL AND DUGWAY); (MICHAEL AFLD, GERMAN VILLAGE, AND DUGWAY SITE). THIS IS A JCS COORDINATED, JTD SPONSORED EXERCISE INVOLVING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS FROM 1 SOW, MAC, SAC, TAC, 101ST, [REDACTED] RANGERS AND DELTA. THE STRATEGIC SETTING IS A REPRESENTATION OF WORLD-WIDE CAPABILITIES IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.

(U) B. (S) SETTING COUNTRIES: IN THE EXERCISE STRATEGIC SETTING, COUNTRY KILOGRAM IS SURROUNDED ON 3 SIDES BY COUNTRIES INIMICAL TO THE U.S. INTERESTS. ON ONE SIDE (S/E) THERE ARE FRIENDLY, COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALLOWED U.S. FORCES USE OF THEIR TERRITORIES AS LANDING/STAGING SITES AT HURLBURT (SHAMROCK) AND FT HOOD (VENDETTA).

(U) C. (S) POLITICAL SITUATIONS:

(U) (1) (S) COUNTRY KILOGRAM HAS LONG BEEN FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND HAS SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN MANY COMMON REGIONAL AREAS OF INTEREST. KILOGRAM HAS HAD A LONG HISTORY OF VIOLENT INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO THE CONTROLLING POWERS IN ITS GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT FORCES USED BRUTAL METHODS IN THE PAST ATTEMPTING TO ERADICATE ANTI-GOVERNMENT (VIOLENT) ORGANIZATIONS, BUT DID NOT SUCCEED IN SUPPRESSING THEM. OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES SPREAD AND VARIOUS SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS BANDED TOGETHER TO INCITE THE POPULATION TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT.

(U) (2) (S) DESPITE ITS LARGE ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES, THE GOVERNMENT WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE POPULAR REACTION AS ARMED FORCES MEMBERS DEFECTED IN LARGE NUMBERS TO THE OPPosition.

(U) (3) (S) AFTER A MASSIVE COUNTRY-WIDE STRIKE, THE GOVERNMENT FELL AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUBVERSIVE FORCES WERE FORMED INTO A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE, DOMINATED BY RADICAL LEFT WING GROUPS. A "PEOPLE MILITIA" WAS FORMED, LED BY THE RADICAL LEFT WING ELEMENT, WITH ADEQUATE POWER TO ENFORCE THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE DECREES.

(U) (4) (S) ALL KILOGRAM'S PROBLEMS WERE BLAMED ON U.S. INTERFERENCE IN KILOGRAM'S AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.'S "CONTROL" OVER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT OF CONSTANT PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE U.S., POPULAR SENTIMENT, INCITED BY THE RADICAL "PEOPLES MILITIA", LED TO A "POPULAR" ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TERRY (LEMONADE) -- A CONSULATE IN GERMAN VILLAGE (GOULASH) -- AND A U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN ROSWELL WET (DIOXIDE).

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(U)

(5) (S) THE U.S. CITIZENS TAKEN HOSTAGE ARE TO BE TRIED AND PROBABLY EXECUTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT A RESCUE EFFORT WILL COMMENCE BY 27 SEPTEMBER.

(U)

D. (S) MILITARY SITUATION: MILITARY FORCES FROM HEMPSTEAD AND CHESTERBROOK HAVE LONG BEEN ARRAYED AGAINST KILOGRAM. BOTH HAVE TERRITORIAL DESIGNS ON KILOGRAM AND BOTH WANT ACCESS TO KILOGRAM'S LARGE RARE MINERAL DEPOSITS. AS A RESULT OF THE LONGSTANDING FEUD BETWEEN KILOGRAM AND ITS NEIGHBORS, KILOGRAM HAS PURCHASED VAST AMOUNTS OF THE LATEST MILITARY HARDWARE FROM THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS. ALTHOUGH KILOGRAM'S ARMED FORCES ARE NOT FULLY PROFICIENT IN UTILIZING AND MAINTAINING ALL OF THE MILITARY ASSETS AVAILABLE, THEY HAVE A REASONABLE CAPABILITY TO PROTECT KILOGRAM FROM ASSAULT BY WELL-ARMED NEIGHBORS AND THEY PRESENT A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT TO THE U.S. RESCUE EFFORT.

(U)

E. (S) POLITICAL ALLIANCES: HEMPSTEAD AND CHESTERBROOK ARE HOSTILE TO THE U.S. AS WELL AS TO KILOGRAM. HOWEVER, DUE TO ITS EXTREMELY ANTI-U.S. NATURE, HEMPSTEAD, IN THE NORTH, WOULD WARN KILOGRAM OF ANY U.S. ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE U.S. CITIZENS HELD IN KILOGRAM. SHAMROCK (HURLBURT) AND VENDETTA (FT HOOD) ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE U.S. AND HAVE GRANTED THE U.S. STAGING AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS.

(U)

F. (S) CODE NAMES TO BE USED IN JTD EXERCISE POISON DART ARE ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>ACTUAL NAME</u>
BARE BACK	PHOENIX, AZ
BREAKWATER	TINKER, AFB OK
BUMBLE BEE	PLAINVIEW, TX
CAMPFIRE	PRATT, KS
CASSEROLE	KANSAS CITY, KS
CHECKERS	HILL AFB, UT
CHESTERBROOK	SOUTH COUNTRY
CHICKORY	CANNON AFB, NM
COMPONENT	WINDOW ROCK, AZ
DIAGONAL	PUEBLO, CO
DIOXIDE	ROSWELL, NM
FACTORY	RED CLOUD, KS
FOOTLIGHT	HOLLOWMAN AFB, NM
GOULASH	GERMAN VILLAGE, UT (DUGWAY)
HARMONICA	LAS VEGAS, NV
HEMPSTEAD	NORTH COUNTRY
KETTLE	FARMINGTON, NM
KILOGRAM	TARGET COUNTRY
LAMP POST	DENVER, CO
LEMONADE	TERRY AUX, TX (REESE)
LETTERHEAD	MICHAEL AAF, UT

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<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>ACTUAL NAME</u>
PADLOCK	DODGE CITY, KS
PALMTREE	ABILENE, TX
PRIMROSE	MILSAP, TX
RIDGEWORTH	ALBUQUERQUE, NM
SANDPIPER	CHARLESTON AFB, SC
SHAMROCK	HURLBURT FLD, FL
SKYSCRAPER	LUKE AFB, AZ
SOMBRERO	CONDRON AAF, NM
SPARKLER	SPARE
SPEAKEASY	DIRT STRIP (DUGWAY, UT)
TAPROOT	GRAND ISLAND, NE
VANILLA	FAIRVIEW, UT
VENDETTA	FT HOOD, TX

G. (S) ORDERS OF BATTLE:

(1) (S) EOB

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>EW/GCI</u>	<u>ATC</u>
FAIRFIELD, UT	CHECKERS	MARCONI S-266 DECCA HF 200	ASR-4 PAR 2
BUCKLEY AFB	LAMP POST	DECCA AR-1	
GRAND ISLAND	TAPROOT	AN/TPS-43	
RED CLOUD	FACTORY	AN/TPS-43	
ROSWELL	DIOXIDE		AN TPN 1
HOLLOWAN	FOOT LIGHT		ASR-4 PAR-2
WINDOW ROCK	COMPONENT		ASR-4 PAR-2
CANNON	CHICKORY		PAR-2
FARMINGTON	KETTLE		PAR-2
MEMPHIS (NAS)	PADLOCK	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	
FAIRVIEW	VANILLA	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	
MILSAP, TX	PRIMROSE	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	
DYESS	PALMTREE	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	
PRAT	CAMPFIRE	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	

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<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>EW/GCI</u>	<u>ATC</u>
PUEBLO	DIAGONAL		DECCA AR PAR 2
TERRY	LEMONADE	AN/FPS-100 AN/FPS-89	MARCONI S26 PAR-2
LUKE	SKYSCRAPER	DECCA FH 200 ESF RV 377	
NELLIS	HARMONICA	MARCONI S 244 CSF RV 377	

(v)
(2) (S) SAMOB RADARS

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
LUKE	SKYSCRAPER	AN/MPQ 39 AN/MPQ 35
TERRY	LEMONADE	AN/MPQ 39 AN/MPQ 35
MILSAP, TX	PRIMROSE	AN/MPQ 39 AN/MPQ 35
CANNON	CHICKORY	AN/MPQ 39 AN/MPQ 35

(v)
(3) (S) AAAOB

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>RADAR</u>
DODGE CITY, KS	PADLOCK	ZU-23-2	
FAIRVIEW	VANILLA	ZU-23-2	
PARIS	SPARKLER	ZU-23-2	
MILSAP, TX	PRIMROSE	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
DYESSION	PALMTREE	ZU-23-2	
PRATT	CAMPFIRE	ZU-23-2	
TERRY	LEMONADE	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
LUKE	SKYSCRAPER	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
NELLIS	HARMONICA	ZU-23-2	
FAIRFIELD, UT	CHECKERS	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
BUCKLEY	LAMP POST	ZU-23-2	
GRAND ISLAND	TAPROOT	ZU-23-2	
RED CLOUD	FACTORY	ZU-23-2	
PLAINVIEW	BUMBLEBEE	ZU-23-2	
ROSWELL	DIOXIDE	ZU-23-2	
HOLLOWMAN	FOOTLIGHT	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
WINDOWROCK	COMPONENT	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
CANNON	CHICKORY	ZU-23-2	
PUEBLO, CO	DIAGONAL	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS
FARMINGTON	KETTLE	OERLIKON/ZU-23-2	SUPERFLEDERMAUS

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(v)

(4) (S) AOB

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
PHOENIX	BAREBACK	I-HAWK
MILSAP, TX	PRIMROSE	I-HAWK
TERRY	LEMONADE	I-HAWK RAPIER
FAIRFIELD, UT	CHECKERS	RAPIER

(5) (S) AOB

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
TERRY	LEMONADE	F-4, F-5
FAIRFIELD, UT	CHECKERS	F-5
PUEBLO, CO	DIAGONAL	F-14
HOLLOWMAN	FOOTLIGHT	F-14 PRIMARY
MILSAP, TX	PRIMROSE	F-4
FARMINGTON	KETTLE	F-4
WINDOWROCK	COMPONENT	F-4
LUKE AFB	SKYSCRAPER	F-4 PRIMARY

(6) (S) GOB

4 INFANTRY DIVISIONS
 4 ARMORED DIVISIONS
 1 ABN BRIGADE
 1 SF BRIGADE
 1 INFANTRY DIVISION, 1 SF BRIGADE AT TERRY (LEMONADE)

ARMORED - PHOENIX (BAREBACK) ARMOR
 ARMOR - NELLIS (HARMONICA) GRAND ISLAND (TAPROOT)
 ARMOR - HILL (CHECKERS)
 INF - PHOENIX (BAREBACK)
 INF - NELLIS (HARMONICA)
 INF - RED CLOUD (FACTORY)
 ABN BDE - PUEBLO DIAGONAL C-130S
 SF BDE - TERRY (LEMONADE)
 IND - TERRY (LEMONADE)

GROUND FORCES ARE AUGMENTED BY 75,000 GENDARMERIE AND PEOPLES
 MILITIA SCATTERED THROUGH THE COUNTRY.

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(u) H. (S) TARGETS:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
TERRY AUX AFLD	(LEMONADE)	2 TARGET AREAS
ROSWELL WET	(DIOXIDE)	GOB/AAA DEFEN. NO AOB/DEPLOYMENT BASE
DUGWAY-GERMAN VILLAGE	(GOULASH)	1 TARGET AREA

(u) (1) (S) GOB AT/NEAR TARGETS:

(A) TERRY (LEMONADE) - 30 US HOSTAGES

(u) 1. (S) HELD BY MILITIA FORCE (6 INDIVIDUALS)
GUARDING AT ANY ONE TIME.

(u) 2. (S) LOCATION - HARD SURFACES R/W WITH
SEVERAL BUILDING.

(u) 3. (S) ROSWELL WET (DIOXIDE) - 11 U.S. HOSTAGES:

HELD BY 4-5 INDIVIDUALS GUARDING AT ANY ONE TIME.
REACTION/SECURITY FORCE (10-15 ADDITIONAL GUARDS).
LOCATION LZ IS NEARBY ADEQUATE FOR 4 HELO, SMALL
LZ IN COMPOUND.

(u) 4. (S) GERMAN VILLAGE (GOULASH) - 11 U.S. HOSTAGES:

HELD BY 4-5 INDIVIDUAL GUARDING AT ANY ONE TIME.
REACTION FORCE OF 6-8 ADDITIONAL (IN BUILDING).
LOCATION: DIRT STRIP
ADDITIONAL GUARDS ON GROUND FLOOR, HOSTAGES
ON 2ND FLOOR.

(u) (2) (S) GOB AT/NEAR OTHER SITES:

(u) (A) (S) MICHAEL (LETTERHEAD)

NO AOB

ASPHALT R/W 2907M X 49M (NE/SW)

24 BUILDINGS

AT NORTH BARRACKS - 24 KM NORTH

1. NORTH ART BN 155 MM TOWED

2. NORTH ARMORED BN 130 MM (4)

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REACTION TIME: 2 HRS AFTER NOTIFICATION

AT SOUTH BARRACKS - 19 KM SOUTH

1. SOUTH INFANTRY BN (RESERVE)
2. PARAMILITARY POST 1000
- 3..PEOPLES MILITIA IN AREA

REACTION TIME: 4 HRS FOR RESERVES;
1-2 HRS FOR PARAMILITIA TO BEG

(U) (S) (B) CANNON (CHICKORY)

1. NO AOB
2. MISSILE TEST CTN I HAWK
3. 11,500' x 148' (NE/SW)

(U) 4. NO BUILDINGS

(C) (S) (C) CONDRON (SOMBRERO)

NO AOB

NO SUPPORT FACILITIES

ASPHALT R/W 1,785 M X 30 M (NE/SW)

NO GROUND FORCES

(U) 7 PARAMILITARY NEAR FIELD

(D) (S) (D) DUGWAY (SPEAKEASY)

OILED EARTH R/W (NE/SW)

1,350 M X 74 M

R/W BLOCKED BY TIRES, MAN-MOVABLE OBJECT

SEVERAL SMALL BUILDINGS

NO ADA

4 PARAMILITARY

17

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(U)

I. (S) WEATHER: (SEE CHART ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

(U)

(A) (S) LATE SEPTEMBER THROUGH OCTOBER IS A WEATHER TRANSITION PERIOD WITH THE COUNTRY OF KILOGRAM AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES STILL RECEIVING AFTERNOON THUNDERSTORMS AND RAINSHOWERS BUT ALSO IMPACTED BY THE FIRST POLAR FRONTAL PASSAGES OF THE YEAR. FRONTAL SYSTEMS WILL INCREASE CLOUD COVER, DECREASE CEILINGS, PRODUCE INCREASED RAINSHOWERS, AND THUNDERSTORMS AND GUSTY, SHIFTING SURFACE WINDS. THE COUNTRIES WILL BEGIN RECEIVING LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES DUE TO FOG AND STRATUS.

(B) (U) TEMPERATURE RANGE FROM AN AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 49 DEGREES F AT LEADERHEAD TO AN AVERAGE DAILY MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 87 DEGREES F AT SHAMROCK. ADDITIONAL DATA CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE ATTACHED CLIMATOLOGY FOR EACH STATION. MOONRISE VARIES FROM 0222 TO 0356Z AND MOONSET FROM 1606 to 1814Z, WITH 91% DUSK DURING THE EXERCISE PERIOD.

(C) (U) SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER ARE INCLUDED IN THE HURRICANE SEASON AND COAST LINE AREAS MIGHT BE IMPACTED BY TROPICAL STORMS.

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1. SITUATION:

A. GENERAL: A RADICAL THIRD WORLD NATION, HATCHET, HAS FORCED DOWN AN AMERICAN AIRLINER, FLYING OVER INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, WHILE CLAIMING THAT THE AIRLINER VIOLATED HATCHET'S AIRSPACE. THE AIRLINER, A CHARTERED U.S. JET, HELD 150 PASSENGERS, 100 OF WHOM WERE U.S. CITIZENS AND 50 WHO ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS. WITHIN HOURS, ALL 50 FOREIGN NATIONALS WERE RELEASED: BUT THE AIRCRAFT, ITS AMERICAN CREW, AND ALL U.S. CITIZENS WERE HELD.

HATCHET'S PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE CLAIMS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON A SPYING MISSION FOR THE U.S. AND THAT SOME OR ALL OF THE U.S. CITIZENS ABOARD ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SPYING.

HATCHET PLANS TO USE THE AIRCRAFT, ITS CREW, AND THE U.S. CITIZENS TO EXTORT VAST SUMS AND A U.S. GUARANTEE OF SUPPORT FOR ITS DISPUTED CLAIMS TO A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY'S CRITICAL ORE DEPOSITS IN AN UPCOMING U.N. COUNCIL.

A SEARCH HAS LOCATED THE DETAINED PASSENGERS AND CREW (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS "DETAINEES") IN A LARGE CITY WITHIN HATCHET. THE PASSENGERS ARE HELD IN A LARGE CITY PRISON, PORTHOLE. THE CREW IS BEING DETAINED AT A NEARBY POLICE FACILITY, OCTAGON.

THE OBJECTIVE OF [REDACTED] EXERCISE TRADE WIND IS TO RECOVER THE DETAINEES SAFELY.

B. THE COUNTRY OF HATCHET IS EXTREMELY HOSTILE TO THE U.S. NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WHILE HOSTILE TO BOTH THE U.S. AND HATCHET, WOULD NONETHELESS PROBABLY WARN HATCHET OF ANY U.S. ATTEMPT TO FREE THE DETAINEES.

ALTHOUGH HATCHET'S ARMED FORCES ARE RELATIVELY INEFFICIENT, THERE ARE ADEQUATE MILITARY RESOURCES TO PRESENT AN EXTREMELY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT TO ANY U.S. RECOVERY ATTEMPT.

C. THE COUNTRIES SOUTH OF HATCHET ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE U.S. AND HAVE GRANTED THE U.S. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND A FEW STAGING FACILITIES. THESE FACILITIES, QUICK SILVER (HURLBURT) AND GARNISH (HUNTER AAF) ARE IN SUFFICIENTLY REMOTE AREAS TO ALLOW SHORT TERM USE WITHOUT DRAWING UNDUE ATTENTION.

Atch 2

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Atch #2

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1. SITUATION:

A. General: A wealthy, radical "third world" nation, Calivada, is in the final stages of becoming a nuclear power. Peaceful nuclear facilities purchased from European nations have helped this process. Recently this nation has decided to speed the process by secretly kidnapping three U.S. nuclear physicists and stealing components and plans for nuclear weapons. The self-proclaimed President-For-Life of Calivada has clearly stated that he will attempt to use his future nuclear capability to coerce the U.S. on a number of regional issues.

The U.S. has confirmed that Calivada was responsible for the kidnapping and theft. An exhaustive search has located the U.S. physicists and the plans/components (hereafter collectively referred to as "critical cargo") in a large city within the country.

The physicists are being held in a government research office, Bacon, while the plans and components are being kept at a nearby research facility, Limestone.

The objective of JTD/Exercise STORM CLOUD is to recover the critical cargo intact and the physicists alive and well.

B. Enemy: The country of Calivada is extremely hostile to the U.S. Neighboring countries of Arizona and New Mexico, while hostile to both the U.S. and Calivada, would nonetheless probably warn Calivada of any U.S. attempt to recover the critical material. Although Calivada's armed forces are relatively inefficient, there are adequate military resources available to present an extremely hostile environment to any U.S. recovery attempt.

C. Friendly: The countries east of the Mississippi are sympathetic to the U.S. and have granted the U.S. overflight rights and a few staging

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facilities. These facilities are in sufficiently remote areas to allow short-term use without drawing undue attention.

6. Intelligence:

A. Strategic Setting: Joint Training Exercise STORM CLOUD will be held utilizing the following: Hurlburt Field, Fla; Ft. Bragg, N.C.; Ft. Campbell, Ky.; Edwards AFB, Ca.; Indian Springs Aux., Nev.; Desert Rock Aux., Nev.; and Nevada Test Site. This is a JCS coordinated, JTD sponsored exercise. The setting is a representation of world-wide capabilities in a hostile environment.

B. Setting Countries: In the exercise strategic setting, country Calivada is surrounded by countries inimical to its own as well as to U.S. interests. In the region there are friendly countries which will allow U.S. forces use of their territories as landing/staging sites, as long as the influx of forces are kept as inconspicuous as possible.

C. Political Situations: Country Calivada has long been suspicious of U.S. and European motives in the region. Despite Calivada's continuing attempts to rid the region of U.S. and European influence, it has continued to do business and purchase arms from both. Calivada is also regarded by its neighbors as being a threat to the stability of the area. Its neighbors suspect Calivada of planning to develop a nuclear capability that will allow it not only to influence U.S. actions, but to intimidate its neighbors as well. There is ample reason for this suspicion, as Calivada has had historical territorial designs on its neighbors as well as a history of irrational actions.

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
Calivada's armed forces, while inefficient by Western standards, is one of the largest and best equipped in the area. Calivada has shown itself to be extremely security conscious and has attempted to arm itself with the best and latest military equipment.

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SUBJ: EXERCISE TRADE WIND SCENARIO

1. (u) (S) THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR USE DURING EXERCISE TRADE WIND. THIS SCENARIO COVERS BACKGROUNDS.

2. (u) (S) SITUATION:

3. GENERAL: A RADICAL THIRD WORLD NATION, HATCHET, HAS FORCED DOWN AN AMERICAN AIRLINER, FLYING OVER INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, WHILE CLAIMING THAT THE AIRLINER VIOLATED HATCHET'S AIRSPACE. THE AIRLINER, A CHARTERED U.S. JET, HELD 150 PASSENGERS, 100 OF WHOM ARE U.S. CITIZENS AND 50 WHO ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS. WITHIN HOURS, ALL 50 FOREIGN NATIONALS WERE RELEASED. THE AIRCRAFT, ITS AMERICAN CREW, AND ALL U.S. CITIZENS WERE HELD.

4. HATCHET'S PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE CLAIMS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON A SPYING MISSION FOR THE U.S. AND THAT SOME OR ALL THE U.S. CITIZENS ABOARD ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SPYING.

5. HATCHET PLANS TO USE THE AIRCRAFT, ITS CREW, AND THE U.S. CITIZENS TO EXTORT VAST SUMS AND A U.S. GUARANTEE OF SUPPORT FOR ITS DISPUTED CLAIMS TO A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY'S CRITICAL ORE DEPOSITS IN AN UPCOMING U.N. COUNCIL VOTE.

6. A SEARCH HAS LOCATED THE DETAINED PASSENGERS AND CREW (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS "DETAINEES") IN A LARGE CITY WITHIN HATCHET. THE PASSENGERS ARE HELD IN A LARGE CITY PRISON, PORTHOLE. THE CREW IS BEING DETAINED AT A NEARBY POLICE FACILITY, OCTAGON. THE OBJECTIVE OF EXERCISE TRADE WIND IS TO RECOVER THE DETAINEES SAFELY.

7. THE COUNTRY OF HATCHET IS EXTREMELY HOSTILE TO THE U.S. AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WHILE HOSTILE TO BOTH THE U.S. AND HATCHET, WOULD nevertheless probably warn HATCHET of any U.S. attempt to free the detainees.

8. ALTHOUGH HATCHET'S ARMED FORCES ARE RELATIVELY INEFFICIENT, THERE ARE ADEQUATE MILITARY RESOURCES TO PRESENT AN EXTREMELY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT TO ANY U.S. RECOVERY ATTEMPT.

9. THE COUNTRIES SOUTH OF HATCHET ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE U.S. AND HAVE GRANTED THE U.S. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND A FEW STAGING FACILITIES. THESE FACILITIES, QUICK SILVER (CHURLBURT) AND SEABURN (HUNTER AAF) ARE IN SUFFICIENTLY REMOTE AREAS TO ALLOW SHORT TERM USE WITHOUT DRAWING UNDUE ATTENTION.

10. (u) (S) THIS MSG HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH JTD SECURITY, 0
JTD 112 13 16

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(- 6)
X01
R

A MSG 174
DTG 151805Z NOV 80
FM JTF/J2
TO [REDACTED] RANGERS S2/S3

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE DATA

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON LZ PEGGY IS PROVIDED FOR USE IN EVERGLADE PLANNING:

(A) THREAT ASSESSMENT - PEGGY (345839N/050481ZB)
DESCRIPTION: A 10,900 X 148 FOOT ASPHALT AIRSTRIP WITH PARALLEL TAXIWAY AND 2 LINKS. LZ IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 50 NM SW OF TEHRAN AND APPROXIMATELY 20 NM NORTH OF QOM.

(B) ON SITE THREAT AS OF 13 NOV 80 CONSISTED PROBABLY OF 12-15 PERSONNEL SINCE 7 VEHICLES, 1 FIRETRUCK (PROBABLE 4 MAN CREW) AND ONE TRUCK MOUNTED CRANE WERE OBSERVED ON THE AIRFIELD COMPLEX.

(C) ONE AND ONE HALF KM SE OF RUNWAY AND ACROSS THE HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION CAMP. ACTIVITY LEVEL HAS BEEN BASICALLY STATIC WITH APPROXIMATELY 40 VEHICLES IN AND AROUND THE CAMP AREA. THE EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES ARE THE TYPE NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH ROAD CONSTRUCTION. IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MAN ALL OF THE VEHICLES AT ONCE, THE PROBABLE THREAT WOULD RANGE UP TO 50-70 PERSONNEL COMPOSED OF EQUIPMENT OPERATORS, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND SUPERVISORS. GIVEN THE TYPE OF WORK OF THE PERSONNEL AT THE CAMP, THE ONLY ARMS TO BE ENCOUNTERED WOULD LOGICALLY BE SMALL ARMS (PROBABLY NO MACHINEGUNS OR HEAVY WEAPONS). PERSONNEL AT THE CAMP COULD REACT TO A FORCE INSERTION ON PEGGY WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION OF INCREASED ACTIVITY AT PEGGY BECAUSE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AIR ACTIVITY AT PEGGY WOULD NOT RAISE INORDINATE CURIOSITY AND WOULD PROBABLY DELAY ANY INVESTIGATION BY CAMP PERSONNEL.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

W SOUTH OF PEGGY. ANY PERSONNEL STATIONED AT THIS LOCATION PRESENT LITTLE OR NO THREAT AS A DIRECT REACTION FORCE TO ACTIVITY ON PEGGY. PERSONNEL AT THE [AMMO STORAGE DEPOT] COULD INVESTIGATE ACTIVITY ON PEGGY WITHIN 30 MINUTES.

(E) THE CLOSEST PARA-MILITARY FORCES WOULD FIRST COME FROM QGM (20 NM SOUTH OF PEGGY). THERE ARE 4 GENDARMARIE POSTS IN THE QOM CO DISTRICT. THE DISTRICTS ARE LOCATED AT [QOM 343920N/050520E, KUSHK-E NOSRAT 350700N/050540E, QOMRUD 344427N/051040E, AND TAGHARUD 344400N/050300E.] THESE 4 POSTS ARE CAPABLE OF DETECTING AND REPORTING UNUSUAL AIR ACTIVITY IN THE QOM AREA. OF THE 4 ONLY THE POST AT KUSHK-E NOSRAT IS CLOSE ENOUGH (9NM) TO QUICKLY INVESTIGATE ACTIVITY AT PEGGY. ADDITIONALLY, ONLY THE POSTS AT KUSHK-E NOSRAT AND QOM HAVE GOOD ROAD ACCESS TO PEGGY. GENDARMARIE POSTS TYPICALLY HAVE 7-10 PERSONNEL. IF IMMEDIATELY ALERTED TO A US FORCE AT PEGGY, THE KUSHK-E NOSRAT POST COULD PROBABLY INVESTIGATE WITH 3-4 PEOPLE WITHIN 15-30 (U) MINUTES.

(F) THE NUMBER OF PARAMILITARY FORCES AT QOM IS UNKNOWN. IF A REACTION FORCE OF 100-200 REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE AVAILABLE AND ABLE TO RESPOND, THE EARLIEST ARRIVAL WOULD PROBABLY BE 45 MIN TO 1 HR. 200 PERSONNEL WOULD REQUIRE 8-10 TWO AND HALF TON TYPE TRUCKS OR 4-5 BUSES FOR TRANSPORTATION. BEING PARAMILITARY, THE REV GUARDS DO NOT HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF TRUCKS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

(G) ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 13 OCT 80 SHOW [NO REGULAR ARMY UNITS] IN THE VICINITY OF PEGGY (INCLUDING QOM). REGULAR MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN TEHRAN COULD REACT TO ACTIVITY AT PEGGY WITHIN ONE AND ONE HALF TO TWO HOURS IF SUCH A FORCE WERE ON AN ALERT STATUS FOR SUCH A CONTINGENCY. MAXIMUM PROBABLE REACTION FORCE WOULD BE CO (PLUS) TO ARRIVE WITHIN 2 HOURS.

(H) GIVEN IMMEDIATE DETECTION AND ALERT NOTIFICATION OF A US FORCE AT PEGGY, IIAF COULD PLACE [REDACTED] ON PEGGY WITHIN [REDACTED] COULD REACT WITHIN [REDACTED] ORDNANCE UPLOADED COULD BE [REDACTED]

(I) (SUMMARY) BASED ON CURRENT POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SITUATION, THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND SHORTAGE OF POL FOR CIVILIAN TRAVEL IT IS REASONABLE TO POSTULATE AT LEAST 2 HRS OF OPERATION ON PEGGY BEFORE ANY MAJOR INVESTIGATION OR REACTION. THIS ASSUMES UNDETECTED ARRIVAL AT PEGGY.

REVW 15 NOV 80

BT

REF ID: A6512

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X #13

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

24 July 1980

MEMO TO: General Jones

Through: LTC PUSTAY

1. The attached memo summarizes yesterday's meeting on Snowbird Six.
2. General Vaughn's overview covered the status of training for:

~~Delta~~ 1st SOW (130's,
~~Rangers~~ C-141B's
and helos - HH-53
CH-47
UH-60

3. Vaughn's overall estimate is, that of the intelligence, he could be ready to execute in about 3 weeks.

4. In addition to the [REDACTED] mentioned in para. 3, [REDACTED] was also writing on [REDACTED] used by the guards.

5. A question was raised concerning who to notify when exploratory missions were [REDACTED]. The consensus was that Ambassador should be told, not by State, but by NSC for the President - Odom agreed.

6. If you have detailed questions, I'd be glad to debrief.

VReilly Chuck [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12/26/80

CONDUCTED ON 2/14/82

DERIVATIVE FROM JCS-MCC

DECL X DOWNLOADED BY [REDACTED]

REVIEW ON 10/10/82

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] Multifunction Switch

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

**ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!**

EYES ONLY FOR: GEN JONES

LTC RUSTAY

COL. PITTMAN

7/24

Gen Jones
This intel effort
should, in my judgment,
reas on ..

m/john

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

G

ACTION OFFICER: COL

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078 **SECURE** 2817

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

24 July 1980



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 July 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Review

On 23 July a meeting was held in SOD to review status and progress of intelligence actions and initiatives to satisfy SNOWBIRD requirements. The meeting was attended by LTG [REDACTED] Gast, MG Vaught, MG Secord, BG Odom, RADM Gureck, Messrs [REDACTED] and COL [REDACTED] Pittman, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The meeting was initiated at the request of MG Vaught, who began with a brief review of the operational capabilities that have been and are being developed to support a second rescue attempt.

C, C

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assessment states that hostages are probably being detained
at the following cities: [REDACTED]

6(v) The meeting was adjourned with a follow-on meeting
anticipated two weeks hence O/A 6 August.

G.

[REDACTED]
Colonel, USA

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TAD-~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

30 JUL 80

H - #14

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR:

G

CJCS

LTG PUSTAY

VADM HANSON

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 1233
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMC
 DECL UPGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADA
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

ACTION OFFICER:

LT. COL. USAF

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078

SECURE 2817

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

30 July 1980

~~SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status (U) (TS)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		X	X		

REMARKS

Attached memorandum forwards status of SNOWBIRD intelligence actions and requires a greater priority be assigned SNOWBIRD support.

ACTION OFFICER Lt Col. USAF J-3, [REDACTED] Ext 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J P						
	EXEC						
	TIN CINCP						
	WEDPO						
COPD							
DATE OF PREPARATION 30 Jul 80							

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~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

30 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status (TS)(U)

1^(TS) On 23 July a meeting was held at the request of MG Vaught in Special Operations Division to review status and progress of intelligence actions and initiatives to satisfy SNOWBIRD requirements. The meeting was attended by LTG Gast, MG Vaught, MG Secord, RADM Gureck of OJCS, BG Odom (NSC Staff), Messrs. [REDACTED] and COL's Pittman, [REDACTED]

2^(TS) [REDACTED]

3^(TS) [REDACTED]

4^(TS) [REDACTED]

5^(TS) [REDACTED]

B,C [REDACTED]


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Classified By: COMJTF
Declassified ON: OADR

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B, C
C
7(b) Accepting the combination of these two assessments, the SNOWBIRD staff has prepared a generic list of intelligence and mission support requirements and an implementation schedule. The support schedule which is outlined on the next page would require [redacted] if conducted sequentially. Time could be saved if some actions were accomplished in an overlap fashion. However, practically speaking [redacted] will be required to establish the necessary structure, unless forceful measures are taken to upgrade the priority accorded this project [redacted]

7(b) Recommend priority of intelligence support to SNOWBIRD be addressed at senior levels of DOD [redacted]


JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

1 - Intelligence Requirements
2 - General Support Schedule

7/30/80

The Operations Director and I note this information and believe the military should be pursued. They also support the recommendation of Paragraph 7.

Thor Hansen
VADM, USN

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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

(v) 1. The following generic description applies to all targets: two-three story masonry building within a walled compound; located in a suburban environment approximately 30 minutes helicopter flight time from an adequate fixed wing offset insertion site; and 30 minutes driving time (or 12 minutes helicopter flight time) from the nearest potential fixed wing extraction site.

(v) 2. The following intelligence and mission support requirements apply to all target locations:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

h. [REDACTED]

Attachment 1

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 15

Item Number:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

O DIA X COMINT REC'D BY [REDACTED] SICU

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] MULTIPLE SMC

SUBJECT: Overland Insertion/Movement - Characteristics of Iranian Convoys

TIMEFRAME: October 1980

SUMMARY:

(u) As an outgrowth of information being sought on Iranian Field/Tarifque Uniforms for use by US Forces in

information was obtained about Iranian characteristics

A JTF/J-2 source provided detailed but dated information. See Attachments 1 through 3.

COMMENT:

(u) While information is available on high-profile countries (i.e., Korea, the Soviet Union), the lack of simple data on basic operating military procedures of most countries' military forces can be a significant hindrance should an insertion be proposed that will use as a

RECOMMENDATION:

(u) An intelligence agency should be tasked to maintain information on foreign country basic military operating characteristics (i.e., convoy movement, military air traffic flight characteristics) that might be simulated by a US force being inserted to carry out special operations.

CLASSIFIED BY COMINT
DECLASSIFIED ON OADR

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OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

1, G J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Captain [REDACTED], USMC, MAJ [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ATTACHMENTS:

1. JTF, J-2 source report
2. Memorandum for Record, 14 October 1980
3. Memorandum for Record, 22 October 1980

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12Z 20

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92DERIVATIVE OF BY DDON MC DDCI DODR ELEVATED TO SECRETREVIEW OF Item Number: CADRSERIALIZED FROM Multicell AnnexH-10
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Movement ConceptsTIMEFRAME: November 1979 - April 1980SUMMARY:

1. In November 1979, COMJTF directed that alternative [REDACTED] options be developed for movement of assault forces from air insertion point to targets in Tehran.

2. JTF obtained three personnel to conduct research and analysis of this subject. Two of these personnel had previously served in Iran and were familiar with the Tehran environment and types of vehicles normally seen in-country.

3. Planners were required to develop options that would meet most or all of following requirements:

~~vehicles that are~~

~~a. C-130/C-141 transportable or available for acquisition in Iran prior to arrival of SFOD-D.~~

~~b. Movement of entire assault force with equipment from LZ to targets in one lift.~~

~~c.~~

~~d.~~

without arousing suspicion.

~~e.~~

without arousing guard suspicion.

~~f.~~

~~g. Assault force can rapidly~~

CLASSIFIED BY COMJTF
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

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4. (b) To support this planning, detailed information relating to the following subjects was required:

- (b) [REDACTED]
- (b) [REDACTED]
- (c) [REDACTED]
- (d) [REDACTED]
- (e) [REDACTED]
- (f) [REDACTED]
- (g) [REDACTED]
- (h) [REDACTED]
- (i) [REDACTED]
- (j) [REDACTED]

5. (b) Following general types of [REDACTED] were considered:

- (a) [REDACTED] and armored personnel carriers.
- (b) [REDACTED]
- (c) [REDACTED]
- (d) [REDACTED]
- (e) [REDACTED]
- (f) [REDACTED]
- (g) [REDACTED]
- (h) [REDACTED]
- (i) [REDACTED]

6. (b) Initially, [REDACTED] appeared to offer optimum solution. Over time, however, [REDACTED] militated against their use.

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7. (S) Ultimately, COMJTF [REDACTED]
acquired in advance in Iran.

A
COMMENTS: (S) When considering options requiring [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] materiel, it is essential that personnel with
first-hand experience in the target country be included in
the planning. No amount of photos and narrative reports can
replace their personal experiences and recollections.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

G
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [REDACTED] (USA), ODCSOPS, DA
[REDACTED] (USA), HQ, TRADOC,
Ft. Monroe, VA
[REDACTED] (USAF), AFOSI
District 17, Kirtland AFB, NM

Attachment:

1. Personal Observations by JTF member of driving conditions
in Tehran (S)(U)

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OPERATIONS PLAN - PROPOSED PRIMARY TEHRAN CITY INGRESS TO

y
~~(FB)~~(U) OBJECTIVE AREA

I. OBJECTIVE: To transport Delta strike force from helicopter laager zone (HLZ) to the AMEMB, Tehran (objective area). The success of this mission objective depends upon a number of tangible and intangible occurrences or restrictions that if not considered and contingencies developed could adversely effect the timing and completion of the mission. Preparation to meet the tangibles and work the intangibles is largely dependent upon a fundamental knowledge of the enemy -- in this case, the city and people of Tehran.

(u)
~~(FB)~~ II. BACKGROUND: Tehran is an old, if not an ancient, city. And only in recent years (from the early 1900s) has swelled to its modern-day size and congestion. As late as the 1920s, Tehran was centered around REY, the railroad station and north on Pahlavi to the old palace (approximately 5 KM north of the railroad station). When land for the present USEMB compound was acquired and the compound built, it was a source for jokes by Iranians: "The dummy Americans have built far out of town in the middle of a barren field." Since that time, Tehran has virtually mushroomed - primarily north and west, until the embassy is now considered in the "down town" area, surrounded by a maze of alley ways and congested streets laid out in an unplanned hodge-podge pattern that defies description and is totally alien to the western driver accustomed to reasonable degrees of traffic.

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flow and organization. The secret to movement in Tehran is familiarity with the street patterns and thorough trip planning, regardless of the distance or direction involved. Inattentive "Sunday cruising" can lead to disastrous results: traffic jams and impromptu restrictions or bottle necks that can take hours to unsnarl. This ops plan, or concept for operations will address the trip planning portion of the equation; develop contingencies for the unexpected and provide for timing adjustment requirements or alternatives. The second portion of the equation must be completed by the selected drivers and monitors who must be intimately familiar with the routes, contingencies and alternatives.

SITUATION: Beyond the inherent complexities of movement in Tehran, we must assume that changes have taken place since the revolution a year ago. The types of changes and resulting effects are wide-ranging; some are discussed below.

(v) a) Lack of driver discipline: ~~Driver self-discipline, enforced or otherwise has never been big in Tehran,~~ and to the casual western trained/experienced driver probably never seemed to exist at all. Rather than by discipline or law-abiding means, ~~traffic flow is maintained through very subtle yet understood courtesies that have evolved from the Iranian's intellect, religion and traditions.~~ He is bound by Islam to help his neighbors (fellow drivers) and treat them with respect; he is traditionally easy-going, friendly and courteous. The intellect that tips the scales

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in the other direction is one of status, or his image as he perceives his peers to see him. The class distinctions that exist in all other facets of Iranian life disappear when he gets behind the wheel of a motor vehicle. His status or worth from that point on rests on his driving proficiency and how well he demands and gets the position he perceives is - or should be - his. If he is too far back in line he makes another. If traffic is moving too slowly, he feels justified in using the opposing side. If he wants to make a turn from the wrong lane, he will do it. ~~The fact that he stops traffic, causes jams and bottlenecks is not important; if his status is what he believes it is, all of the above can be executed arbitrarily simply by holding out one's hand, blinking the driving lights or blowing the horn.~~ It is this part of the Iranian intellect that makes Tehran the most dangerous city in the world to drive in, ~~it is impossible to drive in~~ ~~this type of vehicle without provoking at least one confrontation~~ ~~any type of driver that respects the rules of the road~~ ~~or safety~~ In the wake of the revolution with resulting decreased traffic enforcement and control of the populous, ~~this type of driver is in all probability more prevalent today and~~ more willing to take even greater risks in his quest for status or position.

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b. Changes in population density and location within the city.

With the revolutionary promise to institute the rights of the people and to allow all to share in the good things, the restrictions imposed against the masses, the poor and the uneducated have been lifted, allowing all to actively seek "higher ground," by whatever means at their disposal. In Tehran, this literally means moving to higher ground in the northern parts of the city -- if not for housing and life-style; at least for vocation. ~~It can be assumed that a large percentage of the poor people usually restricted to the squalor and congestion of the extreme southern parts of the city have, or are in the process of moving northward throughout the city.~~ That means that ~~street vendors, hawkers, beggars, children, shacks and small crowds should be expected to be present throughout the city at any time, day or night.~~ At each slowing down or stopping point drivers and monitors ~~should be prepared to deal with the beggars, vendors and children that will approach and possibly reach into the vehicle.~~ The amount of people involved could be as high as 5-6 but more likely 1-2. Discretion must be used in the handling of these situations. ~~Too much generosity only invites more of the same while to totally ignore their presence may invite a small confrontation. A wave of the left hand to indicate "go!" or "buro!" should serve to keep the beggars from moving. Such actions must be done~~

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almost impassively -- yet not without some degree of sternness
with courtesy.

(b) Presence of armed militia or "Khomiteh" personnel on the streets. Never in the history of the monarchy has the population been allowed to hold or maintain arms; the initial hours and days of the revolution changed that forever. Calls from the most respected government and religious leaders has resulted in minimum reaction by the people to turn in the arms they have stolen, confiscated or acquired from governmental or military agencies. ~~To have possession of a gun in Iran today is a significant status or position symbol.~~ For those previously in the lower and lower middle classes it is a symbol of great value whose authority and potential must be kept visual at all times. Possession of a weapon is the most important consideration towards becoming a member of a Khomiteh and an active part of the "new" ruling class. This extremely difficult step upwards by the uneducated masses can be easily transcended by using personal possession of a weapon as the status raising vehicle. With the possible exception of the upper and middle classes, proliferation of weapons of all types is wide spread throughout the country and is most dense within Tehran. Most gun-toters encountered will exude some authority - perceived or real - and will use it as an aid to traffic direction by an untrained teenager

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to using it to guard hostages by a highly trained, perhaps radical special forces soldier. In any case confrontation with a weapon-bearing person should never be taken lightly -- nor immediately assumed to be a combat situation. The middle ground should be one of preparedness, not of reactivity. Iranians are not barbaric killers, further they (with the exception of the military) are not trained in the proper use of firearms. ~~he will approach the situation casually with~~
~~the opportunity to do so, he may even change upward~~
~~firearm~~
~~not~~
~~questions and continue his~~
~~especially~~
~~ever he has lived without quarreling with real or perceived~~
~~injury to himself or others~~
~~he will initially~~
~~likely to do so in a non-threatening way of a hand or~~
~~complaints~~ If not, he may not know what to do, but rather than back down he may decide to employ his firearm - which could lead to a very untenable situation.

~~With the exception of a life threatening emergency~~ Do not (unless in extreme emergency) try to "run" a guard post or

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checkpoint. Trained or not, he has been assigned a duty which he takes seriously; if you try to ignore him and "run" his post he in all likelihood may take a shot at you.

(v) d) City layout and street patterns. Possibly the one thing in respect to movement within Tehran that has not changed significantly since the revolution is the street patterns and overall city layout in terms of traffic flow. Tehran is situated on the foothill slopes of the Alborz Mountains; a key direction finding rule to keep in mind is: If you are going uphill, you are proceeding north; downhill - south; level - either east or west. Street layout and city pattern - especially in the older areas - is dictated by water flow (surface or sub-surface) off of the mountain slopes and down through Tehran. People in this area for centuries have settled and built along the primary water routes. Even the man-made "jubes" or water troughs that came later did not significantly alter this clustering/building process. Because the water flows from the north to the south, this became the primary axis for settlement and movement. It remains so today; the main arteries through the city run in a north-south direction and with minimum exceptions east-west movement is difficult, time consuming and only accomplished through a thorough knowledge of the twisting, narrow alleyways and streets that link the main north-south thoroughfares together.

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Any travel in the city must evolve on the north-south axis with planning to take advantage of the very few east-west routes wherever possible. In almost every instance, traffic jams, bottlenecks and problems will occur far more frequently on east-west streets vice north-south, caused primarily because of higher levels of traffic or fewer streets. The "jubes" referred to earlier are an ever present danger to the Tehran motorist; they exist along virtually every street and alleyway in the city. The jubes are usually 1-2 feet wide and about the same 1-2 feet in depth. They will usually - but not always - have rapidly flowing water in them. For the most part they are uncovered, unmarked and unprotected by even the slightest curbing. To drive into one of them, even with just one wheel will instantly immobilize the vehicle - regardless of type. Only by enlisting considerable help or through a time-consuming jacking process will the vehicle be able to continue on. Lack of attention to the jubes can result in stopping the operation, instant traffic jam,

(v) crowds and infinitely more visibility than is desired.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Given the above discussed ever-present tangibles and intangibles this proposed concept of operations is based upon entry to the city from the southeast quadrant, proceeding northward to a laager point situated close to a suitable east-west axis, with the final operation planned from the north directly south to the USEMB. This concept of routing is developed from consideration for the fundamental restrictions to movement in

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Tehran rather than most direct route. The street names used in this description may have been changed since the revolution; drivers and monitors must not depend on street signs, but must know the route instinctively.

~~SECRET~~ Phase I: Entry into city to laager point/area.

Ingress to the city from the HLZ on the Semnan highway should be uneventful. As the outskirts are penetrated, a [REDACTED] will have to be passed; there should be no activity or guards in this area. As the first major intersection (Bozorgrah - E and Shahbanu Farah (Queen Farah)) is approached, care should be exercised to insure this intersection is not missed. The other two choices available here will lead the vehicles directly into the most congested, hostile portions of the city, from which reversal or retreat would be difficult. As the vehicles proceed north on Shahbanu Farah, they should not encounter any traffic or road difficulties; it is a six lane divided highway. At one point the vehicles will pass by a major Iranian Air Force depot and family housing area. There are approximately three (3) security gates off the highway associated with this installation. Again, the vehicles (if not in convoy) should not raise any interest of the gate guards nor should there be any stop and check points along this highway. Proceeding north to the next intersection (Khibau-E Si Metrey and Niruy - E Pahlavi) the vehicles will have to negotiate

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a traffic circle, it should not present any problem and the objective is to proceed out of the circle almost exactly opposite the entry point. This is the first major intersection into the city proper and the potential of Khomiteh presence or a possible check point here should be considered good. Khiban-E Si Metrig is a four-lane, divided street with parking on both sides. At times this street can become quite congested and difficult to negotiate. With patience and forethought, there should be no significant problems as you approach Damavand. After passing Doshen Tappeh airfield (which may not be noticed as only occasional glimpses of the tall brick fence can be gotten) the drivers should be able to determine the "T" intersection with Damavand. At this point they need to work into the right-turn lane. Here we begin heads-up driving and here is where the vehicles will begin to get separated if they are attempting to stay together. At the intersection, when the proper signal light indicates right turn, the vehicles must negotiate a right on Damavand and then immediately into the left lane for a left turn (with traffic light) less than 100 yards after entering Damavand. This can sometimes be difficult as the bulk of the traffic wants to continue east on Damavand. Damavand is four lane with a divider and the turn onto Khiaban-E Shahrdari can only be accomplished at the intersection. Once into Khiban-E Shahradari and proceeding north the biggest problem is space.

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The street is not wide but can accommodate the northbound one-way traffic plus parking) on both sides without difficulty; the hang-up occurs when someone double-parks (almost always) or tries to oppose traffic (seldom). Again with patience and foresight the difficulties should not be serious. At the first traffic light since leaving Damavand, Khiaban-E Shahrdari jogs slightly to the left and continues northward. This jog can sometimes become a transient bottleneck, but usually clears fast as it represents the direction most of the traffic wants to go. After passing another traffic light and approaching 45 Metre Road be aware of the Mosk and middle school along the left-hand side of the street. In the past Americans have encountered many stone/brick throwing incidents in this area. There is not expected to be any activity in the area today, but be advised the revolutionary spirit is high here. As Forty-Five Metre Road is approached, the vehicles must merge with traffic traveling almost parallel and converging from the left. The vehicles must then jockey into the left lanes through paralleling traffic to prepare for a left turn around the traffic circle immediately ahead and onto 45-Meter Road. At this point let's retrace for contingencies off the roads we have covered. The choices for alternate routes from Kaiban Si Metrig-E Pahdavi to Damavand are slim and must be assessed

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from block to block by the drivers and monitors. Heads-up driving and proper attention should allow them at least one block to decide on evasive measures around roadblocks, traffic jams, etc. Once past Damavand and on the first section of Khiaban-E Shahrdari the choices are less; the best course of action along this street is to stay in the traffic on the street and work or bluff your way through. In the second section of Khiaban-E Shahradari (after the jog) the choices are good; primarily to the right to intercept a paralleling street then on to 45-Meter Road. Once on 45-Meter Road you must stay on it until the first major intersection with a traffic light. This is Ruz-E-Madar which goes north to the proposed laager site. Take a right on Ruz-E-Madar, proceed north approximately 2-3 KM through the built-up area, past the small park in the center of the road to the left-then-right jog that leads to the crest of hill 1444 and the proposed laager site. This laager site was chosen because it is relatively isolated, the activity is low-primary with entrepreneurs working in the open in the body and fender business. Miscellaneous vehicles parked in the open areas or along the roads and common here and our vehicles should be able to laager with minimum attention or questions. Also this laager area provides two egress routes: One to the north then west to Sultanatabad and then south to Kurish-E Kabir; the second is to the south on Ruz-E-Madar

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to 45-Meter Road, west to Kurush-E-Kabir then south to the objective.

PHASE II:

(U) b. Once the operation is executed and the vehicles are ordered out of the laager area, timing becomes critical and all vehicles must stay within sight of one another. At this point the culmination of the operation is only minutes away and arrival at the objective should be timed to accommodate vehicle arrival no more than 1-2 minutes apart. It is the responsibility of the lead and trail vehicles to insure that timing and spacing remain as intact as possible while approaching the objective. Timing, spacing and arrival of Delta at the objective during this phase is critical; to the point of aborting execution until forces can be re-mustered. Two pre-planned muster points between laager and objective will be covered below. When departing the laager area to the south (primary) the vehicles should time their departures 10-15 seconds apart; this will allow some spacing but retain visual contact. Vehicles will proceed south on Ruz-E-Madar to 45-Meter Road. The only alternative is a paralleling road approximately 3 blocks or 1/2 KM to the right. NOTE: vehicles must come off the hill, south to the built-up area before they can turn right to intercept the paralleling alternate. From Ruz-E-Madar turn right on 45-Meter road, staying in

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right lanes. There is no viable alternate to 45-Meter Road for this portion of ingress. Proceed west on 45-Meter Road to the Kurush-E-Kabir overpass; remain in right lanes to go along side the up ramp to the overpass. This single lane street will lead directly to Kurush-E-Kabir (traffic light under overpass). Turn left directly onto Kurush-E-Kabir and proceed south. The lead vehicle will slow after making turn and account for trailing vehicles as they make their turns onto Kurush-E-Kabir. This timing/muster point is important enough to ignore traffic lights to maintain spacing and timing. If by some chance the spacing breaks up here, the lead vehicle will slow further or stop until all following vehicles are accounted for and are in spaced trail. Do not anticipate any difficulties negotiating the turn off 45-meter to Kurol-E-Kabir, traffic should be the only problem of any significance, and it flows well under the overpass. The route down Kurush-E-Kabir should be uneventful, but traffic and traffic lights could separate the force again. Prior to getting to Tahte-Jamshir, the lead dirver will again slow down and stop if necessary to muster the convoy spacing prior to making his right turn onto Tahte-Jamshid. Once the lead vehicle has accounted for the trail vehicles, he will make his right turn onto Tahte-Jamshid and proceed directly to the objective as briefed by Delta. The force and mission, as far as the

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drivers are concerned, is committed once on Tahte-Jamshid.

From here every effort must be made to insure Delta arrives at the prescribed place at the prescribed time.

The alternative ingress route should Kurush-E-Kabir be unusable is Sohreverdi, a major south-bound six lane street that roughly parallels Kurush-E-Kabir to Bandar-E-Shinaz approximately 10 blocks north of Tahte-Jamshid.

At Bandar-E-Shiraz the alternate again joins Kurush-E-Kabir. Access to Sohreverdi should be made at the Kurush-E-Kabir, 45-Meter road overpass. After turning left off 45-Meter Road, the vehicles pass under the overpass then turn right to parallel the south side of the overpass for one block to intercept Sohreverdi. Accounting, re-muster and spacing procedures will be made by the lead vehicle immediately after turning south on Sohreverdi. Sohreverdi is one way and traffic travels fast on it; there should be no difficulties encountered on this street. It "Ts" with Bandar-E-Shiraz where the vehicles will turn left on Shiraz then 3 blocks later turn right on Kurush-E-Kabir to pick up primary routing and procedures to the objective.

c. Alternate Routes: This section being developed.

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MSG 193

O 010115Z FEB 83
FM: ~~DELTA~~/INTEL
TO: JTF//J2//
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRIVER ROUTES/LAAGER SITES

REF: TEHRAN & VICINITY (4 SHEET), SERIES K951, ED. 3, DMA.

1. PROPOSED ROUTE/LAAGER SITE ONE(1): FOLLOW POSSIBLE KLZ ROAD TO THE INTERSECTION AT BOZORGRAH-E SHAHSANU FARAH AND TAKE A RIGHT; PROCEED NORTH TO THE INTERSECTION OF BOZORGRAH-E SHAHSANU FARAH AND KHIBAN-E SI METRIY-E NIRUY-E PAHLAVI (APPROX 4 MILES); NEGOTIATE THE INTERSECTION AND PROCEED NORTH ON KHIBAN-E SI METRIY-E PAHLAVI APPROX 1 1/2 MILES TO THE DAMAVAND ROAD (NOTE: SI METRIY CHANGES INTO KHIABAN-E

VOSUQ AT THE NORTHEAST EDGE OF DOSHAN TAPPEH AIRFIELD); CROSS THE DAMAVAND ROAD ONTO KHIABAN-E SHAHRDARI AND PROCEED NORTH FOR APPROX 1 1/2 MILES TO KHIABAN-E SEPAHIBOD FARSYU ROAD; TAKE A LEFT ONTO KHIABAN-E SEFAHIEAD FARSHYU AND PROCEED WEST ABOUT 1/2 MILE; THIS ROAD NOW CHANGES TO THE 45 METER ROAD; PROCEED APPROX 1.3 MILES AND EXIT NORTH ON RUZ-E MADAR STREET; FOLLOW RUZ-E MADAR NORTH/NORTHEAST TO THE BODY AND FENDER SHOPS LOCATED NEAR HILL 1444 IN GRID SQUARE WV 435582; THIS IS LAAGER SITE 1. THERE IS TWO/THREE PLACES ALONGSIDE THE ROAD TO PARK AND LOITER. PROCEED ON TO THE EMBASSY BY REVERSING THE ROUTE & FOLLOWING RUZ-E MADAR SOUTH TO A5 METER ROAD AND TAKING A RIGHT AND FOLLOWING 45 METER ROAD ABOUT 1.1 MILES TO KHIABAN-E KUROSH-E KAEIR ROAD; EXIT ONTO KHIABAN-E KUROSH-E KABIR ROAD AND PROCEED SOUTH ABOUT 2 1/2 MILES TO TAKHT-E JAMSHID; TAKING A RIGHT ONTO TAKHT-E JAMSHID AND PROCEEDING WEST ABOUT 1/2 MILE WILL PUT YOU AT THE INTERSECTION OF ROOSEVELT AND TAKHT-E JAMSHID.

ANOTHER ROUTE FROM LAAGER SITE #1: PROCEED NORTHWEST FROM HILL 1444 TO KHIABAN-E SALTANATABAD ROAD (ABOUT 1.3 MILES); TAKE A LEFT ON KHIABAN-E SALTANATABAD ROAD AND DRIVE SOUTH ABOUT 1.7 MILES TO KHIABAN-E KUROSH-E KABIR ROAD; TURN ONTO KHIABAN-E KUROSH-E KABIR ROAD AND DRIVE SOUTH ABOUT 3.2 MILES TO TAKHT-E JAMSHID; AGAIN, TAKING A RIGHT ONTO TAKHT-E JAMSHID AND PROCEEDING WEST ABOUT 1/2 MILE WILL PUT YOU AT THE INTERSECTION OF ROOSEVELT AND TAKHT-E JAMSHID.

2. POSSIBLE LAAGER SITE TWO(2): TURN RIGHT AND GO N.E. TO THE DAMAVAND ROAD AS DESCRIBED ON PROPOSED ROUTE #1; TURN RIGHT ONTO DAMAVAND ROAD AND PROCEED NORTHEAST ABOUT 2.5 MILES TO THE INTERSECTION OF DAMAVAND & 45 METER ROAD EXTENSION (WV 4653); ANYWHERE ALONG THIS AREA NEAR THE CAR AND TRUCK ASSEMBLY PLANT COULD BE USED AS LAAGER SITE #2. TO PROCEED TO THE EMBASSY FOLLOW DAMAVAND ROAD TO DAMAVAND CIRCLE (ABOUT 5.1 MILES); THE DAMAVAND CIRCLE SHOULD BE CIRCLED BY TRUCKS AS THE TUNNEL IS NOT HIGH ENOUGH FOR LARGE TRUCKS; COME OUT OF THE CIRCLE AND ONTO KHIAEAN-E SHAMPEZA STREET; PROCEED WEST ABOUT 1.1 MILES TO FAHAR STREET; TURN RIGHT ONTO BAHAR STREET AND GO NORTH ABOUT 1/2 MILE TO THE STADIUM COMPLEX (EAST SIDE OF STADIUM).

3. PROPOSED DIRECT ROUTES TO EMBASSY: SIMPLY BYPASS THE LAAGER SITES. FOLLOW PROPOSED ROUTE FROM PLZ (KHIAEAN-E MALAYERI ROAD) CROSSING BOZORGRAH-E SHAHEMANU FARAH ROAD (FROM HERE TO SHAHZAD ROAD IS ABOUT 3 MILES); TURN RIGHT ONTO SHAHZAD ROAD AND PROCEED NORTH TO DAMAVAND CIRCLE (ABOUT 2 1/2 MILES); NEGOTIATE THE CIRCLE AND PROCEED WEST ON KHIAEAN-E SHAHZADA STREET FOR 1.1 MILES TO BAHAR STREET; TURN RIGHT ONTO BAHAR AND DRIVE NORTH ABOUT 1/2 MILE TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE STADIUM.

NOTE: THIS IS NOT A FAVORITE ROUTE; ONLY A PROPOSED SECONDARY.

4. POSSIBLE LAAGER SITE THREE(3): CENTER OF AREA IS WV 3856. THIS IS ALL OPEN AREA. NOT ENOUGH ROADS IN AND OUT. COULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT. FROM HERE FOLLOW SHAHANSHEH EXPRESSWAY TO EMBASSY (ABOUT 3.1 MILES TO CORNER OF ROOSEVELT AND NE WALL OF EMBASSY).

NOTE: POSSIBLE GOOD ROUTE FROM 45 METER EXPRESSWAY TO EMBASSY BUT LAAGER SITE IS NOT A FAVORITE.

RW 01 FEB 80

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A Delta Rec'd 15th

MSG 194 FEB
C 0216Z JAN 30
FM DELTA INTELL
TO JTF/ZI-2
INFO
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SUEJ: ADDITIONAL EEI (U)

A. REFERENCE: TEHRAN AND VICINITY, DMA, SERIES K951, ED 3, SHEETS 1-4.

1. REQUEST INFORMATION/PHOTOS ON THE AREAS WV 4441, WV 4540, AND WV 4541. NONE OF THE DRIVERS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THIS AREA BUT THEY THINK THE AREA SHOULD BE EXAMINED AS A POSSIBLE LAAGER SITE FOR DRIVERS.
2. (S) WHAT ARE THE NEW NAMES OF MAIN STREETS IN TEHRAN NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY? TAKHTE-JAMSHID = TALEGHANIE ROOSEVELT = MOBAREZAN
3. DAMAVAND AND SHAHREZA CIRCLE: NEED THE HEIGHT AND WIDTH OF THE TUNNEL; CLEARANCE AROUND THE TUNNEL (CIRCLE TRAFFIC).
4. THE DENSITIES AND ROADBLOCKS/CHECKPOINTS BETWEEN 0030-0200 HOURS FROM THE INTERSECTION OF SHAHANSHahi EXPRESSWAY AND KAPIM KHAN ZADE TO ROOSEVELT STREET NEAR THE EMBASSY.
5. SPECIFICS ON EXIT/ENTRANCE PROCEDURES AT SHAHANSHahi EXPRESSWAY AND 45 METER ROAD. DRIVERS THINK YOU CAN ONLY EXIT 45 METER ROAD NORTH ON SHAHANSHahi.
6. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING DATA ON NAMJU STREET (NORTH OF STADIUM) AND EAHAR STREET (EAST OF STADIUM):
 - A. TRAFFIC DENSITY
 - B. ROADBLOCKS
 - C. DIRECTION(S) OF TRAFFIC
 - D. STREET LIGHTING
 - E. WILL IT ACCOMODATE LARGE TRUCKS WITH CARS PARKED ON CURBS.
 - F. INTERSECTION OF ROOSEVELT AND NAMJU STREETS.
7. (S) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN THE OF THE COMPOUND? DROPPED (OPSEC)
RVW 2 JAN 80

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~~SECRET~~
Truck route

+ E+E MAP

MSG452
041717Z FEB 80

FM JTF/J2
TO SFOD/S2

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

REFS: A. DELTA MSG 191/DIG 291330Z JAN SUBJ: E&E MAPPING
B. DELTA MSG 193/DIG 012115Z JAN SUBJ: DRIVER ROUTES
C. DELTA MSG 194/DIG 021600Z FEB SUBJ: ADDITIONAL E&I

1. REF 191/NEW E&E PRODUCTS ARE BEING PRODUCED BY DMA. THE FIRST, A COLOR PLASTIC LITHO OF IRAN ROAD MAP HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND WILL BE FORWARDED AT NEXT AVAILABLE COURIER. THE SECOND WILL BE A SIMILAR PRODUCT OF THE BEST TEHRAN CITY PLAN AND THE THIRD WILL BE A COMPOSITE JOG OF THE TEHRAN/SEMNAH AREA.

2. REF 193/PROPOSED DRIVER ROUTE DATA [REDACTED] PER AGREEMENT SFOD/S2 AND JTF/J2 PENDING RESULTS OF ONGOING SURVEY EFFORTS.
3. REF 194/PHOTO REQUESTED IN PARA ONE HAVE BEEN ORDERED AND WILL BE FORWARDED IN TUESDAY'S COURIER. OTHER E&I HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED ALONG WITH ROUTE DATA FROM MSG 193 INFO [REDACTED] MESSAGE BEING HELD PENDING RESULTS OF ONGOING SURVEY.

4. EFFORT TO OBTAIN [REDACTED] TERMINATED WITH PRINCIPAL SOURCE DUE TO OPSEC CONCERN. SFOD/S2 WAS BRIEFED ON DETAILS.

5. CONTACT CPT [REDACTED] ON 05 FEB TO OBTAIN DETAILS ON TUESDAY COURIER FLIGHT. OIA WILL HAVE MATERIAL. LT COL [REDACTED] WILL WILL BE COURIER AND NEED TO MEET WITH "TRUCK" PERSONNEL AT AIR TERMINAL TO SELECT APPROPRIATE CITY PLAN FOR DMA PRODUCTION.
RVW 04FEB80

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[REDACTED]

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LRRF

MSG 191

O 291330Z JAN 80
FM CDR/DELTA 1
TO JTF/J2/J3
INFO [REDACTED]
BT

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SUBJ: E&E MAPPING (U)

(U) 1. (S) E&E MAPPING SUPPORT REQUESTED AND DELIVERED IN NOV 79 IS PRESENTLY INADEQUATE. PAPER MAPS WERE OBTAINED THEN BECAUSE OF THE NONAVAILABILITY OF EVASION CHARTS AND THE IMMINENT NATURE OF THE OPERATION.

(U) 2. (S) WITH MORE TIME AVAILABLE, REQUEST THAT PLASTICIZED EVASION CHARTS IN A SCALE OF 1:500,000 OR 1:1,000,000 NOW BE OBTAINED. SUCH A PRODUCT WILL BE PLACED INSIDE AN E&E KIT, WOULD ENABLE EVADERS TO LAND NAVIGATE, AND WOULD BE MORE DURABLE THAN MAPPING PRESENTLY ON HAND.

RW 29 JAN 00

BT

NNNN



REF ID: A65117
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

H - #17
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256

9 December 1980

CONDUCTED ON 22 Apr 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO/NMC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO Acut

REVIEW ON CADe

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Minutes of 9 December Intell Review Meeting

A [REDACTED] C 1. (TS) At 1000 on 9 December 80, MG Vaught convened the 5th meeting of the representatives from NSC, [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] OJCS, JTF/J2, JTF/[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] J2 to review the status of SNOWBIRD intelligence actions. Copy of agenda and annotated list of attendees is attached. (Atch #1)

A [REDACTED] 2. (TS) MG Vaught began meeting by briefly reviewing [REDACTED] transition actions indicating an operational change of command is scheduled to take place effective O/A 15 Dec 80, however the requirement to continue an active and aggressive intelligence effort is essential as the mission has not changed.

A [REDACTED] C 3. (TS) Discussions followed the proposed agenda and are summarized below:

C a. General consensus was that some, possibly all hostages,

C [REDACTED] that only the Embassy and MFA are fully accepted detention sites with two other unknown locations in Tehran also being possible detention sites. [REDACTED]

C b. The group did not view the situation as terminating in the near future, although the possibility of a partial release was recognized. [REDACTED] stated negotiations were proceeding and some positive indications had been noted. The group discussed several long term possibilities, none of which had an optimistic cast.

A,C c. Regarding the Technical Program, [REDACTED] was advised of 8 December [REDACTED] message requesting DOS be approached again on the [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 9 DECEMBER 2000

TOP SECRET


~~SECRET~~

~~(1)~~
~~(2)~~
~~(3)~~
~~(4)~~
A, G, C
f. [REDACTED] msg passed to [REDACTED]
will reply.)

A, G, C
g. [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] personnel. Col [REDACTED] stated efforts underway
to upgrade individual viability.

LTC, USAF

~~C~~
* Radio's } Sea/overland/Convoled [30 - Min]
(5) * [REDACTED]
*
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

9 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTENDEES

Subject: Intelligence Review Meeting, 9 December 1980

1. (U) ~~PST~~ Comments by various Iranian leaders and the contents of several intelligence reports lead this office to believe that many, if not all of the hostages will be held into 1981. Aggressive intelligence collection activities must be mounted in order to obtain current, accurate data on the hostages and to develop an adequate in-country support base. This meeting will continue to address these areas.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Agenda:

- a. Assessment of hostage locations
- b. 60-90 day situation outlook
- c. Technical program review
- d. In-country reconnaissance
- e. In-country support structure
- f. ~~(TS)~~ personnel

3. ~~(TS)~~ Tentative list of attendees:

BG ODOM
LTG GAST
MC BROWN/LTC
COL PITTMAN

NSC
J3, OJCS
DIA
OJCS

MG VAUGHT
MG SECORD

JTF
JTF

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
DECLASSIFY ON 9 DECEMBER 2000

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1501 441

G
[REDACTED]
BC
LTC
MR
COL [REDACTED] / COM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 10 [REDACTED]
JTF
JTF
JTF [REDACTED]

G [REDACTED]
LtCol. USAF
VA [REDACTED]

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JTF
DEP
ES
J3
JR RD

H - 8.18
THE JOINT STAFF

4 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Executive Level Intelligence Review Meeting,
3 September 1980

1. The 2nd Executive Level SNOWBIRD Intelligence Review meeting was held at 1100/3 Sep 80/in OJCS/SOD spaces suite 2C840. Attendees included:

C [REDACTED]

- DIA - Col OZ60 for MG Brown
- CJCS - Col Pittman for LtGen Pustay
- NSC - BG Odom
- USA/ACSI - MG Thompson
- MG Vaught, MG Secord, [REDACTED]

A, G [REDACTED] LTG Cast 90%

2. The proposed agenda as outlined below was the basis for discussions:

G [REDACTED]

- Introductory remark - MG Vaught
- Situation Update - LTCOL [REDACTED]
- In-country Support
- Source Recruitment
- Technical Collection Policy
- DOD HUMINT Program
- Field Training Support

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 001255
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO & NCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0AOPR
DECLINED FROM Multiple Sources

C [REDACTED] Potential

~~CLASSIFIED BY COMJTF
DECLASSIFY ON 0AOPR~~

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3. Summary of Meeting:

a. During his introductory remarks, MG Vaught again stated that the tempo (slow or fast) of the receipt of reliable intelligence had a direct impact on mission training and plan development and to date it had not been adequate.

B, C [REDACTED] and that it appeared that getting our own organizations to cooperate was sometimes more difficult and frustrating than working against the enemy.

b. In the course of the situation update, the scope and volume of the future intelligence requirements was presented. The main point being that [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]
d. General: Discussion also touched on the need for a governmental policy on official announcements regarding hostage locations. This need was agreed to but a specific approach to tabling the subject before senior officials was not formulated, however, BG Odom stated he would mention it to Mr. Brzezinski along with the subject of the [REDACTED] program during the course of his back brief on the meeting.

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A
Also during the discussion BG Odom asked [REDACTED] J2 for an opinion on what is needed to satisfy the RIQ. The reply stated [REDACTED]

B
C
[REDACTED]

A third topic of general discussion was raised by MG Vaught and suggested the development of an inter-agency cooperative group at a medium level to consider the full scope of psychological actions that could be employed to convince the Iranian power elite that it was counter-productive to detain the hostages. The need for such a program was accepted but opinions differed on the scope of organizational participants and the level of the attending representatives. A clear opinion was not formulated. BG Odom suggested that the group should not be too high a level and that selected representatives from the attendees at this meeting with the addition of representatives from FBI, DOS, and INS would probably be the best balance of organizational participation, professional knowledge and concern for mission success.

Mission being to get the hostages home safely.

C
~~Part~~ Subjects Not Discussed: The potential need for a future [REDACTED] was the only subject not specifically discussed although the requirement to check out several possible landing zones was surfaced during the situation update.

G
[REDACTED]
LTCOL, USAF

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~~TOP SECRET~~

9 September 1980

FACT SHEET ON INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Ref: 3 September 1980, Executive Level Review Meeting

Attendees: [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] NSC, OJCS-J3, COMCTJTF, and
[REDACTED] selected members of [REDACTED] staff (CDR, CS, J2,
[REDACTED])

C, A

Key Note:

- Receipt of reliable intelligence drives operational planning.
- To date, tempo too slow.
- Key question, unanswered.

B, C

Requirements Overview -

Other Comments:

- Question of USG policy on official announcements regarding hostage locations is unresolved. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BG Odom will mention it to Dr. Brzezinski.

~~CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION ON [REDACTED] ORDER~~

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- Possibility of inter-agency cooperative group to consider full scope of governmental actions which might be used to gain hostage release. BG Odom commented that addition of a representative from FBI, INS and DOS to the Intelligence Executive Review Group might be better than creating another group.

Subjects Not Discussed:

- ~~C~~ - Potential need for [REDACTED] within next thirty (30) days;
- Potential need to conduct wiretap of telephone within 4-5 weeks.

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WORKING PAPER

~~J.C. R.~~
~~X. FILE~~

4 SEPTEMBER 1968
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MEMO FOR ~~THE~~ GENERAL VACANT

SUBJECT: CALL FROM GENERAL ~~ODON~~ ODOM

1. GENERAL ODOM, WHITE HOUSE, CALLED ON
SECURE PHONE AT 1410 ON SATURDAY
6 SEPTEMBER 68. ~~HE~~ ~~INTENDED~~ HE
HAD INTENDED TO CALL YOU MONDAY MORNING
REGARDING THREE ITEMS YOU HAD
ASKED HIM TO LOOK INTO, BUT HE
WILL THEN BE ENROUTE TO CHINA
WITH BILL PERRY.

a. "REGARDING 13 SEPT 68 EXCUSE
AND ATTENDANCE BY DR. ~~Z~~ Z
HE HAS NOT MADE UP HIS MIND YET, BUT
HE PROBABLY NOT GO. I AM ENCOURAGING
HIM, HOWEVER, TO GET IN TOUCH WITH
THE CHAIRMAN IF HE CHANGES HIS MIND."
BALL IS ID DR. Z'S COURSE NOW, BUT
CHAIRED COULD INQUIRE/ENCOURAGE, —

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WORKING PAPER

b. "I HAVE PORED ON GENERAL
VAUGHN'S CONCERN REGARDING PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, REFERENCE WHEREABOUTS OF
THE HOSTAGES, BEING MADE BY HIGH
OFFICIALS AT STATE, DEFENSE, AND
WHITEHOUSE."

c. "ON THE QUESTION OF A BROADER
INTELLIGENCE GROUP, I UNDERSTAND
FROM GENERAL GAST THAT THE ISSUE
IS NOW WITH THE CHAIRMAN. I WOULD
NEED TO GET IT OFFICIALLY THROUGH
THAT SOURCE TO PROCEED."

- A LOT HAS BEEN DONE ALREADY - MANY
~~IDEAS~~ IDEAS TRIED - NOT PERFECT BUT
IT IS NOT A SITUATION OF NOTHING BEING
DONE - COMPLEX SITUATION. —

~~TOP SECRET~~

COLONEL

U.S. Army

G

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 NOV 82

(CLASSIFICATION)

H- K 19

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jule 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO Nmc
 DECL CPB GRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0408
DERIVED FROM multiple Smiles

CJCS (has seen)

Off. O'D

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840



ACTION OFFICER

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078 SECURE 2817

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

12 November 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Minutes of 6 Nov Intell Rev Meeting

1. (TS) At 1000 on 6 Nov 80, MG Vaught convened the 4th meeting of representatives from the NSC [REDACTED] DIA [REDACTED] OJCS, USA/ACSI, JTF/J2 and JTF [REDACTED] to review the status of SNOWBIRD intelligence actions. Copy of agenda and annotated list of attendees is attached (Atch #1).

2. (TS) MG Vaught began the meeting by briefly reviewing [REDACTED] transition efforts indicating the turnover would take place no earlier than 15 Dec 80.

3. (TS) MG Vaught summarized ongoing component training as follows:

a. Fixed wing, ground and helo

b. Helo ops w/ SOW [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

4. (TS) [REDACTED] has 5-10 Cat II trainees coverable. These personnel and Cat III continue in training.

5. (TS) JTF practicing for C5 use of SUSAN - loading/unloading/aircraft position [REDACTED] undergoing area study.

6. (TS) COMJTF regards rumors of release to be just that.

7. [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
DECLASSIFY 12 NOVEMBER 2000

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. ~~(S)~~

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

(g) ~~(S)~~

(h) ~~(S)~~

9. ~~(S)~~

(i) ~~(S)~~

10. ~~(TS)~~ MG Vaught raised the subject ~~pressuring~~ of the GOI for ~~for~~ hostage accountability through use of:

- a. Algeria Diplomatic Visit
- b. Publicizing mail denial
- c. Seeking medical conditions

11. ~~(S)~~

LtCol, USAF

P.S. JTR released ~~on~~ 10 Nov



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 November 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTENDEES

Subject: Intelligence Review Meeting 6 November 1980

1. (TS) The probability of the continued detention of the hostages in the opinion of this office is high. This probability means a new, fresh and comprehensive intelligence effort must be mounted. Key requirements remain:

b

c

2. (TS) Some options in addition to [REDACTED] (observation and penetration):

b

c

3. [REDACTED] Tentative list of attendees:

BG Odom

NS

Col Pitmann

OJCS

✓ Attended

— Absent

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, 3-3, JTD
DECLASSIFY 5 NOVEMBER 2000

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

G
✓ LTG Gast [REDACTED]
✓ MG Brown/LTC [REDACTED]
✓ MG Thompson [REDACTED]
✓ MG Vaught [REDACTED]
✓ MG Secord [REDACTED]
✓ Col [REDACTED]
✓ LTC [REDACTED]
✓ Mr. [REDACTED]
Col [REDACTED]
✓ LTC [REDACTED]

J-3, OJCS
DIA
OACSI, DA
JTF
JTF
JTF
JTF
JTF
JTF
JTF

LtCol, USAF
Joint Test Directorate

~~TOP SECRET~~

How about PLANNING Cost
\$ SPACE PROBLEM?

~~SECRET~~

VZCZ31VAGG0
OO AUEAIIF
00 RUEIZJC #0413 080140Z
ZNY TTTT
0 011450Z NOV 82
AM SOS/3RD INF/1
TO [REDACTED]
BT

LIMDIS CITE J2 08410

SUBJ: SENIOR INTELL REVIEW MTG

1. (S) THE LAST SENIOR LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW MEETING WAS HELD ON 8 OCT 82. GIVEN THE TIME LAPSE, CHANGING SITUATION AND POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OR ALL OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES MAY CONTINUE TO BE DETAINED PAST THE 4-7 NOV 82 TIME FRAME, A FOLLOW ON MEETING HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 8 NOV 82.

2. (S) MTG IS PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN AT 1000 IN SNOWBIRD SPACES. ATTENDANCE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS MEETINGS. SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR REVIEW ARE:

- (a) ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE EVENTS
- (b) ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 08413 T- [REDACTED] LIMDIS

(c) IN COUNTRY-SUPPORT STATUS

(d) DISSEMINATION OF IIR'S

(e) DOCUMENTATION OF PERSONNEL

(f) REVIEW OF TECHNICAL PROGRAMS

- (g) (C) APPRECIATE NAMES OF ATTENDEES BY COZ 4 NOV 82.
REV. 01 NOV 82

BT

#0413

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OK

OO RUEAIIIF
J2 RUEIZJC #0413 0001400
ZNY TTTT
U 211400Z NOV 80
FM JCS/SNOBIRD/DC
TO [REDACTED]
BT

~~1 2 3 4 5 6 7~~ LIMDIS Q14 02 00413

SUBJ: SENIOR INTELL REVIEW MTG

(U)

1. (IS) THE LAST SENIOR LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW MEETING WAS HELD ON 9 OCT 80. GIVEN THE TIME LAPSE, CHANGING SITUATION AND POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OR ALL OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES MAY CONTINUE TO BE DETAINED PAST THE 4-7 NOV 80 TIME FRAME, A FOLLOW ON MEETING HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 6 NOV 80.

(U)

2. (IS) MTG IS PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN AT 1000 IN SNOWBIRD SPACES. ATTENDANCE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS MEETINGS.

SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR REVIEW ARE:

A) ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE EVENTS

B) ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC #0413 ~~1 2 3 4 5 6 7~~ LIMDIS

C) IN COUNTRY-SUPPORT STATUS

D) DISSEMINATION OF IIR'S

E) DOCUMENTATION OF PERSONNEL

F) REVIEW OF TECHNICAL PROGRAMS

3. (U) APPRECIATE NAMES OF ATTENDEES BY COB 4 NOV 80.

REVV BT NOV 80

BT

#0413

~~SECRET~~

~~HIS~~
~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~

9 Oct 80

#26

H-

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

Intell Rev

WARNING

**ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!**

EYES ONLY FOR:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL. BY DDA NMCC
 DECL. & DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON DAAD
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MG ✓
MG S

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

ACTION OFFICER: LT

TELEPHONE: EXT. _____ SECURE _____

~~HIS~~
~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Intell Rev Mtg #3/9/10/80

1. (PST) At 1000 on 9 October 1980, MG Vaught convened ~~the~~ ^{the 3rd meeting of representatives from NSC, [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] CJCS, JCS/J3, USA/ACSI, JTF/J2 and JTF [REDACTED] to review the status of SNOWBIRD intelligence actions. Copy of agenda and annotated list of attendees is attached. (Atch #1).}
2. (PST) MG Vaught began the meeting with a brief outline of the training to date and then discussed current operational concepts, one of which involves clandestine air landing of several fixed wing aircraft at a remote [REDACTED] unimproved landing area with subsequent heloborne assault into and extraction from the hostage detention sites to selected fixed wing transfer LZ's.

3

4

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C

[REDACTED]

5. (S) MG Vaught criticized [REDACTED] for wide dissemination of messages dealing with hostage location. He requested that all agencies guard against publicizing data on locations.

(Atch #2, #3)

6. (TS) [REDACTED] briefed group on LZ Susan for [REDACTED] and feasibility survey. [REDACTED]

AG

[REDACTED] MG Vaught advised the concept would be briefed up the DOD chain next week.

7. (TS) Col [REDACTED] and Col [REDACTED] gave capsule overview of [REDACTED] status: 41 individuals in training (7 fully [REDACTED]).

A

[REDACTED] more than 4 weeks ago. The two are awaiting utilization.

C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Jil
9 October 1980
JW

MEMORANDUM TO ATTENDEES

Subject: Intelligence Review Meeting, 9 October 1980

1. Tentative Agenda:

1000 - 1005 INTRODUCTION

1005 - 1020 OPS/TRNG UPDATE

1020 - 1040 [REDACTED]

1040 - 1100 FUTURE OPTIONS //

- OPN TINHORN

- SUPPORT

- TECH ACTIONS

2. Tentative list of attendees:

✓ BG Odom

NSC

LTC Pustay

OJCS

✓ Col Pittman

OJCS

LTG Gast

J-3, OJCS

RADM Paddock

J-5, OJCS

✓ MG Brown

DIA

✓ MG Thompson

OACSI, DA

✓ MG VAUGHT

JTF

✓ MG SECORD

JTF

Col

JTF

✓ LTC

JTF

✓ Mr.

JTF

✓ Col

JTF

CLASSIFIED BY COMINTF
DECLASSIFY ON DADSR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/26

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 23 Jul 92
DERIVED FROM DDCNMIL

DECL DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REVIEW ON 1 APR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

INFO 012

DTG 311440Z MAR 92
FM: JTF /J-2/
TO: AFOS /J-2/
[REDACTED] /J-2/
[REDACTED] /A-2/
[REDACTED]

SUBJ: [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON CIA ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

1. IRANIAN AIR/AIR DEFENSE ANALYSTS ARE REPORTING AN UNPRECEDENTED IMPLICATION THAT IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES ARE BEING OVERINFLATED. (INFERRED FROM PHASE 1... MUST BE DISCUSSED IN THIS DOCUMENT. WE WOULD PREFER TO STATE 'IRAN HAS THE SECOND OR THIRD STRONGEST AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE PERSIAN GULF.'
2. RE PARA 3: [REDACTED] THAT PILOTS ARE REPORTINGLY SHOT DOWN ALMOST DAILY. WE DO NOT ACCESS ENOUGH OF THE INFORMATION TO FULLY DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE TRAINING. (WE DO NOT KNOW IF THEY SEEM TO HAVE CLASSED IT YET.)
3. RE PARA 4: WE WOULD USE AWARE REGARDING THE NUMBER OF IRANIANS KILLED AND THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. (WE DO NOT KNOW IF ONLY THE LEAD PILOT IS SHOT DOWN OR IF OTHER AIRCRAFT WAS INVOLVED, SO SHOULD REVISE THIS TO REFLECT THE AIRFRAGUE COUNT SOMETHAT.)
4. RE PARA 5:

Classified by JCS
Declassified ON 1 APR

~~SECRET~~

TO: 5600 YG-2/
S-2/
A-2/
STATION: ALPHA

IT # 41

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY MAJOR
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMC
DECL. FOR DISSEMINATED TO Direct
REVIEW ON 0 ADA
PERIOD FROM Jan to Oct 92 Sust

SURVEY SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0900 EST, MARCH 31

1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JODY POWELL DENIED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SENT A LETTER TO IRAN SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. AT THE SAME TIME, POWELL SAID HE COULD "NOT DISPUTE" A SWISS FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT SWITZERLAND'S CHARGE IN TEHRAN PASSED A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI AND PRESIDENT BANI-SADR FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER THIS WEEK.
2. TEHRAN RADIO'S DOMESTIC SERVICE THIS MORNING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO FDIS, THAT "JODY POWELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT CARTER SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN". THE BROADCAST SAID THE MESSAGE, RECEIVED LAST WEEK, WAS MEANT "TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN AMERICA AND IRAN AND EXPEDITE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES." POWELL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT REVEALING THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE "MIGHT ENDANGER FINDING A SOLUTION" TO THE CRISIS.
3. THE "WASHINGTON POST TODAY" WRITES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GHODZADEH BELIEVES, THANKS TO "PRESIDENT CARTER'S NOW ADMITTING MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY," THAT HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE THIS MORNING CLAIMS IRANIAN OFFICIALS SEE THE U.S. MESSAGE AS THREATENING."
4. PAPA FRANCIS IS NOW REPORTED BY AP AS SAYING HE WILL ALLOW A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE FIFTY HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE FILM CLIP ON WHICH THE REPORT IS BASED IS RECENT AND REPRESENTS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OR NOT. "IF THE POPE WANTS TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES, HE MAY SEND AN ENVOY TO COME AND SEE," KHOMEINI IS QUOTED TELLING THE PAPAL NUNCIUS IN TEHRAN.
5. THE NINE COUNTRY MARKET COUNTRIES SENT LETTERS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES URGING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, ACCORDING TO AP. BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND CHancellor Schmidt HAVE WRITTEN TO BANI-SADR; BUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR MESSAGES ARE NOT DISCLOSED.
6. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER STEPHEN KENNEDY TOLD CARTER TODAY THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED A JUDICIAL PLAN FOR A "ROMAIN-C-STYLE" INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OF THE REPORTED SHAB. THE TRAIL SHOULD BE SPONSORED BY U.N. SPONSORSHIP, ACCORDING TO KENNEDY. THE U.N. WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING THE VERDICT AND THE PENALTY. HE HAD NO CONFIRMATION FROM IRAN, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED KENNEDY'S PROPOSAL.
7. THE DOS MANAGED TO CONTACT DIMITRI LAVROV YESTERDAY. HE AND POLITICAL OFFICER TOWSETH INDICATED THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLAY IN TEHRAN OVER THE SUPPORTIVE CARTER-KHOMEINI MESSAGE. TOWSETH FELT THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED AFTER ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MINUTES.
8. A REPORT BY CGS CORRESPONDENT TO FENTON IN TEHRAN HAS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VOTED TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE CGS NEWS DESK, FENTON SAYS MR. AYATOLLAH VAHIDI KAMI PROVIDED A CRUCIAL SWING VOTE. REPORTERLY, OPPONENTS OF THE TRANSFER WILL TRY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS TO BLOCK THE MOVE; VAHIDI KAMI HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT RECOMMENDING ALL CONCERNED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES ARE NOT PERMITTED. EXCEPT FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT NO DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT PERMIT, HE HAD NO COMMENT ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S DECISION.

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1. THE NATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) MAY
ADOPT A STRONGER STANCE AGAINST IRAN IF IT'S REQUEST THAT
NEUTRAL OBSERVERS BE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE HOSTAGES IS
DENIED AND IF THE U.S. CLARIFIES ITS FUTURE POLICY TOWARD
IRAN.

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● 10. IN HONOR OF IRAN'S NATIONAL DAY ON 1 APRIL, THE
IRANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN EAST GERMANY IS PLANNING TO
HOLD A RECEPTION AND SHOW AN ANTI-SHAH FILM, WHILE IN TEHRAN,
CELEBRATIONS WILL BE HELD TO HONOR THOSE KILLED AND WOUNDED
DURING THE REVOLUTION.

● 11. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ REMAIN COOL WITH BOTH
NATION'S CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF HINDERING DIPLOMATIC
ACTIVITY. IRAN ALSO REMAINS MARY OF IRAQ'S MILITARY INTENTIONS

● 12. PAKISTAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS TRYING TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

● 13. NEVERTHELESS, TURKEY HAS INDICATED THAT THE FIGHTING IN WEST AZERBAIJAN
HAS BEEN FAR MORE EXTENSIVE WITH SEVERAL LOCATIONS
TO THE SOUTH OF URMIA YEH INVOLVED (UNCLASIFIED).

SECRET
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Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 04/01/

5
[REDACTED]
H (56)
G

STC: 25255Z MAR 80

FM: JTF [REDACTED]
TO: HELO SET/ PITMAN/SLEFFERT
SUBJ: MISSION ROUTE PLANNING

1. REMAIN CONCERNED THAT HELO ROUTE IS NOT COMPLETELY FIRM.
MISSION BOOKS PREPARED EARLY IN PLANNING PHASE HAVE NOT BEEN VALIDATED
IN SOME MONTHS. BASED ON CURRENT "NOTIONAL" ROUTE EFFECTIVE SAR
PLANNING IS NOT POSSIBLE REQUEST ONE HELO PILOT WITH AUTHORITY TO
DEVELOP EXACT ROUTE FROM COAST-IN TO CHANZARIYEH RETURN TO WASHINGTON
ASAP TO EXAMINE SAME WITH INTEL O AND UPDATE CREW MISSION BOOKS.
TIME IS BECOMING CRITICAL FACTOR.

BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 6 APR

Declassified by
22 NOV 1992
X20114

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H(61)

MSG 763

A 241620Z
FM: JTF/J2
TO: SFOD AS2
A S2
TSW/A2

[REDACTED]

H61

SUPPLEMENTARY PRESS SERVICE:

CLERICS CALL FOR MARCH TO U.S. EMBASSY 25 MAR (U)
//UNCLAS//

FBIS 37, D241158 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1125 GMT 24 MAR 80

(UNSCHEDULED ANNOUNCEMENT)

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE.
IN THESE CRUCIAL TIMES, WHEN U.S. IMPERIALISM HAS EMBARKED ON
A FRESH PLOT AGAINST THE IRANIAN MUSLIMS AND THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION AND WHEN, IN ORDER TO CONTAMINATE THE PURE BLOOD
OF OUR MARTYRS, IT IS TRANSFERRING THE CRIMINAL MOHAMMAD REZA
PAHLAVI FROM PANAMA TO EGYPT -- AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY -- THE CLERICAL
COMMUNITY, IN HARMONY WITH THE IMAM'S HISTORIC MESSAGE, INVITES
ALL GROUPS AND STRATA TO STAGE AN ORGANIZED AND GLORIOUS MARCH
IN ORDER TO EXPRESS THEIR HATRED AGAINST THIS TREACHEROUS PLOT
BY AMERICA; AND WHILE CONDEMNING ALL PLOTS HATCHED BY
EASTERN AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM, IT WILL UNRESERVEDLY PROVIDE
ALL ITS RESERVES AND FORCES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE IMAM'S
OBJECTIVES AND WISHES, WHICH ARE PRECISELY THE NEEDS OF OUR
REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE APPEAL TO THE HEROIC AND MUSLIM INHABITANTS
OF TEHRAN AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY TO TAKE PART IN THIS MARCH
WITH AN EVER-INCREASING SOLARIDITY AND MIGHT.

THE MARCH WILL TAKE PLACE IN TEHRAN TOMORROW. STARTING FROM
VARIOUS PARTS OF TEHRAN AND PROCEEDING TOWARD THE U.S. ESPIONAGE
DEN.

BT

Classified by:

NNNN

DDO NMCC
28 Jul 92

Declassify on:

JADP

Downgraded by:

DDO, NMCC
7-92

Classified By: DCS

Declassify on: 07/02/92

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12815

CONSIDERED ON: 07/02/92

DERIVATIVE CL BY: DDCI

□ DECLASSIFIED COMMENDED TO: CDR

REVIEW ON: 07/02

DERIVED FROM:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MSG 760
241407Z MAR 80
FM JTF
TO: SFOD
[REDACTED]
I SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H63
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/NCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON 040P

DERIVED FROM multiple Annexes
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. THE SHAH FLEW FROM PANAMA TO EGYPT THIS MORNING ACCCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND PERSONAL STAFF. HE IS EXPECTED TO ENTER MAHDI MILITARY HOSPITAL IN CAIRO WHERE HE WILL PROBABLY UNDERGO SURGERY FOR AN ENLARGED SPLEEN.
2. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRZEZINSKI TOLD REPORTERS YESTERDAY THAT THE SHAH'S MOVE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A POLITICAL ISSUE. "HE IS MERELY TRYING TO OBTAIN MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND HE FEELS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO GET WHAT HE NEEDS IN EGYPT THAN ANYWHERE ELSE," BRZEZINSKI EXPLAINED.
3. IN TEHRAN, MILITANTS HOLDING THE 50 HOSTAGES TOLD REUTER THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE FROM PANAMA WAS OF "NO IMPORTANCE" AS THEY WOULD ONLY FREE THE HOSTAGES WHEN THE SHAH AND HIS WEALTH WERE RETURNED TO IRAN.
4. REUTER IS REPORTING A RUMOR FROM TEHRAN THAT A TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES THAT WAS IMMINENT IS NOW OFF BECAUSE OF THE SHAH'S MOVE JUST AS IRAN WAS ABOUT TO PRESENT ITS EXTRADITION CASE TO THE PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES. DOS HAS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT THE MILITANTS WERE ABOUT TO GIVE UP THE HOSTAGES. THE RUMOR APPEARS TO BE AND ATTEMPT TO TRANSFER BLAME FOR PROLONGING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS TO THE U. S.
5. THE DOS SUCCEEDED IN TELEPHONING BRUCE LAINGEN AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY MORNING (3/22). LAINGEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE WELL; THEY APPEAR TO ENJOY SOMEWHAT GREATER ACCESS TO VISITORS. THE TRIO IS ALSO ALLOWED TO GO TO AN OUTSIDE BALCONY FOR FRESH AIR AND EXERCISE.
6. CHARGE LAINGEN REPORTS THAT VOTE COUNTING ON THE FIRST ROUND OF ELECTIONS IS PROCEEDING VERY SLOWLY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DATE FOR THE RUNOFFS HAS BEEN PUSHED BACK TO APRIL 10. LAINGEN DOUBTS THE NEW PARLIAMENT WILL BE ABLE TO MEET BEFORE THE END OF APRIL.
7. TO MARK THE IRANIAN NEW YEAR THE MILITANTS CLAIMED THAT, IN ADDITION TO CANDIES AND A SPECIAL DINNER, SOME OF THE HOSTAGES WERE ALLOWED TO TELEPHONE THEIR FAMILIES. THE SPOKESMAN DID NOT ELABORATE.
8. IN A STATEMENT TO THE ARABIC-LANGUAGE PARIS-BASED WEEKLY, AN-NAHAR, BANI-SADR SAID HE WISHES TO PURGE THE PERSIAN GULF REGION OF ALL U.S. INFLUENCE. HE USED THIS GOAL AS JUSTIFICATION FOR IRAN'S REFUSAL TO RETURN TO RAS AL-KHAIMAH THE GULF ISLANDS OF ABU MUSA AND THE GREATER AND LESSER TUMBS, WHICH THE SHAH SEIZED IN 1971.

~~SECRET~~

9. BANI-SADR WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF THE SOVIETS, RECOGNIZING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE A THREAT AND THAT MOSCOW MAY ATTEMPT TO FOMENT TROUBLE IN IRAN TO BLUNT IRANIAN CRITICISM OF THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

63
SECRET

10.

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11.

(C)

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12. TWO MORE IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE BECOME THE SCENES OF IRANIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, THIS TIME TO PROTEST THE GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THE TURKOMAN UPRISING IN EARLY FEBRUARY AND THE SUBSEQUENT MURDER OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE FEDAYEEN-E KHALQ WHO ALLEGEDLY WERE IMPLICATED IN THE REVOLT. AS OF 17 MARCH, STUDENTS HAD BEEN STAGING SIT-INS AT THE EMBASSY IN BONN AND THE CONSULATE IN WEST BERLIN FOR OVER A WEEK.

13. IN A PUBLIC SPEECH ON 22 MARCH PRESIDENT ELECT BANI-SADR HARSHLY CRITICIZES IRAQI PRESIDENT SADAM HUSSEIN AND URGED IRAQI SHIAS TO RISE UP AND FOLLOW THE IRANIAN EXAMPLE BY OVERTHROWING THE BA'ATHI REGI-

ME. ALTHOUGH IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ HAVE BEEN STEADILY DETERIORATING, THE VEHEMENCE OF THE ADDRESS AND THE SPECIFIC, PUBLIC CALL FOR A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION TO OVERTHROW HUSSEIN IS UNUSUAL AND APPEARS TO SIGNAL A NEW LOW IN BI-LATERAL RELATIONS. KHOMEINI IS HIGHLY REVERED BY IRAQ'S SHIA POPULATION WHICH IS TWICE THE SIZE OF THE RULING SUNNI MINORITY AND SO SUCH CALLS TO ARMS WILL BE TREATED SERIOUSLY.

TOTAL POP. EST. 13 MILLION. 45 PER. SHIA, 33 PER. KURD, 20 PER. SUNNI. IRAQI FORCES ALONG THE IRANIAN BORDER HAVE BEEN ALERT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, WATCHING FOR EITHER IRANIAN OR KURDISH CROSS-BORDER THREATS. WHILE DIA CONSIDERS IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD INITIATE ANY MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ, THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY.

SUCH TROOP MOVEMENTS COUPLED WITH INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES BY BANI-SADR ARE BOUND TO HEIGHTEN IRAQI FEARS AND INCREASE TENSIONS ALONG THE IRANI-IRANIAN BORDER.

SECRET

(69)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SG 746

211400Z MAR 80

A
FM JTF
TO SFOD-D
1ST SOW
HELO DET/SEIFFERT/SCHAEFFER
RANGERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

H 69
px
SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12358
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
BERYALITE CL BY DDA/NMC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 04 Oct
DEARED FROM *multiple sources*

1. ACCORDING TO PARS NEWS AGENCY, THE PASDARAN HAVE ARRESTED MRS VICTORIA BASSIRI, AN OFFICIAL OF THE MFA, AS AN AMERICAN SPY. JUST AFTER THE REVOLUTION SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ADVISER, AND MORE RECENTLY DEPUTY IN THE PASSPORT BUREAU, AT A SALARY OF RS 100,000 A MONTH. SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONFESSED TO PASSING INFORMATION TO WILLIAM B DOHERTY OF THE US EMBASSY, ON THE FOLLOWING:

- A. INFORMATION FROM THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMICS DEPUTY
- B. THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE
- C. IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
- D. GENERAL POLICY OF THE MFA

DOHERTY IS SAID TO HAVE CONFIRMED MRS BASSIRIS CONFESSIONS AND TO HAVE SAID THAT SHE USED TO BE PAID 300 DOLLARS PER MONTH FOR THE INFORMATION. THE NEWSPAPER ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HAS COMMENTED THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN SPY IN THE MFA SHOWS THE LACK OF PERCEPTION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS DEPUTIES, AND INDECISIVENESS IN CARRYING OUT PURGES.

2. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE HOSTAGES CONTINUE

[Large area of the document from approximately line 650 to the bottom is heavily redacted with black ink.]

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. MEANWHILE, IN A 13 MARCH SOVIET COMMENTARY DIRECTED AT IRAN, MOSCOW AGAIN PUBLICLY CAUTIONED TEHRAN OF AMERICAN MILITARY THREATS TO THAT COUNTRY. IT MENTIONED THE "US ARMADA" CONSISTING OF 7 WARSHIPS AND 1,800 MARINES THAT HAD ARRIVED IN SINGAPORE. DESCRIBING THE US NAVAL UNITS IN THE GULF OF OMAN AND THOSE ON THEIR WAY AS THE "BIGGEST... SINCE WORLD WAR II," THE COMMENTARY NOTED THE "ARMADA" NOT ONLY IS A SHOW OF MUSCLE BUT, "IT HAS ALSO BEEN ASSIGNED OTHER SPECIFIC DUTIES AS WELL." THE SUGGESTION WAS THEN MADE THAT IRAN'S SEA ROUTES WOULD BE OBSTRUCTED AND THE MARINES, ACCORDING TO THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, ARE TO CARRY OUT "OVERT MILITARY ACTIVITIES." SUCH SOVIET COMMENTARY IS NOT NEW. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE PRESENT IMPASSE OVER THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, MOSCOW IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED WASHINGTON MAY ACT AGAINST IRAN. ADDITIONALLY, WHEN ONE INTERJECTS SOVIET-BERCEIVED CONCERN OVER THE USSR'S BORDER WITH IRAN AND ITS OWN XENOPHOBIC INSECURITIES, THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MOVE AGAINST IRAN INCREASES. MOSCOW COULD FOLLOW UP BY INVOKING THE 1921 RUSSO-PERSIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, WHICH PROVIDES FOR UNTEATRAL SOVIET INTERVENTION IN IRAN AFTER ONLY ONE WARNING SHOULD A THIRD PARTY ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT A "USURPATION" THERE. NOT KNOWING WHAT ACTION WASHINGTON MAY TAKE, THE KREMLIN IS LIKELY TO THINK THE WORST. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT IN THE WEEKS AHEAD EXERCISE THEIR OPTION NOT ONLY TO SECURE THEIR BORDER BUT ALSO TO GAIN LEVERAGE AND FORESTALL AMERICAN MOVES BY DEPLOYING GROUND FORCES INTO NORTHERN AND EASTERN IRAN, CITING THE 1921 TREATY AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH ACTION.

5. THE STATUS OF SHIPMENTS OF CARGO TO IRAN BY SEA CONTINUES TO IMPROVE FROM EARLIER LEVELS AS THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE OF IRANIAN PORTS, OR OF OTHER MILITARY ACTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, BECOMES MORE REMOTE. HOWEVER, OVERLAND TRANSPORT TO IRAN THROUGH TURKEY OR THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS POOR, EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE PROBLEMS ARE CAUSED BY FACTORS OTHER THAN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION.

6. DESPITE MANY CHARGES OF FRAUD AND VOTING IRREGULARITIES, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY HAS RULED THAT THE FIRST ROUND OF VOTING IN IRAN'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WAS FAIR. THIS FURTHER BOLSTERS CHANCES OF ELECTION VICTORIES BY THE HARD-LINE, CLERGY-DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY WHICH HAS THUS FAR WON OVER HALF OF THE APPROXIMATELY 275 SEATS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECIDED. THE BIG LOSER APPEARS TO BE PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR WHO HAS GAINED ONLY 2 OF 13 SEATS DECIDED IN TEHRAN AND ITS SUBURBS. MEANWHILE, THE BALLOT COUNTING IS PRECEEDING VERY SLOWLY IN THE ELECTION IN WHICH AROUND 3,300 CANDIDATES ARE COMPETING FOR 270 ASSEMBLY SEATS. BALLOT COUNTING WAS SUSPENDED YESTERDAY, AS ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICES CLOSED FOR SEVEN DAYS TO CELEBRATE THE NEW YEAR HOLIDAY. BECAUSE OF THE HOLIDAY PERIOD, THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND ARE NOW NOT EXPECTED TO BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THE FIRST WEEK IN APRIL. THOUGH NO NEW DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE SECOND ROUND, IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE MOVED BACK IN ORDER TO GIVE CANDIDATES IN THE RUN-OFF ELECTION TIME TO CAMPAIGN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H79

MSG 0720

DIG 181335Z MAR 80
FM: JIF /J-2/
TO: SFOD /S-2/
~~S-2/~~
I SOW /A-2/

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT 18 MARCH 80

H79
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON 04 Oct
DERIVED FROM Multiple sources

(u) 1. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR REPORTEDLY TOLD THE PRESS YESTERDAY THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL INCREASE THE "AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES" OF THE PRESIDENT BEGINNING ON THE IRANIAN NEW YEAR (21 MAR). HE SAID THAT KHOMEINI WILL OVERSEE MATTERS, "BUT ONCE THE PARLIAMENT IS ELECTED AND I FORM A GOVERNMENT, THAT GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE CHARGE OF THINGS." WITH KHOMEINI'S HEALTH CONTINUING TO DECLINE, HE PROBABLY WILL TURN MORE RESPONSIBILITIES OVER TO BANI-SADR. HOWEVER, WHEN IT COMES TO MAJOR ISSUES SUCH AS THE HOSTAGES, A SINGLE UTTERANCE FROM KHOMEINI CAN REVERSE ANY EFFORTS BY BANI-SADR, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN DEMONSTRATED. THE IMPACT OF ANY INCREASED AUTHORITY FOR BANI-SADR VISE-A-VIS THE HOSTAGE SITUATION REMAINS HIGHLY PROBLEMATICAL.

2 3. INCREASED HOSTILITY AMONG SOME LEADING IRANIAN RELIGIOUS FIGURES AND POLITICAL DISPUTES AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE ALREADY UNSTABLE ADMINISTRATION IN TEHRAN. WITHIN THE THEOCRACY, OPEN DISAGREEMENTS HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND A LEADING CLERIC IN THE NAME OF AYATOLLAH QOMI.

ON THE POLITICAL SCENE, THERE REPORTEDLY IS A GROWING NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN TEHRAN AS WELL AS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF.

S. ACCORDING TO IRANIAN STATE RADIO AND ITALIAN PRESS ARTICLES, ITALY HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY 10 CHINOOK HELICOPTERS AND SPARE PARTS TO IRAN IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY FOREIGN MINISTER GOURZADEH, BASED ON HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS CAUSED BY RECENT KHUZESTAN FLOODS. NO CONFIRMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THE AIRCRAFT OR PARTS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN PROVIDED TO DATE. THE US AMBASSADOR TO ITALY WAS TO MEET WITH COUNT AGUSTA, AGUSTA-BELL TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ON 17 MARCH AND POINT OUT THAT PROVIDING HELICOPTERS OR SPARE PARTS WOULD IMPOSSIBILIZE US LICENSING FOR AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS PRODUCTION.

WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST - 18 MARCH 1980

UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE OVER EASTERN TURKEY AND NW IRAN BRINGING CLOUDY SKIES, LOW CEILINGS, ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS, RAINSHOWERS, ICING, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, AND TURBULENCE ACROSS THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS AND RAINSHOWERS MOVING ACROSS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN INTO SYRIA. HIGH LEVEL CIRRUS CLOUDS EVIDENT ACROSS N1/2 SAUDI ARABIA, PERSIAN GULF, AND SW IRAN MOVING EAST. JET STREAM EVIDENT ACROSS NORTHERN AFRICA BRINGING ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL CLOUDINESS TO EGYPT.

LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

18-20 MAR: UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE GRADUALLY MOVES OVER IRAN WITH POOR WEATHER LEAVING CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER TURKEY BEHIND THE STORM. JET STREAM CIRRUS CONTINUES EASTWARD MIGRATION ACROSS CENTRAL MID EAST FROM EGYPT THROUGH S1/2 IRAN NEXT FEW DAYS. EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE MOST PART WILL BE UNDER CLEAR SKIES WITH RISING TEMPERATURES AND AFTERNOON GUSTY SURFACE WINDS. NEXT STORM APPROACHES TURKEY THE 20TH.

22-27 MAR: THIS STORM MOVES ACROSS TURKEY 20-22ND WITH TRAILING FRONT BACK ACROSS EGYPT FIRST, THEN NW SAUDI ARABIA AS THE STORM MOVES INTO IRAN 22ND. THIS STORM SHOULD BRING POOR WEATHER BEGINS TO IRAN 22-23RD WITH TRAILING FRONT DOWN INTO CENTRAL SAUDI ARABIA. A THIRD STORM IS EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO THE TURKEY-MEDITERRANEAN REGION ON THE 25TH AND GRADUALLY TRACK EASTWARD THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST THE 26-27TH. EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD STAY CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY DURING THIS PERIOD FOR THE MOST PART WITH AFTERNOON GUSTY SURFACE WINDS AND BLOWING DUST/SAND AFFECTING DESERT AREAS.

WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF

IRAN: SURFACE WINDS PRIMARILY WESTERLY AT 15-20 KNOTS WITH LIGHT TURBULENCE FROM SURFACE TO 10,000FT IN N1/2.

PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE TO 1500 FT AGLD WINDS WESTERLY AT 10-20 KNOTS. NO TURBULENCE EXPECTED.

~~REV 10 MARCH 1980~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCT 1855 Z
A [REDACTED]
DTG 171300Z MAR 89
FM: JTF /J-2/
TO: SED /S-2/
[REDACTED] S-2/
1 SOR /A-2/
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

SUPJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 17 MARCH 1989

H81
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 92
BERKSHIRE U.S. DDCI NMIC
 DDCI DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON 0 ADA
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

(U) 1. EARLY RETURNS IN THE FIRST ROUND OF IRAN'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION HELD ON FRIDAY INDICATE THAT THE CLERICALLY-PACKED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY IS HEADED FOR CONTROL OF THE 270- SEAT LEGISLATURE. IPP CANDIDATES HAVE APPARENTLY SECURED 20 OF THE 54 SEATS FILLED SO FAR ON THE FIRST BALLOT. SO FAR BANI-SADR SUPPORTERS HAVE WON ONLY 11 SEATS. A SENIOR IRP OFFICIAL REMARKED THAT THE PARTY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACT AS A UNIT IN PARLIAMENT AND, SHOULD IT WIN A MAJORITY IN THE ELECTION, PRESIDENT BANI-SADR WOULD BE OBLIGED TO NOMINATE AS PRIME MINISTER A MEMBER OF THE PARTY OR SOMEONE ACCEPTABLE TO IT. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IF TWO-THIRDS OF THE SEATS ARE FILLED BY THE FIRST BALLOT, THE MAJLES CAN BEGIN ITS DUTIES "IMMEDIATELY". AMID REPORTS OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES, PRESIDENT BANI-SADR DECLARED THAT THE ELECTION RESULTS WOULD BE SET ASIDE IF WIDESPREAD AND SERIOUS MISCONDUCT HAD OCCURRED. FINAL RESULTS ARE TO BE RELEASED ON THURSDAY, "WITH A RUN-OFF ELECTION" SCHEDULED FOR THE FIRST WEEK IN APRIL.

(U) 2. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED LAST NIGHT THAT NO MORE THAN 150 OF THE TOTAL 270 SEATS WILL BE DECIDED IN THE FIRST ROUND OF VOTING. INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE STATED THAT, IF AROUND 180 SEATS ARE SETTLED IN THE FIRST ROUND, PARLIAMENT COULD START WORK IMMEDIATELY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ANNOUNCE FINAL RESULTS FROM THE FIRST ROUND IN SEVERAL DAYS. THE SECOND ROUND OF VOTING WILL TAKE PLACE IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS.

(U) 3. MEANWHILE, IN A FRIDAY PRESS INTERVIEW, PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAS SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY ASK THE PARLIAMENT NOW BEING ELECTED TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES WHEN IT CONVENES IN MAY.

(U) 4. IN KURDISTAN, THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS CALLED FOR A GENERAL STRIKE, SIT-IN, AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE NAME OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDER CLOSING POLLING STATIONS IN THREE KURDISH TOWNS. A KDP REPRESENTATIVE REPORTEDLY WOULD VOTE IN THE ELECTION IN MEHAPAD, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE AUTHORITY WILL VALIDATE THE MEHAPAD RETURNS.

(U) 5. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE, IRAN'S BUDGET AND PLANNING MINISTER, EFRATOLAH SHAFI, CLAIMS TO HAVE VISITED RECENTLY WITH EACH OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES BEING HELD AT THE US EMBASSY. SAIFI, A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, STATED THAT THE HOSTAGES ARE IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION, BUT THAT MANY ARE SUFFERING FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES OR DEPRESSION. SOME OF THE HOSTAGES--THOSE CONSIDERED "DISRUPTIVE" BY THE MILITANTS, AND INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF ESPIONAGE--ARE KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT SAIFI ADMITTED.

(U) 6. TEHRAN RADIO BROADCAST REPORTS THAT A NEW COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN GENDARMERIE HAS BEEN APPOINTED. THE REPORT CLAIMS THAT AVATOLLAH MAHDavi-KANI, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY SUPERVISOR, APPOINTED BY QASEM ALI ZAHIRNEZHAD, HEAD THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC GENDARMERIE.

(U) 7. THE IRANIAN PAPS NEWS AGENCY HAS REPORTED THAT ITALY HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY 12 U.S. DESIGNED HELICOPTERS AND A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF SPARE PARTS TO IRAN FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. THE REPORT NOTES THAT THE HELICOPTERS ARE BUILT IN ITALY UNDER U.S. LICENSE.

10. RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN IRANIAN CITY OF ZAHEDAN STAGED AN ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATION ON 6 MARCH, DEMANDING GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN SUPPRESSING COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES.

THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF KURDISTAN, SAMANDAJ, AGAIN WITNESSED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS ON THE 10TH.

WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 17 MARCH 81
PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER THE MIDDLE EAST TONIGHT AS ONE STORM ENDS IRAN INTO AFGHANISTAN WITH TRAILING CLOUDCOVER ACROSS IRAN CORNER WITH SPONTANEOUS RAINSHOWERS AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS. HIGH LEVEL JET STREAM CIRRUS CLOUDS EVIDENT ACROSS NORTHERN AFRICA THROUGH MOROCCO AND SAUDI ARABIA THIS MORNING TRAVELING EASTWARD. UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE MOVES THROUGH TURKEY WITH CLOUD COVER EXTENDING SOUTH TO NORTHERN PORTIONS OF EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. THIS DISTURBANCE CARRIES RAINSHOWERS, LOW CEILINGS, ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, LIGHT TURBULENCE FROM SURFACE TO 10,000 FT, AND SCATTERED ICING 0-15,000 FT THROUGH THIS REGION. EASTERN EDGE OF THIS DISTURBANCE PACHING INTO NW IRAN.

LONG RANGE OUTLOOK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
18-19 MAR: UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE MOVES INTO IRAN LATE 18TH AND COVERS THE ENTIRE COUNTRY 18-19TH IN EASTWARD PROGRESSION BRINGING POOR WEATHER THROUGH REGION. CLEARING SKIES OVER TURKEY, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, AND EGYPT 18-19TH WITH FAIR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, SOME FOG EARLY MORNING HOURS, AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS IN THE AFTERNOONS WITH FLOWING SAND POSSIBLE IN EGYPT. JET STREAM CIRRUS CONTINUES EASTWARD MOVEMENT ACROSS CENTRAL PORTION OF MIDDLE EAST WITH HIGH LEVEL TURBULENCE. NO SIG WKS IN SKIES OF SAUDI ARABIA AS LOW PRESSURE DOMINATES REGION; AFTERNOON WINDS WILL CAUSE SCATTERED DUST/SAUD TO REDUCE VISIBILITY AT TIMES.

20-22 MAR: UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE EXPECTED TO EXIT IRAN ON 20TH. THE NEXT STORM MOVES INTO TURKEY FROM THE WEST. THIS NEXT STORM SHOULD HAVE A TRAILING FRONTAL BOUNDARY INTENINGING SW BACK ACROSS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN INTO NORTHERN EGYPT. THIS STORM IS EXPECTED TO MOVE EAST INTO IRAN BY THE 21ST WITH TRAILING FRONT ACROSS NORTHERN SAUDI ARABIA, EXITING IRAN ON 22TH. A THIRD STORM ENTERS TURKEY ON THE 24TH WITH FRONT BACK ACROSS EGYPT. THIS THIRD STORM SHOULD MOVE EASTWARD OVER IRAN THE 25TH AND OUT IN SOUTHERN IRAN/SAUD TO REDUCE VISIBILITY AT TIMES.

WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF
IRAN: WINDS PRIMARILY FROM THE WEST (SW-WW) VARYING DEPENDING ON THE WKS AS STORM SYSTEMS MOVE THROUGH. SPONTANEOUS LOCAL WINDS. TURBULENCE A PROBLEM ENTIRE COUNTRY.
PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE TO 1500 FT AGL WESTWARD (SW-WW) LOCAL WINDS WITH TURBULENCE.

END OF MAR

AA

101600Z MAR 80
 FM: JTF/J-2
 TO: SFOD7E-2
 1 SOW/A-2
 JS-2
 JTF/A

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: 10 MAR 80 ADDRESS OF IMAM KHOMEINI FOLLOWING THE JOINT SESSION OF THE REVOLUTION COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

((TEXT))

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE. NOBLE AND STRUGGLING NATION OF IRAN. CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SHAH AND THE UNITED STATES MADE US NEED NO PROOF. THE SHAH AND THE UNITED STATES MADE US DEPENDENT IN ALL FIELDS. MURDER, VILIFICATION, IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE WERE COMMON PRACTICE FOR THESE CRIMINALS. WE SHALL FIGHT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO THE END OF OUR LIVES. WE SHALL NOT REST UNTIL WE PUT THE UNITED STATES IN ITS PLACE, CUT OFF THE HANDS FROM THE REGION, HELP ALL LIBERATION FIGHTERS TO DEFEAT IT AND ENABLE THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO TAKE OVER THEIR OWN TERRITORY.

TO US THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AGGRESSIVE EAST AND THE CRIMINAL WEST. WE SHALL FIGHT AND, AS JUSTICE SHALL PERSIST, WE SHALL TRIUMPH. U.S. DOMINATION ENTAILS CALAMITY FOR ALL THE OPPRESSED NATIONS. THE AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY THE AGGRESSIVE EAST HAD DISGRACE(FED) HISTORY.

DEAR IRANIAN NATION: BEWARE, AS WE HAVE LONG YEARS OF STRUGGLE AHEAD OF US. TO DESTROY YOU, THE SUPERPOWERS ARE ENGAGED DAILY IN PLOTS. THE DEVIL'S MISCHIEF HARMS THE OPPRESSED. (PREVIOUS SENTENCE IN ARABIC--FRIS) THE QUESTION RAISED NOWADAYS IS THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND SPIES WHO ARE HELD BY THE MUSLIM AND STRUGGLING STUDENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION I SHALL MAKE A FEW POINTS:

1. COPIES OF ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE TRAITOROUS SHAH SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE SHAH. AS FOR THE MUSLIM STUDENTS, IF THEY TOO HAVE ANY EVIDENCE, THEY SHOULD PROVIDE COPIES TO THE COMMISSION.

2. THE MEETING WITH THE HOSTAGES INVOLVED IN (COMPILEING--FRIS) THE DOSSIER ON THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SHAH AND THE UNITED STATES CAN TAKE PLACE FOR THE PURPOSE OF THEIR INTERROGATION.

3. IF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ANNOUNCES ITS VIEWS IN TFRPA ABOUT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE OUSTED SHAH AND THE INTERFERENCES BY THE AGGRESSIVE UNITED STATES, THEN A MEETING WITH THE HOSTAGES (AS HEARD) CAN TAKE PLACE.

ONCE AGAIN I DECLARE MY SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTION COUNCIL AND HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRESIDENT AND CALL ON EVERYONE TO HELP THEM AND SPARE NO EFFORTS IN SUPPORTING THEM. I WANT ALL STRATA TO FOLLOW THE PRAISEWORTHY ISLAMIC ETHICS AND SAFEGUARD FRATERNAL RIGHTS.

MY DEAR SISTERS AND BROTHERS: TODAY IS THE DAY OF UNITY AND UNANIMITY; TODAY IS THE DAY WHEN, IF YOU FAIL IN YOUR UNITY, THEN YOU WILL BE TRAPPED EITHER BY THE EAST OR THE WEST. NEVER ADHERE TO A SINGLE IDEA; DO WHATEVER SERVES THE INTEREST OF THIS LAND THE ISLAMIC NATION. THE MOVEMENT OF THE NOBLE NATION OF IRAN CONTINUES TO CUT OFF THE HANDS OF THE ENEMIES. SO LONG AS THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER SUPERPOWERS CONTINUE ITS CONFRONTATION AND STRUGGLE AGAINST THEM, WHILE SAFEGUARDING ITS COMPREHENSIVE INDEPENDENCE WITH ALL ITS MIGHT.

IT IS UP TO THE INTELLECTUALS TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS IN EXPOSING THE SUPERPOWERS AND POWERS. I HOPE THAT KHOMEINI WILL NEVER DEVIATE FROM THE STRAIGHT PATH OF ISLAM, WHICH IS FIGHTING AGAINST THE OPPRESSIVE POWERS, AND WILL NEVER REST IN REALIZING ISLAMIC GOALS; AS I HOPE OUR MUSLIMS, ESPECIALLY THE STRUGGLING IRANIAN NATION, WILL ENDEAVOR TOWARD ACHIEVING THIS ISLAMIC GOAL AND CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS OF THE EAST AND WEST.

I PRAY TO GOD ALMIGHTLY FOR THE VICTORY OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM GOD BLESS YOU ALL.

(SIGNED) R.HOLI AY MOSAVI KHOMEINI

~~SECRET~~

Classified by DDN/MCC
 22 Jul 12
 Declassify on 10 Apr
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 12
 DERIVED FROM DDN/MCC
 O DECL OR DOWNGRADED TO DDN/C
 REVIEW ON 22 Jul 12
 RELEASED FROM DDN/C

Downgraded by DDN/MCC
 22 Jul

Classified by JCS
 Declassify on 04 Apr

MSG 635

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H 106

DTG 071628Z MAR 80
FM: JTF /J-2/
TO: DELTA VS-2/
1 SOW /A-2/
~~AAT~~ /S-2/
JTF /A HELOS

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: IRAN TIME CHANGE (U)

ACCORDING TO A NOTAM ISSUED BY IRAN TODAY, IRANIAN TIME WILL
CHANGE AT 20/0330Z MAR 80 TO FOUR HRS THIRTY MINUTES AHEAD OF ZUL .

~~REF ID: A7 MAR 18~~

NNNN

Demilitarized by:
DDO NMCC
220 1100Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By ~~TAS~~

Declassified On ~~040494~~

Classified by
DDO NMCC - 22 Jul 92
Declassify on 040494

~~SECRET~~

H110

MSB 646
061745Z MAR 80
FM: JTF/J2
TO: [STOD]

I SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COMMENTS ON IRAN'S NATIONAL MOBILIZATION WEEK.

[REDACTED] (A PARS NEWS AGENCY REPORT DATED 1 MARCH
SAID THAT 65 PERCENT OF THE CITIZENS APPROVED OF THIS EXTENSION).

[REDACTED] (THE "TEHRAN
TIMES" REPORTED THAT 100 THOUSAND PERSONS TOOK PART IN THE PARADE).

REVV 6MAR 10

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12336

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REVIEW ON FADP

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

H 117

MSG 632

041945Z MAR 80

FM: IIE

TO: SFOD

1 SOW

TOP SECRET

SUBJ: STATUS OF IRANIAN AIR FORCE F-4 FIGHTERS

INTRODUCTION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1233
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE DA BY DDCI NMCC
 DECL X DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 1 ADT
DERIVED FROM ~~Multiple Sources~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

H MSG 628

1 241430Z MAR 80
FM: JTF
TO: /DELTA
1 SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

H 119

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

1. THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY INFORMED RADIO TEHRAN THAT THREE OF THEIR NUMBER MET WITH PRESIDENT BANI-SADR AND FOUR REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBERS LATE YESTERDAY REGARDING THE U.N. COMMISSION'S VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES. ACCORDING TO THE MILITANTS, NONE OF THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR A VISIT WAS AGREED TO; HOWEVER, THEY DID EXPECT TO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BY THIS MORNING OF THEIR "FINAL DECISION" ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MEETING WITH THE HOSTAGES. THE LATEST REPORT FROM AFP INDICATES THAT THE MILITANTS HAVE NOW SAID THEY WILL LET THE COMMISSION VISIT THE 50 HOSTAGES. THE FIVE U.N. JURISTS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO MEET THE HOSTAGES IF THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO VERIFY THAT THEY WERE IN GOOD HEALTH, THE MILITANTS WERE QUOTED AS SAYING. THEY ADDED: "WE WILL NOT AGREE TO LETTING THEM SEE THEM FOR OTHER REASONS."

2. THE U.N. COMMISSION, IN A STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY, INDICATED THAT ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHAH'S ALLEGED CRIMES IS NEARING AN END. THE STATEMENT SAID ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO PRESENT BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS TODAY ALL REMAINING DOCUMENTATION INTENDED FOR THE COMMISSION'S REVIEW. PRESUMABLY, THIS DOCUMENTATION INCLUDES "EVIDENCE" FROM THE EMBASSY'S FILES THAT THE COMMISSION HAS SAID IT WILL ACCEPT IN AN ATTEMPT TO COUNTER MILITANT OBJECTIONS TO AN OTHERWISE UNCONDITIONAL VISIT TO THE HOSTAGES.

3. PARS REPORTED LAST NIGHT THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS DECIDED NOT TO ALTER ITS DECISION TO HOLD TWO-STAGE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT BANI-SADR, TO SHORTEN THE ELECTION PROCESS, HAD ASKED THE COUNCIL TO RECONSIDER THE ISSUE. [REDACTED] HOWEVER, TELLS US, THERE IS A LOT OF LOCAL OPPOSITION TO THE PROTRACTED ELECTION PROCESS--WHICH FAVORS LARGE, WELL-ORGANIZED GROUPS--AND THE LAST WORD ON THIS MAY NOT YET BE IN.

4. FOOD SHORTAGES IN IRAN'S URBAN AREAS ARE CONTINUING PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HOARDING, BUREAUCRATIC BLUNDERING IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION, AN INEFFICIENT AND DISRUPTED INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, AND INTERMITTENT INTERRUPTIONS IN FOREIGN DELIVERIES. RECENT REPORTING CONCERNING THE USE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT FOOD TO TEHRAN INDICATES THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE FOOD SITUATION FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND AND LEADING TO DOMESTIC UNREST. AS OF 29 FEB THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AT LEAST THREE MILITARY FLIGHTS TO FRANCE TO RICK UP MEAT FOR TEHRAN.

APPEARS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE HAD TO RESORT TO THE USE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR THE MEAT DELIVERIES BECAUSE IRAN AIR LACKS SUFFICIENT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. THE IRANIANS USED AIR FORCE C-130, 707 AND 747 AIRCRAFT FOR THE TRANSPORT OF MEAT AND OTHER FOOD PRODUCTS FROM FRANCE, ROMANIA AND THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY.

7. THE IRANIAN LEFTIST ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLE'S SACRIFICE GUERRILLAS, HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN PROMOTING TURMOIL THROUGHOUT IRAN, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT MURDER OF FOUR OF ITS MEMBERS DURING THE TURKOMAN UNREST.

H - (126)
312330Z JAN 80
FM: JTF/J-2
TO: HELO DET/M-2
SUBJ: EMERGENCY LANDING/EXTRACTION LOCATIONS

A [REDACTED] SFOD/S-2

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EMERGENCY LANDING/EXTRACTION LOCATIONS

1. THIS OFFICE HAS CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE TEHRAN AREA AND IDENTIFIED SEVEN LOCATIONS AS POTENTIAL EMERGENCY LANDING AREAS.
2. FIVE OF THE LOCATIONS ARE SUITED FOR EMERGENCY LANDINGS OF A HELICOPTER WITH PICK UP BY A SECOND HELICOPTER. TWO SITES KARAJ AFLD (27 NM WEST OF TEHRAN) AND KAHRIZAK AFLD (14 NM SOUTH OF TEHRAN) ARE SUITABLE FOR PICKUP BY HELICOPTER OR C - 130 AIRCRAFT.
3. THE FIVE ROTARY-WING LZ'S ARE WITHIN TEHRAN ITSELF. TWO ARE ALONG POSSIBLE INGRESS ROUTES AND THREE ARE ALONG THE MOST LIKELY EGRESS ROUTE. ONE INGRESS EMERGENCY LZ IS A RACETRACK ON THE EAST OF TOWN. THE OTHER IS IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CITY. THE THREE EGRESS EMERGENCY LZ'S ARE ALONG A LINE OF RUNNING SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF THE COMPOUND AND ARE RESPECTIVELY A SCHOOL YARD, AND TWO ATHLETIC FIELDS.
4. DETAILS, REFERENCE GRAPHICS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF EACH LOCATION HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN BOOK FORM AND WILL BE PROVIDED VIA NEXT COURIER DELIVERY.

REVV 31 JAN 00

Classified by:
DDO, NMCC 22Jul92
Declassify on: OAOR

Downgraded to Confidential
DDO, NMCC 22Jul12

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

H- 21 127
CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
BERWATNE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

MSG 418
311500Z JAN 82
FM: JTF
TO: DPMIA
A [REDACTED]
1 SOW
HELO DET

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEZADEH CONTINUES TO BE CRITICAL OF THE CANADIAN ROLE IN HELPING SIX EMBASSY STAFF TO LEAVE TEHRAN THIS WEEK. HE IS REPORTED THIS MORNING AS SAYING IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH CANADIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, "YOU SHOULD REALIZE THE TENSIONS THIS HAS CREATED AMONG THE STUDENTS." HE ADDS, "I'M NOT ANTICIPATING ANYTHING BUT WHEN TENSIONS RISE, YOU CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE REACTIONS." HOWEVER, IN SO FAR AS WE KNOW, THE MILITANTS THEMSELVES CONTINUE TO STAND BY THEIR STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY THAT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SIX WILL NOT AFFECT THE HOSTAGES' TREATMENT.

2. FORMER RELIGIOUS PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI YESTERDAY ACCUSED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF "NEGIGENCE OR TREASON" FOR ALLOWING THE AMERICANS TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, GHOBZAEEH RESPONDED IN A RADIO INTERVIEW THAT HE HAD NO IDEA THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT LARGE IN TEHRAN.

~~FOB~~
C [REDACTED]
MOIN FAR HAS PROMISED A PURGE OF STAINED MANAGEMENT STAFF EVER SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE. POSSIBLY THIS MOVE IS DESIGNED TO REASSURE FEARFUL MANAGERS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MEETING THE DEMANDS OF EXTREMISTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. WHETHER EITHER GROUP WILL BE SATISFIED REMAINS TO BE SEEN; IN THE MEANTIME

4. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH WEST GERMAN T.V. BANI-SADR SAID THAT IRAN HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND REALIZES THAT IT COULD BE ATTACKED AS AFGHANISTAN WAS. HE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT FOR ITS DEFENSE IRAN MUST DEPEND OF THE ENTIRE IRANIAN POPULATION RATHER THAN THE ARMY OR AN ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. HE SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. CAN CHANGE ONLY IF THE AMERICANS CIVE UP THEIR POLICY OF EXPANSION AND PREDOMINANCE.

~~SECRET~~

H-127
B2

~~SECRET~~

5. IN A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW AFTER THE ELECTION BANI-SADR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE EFFORTS HE HAD INITIATED WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSED SHAH HAD NOT PROVEN POSSIBLE AND WOULD NOT WORK OUT UNLESS THE IRANIANS CAN MAKE THE SHAH, HIS CRIMES AND HIS CORRUPTION THE MAIN ISSUE. BANI-SADR ADDED THAT IF THIS BECOMES THE MAIN ISSUE, EVEN IF THE SHAH CANNOT BE BROUGHT BACK, THE PRIMARY IRANIAN AIM WILL HAVE BEEN ATTAINED AND THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER NEED FOR HOLDING THE HOSTAGES.

6. TEHRAN RADIO TODAY BROADCAST AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE SAYING THAT FOLLOWING CLASHES WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN ON 30 JAN, THE SON OF KHOMEINI APPEALED FOR CALM AND ORDER FOR THE SAKE OF THE HEALTH OF HIS FATHER. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT KHOMEINI'S SON-IN-LAW, AYATOLLAH ESHRAQI, HAS GONE TO THE UNIVERSITY TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE CLASHES. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SAID THAT RECENTLY CLASHES HAS TAKEN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE CITY WHICH HAVE LED TO DISORDER AND DISTURBANCES, AND WARNED THAT IT WILL STOP SUCH INCIDENTS WITH SEVERE MEASURES AND HAND OVER THE OFFENDER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE.

7. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE HOSTAGE CRISIS BEGAN, THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO CRITICIZE IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES FOR ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY THINK THAT THE ELECTION OF BANI-SADR AS PRESIDENT OF IRAN PORTENDS A MODERATION OF ANTI-U.S. FEELING. THE TUDEH PARTY, REFLECTING SOVIET THINKING, BACKED ANOTHER CANDIDATE, AND THE SOVIET-SPONSORED "NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN" OMITTED BANI-SADR AS AN ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE.

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~~THIS IS POSSIBLY AS A RESULT OF THE LEAK OF THE EXTRACTION OF THE ANDERS PARTY FROM TEHRAN. THIS OFFICE IS PREPARING A SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT ON POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 04 DR

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NNNN

~~SECRET~~

MSG404

DTG: 301330Z JAN 80

A
FM: JIF/J2
TO: [REDACTED] S2
[REDACTED] S2
TSOW/A2
HELO/M2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

H - H 132

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1236
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 CCL COMMISSIONED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources
JS, DIA

1. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH VOWED TO MAKE CANADA PAY FOR SMUGGLING SIX U.S. DIPLOMATS OUT OF IRAN, "SOONER OR LATER, SOMEWHERE IN THE WORLD, CANADA WILL PAY FOR THE ACTION THEY HAVE TAKEN," GHOTBZADEH SAID IN A STATEMENT TO JOURNALISTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE CLANDESTINE DEPARTURE OF THE SIX AMERICANS, WHO LEFT THE COUNTRY ON CANADIAN PASSPORTS, WOULD VERY PROBABLY MAKE CONDITIONS WORSE FOR THE 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. NEVERTHELESS, GHOTBZADEH INDICATED IRAN WOULD NOT FORMALLY BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CANADA. WE HAVE NO WORD ON THE REACTION TO THIS AFFAIR ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF U.S. CHARGE LAINGEN AT THE MFA.

2. THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY TODAY DEMANDED TO KNOW HOW SIX EMBASSY STAFF, POSING AS CANADIAN DIPLOMATS, COULD SLIP OUT OF IRAN AT THE WEEKEND WITHOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S KNOWLEDGE. A STUDENT SPOKESMAN TOLD REUTER EARLY TODAY: "THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MUST KNOW THE NUMBER OF DIPLOMATS IN IRAN, SO HOW COME MORE THAN THE KNOWN NUMBER OF CANADIAN DIPLOMATS WERE ABLE TO LEAVE?" THE STUDENT SPOKESMAN SAID THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE TREATMENT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY HOSTAGES AND SAID THE STUDENTS ANTICIPATED NO REPRISALS AGAINST CANADIAN CITIZENS STILL IN IRAN.

3. IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK HAS SENT A ONE-SENTENCE INSTRUCTION TO MAJOR AMERICAN BANKS ADVISING THEM THAT ALL OPERATING LICENSES HAVE BEEN REVOKED. THIS MEANS THE BANKS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES IN TEHRAN. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS MOVE NOW IS NIL SINCE THE BANKS HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR STAFF SOMETIME AGO. THE ORDER WILL SEVER A LINE OF COMMUNICATION AND WILL COMPLICATE FUTURE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE BANKING AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES.

4.

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(A) "FBIS NOTES THIS MORNING THAT IMAM KHOMEINI HAS CALLED ON THE ENTIRE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO COLLABORATE WITH BANI-SADR AS THE FIRST IRANIAN PRESIDENT."

~~SECRET~~

6. THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF BANI-SADR IS PROVIDED AS BACKGROUND.

(A) THE 46-YEAR-OLD SON OF A MULLAH, BANI-SADR OWES HIS APPARENT VICTORY PRIMARILY TO SPLITS IN THE SHIA MUSLIM CLERGY -- HE WAS ENDORSED BY MANY INFLUENTIAL CLERICS WHILE OTHERS, INCLUDING AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, BACKED OTHER CANDIDATES. BANI-SADR ALSO DID WELL AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS, WHICH RESPECTS HIS WESTERN EDUCATION AND 15 YEARS' RESIDENCE IN PARIS. HIS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS ARE EXCELLENT -- HE SUPPORTED FORMER PRIME MINISTER MOSSADEGH IN THE 1950S, WAS EXILED IN 1963, AND FIRST CONTACTED KHOMEINI IN 1966. DURING HIS YEARS IN FRANCE HE DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF ANTI-SHAH GROUPS, INCLUDING LEFTISTS AND PALESTINIAN ACTIVISTS.

(B) BANI-SADR IS BEST KNOWN AS A RADICAL THEORETICIAN OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS. HIS VAGUELY FORMULATED VIEWS INCLUDE NATIONALIZING INDUSTRY, INCREASING EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURE, ABOLISHING INTEREST RATES, AND SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILING OIL EXPORTS TO REDUCE IRAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WEST.

(C) ALTHOUGH HE WAS ONE OF KHOMEINI'S PRINCIPAL AIDES DURING THE AYATOLLAH'S RESIDENCE IN PARIS, BANI-SADR'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI HAS BEEN AMBIVALENT. HE APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT AN OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNED TO IRAN, BUT HE WORKED BEHIND THE SCENES TO IMPLEMENT HIS ECONOMIC THEORIES. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT HE DOES NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH KHOMEINI'S CLERICAL ASSOCIATES AND THAT HE REGARDS THEM AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AMATEURS.

(D) BANI-SADR HAS DISAGREED WITH KHOMEINI ON A WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES. HIS RESIGNATION AS FOREIGN MINISTER LAST NOVEMBER WAS THE DIRECT RESULT OF CROSSING KHOMEINI OVER THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. BANI-SADR LONG HAS HELD THAT THE HOSTAGE ISSUE DISTRACTS THE NATION FROM ITS REAL PROBLEMS. HE MADE LITTLE MENTION OF THE HOSTAGES DURING THE CAMPAIGN, SAYING ONLY THAT THE CRISIS SHOULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY, EITHER BY RELEASING THE HOSTAGES OR PUNISHING THEM.

(E) BANI-SADR'S FIRST TASK WILL BE TO ORGANIZE HIS SUPPORTERS TO WIN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS FOR THE 270-MEMBER PARLIAMENT OR MAJLES. HE WILL ALSO HAVE TO CHOOSE A PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, AND MAY REPLACE FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEBZADEH SOON. HE IS LIKELY TO FACE STRONG OPPOSITION FROM SENIOR CLERICS, INCLUDING BEHESHTI, WHO HAVE NO INTENTION OF SURRENDERING POWER. WHILE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MAY SOON BE FORMALLY ABOLISHED, ITS MEMBERS WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE KHOMEINI AND MAY FUNCTION AS A KITCHEN CABINET. SENIOR CLERICS WILL ALSO DOMINATE THE COUNCIL OF GUARDIANS, COMMITTEE OF CLERGymEN AND LAWYERS SOON TO BE APPOINTED BY KHOMEINI TO OVERSEE THE MAJLES.

(F) HE IS ALSO LIKELY TO FACE LEFTIST OPPOSITION. THE PRO-SOVIET TUDEH PARTY, FOR EXAMPLE, BACKED ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY CANDIDATE HABIBI AND PROBABLY HAS BEEN ANGERED BY BANI-SADR'S PLEDGE TO ASSIST THE AFGHAN REBELS. THE MARXIST FEDAYEEN CAN BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE ANYONE WHO ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER.

(G) KHOMEINI, OF COURSE, WILL CONTINUE TO INTERFERE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CAN REMOVE THE PRESIDENT AT ANY TIME UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. NONETHLESS, HE WILL HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT BANI-SADR, UNLIKE FORMER PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, HAS DEMONSTRATED WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT INDEPENDENT OF THE AYATOLLAH.

(H) THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ARE AWARE THAT BANI-SADR HOPES TO END THE HOSTAGE CRISIS QUICKLY. THEY UNDOUBTEDLY ARE NOT PLEASED WITH HIS APPARENT ELECTION VICTORY AND MIGHT MAKE AN EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM OR MAKE THE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE.

(I) AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE AND FIT, HE WILL BE THE SINGLE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURE IN IRAN. THE AYATOLLAH'S VISION OF THE REVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH BANI-SADR WILL HAVE TO WORK. IF KHOMEINI DIES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BANI-SADR'S TASK WOULD PROBABLY BE OVERWHELMING. THE GOVERNMENT IS TOO FRAGILE TO MAKE THE TRANSITION TO HIS LEADERSHIP AT THIS POINT, AND NONE OF THE SENIOR CLERICS IS CAPABLE OF ACCEDING TO THE AYATOLLAH'S MANTLE. IN THE POWER STRUGGLE THAT WOULD FOLLOW KHOMEINI'S DEATH, THE LEFT, THE MILITANTS, AND THE MINORITIES WOULD MANEUVER FOR THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE.

MSG400

DTG 292005Z JAN 80
FM: JTF
TO: JTF 4A

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DELTA
I SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H - H133

SUBJ: INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE TO IRAN, 19-25 JANUARY

THE FOLLOWING CIVIL AIR CARRIERS PROVIDED SCHEDULED AIR SERVICE
TO/WITHIN IRAN BETWEEN 19 AND 25 JANUARY:

19 JANUARY-AIR FRANCE, ALITALIA, ARIANA (AFGHANISTAN),
BRITISH AIRWAYS, CAAC (CHINA), GULF AIR (BAHRAIN), IBERIA (SPAIN),
IRAN AIR, ALIA (JORDAN), KLM (NETHERLANDS), KUWAIT AIRWAYS, LUFTHANSA,
SWISSAIR.

20 JANUARY-AIR FRANCE, ARIANA, BRITISH AIRWAYS, IRAN AIR, JAL
(JAPAN), KUWAIT AIRWAYS, PIA (PAKISTAN), SABENA (BELGIUM), ONE
UNIDENTIFIED CARRIER.

21 JANUARY-AIR FRANCE, IRAN AIR, IRAQI AIR, ALIA, KLM, SABENA,
SWISSAIR, SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES.

22 JANUARY-AIR FRANCE, AIR INDIA, BRITISH AIRWAYS, GULF AIR,
IRAN AIR, JAL, LUFTHANSA, TAROM (ROMANIA), ONE UNIDENTIFIED CARRIER.

23 JANUARY-BRITISH AIRWAYS, IRAN AIR, LUFTHANSA, SWISSAIR.

24 JANUARY-IRAN AIR, KUWAIT AIRWAYS, MALEV (HUNGARY), ONE
UNIDENTIFIED CARRIER.

25 JANUARY-AIR FRANCE, ALITALIA, IRAN AIR, SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES.

REVW 29JAN 00

[REDACTED]

Classified by 22 Jul 92
DDO/NMC
Declassify n: OADR
Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL
22 Jul 92

MNNN


~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A6570~~

#134

MSG399

DTG 291600Z JAN 80

FM: JTF
TO: DELTA

 I SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DECI EX DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON DAOR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources


SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. FINAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TODAY RELEASED THE FINAL RESULTS OF IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. OUT OF 14 MILLION VOTES CAST, BANI-SADR RECEIVED ALMOST 11 MILLION (75.7 PERCENT). MADANI CAME IN SECOND WITH OVER 2 MILLION VOTES (14.6 PERCENT). HAEIBI, WITH 700,000 VOTES (4.8 PERCENT), WAS A DISTANT THIRD. GHOTBZADEH AND OTHERS WERE MERE ASTERISKS (LESS THAN 1 PERCENT). AS A MATTER OF FACT, GHOTBZADEH GARNERED LESS THAN 50,000 VOTES (0.3 PERCENT) AND RAN 7TH.

2. THE MILITANTS, WHILE SAYING THEY APPROVED OF BANI-SADR AS THE POPULAR CHOICE FOR PRESIDENT, INSISTED ON THEIR RIGHT TO DISAGREE WITH HIS VIEWS. THE MILITANTS COUNTERED BANI-SADR'S CRITICISM OF THEM AS TRYING TO BE A SECOND GOVERNMENT, BY SAYING THAT "ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REVOLUTION IS THAT ALL THE DECISIONS SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE MADE THROUGH GOVERNMENT CHANNELS."

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN BANI-SADR AND THE MILITANTS STARTED LAST SATURDAY WHEN THE MILITANTS CONDEMNED IRANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. NOW THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN CRITICAL STATEMENTS ON PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE FROM THE POWERFUL QOM THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AND OTHER MAJOR NEWSPAPERS IN IRAN. SEVERAL THOUSAND STUDENTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE MARCHED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE CONFERENCE, CALLING IT AN AMERICAN PLOT.

3. A MEXICAN TELEVISION CREW WAS ATTACKED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON IN TEHRAN WHILE FILMING A DEMONSTRATION OF THE MUJAHEDIN, THE LEFTIST ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS BEING HELD IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY WHEN A RIVAL GROUP, BELIEVED TO BELONG TO "RELIGIOUS COMMITTEES," ATTACKED THE DEMONSTRATORS AND THE MEXICAN CREW WHICH WAS FILMING THE INCIDENTS, FBIS REPORTS.

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A6570~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12336
CONDUCTED ON 23 July 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DCLB 2X-DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0AOP
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG386
281700Z JAN 80
FM: JTF
TO: ██████████
1.80W
SFOD
HELO

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: IRANIAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES MOUNT

H - H 138

PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THERE WERE NO
SURVIVORS AMONG THE PASSENGERS OR CREW(D).

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 0AOP

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

MSG 382
281315Z JAN 80
FM: JTF/J-2
TO: SFOD
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I SOW
HELO DET

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-4139

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 72
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC-RM
U/DCL/5 DOWNGRADED TO 1-2
REVIEW ON 6 Aug 72
DENIED FROM multiple sources

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S CONDITION WAS REPORTED TO HAVE IMPROVED LAST NIGHT. DOCTORS AT TEHRAN'S MEHDI REZA HOSPITAL, WHERE HE WAS TAKEN LAST WEDNESDAY NIGHT, SAID THEY EXPECTED TO MOVE HIM OUT OF THE INTENSIVE CARE WARD WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

2. MEANWHILE, AS THE IRANIAN LEADER'S HEALTH REMAINS QUESTIONABLE BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANEUVERING FOR POLITICAL POWER APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN.

3. FINANCE MINISTER BANI-SADR'S ABILITY TO CAPTURE AN IMPRESSIVE SHARE OF THE VOTES EXTENDS TO THE PROVINCES AS WELL AS THE URBAN AREAS. IN KHUZISTAN, THE OIL CENTER OF IRAN, BANI-SADR HAS GARNERED 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE. FORMER NAVY CHIEF AND KHUZISTAN GOVERNOR, ADMIRAL MADANI, IS ONLY A DISTANT SECOND IN THE PROVINCIAL VOTING WITH 16 PERCENT. THE CLERGY'S CANDIDATE, HASSAN HABIBI, HAS DONE NO BETTER IN KHUZISTAN THAN IN TEHRAN. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH'S SHOWING HAS BEEN A STATISTICAL AND POLITICAL DISASTER.

4. BANI-SADR ANNOUNCED THAT HE IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PARALLEL GOVERNMENT IN THE FORM OF THE MILITANTS WHO ARE HOLDING THE 50 AMERICANS HOSTAGES. IN A RADIO-TELEVISION INTERVIEW HE SAID, "THE MILITANTS, WHO HAVE BECOME NATIONAL HEROES AFTER SEIZING THE EMBASSY, ARE FREE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS THERE TO GOVERN." BANI-SADR'S CRITICISM WAS DIRECTED AT A MILITANT STATEMENT ON SATURDAY WHICH ATTACKED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN ISLAMABAD.

5. SPEAKING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, BANI-SADR RETREATED FROM HIS CONCILIATORY REMARKS YESTERDAY ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. HE NOTED THAT THE VERSION CARRIED BY REUTER DID NOT PROPERLY REFLECT HIS VIEWS. ACCORDING TO BANI-SADR, THE MOMENT THE U.S. DESISTS FROM ITS EXPANSIONIST POLICY, "IT WILL BE A DIFFERENT MATTER," MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT A SOLUTION WILL BE ATTAINABLE. RETURNING AGAIN TO THIS THEME LATER IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE, BANI-SADR SAID THAT WHEN THE U.S. DECIDES TO TELL THE AMERICAN NATION AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD THAT IT IS GOING TO DESIST FROM ITS DOMINATION OVER OTHER NATIONS AND WHEN IT CONCEDES THE RIGHT OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO PURSUE CRIMINALS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, THEN AT THAT MOMENT THE GROUND FOR THE PROBLEM'S SOLUTION WILL ALSO HAVE BEEN PREPARED.

6. ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' OBJECTIONS TO IRAN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE CONFERENCE ALSO DEBATE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAS FINALLY BEEN RESOLVED BY EXPANDING THE AGENDA TO COVER THE QUESTION OF "EXTERNAL PRESSURES AGAINST THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES." SOURCES ALSO EXPECT SHARP DEBATE OVER A RESOLUTION DEALING WITH U.S./IRANIAN RELATIONS AND THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

7. ACCORDING TO CHARLES LAINGEN, THE IRANIANS ARE PLANNING TO HOLD A LARGE CELEBRATION ON FEBRUARY 10. THE DAY WOULD COMMEMORATE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE 1500TH YEAR OF ISLAM.

8. JOHN THOMAS, A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, PLANS TO MAKE HIS SECOND VISIT TO TEHRAN LATER THIS WEEK. THOMAS WILL BE CARRYING LETTERS AND MESSAGES FOR THE HOSTAGES FROM THEIR FAMILIES.

REF ID: A8 JAN 80

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MT
OK GO GO
KXX

MSG379

H - #140

271930Z JAN 80

FM: JTF
TO: (1 SOW) A2
HELO DET/M2
INFO: DELTA/S2
S2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: ROUTE ANALYSIS

1. LISTS OF SELECTED GENDARMERIE STATIONS CLOSE TO FLIGHT ROUTES HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROVIDED TO FLYING ELEMENTS BY COURIER. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS, LISTING GENDARMERIE POSTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WILL BE PROVIDED BY COURIER. REVIEW OF DIA ROUTE ANALYSIS REVEALS FOLLOWING GENDARMERIE LOCATIONS ARE PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO REPRESENTATIVE FLIGHT ROUTES.

2. C-130 ROUTE, COAST-IN TO TEHRAN:

BANDAR DEYLM POST	30 04 00N	050 10 00E	6-10 GENDARME
ORGAN POST	32 42 36N	050 24 36E	6-10 GENDARME
DARAN COMPANY	32 59 30N	050 24 00E	6-10 GENDARME
GANJEXHAN POST	33 30 36N	050 27 36E	6-10 GENDARME
MAHALAT COMPANY	33 55 00N	050 27 00E	60 GENDARME
RAMJERD POST	34 23 00N	050 22 00E	6-10 GENDARME
TAF-ROOD POST	34 44 00N	050 30 00E	6-10 GENDARME

3. C-130 ROUTE, COAST-IN TO NAIN:

ARDAKAN POST	30 16 00N	051 59 00E	6-10 GENDARME
ABARQU POST	31 08 00N	053 20 00E	6-10 GENDARME

4. HELO ROUTE, COAST-IN TO NAIN:

KOOKSAR POST	25 25 00N	059 04 30E	6-10 GENDARME
RAHMAT-ABAD POST	28 39 30N	058 59 00E	6-10 GENDARME
KESHIT POST	29 44 00N	058 18 30E	6-10 GENDARME
SHAFID-ABAD POST	30 32 30N	057 47 30E	6-10 GENDARME
SAGAND POST	32 32 24N	055 11 24E	6-10 GENDARME

REVV 27 JAN 10

Classified by
DDO NMIC 20 Jan 92
Declassify by: DAD

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Downgraded to
CONFIDENTIAL
DDO NMIC

MSG370

DTG 261510Z JAN 80

FM: JTF

TO: [REDACTED]

1. SONG

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE VOTES IN IRAN'S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE NOT YET IN, FINANCE MINISTER BANI-SADR HAS CLAIMED VICTORY AFTER RECEIVING APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE VOTES IN TEHRAN. HE CLAIMED HIS FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAN'S BATTERED ECONOMY. BANI-SADR SUPPORTS WIDESPREAD NATIONALIZATION, ELIMINATION OF INTEREST RATES, AND A RETURN OF THE URBAN POOR TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY STATED HE WOULD SEEK TO BRING AN END TO THE SIEGE AT THE US EMBASSY.

3. UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM TODAY WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE U.S. AND IRAN AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED CRIMES OF THE FORMER SHAH. HE SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM IN REACHING A FINAL AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURE FOR THIS IS THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE IRANIANS WANT THE INQUIRY AND A UN RESOLUTION ON THE MATTER TO TAKE PLACE FIRST; THE U.S. WANTS THE HOSTAGES RELEASED FIRST. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE IS CONTINUING TO CONSULT WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT IN IRAN WILL BE HELPFUL IN WORKING OUT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION.

H #141
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

H6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ACCORDING
UNTIL SUNDAY, 27 JANUARY (UNCLASSIFIED).

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11. AN OFFICIAL OF A US AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER REPORTED CONTACT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAN AIR, THE NATIONAL AIR LINE OF IRAN, SEEKING SPARE PARTS FOR USE ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND INQUIRING AS TO POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF SPARE JT9D JET ENGINES. AFTER BEING REFUSED, SOME IRANIANS APPROACHED PRATT & WHITNEY OF CANADA WITH A SIMILAR REQUEST WHICH WAS ALSO REFUSED. SOURCE INDICATE IRANIANS WERE "ALMOST FRANTIC" IN THEIR REQUEST. US AIRCRAFT COMPANY OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT, AS OF SEPTEMBER 1979, IRAN HAD 20 SPARE JT9D ENGINES ON HAND. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF IRAN WILL USE THESE ENGINES FOR NEED PARTS. IRAN HAS APPROACHED MANY OTHER POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR PARTS FOR ITS BOEING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SINCE DECEMBER.
REV 26 JAN 80

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
O'DR DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG366
292200Z JAN 80

FM JTF/J2
TO 1 SOU/A2
S2
1 SOU/A/S2

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-H142

SUBJ: REACTION FORCES VIC MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD

(1) **GENERAL:** NO KNOWN REGULAR IRANIAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE STATIONED AT MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD.

(2) **QOM/MANZARIYEH AMMO DEPOTS:** THERE IS PROBABLY A SECURITY ELEMENT OF COMPANY (-) STRENGTH ASSIGNED TO THE DEPOT (34-38-39N 050-48-00E). THE REACTION TIME COULD BE AS LITTLE AS 30 MINUTES IF A REACTION FORCE AND VEHICLES HAD BEEN PREDESIGNATED.

(3) **GENDARMERIE:** SIX GENDARMERIE POSTS ARE LOCATED WITHIN 30 KM OF MANZARIYEH: THE CLOSEST IS KAUSH-KOGART (35-07-00N 050-54-00E) SOME 20 KM NORTH. THE OTHERS ARE QOM-ROOD (34-44-00N 051-04-00E), TAE-ROOD (34-39-00N 050-52-00E), SAEHV (35-01-00N 050-51-00E), ZARAND (34-16-00N 050-26-00E), JAFAR-ABAD (34-47-00N 050-34-00E). EACH OF THESE HAS A NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 6-10 GENDARMES ABOUT HALF OF WHOM MIGHT BE ON DUTY AT NIGHT. ALTHOUGH PERSONNEL FROM ANY OR ALL OF THE POSTS MIGHT REACT TO AN ASSAULT ON MANZARIYEH, THEIR LEVEL OF MORALE AND TRAINING IS ASSESSED AS LOW AND ANY ATTEMPT AT INTERVENTION WOULD BE MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE. GENDARMERIE UNITS HAVE THEIR OWN ORGANIC RADIOS AND DEDICATED NETS. MOST WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL TELEPHONES.

(4) **REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS:** IN QOM PROPER (34-39-00N 050-52-00E) THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2000 MEMBERS OF KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS. THESE ARE PRIMARILY TASKED WITH SECURITY FOR THE CITY. GUARD UNITS ARE NORMALLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATIONAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES. THE OPERATIONAL UNITS - THOSE WITH MORE MILITARY TRAINING - PERFORM COMBAT TYPE DUTIES. THESE GUARD UNITS CAN BE EXPECTED TO REACT TO ANY FIGHTING IN MANZARIYEH ONCE IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO THREAT TO THE HOLY CITY, THE AYATOLLAH, OR MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. NIGHT MOVEMENT ACROSS THE MORE THAN 30 KM BETWEEN QOM AND MANZARIYEH WOULD PROBABLY BE CONFUSED AND WOULD INVOLVE TRANSPORT BY THIN-SKIN VEHICLES. AT BEST, IT WILL REQUIRE AN HOUR OR MORE BEFORE THE FIRST GUARDSMEN COULD INTERVENE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES MEMBERS OF THE GUARD ARE ARMED WITH ANYTHING LARGER THAN INDIVIDUAL SMALL ARMS BUT IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT LIGHT CREW-SERVED WEAPONS COULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED. THERE ARE

[REDACTED] RIVER HAS BEEN USED AS A DIVISIONAL LINE FOR TANKS.

[REDACTED] PRIMARY USERS OF THE RANGE HAVE BEEN BATTALIONS
OF THE 16TH ARMORED DIVISION AND SHAHROXI-BASED GARRA'S.

[REDACTED] MULABAD IS AN IRANIAN BASE WHICH HAS NO TANKS OR BIGGER BUILDING STRUCTURES. TANK BATTALIONS FROM THE 16TH ARMORED NORMALLY TRANSIT FROM THEIR HOME BASE AT QAZVIN IN TRUCKS AND UTILIZE TRANSPORTERS FOR THE CHIEFTAIN TANKS WHILE AT MULABAD THEY LIVE IN THE FIELD.

[REDACTED] THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THESE UNITS ACTUALLY MOVED TO THE PROPOSED TRAINING SITE EITHER IN DECEMBER OR JANUARY. BAD WEATHER AND THE CONTINUING POLITICAL TURMOIL IN IRAN MAY HAVE RESULTED IN CURTAILMENT OF SUCH ACTIVITY. THE CURRENT DIA ASSESSMENT OF THE 16TH DIVISION IS THAT IT IS AT 50-60 PERCENT OF PERSONNEL T/O WITH ALL KNOWN MAJOR UNITS IN GARRISON VIC QAZVIN APPROX 175 KM NW OF MANZARIYEH.

(6) AIR ELEMENTS: WHILE THERE ARE NO IRANIAN AIR FORCE UNITS AT MANZARIYEH, FIGHTERS COULD REACT FROM BOTH SHAHROXI AND MEHRABAAD.

[REDACTED] IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ARMED WITH AIR-TO-GROUND ORDNANCE. THEY DO HOWEVER POST A THREAT TO US AIR OPERATIONS, BOTH FIXED WING AND HELOS, IF COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, PARTICULARLY GCI RADARS, REMAIN OPERATIONAL.

[REDACTED] IRANI AIRCRAFT COULD BE OVER [REDACTED] WITHIN [REDACTED] AFTER LAUNCH IF PROPERLY VECTORED. ADDITIONARLLY, HELICOPTERS FROM [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ARE WITHIN FLYING RANGE OF MANZARIYEH AREA. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THESE WOULD BE ARMED AND WE HAVE NO INFORMATION WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THAT.

FMW 25 JAN 80

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI/MCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 0ADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

HOW NOW PLS
KFBFB GA TFC
KMN MIN PLS

MSG358
251315Z JAN 80
FM JTF
TO DELTA
1 SOW

H - H145

A [redacted] ~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

2. IRAN HAS ASKED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO CONVENE IN ISLAMABAD ON 26 JANUARY. THE REQUEST IS OSTENSIBLY TO AVOID HAVING THE CONFERENCE OPEN ON THE SAME DAY THAT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS ARE NORMALIZED AND TO PRESERVE ISLAMIC UNITY. A PRESS REPORT OF THE 24TH FROM ISLAMABAD INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN AND THE ORGANIZERS OF THE CONFERENCE DID NOT SEEM WILLING TO CHANGE THE DATE (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. IRANIAN CONDITIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES STATE THAT NOT ONLY MUST AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE BE FORMED TO TRY THE SHAH, BUT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MUST ENDORSE ITS VERDICT OF GUILTY.

4. DOCTORS TREATING KHOMEINI HAVE STATED THAT HIS CONDITION IS SATISFACTORY AND IMPROVING. BLOOD TESTS AND CHEST X-RAYS HAVE BEEN NORMAL. THE TEAM OF PHYSICIANS HOPE THAT KHOMEINI CAN BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT TO THE ORDINARY HEART TREATMENT UNIT SOON. KHOMEINI HAS HAD NUMEROUS VISITORS TODAY, AMONG THEM PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BANI-SADR.

5. A TEN-MINUTE LONG MESSAGE FROM KHOMEINI HAS BEEN BROADCAST REPEATEDLY TODAY ON THE RADIO. IN THIS MESSAGE KHOMEINI SAYS THAT HIS CONDITION IS NOT BAD AND THAT DOCTORS SHOULD GIVE AS MUCH ATTENTION TO THE SLUM DWELLERS OF TEHRAN AS THEY DO TO HIM. KHOMEINI'S MAIN POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE EVERYONE GO TO THE POLLS AND VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. THE FIVE MAJOR CANDIDATES HAVE RESPONDED TO A UNITY CALL BY KHOMEINI BY PLEDGING TO SUPPORT WHICHEVER ONE OF THEM IS ELECTED. THE MILITANTS OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY HAVE LABELED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ADMIRAL AHMAD MADANI AS "AMERICA'S CANDIDATE." MADANI HAS REJECTED THE MILITANTS' CHARGE THAT, IN LEAGUE WITH THE U.S. HE HELPED GENERAL PALIZBAN FLEE IRAN, BUT HE YESTERDAY DECLINED TO GIVE AL FULLER STATEMENT TO JOURNALISTS BECAUSE OF A GOVERNMENT ORDER BANNING CAMPAIGNING ON ELECTION EVE.

8. TEHRAN RADIO HAS BROADCAST AN EDITORIAL IN THE LOCAL NEWSPAPER HOMJURI-YE-ISLAMI CHARACTERIZING THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN ISLAMABAD SOON AS AN ATTEMPT BY U.S. IMPERIALISM TO ASSIST THE SOVIET UNION IN SUPPRESSING THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION. THE EDITORIAL LABELS THE CONFERENCE "A CONSPIRACY OF THE EAST AND WEST AGAINST THE STRUGGLING MUSLIMS OF THE REGION."

9. BRUCE LAINGEN TOLD THE IWG TODAY THAT HE AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES WILL BE VISITED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY A DOCTOR ON SATURDAY. NONE OF THEM HAVE ANY MAJOR MEDICAL PROBLEM, BUT IT IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT THAT THEY WILL HAVE ACCESS TO A PHYSICIAN. WE HAD REQUESTED THIS FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *OADR*

NNNN

REF ID: E2

INDIA
PUNJAB
LAHORE
KARACHI
MADRAS
CHENNAI
KOLKATA
NEW DELHI
MADRAS
CHENNAI
KOLKATA

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

241530Z JAN 80

FM: JTF
TO: 11 SOW
[REDACTED] RANGERS
SFOD
[REDACTED]

H-#146

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 24 JANUARY 1980

1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS CANCELLED ALL ENGAGEMENTS UNTIL 9 FEB, THEREBY EXTENDING HIS CURRENT TWO WEEK REST PERIOD WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO END 27 JANUARY.

[REDACTED]
KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN LEAVES OF
ABSENCE FROM MOST AFFAIRS OF STATE BEFORE, BUT THIS IS THE LONGEST
PERIOD OF SECLUSION AND MAY INDICATE SERIOUS HEALTH PROBLEMS.
[REDACTED]

C. BRUCE LAING TOLD THE Iwg THAT WHEN REPORTS OF THE ARREST OF THE FORMER SHAH WERE RELEASED IN TEHRAN AROUND 1:00 P.M. LOCAL TIME TODAY THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF CELEBRATION IN THE STREETS, INCLUDING AN INCESSANT HONKING OF HORNS.

2. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONCERN IN IRAN FOR KHOMEINI'S HEALTH AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS REPORTEDLY IN ATTENDANCE IN QOM. ALSO THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY HAVE CALLED FOR A NATIONAL DAY OF PRAYER ON 24 JANUARY. WHILE IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THE EXACT NATURE OF KHOMEINI'S ILLNESS IS AT THIS TIME, IT MAY BE MORE SERIOUS THAN THE IRANIANS ARE LETTING ON. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE ON-GOING POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP WILL INTENSIFY AS KHOMEINI'S HEALTH FAILS, AND WHEN HE DIES ANY SEVNLANCE OF UNITY IN THE COUNTRY MAY VERY WELL END COMPLETELY. AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO CLEAR CUT SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI, WHICH SPELLS CHAOS FOR IRAN AFTER HE IS GONE. A STRONG PRESIDENT WILL TRY TO HOLD THINGS TOGETHER, BUT THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE HAD A TASTE OF POWER, AND THEY WILL NOT LET GO TOO READILY.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 2256
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA/NMC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

3. EARLY ON 23 JANUARY THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ANNOUNCED THAT PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ROYO HAD PERSONALLY CALLED IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GOTBZADEH TO INFORM HIM THAT PANAMA HAD ARRESTED THE SHAH AND WAS AWAITING DOCUMENTATION FROM IRAN IN ORDER TO BEGIN EXTRADITION PROCEDURES. THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT DENIED THAT THE SHAH WAS UNDER ARREST. HOWEVER AFTER AN EMERGENCY MEETING, PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ARISTIDES ROYO STATED THAT THE SHAH WAS "UNDER THE CARE OF PANAMANIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES... IN RELATION WITH THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN THAT PROCEEDINGS BE STARTED FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THE EX-SHAH." LATER THE OFFICIAL PANAMANIAN SPOKESMAN DESCRIBED THE SHAH AS BEING "ABSOLUTELY FREE" AND NO IN DETENTION OR UNDER HOUSE ARREST. PANAMANIAN RADIO LATER DESCRIBED HIM AS CONTINUING TO ENJOY FULL FREEDOM "NATURALLY UNDER CUSTODY (BAJO CUSTODIA) WHICH IS NOT THE SAME THING AS ARREST (DETERRIDO)".

THE FOLLOWING IS A TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PRESIDENT ROYO SENT TO THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION:

MR. MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI REMAINS UNDER THE CARE (CUIDADO) OF PANAMA'S SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND THE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN ADOPTED IN OUR NATIONAL TERRITORY. REGARDING THE EXTRADITION OF THE FORMER SHAH, WE HEREBY INFORM YOU THAT CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 4 OF LAW 44 OF 1930 ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS, WHICH MUST BE LEGALIZED AND DULY AUTHENTICATED, ARE NECESSARY:

A COPY OF THE ARREST ORDER ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF IRAN;

ALL THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO VERIFY THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON BEING ASKED FOR;

IF THE ABOVE DOCUMENTS ARE PRESENTED WITHIN 60 DAYS, THE EXTRADITION DEMAND WILL BE ACCEPTED AS FORMAL AND THE EXECUTIVE WILL PROCEED TO CONSIDER IT AND LATER DECIDE ON IT.

WE TRUST THAT PANAMA'S ATTITUDE, WHICH TRIES TO ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY AGREEING TO PROCESS THE DEMANDS, WILL CAUSE THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAN TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE AND RELEASE THE HOSTAGES SINCE THIS IS SERIOUSLY AFFECTING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG THE NATIONS.

THE NOTE IS SIGNED BY PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ARISTIDES ROYO.

PANAMA REPORTEDLY WILL HAVE 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS TO DECIDE WHETHER THE SHAH WILL BE EXTRADITED.

GOI HAS DECIDED TO RELEASE COPIES OF CAPTURED EMBASSY DOCUMENTS TO SUBSTANTIATE IRAN'S CHARGES OF SYSTEMATIC SPIONAGE IN IRAN BY THE U.S. THE DOCUMENTS WILL BE SENT MAINLY TO IRANIAN EMBASSIES IN VARIOUS THIRD WORLD AND MOSLEM COUNTRIES IN AN EFFORT TO ENGENDER SUPPORT FOR THE IRANIAN POSITION.

5. ELECTION POSTPONEMENT

THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED. SAVI SAID HAS REFUSED COMMENT, BUT INTERIOR MINISTER RAFSANJANI SAID THAT THE DEEP SNOW BLANKETING IRAN MIGHT FORCE POSTPONEMENT.

MSG 341
230225Z JAN 80
FM: JTF
TO: DELTA

A 1 SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

H-1A8
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVED FROM DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON 04 Oct
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

1. EMBASSY TEHRAN PRESS ATTACHE BARRY ROSEN HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY OF BEING A SPY. ACCORDING TO REUTER, THE MILITANTS CLAIMED THAT THE UNITED STATES PLOTS WILL BECOME CLEAR WHEN "WE PUT HIM ON TRIAL." ROSEN WAS ACCUSED OF CONTACTING THE EDITORS OF BAMDAD, TEHRAN TIMES AND THE NOW DEFUNCT OMID-E-IRAN WHICH THE MILITANTS DESCRIBED AS PUBLICATIONS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. BAMDAD WAS ACCUSED OF BEING RUN BY THE STAFF OF THE FORMER RASTAKHIZ NEWSPAPER. THE MILITANTS ALSO CLAIMED THAT FORMER GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ENTEZAM HAD DISCUSSED IRAN'S "ANTI-AMERICAN" STANCE WITH CHARGE LAINGEN.

3. MOST OBSERVERS REPORTING ON THE IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN STILL CONSIDER FINANCE MINISTER BANI-SADR AS THE FRONT-RUNNER. OTHER CANDIDATES ARE ALSO DOING WELL.

KURDISTAN LEADERS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WILL BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS AS HAVE THE MARXIST FEDAYEEN GUERRILLA GROUP AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT.

THE BALLOTS FOR THE ELECTION WILL NOT LIST THE NAMES OF THE CANDIDATES. THE VOTER WILL HAVE TO WRITE IN THE NAME OF HIS CHOICE. THIS MEANS THAT THE 50 PERCENT OF THE VOTERS WHO ARE ILLITERATE WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN HELP FROM SOMEONE IN CASTING THEIR BALLOT, RISING THE POSSIBILITY OF VOTE SPREADING FRAUD.

5. WINTER WEATHER AND HEAVY SNOW ARE HAMPERING MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE NORTHEAST. THESE CONDITIONS HAVE DELAYED THE ROTATION OF SOME

6.

7.

WHILE [REDACTED] THAT MANY OFFICERS WOULD SUPPORT
BAKHTIAR,
WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION THAT THE ELISTED RANKS WOULD SUPPORT
BAKHTIAR OR ANY OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENT.
REV 23 JAN 00

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION LEVEL E01055
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADING TO _____
REVIEW ON 0402
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG 335
221500Z JAN 80
FM JTF
TO JTF/A
DELTA
1 SOW

A ~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

FROM DOS

GENERALIZATIONS CAN BE MADE BECAUSE THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN SEPARATED IN SMALL GROUPS AND MAY WELL BE SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT TREATMENT BY THE VARIOUS CAPTORS. SOME REPORT IMPROVED CONDITIONS DATING FROM ABOUT MID-DECEMBER, WHILE OTHER REMAIN BOUND. MOST OF THE HOSTAGES ARE KEPT FOUR OR FIVE TO A ROOM, AND HAVE BEEN MOVED SEVERAL TIMES AT NIGHT. WHEN MOVED, THEY ARE TIED AND BLINDFOLDED. THE HOSTAGES APPEAR TO HAVE ACCESS TO BOOKS, OCCASIONAL VISITS BY A PHYSICIAN, AND RARE EXERCISE PERIODS OUTDOORS. THE WORST CONDITION OF THE INCARCERATION APPEARS TO BE THE ENFORCED SILENCE AMONG THE HOSTAGES.

4. IN AN ATTEMPT TO REFOCUS WORLD OPINION ON IRANIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE US AND THEIR EFFORTS TO EXTRADITE THE SHAH, IRAN HAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO MAKE PUBLIC CERTAIN CAPTURED US DOCUMENTS THAT PURPORTEDLY SUBSTANTIATE IRANIAN CLAIMS OF US ESPIONAGE IN IRAN. THE DOCUMENTS WILL BE RELEASED TO IRANIAN EMBASSIES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, TO INCLUDE BANGLADESH.

5. RUMORS THAT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED AFTER THE IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (25 JANUARY) CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE AMONG DIPLOMATS IN TEHRAN.

P2
6. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH INDICATED IN AN INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH RADIO THAT THE FAILURE OF THE UN TO SET UP AN INVESTIGATION INTO CRIMES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE SHAH WOULD DELAY THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. GHOTBZADEH CLAIMS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM HAD AGREED TO INSTITUTE AN INVESTIGATION DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN BUT THAT HE WAS PRESSURED TO RENEGE BY THE UNITED STATES.

7. RECENT REPORTING IN THE PRESS AND ELSEWHERE HAS TENDED TO DEPICT MORE SERIOUS SQUABBLING AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WHILE SOME OF THIS IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UPCOMING ELECTION, THERE APPEARS TO BE DEEPENING DIVISIONS ON SUBJECTS LIKE LOCAL AUTONOMY, THE SOVIET INVASION, AND RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

11. NO SOVIET UNITS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN OR SOUTH CHINA SEA ARE KNOWN/ EXPECTED TO BE OPERATION UNDER EMCCON CONDITIONS. A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE AND A LIGHT FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF USS KITTY HAWK (TG 70.2). AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A NAVAL SUBORDINATED MERCHANT TANKER CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE COMBATANTS.

USS NIMITZ (TG 70.4) IS IN THE CENTRAL ARABIAN SEA CONTINUING A NORTHERLY TRANSIT AND SHOULD ARRIVE IN THE VICINITY OF THE USS MIDWAY AND USS KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS LATER TODAY.

12.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 0ADR

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 June 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL (DOWNGRADED TO) *Secret*
REVIEW ON 0 ADR
DERIVED FROM *multiple sources*

MSG 324
211402Z JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA
T SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-#150

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH EMBASSY MILITANTS THE JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS THERE ARE ABOUT 400 MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY. THE MILITANTS CLAIM THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES REMAIN AT THE EMBASSY, BUT WOULD NOT GIVE THE EXACT NUMBER OF HOSTAGES. ON THE MILITANT'S ORGANIZATION, THE JAPANESE PRESS INDICATES DECISIONS ARE MADE BY A COUNCIL, AND THE MILITANTS ARE DIVIDED INTO GROUPS WHICH SHARE RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. IN A MAJOR CONCESSION TO THE MINORITY GROUPS, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS APPROVED A PLAN TO AMEND IRAN'S ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW THE SUNNI SECT OF ISLAM EQUAL STATUS WITH THE COUNTRY'S MAJORITY SHIITE SECT. KHOMEINI'S PLAN WOULD PLACE A REFERENDUM BEFORE THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WHICH WOULD AMEND ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH STATES: "THE OFFICIAL RELIGION OF IRAN IS ISLAM OF THE SHIITE SECT." THE CLAUSE ABOUT OFFICIAL RELIGION IS BELIEVED TO BE ONE OF THE MAIN CAUSES OF BOTH THE TURKOMAN AND BALUCHI UNREST. IT IS ALSO PART OF THE REASON FOR THE AZERBAIJAN UNREST AND THE RIFT BETWEEN AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI AND KHOMEINI. IF APPROVED, THE AMENDMENT WOULD BE BY FAR THE BIGGEST CONCESSION MADE TO THE MINORITY GROUPS SINCE THE KHOMEINI REGIME CAME TO POWER.
3. AFTER A FOUR DAY DISAPPEARANCE, AYATOLLAH REHESHTI, SECRETARY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, REAPPEARED TIN PUBLIC DENYING HE HAD FALLEN FROM GRACE. AYATOLLAH REHESHTI HAD BEEN RUEMORED TO BE INVOLVED WITH A TERRORIST GROUP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS CLOSE TO KHOMEINI.
4. FELMORS OF DISSENSION AMONG THE CLERGY WERE STRENGTHENED BY AN ATTACK ON THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (IRP) BY HAJATOLESLAM SHEIKH ALI TEHERANI OF NASHAHP. IN A PUBLISHED LETTER TO KHOMEINI, TEHERANI BITTERLY ATTACKED THREE MEMBERS OF THE IRP CENTRAL COMMITTEE; ACCUSING THEM OF TREASON AND FLOTTING TO GRAB POWER BY THE ELECTION OF FORMER IRP CANDIDATE, JALAEDDIN FARSI. FARSI HAS BEEN DECLARED INELIGIBLE TO RUN BECAUSE HIS FATHER WAS NON-IRANIAN, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT FROM REUTER.

5. IN TAERIZ A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN WERE ARRESTED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FOR THEIR PART IN AN ALLEGED COUP PLOT AND FOR CONSPIRACY WITH THE RECENT CLASHES IN THAT CITY. THERE IS NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE COUP, IT SEEMS THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE CONCERNED PROVIDING ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION MOSLEM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY.

6.

7.

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE CLASHES CAUSED NO DEATHS OR INJURIES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY, KITTY HAWK AND NIMITZ TASK GROUPS. A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUES SURVEILLANCE OF USS KITTY HAWK, WHILE A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER REMAINS IN THE VICINITY OF USS MIDWAY. AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A NAVAL SUBORDINATED TANKER CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THOSE COMBATANTS. USS NIMITZ IS IN THE NORTH-CENTRAL INDIAN OCEAN AND WILL COMPLETE AN EIGHTEEN DAY HIGH SPEED TRANSIT FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN. WHEN IT ARRIVES IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA ON 22 JANUARY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED TO SECRET
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO/NMC
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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM REPORTEDLY IS OPTIMISTIC THAT HIS PLAN TO FORM AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE UNDER UN AUSPPICES WILL RESOLVE THE HOSTAGE IMPASSE. IN HIS OPINION, THE ONLY THING HOLDING UP ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE IS THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE HOSTAGES RELEASE. OTHER INTERNATIONAL FIGURES ARE NOT SO OPTIMISTIC.

1.A. WHILE THE IRANIAN POSITION COMMUNICATED TO WALDHEIM MAY PROVE A STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSIONS, A FORMULA MUST BE FOUND THAT NEITHER IMPLIES UNAGREEMENT TO A PRE-DETERMINED OUTCOME TO ANY INQUIRY, NOR RESULTS IN THE HOSTAGES BEING HELD UNTIL THE IRANIANS ARE SATISFIED AS TO THE INQUIRIES RESULT.

2. THE NEXT WEEK SHOULD SEE AN INCREASE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AS THE REMAINING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES INTENSIFY THEIR CAMPAIGNS. LITTLE PROGRESS IS EXPECTED ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IRANIAN REACTION TO THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE.

3. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS APPROVED PLANS TO AMEND IRAN'S STRICT CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW THE SUNNI BRANCH OF THE ISLAMIC RELIGION EQUAL STATUS WITH THE MAJORITY SHI'ITE SECT.

4. ~~[REDACTED]~~

5. FOREIGN MINISTER GOTBAZADEH COMMENTED IN A RECENT INTERVIEW THAT IRAN PLANS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT IRANIAN AIR TO AFGHAN REBELS. THIS IS THE STRONGEST CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN BY AN IRANIAN OFFICIAL, BUT IS IN LINE WITH THE STAND TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS, KHOMEINI BEING THE EXCEPTION, SINCE HE HAS SAID NOTHING.

6. DESPITE PREVIOUS CLAIMS THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, KHOMEINI ON 19 JAN SAID THAT ALL CANDIDATES WHO DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RECENTLY PASSED CONSTITUTION WOULD BE BARRED FROM RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT. THIS APPEARS AIMED AT THE CANDIDATE FOR THE ISLAMIC MARXIST IRANIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLERS.

19 JAN THAT IRAN WOULD REACT "VERY VIGOROUSLY" IF SOVIET-TRAINED BALUCHIS TRY TO INFILTRATE IRAN. THE EMISSARY HAS BEEN VISITING COUNTRIES IN-SOUTH ASIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR THE PAST WEEK. INSPECTING THE CONDITIONS OF MUSLIMS IN THE AREA AND GENERALLY MAKING CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS.

9. HEAVY SNOWFALL IN NORTHWEST IRAN APPARENTLY IS HAMPERING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PROBABLY DAMAGING TROOP MORALE.

10. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]

TWO MAYS FLEW A PROBABLE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION AGAINST THE USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) BATTLE GROUP TODAY. THIS FLIGHT MARKS THE INITIAL SURVEILLANCE EFFORT OF THE ADEN DEPLOYED MAYS AGAINST THE NIMITZ BATTLE GROUP. IT IS LIKELY THE PRESENCE OF THREE CARRIER TASK GROUPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WILL DRAW ADDITIONAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS FROM THESE AIRCRAFT.

RWW 20JAN00

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TO DELTA

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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

H-1155
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DCL DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

4. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TODAY ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD SET FEBRUARY 18 AS THE DEADLINE FOR IRAN TO RESPOND TO CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST IT BY THE UNITED STATES.

5. BBC THIS MORNING CITES ONE OF THE LEADING CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY, FINANCE MINISTER BANI-SADR, AS MAKING A VIGOROUS ATTACK ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN AND THE MUSLIM STATES TO THE SOUTH OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE BBC CORRESPONDENT IN TEHRAN SAYS THAT DESPITE THE ADMINISTRATION'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE UN, BANI-SADR SEEMS DETERMINED TO KEEP IRAN IN THE POLITICAL CENTER. SPEAKING IN ABADAN, IN A CAMPAIGN SPEECH, BANI-SADR REPORTEDLY SAID THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN WAS THAT IRAN IS NOT A REAL NATION AT ALL BUT A COLLECTION OF MINORITIES. THE SOVIET UNION, HE SAID, WANTED IRAN TO BE DIVIDED SO THAT IT COULD GRAB THE DIVIDED PARTS AS IT DID IN AFGHANISTAN AND MAKE ITS WAY TO THE WARM WATER PORTS FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN.

6. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO PRECISE INFORMATION ON PASDARON REACTION TIME, THE PRESS WHICH HAS GIVEN VERY GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE "PASDARON REACTION TIME TO THE AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET EMBASSY TAKEOVERS." THE PRESS ESTIMATED THAT IT TOOK MORE THAN ONE HOUR FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO ARRIVE ON THE SCENE IN THESE INCIDENTS. ~~DATA MUST~~ VIEWED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE "SLOW" REACTION TIME MAY HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED IN BOTH CASES.

~~SECRET~~

7. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT MEXICO MAY INTRODUCE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION LINKING FREEDOM FOR THE US HOSTAGES TO AN INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY ON THE ALLEGED CRIMES OF THE DEPOSED SHAH. MEXICO, WHICH BECAME A SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER IN JANUARY, WAS REPORTED CONSIDERING A PLAN TO BRING THE IRANIAN CRISIS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN.

15. THE WORLD COURT AT THE HAGUE SET 18 FEBRUARY AS THE DEADLINE FOR IRAN TO RESPOND TO CHARGES BY THE US THAT IRAN HAS VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO RELEASE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. TO DATE IRAN HAS BOYCOTTED THE COURT.

16. A FRENCH COURT HAS UPHELD AN INJUNCTION TO TEMPORARILY FREEZE THE BANK ASSETS OF THE CITY BANK OF AMERICA IN FRANCE BASED ON A COMPLAINT BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN. CITY BANK OFFICIALS HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN IRAN'S DOLLAR DEPOSITS UNDER THE US FREEZE OF IRANIAN FUNDS. ~~PW&ISJAMCO~~

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H-#159
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 0 ADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. TEHRAN RADIO CARRIED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY REPORTEDLY SIGNED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH DENYING THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR OR OBTAINED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S AGREEMENT FOR KURT WALDHEIM TO MEDIATE THE US-RAN CRISIS. THE STATEMENT REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "AT NO TIME AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS A SINGLE WORD UTTERED REGARDING MEDIATION AND, IN PRINCIPLE, SUCH A THING HAS NEVER BEEN ACCEPTED OR WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY".

3. JOHN THOMAS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT IS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM TEHRAN WHERE HE WAS ABLE TO COLLECT ABOUT 150 LETTERS FROM THE HOSTAGES -- THOUGH HE DID NOT GET TO SEE ANY OF THE HOSTAGES DIRECTLY. THOMAS HAS INDICATED HE PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE THE LETTERS. THEN, IN ABOUT A WEEK, COLLECT MONEY FROM THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN TO IRAN.

[REDACTED] THE CONTACTS AGREED THAT SANCTIONS WILL ONLY STRENGTHEN KHOMEINI'S HAND AND HARDEN POSITION IN A WAY THAT WILL MAKE A COMPROMISE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

7. OIL MINISTER MOINFAR REAFFIRMED THREATS TO CUT OFF OIL SUPPLIES TO ANY NATION WHICH JOINS IN US SPONSORED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. HE SAID THAT SUPPLIES WITHDRAWN FROM COUNTRIES ENGAGING IN SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE SOLD ELSEWHERE AND THAT NIOC WOULD LOWER ITS PRODUCTION LEVEL TO AS LITTLE AS 1.5 MILLION B/D IF NECESSARY. THE THREAT WAS PARTICULARLY AIMED AT JAPAN, WHICH HAS CONTRACTED TO IMPORT 520-530,000 B/D OF IRANIAN CRUDE IN 1980.

8. THE SOVIET MEDIA HAS NOW DROPPED ITS EARLIER RESTRAINT IN A STREAM OF CHARGES RANGING FROM ACCUSATIONS OF US PREPARATIONS FOR PUNITIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST TEHRAN TO CLAIMS THAT THE US IS TRYING TO SOW DISCORD AMONG THE COUNTRY'S MINORITIES AND BETWEEN "RELIGIOUS AND NONRELIGIOUS FORCES" WHICH OVERTHREW THE SHAH. MOSCOW'S SENSITIVITY WITH REGARD TO ITS OWN UNCERTAIN RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN HAS BEEN underscored in strident TASS rebuttals of western news reports that MOSCOW IS WILLING TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THAT SOVIET TROOPS ON THE IRANIAN-AFGHAN BORDER ARE ADVANCING TO WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF IRANIAN OIL INSTALLATIONS.

INFORMAL AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTAN
AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE A GUARAN
IRAN OR INSTIGATE TRIBAL UNRES
TO RELY SOLELY ON THE SOVIET FOR
THE EVENT OF US MILITARY ACTION
AUTHORITY TO OCCASIONALLY
MEDLY TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE TIME
THERE IS NO CORROBO
AN ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE
ABROGATION OF THE TREATY
LEGALITY FOR THE SOVIET TO BE
DEFENDING IT. THERE HAS BEEN
PROPOSALS.

15. [A SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE KITTY HAWK (TG 70.2)], WHILE A COORDINATED TANKER AND AN INTELLIGENCE SHIP IN THE RANGE OF USS MIDWAY (TG70.2).

WHILE AN
CONTINUES OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE
16. [DURING THE MORNING OF 16 JANUARY, COMBATANTS EXITED THE TSUSHIMA'S
THE NAVAL TASK GROUP, CONSISTING OF
GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES, IS BELIEVED
AUGMENT INDIAN OCEAN FORCES AND
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED THERE.]

AT ADEN WOULD PROVIDE SUPPORT NECESSARY
CONTINUES TOWARDS THE NORTHERN AF

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON JAN 82

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

H - 162

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ALL AMERICAN MEDIA PEOPLE IN IRAN, SAID TO NUMBER 86 MUST LEAVE IRAN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT FRIDAY, JANUARY 18. THE MINISTRY ALSO STATED THAT NO ONE, EITHER OFFICIALLY OR UNOFFICIALLY, HAS PERMISSION TO GATHER NEWS FOR THE AMERICAN MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. THE MINISTRY HAS STARTED AN INVESTIGATION OF BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN MEDIA REPORTING AND WILL DECIDE SOON WHETHER THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN IRAN.

2. [REDACTED]

3. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IS REPORTED BY REUTER TO HAVE SAID THAT UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM MUST TAKE THE NEXT STEPS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US. GHOTBZADEH APPARENTLY EXPECTS THE U.N. TO ACCEPT AN IRANIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION THAT WOULD VISIT IRAN TO LEARN DETAILS OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE US AND THE DEPOSED SHAH. ACCORDING TO GHOTBZADEH, IF SUCH A COMMISSION FOUND THE CHARGES JUSTIFIED, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THE SHAH RESIDES TO CONSIDER A REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT HE SENT PANAMA'S PRESIDENT ROYO A LETTER LAST SATURDAY (JAN 12) REITERATING IRAN'S FIRST REQUEST FOR THE SHAH'S EXTRADITION. IN THAT LETTER HE ASKED THAT PANAMA ISSUE AN ARREST WARRANT AGAINST THE SHAH WHILE HIS EXTRADITION IS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH "ARTICLES NO. 6 AND 13 OF PANAMA'S EXTRADITION LAW." HE REQUESTED THAT THE SHAH'S DOCUMENTS BE CONFISCATED AS WELL.

5. A SPOKESMAN FOR MILITANTS HOLDING AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN THE US EMBASSY SAID TUESDAY THAT UNDER AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, "WE WILL PROBABLY ABOLISH ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION AND ESTABLISH THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEA OF ESTABLISHING INDEPENDENT INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE." ASKED IF THE HOSTAGE ISSUE CAN STILL BE SETTLED AT A FAIRLY EARLY DATE, THE SPOKESMAN REPLIED THAT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE SUPPORT THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND CONTINUE TO DEMAND THAT THE HOSTAGES BE KEPT AND PUT ON TRIAL. "BECAUSE OF THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT, THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES IS A LEGITIMATE AND LEGAL ACT," THE SPOKESMAN ARGUED. ASKED IF A TRIAL WILL BE HELD AS SOON AS THE US CARRIES OUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, HE REPLIED, "NO CONCRETE DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE TRIAL."

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RESS INDICATES THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE ARRESTED AN ALLEGED SPY BASED ON THIS INFORMATION.

II. THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (NIOC), UNDER ORDERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT, RECENTLY DEMANDED THAT CRUDE OIL CUSTOMERS REIMBURSE NIOC FOR OIL PAYMENTS FROZEN IN US BANKS. NIOC THREATENED TO STALL 1980 CONTRACTS UNTIL THE CUSTOMERS ACQUIESCED TO THEIR DEMANDS. TWO JAPANESE FIRMS, MITSUI AND CO. LTD., AND KANEMATSU GOSHO LTD., HAVE ALREADY BEEN INFORMED OF THIS DEMAND. ALTHOUGH IT REPORTEDLY APPLIES TO ALL NIOC CUSTOMERS, NO OTHERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN APPROACHED BY NIOC. APPARENTLY BOTH JAPANESE COMPANIES HAVE REFUSED NIOC'S DEMAND. HOWEVER, TWO OF THEIR TANKERS TO BE LOADED UNDER 1980 CONTRACTS WILL BE SERVICED BY THE IRANIANS. SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL FREEZE ORDER ON 14 NOVEMBER 1979, A TOTAL OF AT LEAST \$457.1 MILLION IN OIL REVENUES HAS BEEN PAID INTO BLOCKED ACCOUNTS AND ANOTHER \$43.1 MILLION MAY HAVE BEEN AUTOMATICALLY CREDITED TO THESE ACCOUNTS. IN ADDITION, NIOC HAD REQUESTED VARIOUS CUSTOMERS TO WITHHOLD OIL PAYMENTS TOTALLING \$407.5 MILLION UNTIL IT HAD MADE ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PAYMENT. ALTHOUGH THE AMOUNTS SOUGHT BY NIOC ARE RELATIVELY SMALL IN COMPARISON TO OIL EARNINGS OF \$60-70 MILLION A DAY, IT WOULD BE A MINOR POLITICAL COUP IF IRAN COULD JAR LOOSE SOME OF THE FROZEN FUNDS. RW 16JAN00

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VI. THREAT FROM SYRIA

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO Sect

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple source

SUBJECT:

COMSEC THREAT: THE FOREIGN SIGINT THREAT TO
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE MIDEAST AREA. (TSC)

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATERIAL IS BASED ON ALL-SOURCE RESEARCH TO DETERMINE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY TO CONDUCT SIGINT AGAINST U.S. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MIDEAST REGION.

II. THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION

A. ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE SIGINT THREAT TO U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MANY SOVIET INTERCEPT ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CONDUCTED FROM WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF THE USSR. OBVIOUSLY, COMMUNICATIONS FROM ANY COUNTRY THAT BORDERS ON THE USSR (SUCH AS TURKEY, IRAN, PAKISTAN) ARE VULNERABLE TO INTERCEPT FROM SOVIET BORDER SITES THAT CAN BE EQUIPPED TO COLLECT ANY SIGNALS WITHIN RANGE.

ALONG THESE SAME BORDERS COULD EXTEND THE SOVIET'S ACCESS TO LINE-OF-SIGHT COMMS WITHIN ADJACENT AREAS. THEY HAVE FURTHER EXTENDED THEIR SIGINT RANGE BY DEPLOYING A VARIETY OF ASSETS WITHIN OTHER COUNTRIES AND ABOARD SEAGOING VESSELS.

B. ALL SOVIET OFFICIAL FACILITIES WHICH ENJOY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (SUCH AS EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES, AND TRADE MISSIONS) HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO SERVE AS COVERT INTERCEPT SITES. A GRU OFFICER WHO DEFECTED IN 1971 ALLEGED THAT THERE WERE GRU COMINT OPERATIONS AT SUCH ESTABLISHMENTS IN ABOUT 50 CITIES ABROAD - INCLUDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST /AFRICA AREA CAIRO, ATHENS, TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, KARACHI, DAMASCUS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADEN. SUCH SITES ARE USED TO INTERCEPT VHF THROUGH MICROWAVE COMMS OF ANY TARGETS WITHIN RANGE.

C. THE CONTINUING BUILDUP OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS IN GENERAL BRINGS WITH IT AN ASSUMED, IF NOT PROVEN, SIGINT THREAT.

I. AFGHANISTAN

THE SOVIET PRESENCE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH TO WARRANT CONCERN THAT AN INTERCEPT CAPABILITY HAS OR WILL BE ESTABLISHED. (NOTE - SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN SOVIET FORCE POSTURE IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THIS REPORT)

THE RECENTLY SIGNED TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN UNDERSCORES ADEN'S INCREASING RELIANCE ON THE USSR FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT. SUCH RELIANCE FREQUENTLY LEADS TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT TO ENHANCE ITS COLLECTION CAPABILITIES IN PREVIOUSLY UNAVAILABLE AREAS. (WITNESS FOR EXAMPLE, THE ASSETS THAT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN CUBA AND VIETNAM). THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS OF A SOPHISTICATED COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATION SET UP BY THE SOVIETS IN ADEN. ALSO, THE SOVIETS HAVE BASE RIGHTS ON SOCOTRA ISLAND.

ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CRITICAL GULF OF ADEN/ARABIAN PENINSULA OR ARABIAN SEA AREA.

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DO NOT MAINTAIN A CONTINUOUS AGI (INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION VESSEL) PATROL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,

AGI'S ARE ESTIMATED TO CARRY INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT THAT WILL COVER VIET COMMS UP TO THE MICROWAVE FREQUENCY RANGES

ALTHOUGH SUCH OPERATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, THE POTENTIAL FOR THEM DOES EXIST AND PRESENTS A LIMITED THREAT TO COMMS IN PORT AREAS TO WHICH SUCH SHIPS HAVE ACCESS.

ANOTHER COMINT THREAT THAT ALWAYS MUST BE CONSIDERED IS THE PERVERSIVE SOVIET THREAT TO COMMS THAT ARE RELAYED BY SATELLITES. GROUND STATIONS WITHIN SOVIET BORDERS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT THE DOWNLINKS OF ALL SATELLITES SERVING THE MIDEAST AREA. THEREFORE, ANY COMMS TO U.S. FORCES IN THE AREA THAT COME IN BY SATELLITE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO HOSTILE COLLECTION.

IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ARE CAPABLE OF USING ELINT SATELLITES FOR SURVEILLANCE OF THE MIDEAST AREA.

IV. THREAT FROM IRAN

UNDER THE SHAH IRAN WAS DESCRIBED AS HAVING "PERHAPS THE MOST AMBITIOUS INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST," COMPRISING VARIOUS COLLECTION SITES, MOBILE AND AIRBORNE COLLECTION PLATFORMS, INTERCEPT AND JAMMING EQUIPMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTERS. IN SPITE OF THE TURMOIL IN IRAN SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CURRENT REGIME,

VI. THREAT FROM SYRIA

SYRIA IS CREDITED WITH A LIMITED SIGINT CAPABILITY.

VIII. THREAT FROM ETHIOPIA

THEY ARE KNOWN TO APPRECIATE THE VALUE OF SIGINT AND POSSESS EQUIPMENT AND EXPERIENCE THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO MOUNT AT LEAST A LIMITED EFFORT.

X. THREAT FROM IRAQ

IRAQ IS BELIEVED TO HAVE A LIMITED SIGINT CAPABILITY.

ISRAEL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ITS PRIME TARGETS.

IRAN AND

BECAUSE OF THE IRAGI RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE SIGINT OPPORTUNITIES.

XII. THREAT FROM LIBYA

THE LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS IN LIBYA AFFORDS THE SOVIETS AN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

XIII. THREAT FROM ARAB GULF STATES

AN OPEN SOURCE REPORTED IN JANUARY 1978 THAT OMAN WAS MAKING AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A VHF/UHF COMINT AND JAMMING CAPABILITY WITH BOTH MOBILE AND FIXED SITES

COMMENT: PLEASE CORRECT SECTION VIII (ETHIOPIA) TO READ:

RW 15JAN80

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12155
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUNE 1979
DERIVATIVE OF BY DDCI W 12155
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON 21 JUN 1982
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

MSG274
150915R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA
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~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. IN AN INTERVIEW TODAY, FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH SAID THAT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES MIGHT BE HELD "MORE OR LESS FOREVER" IF THE US REFUSES TO EXTRADITE THE FORMER SHAH.

2. ACCORDING TO A NEWS REPORT FROM PANAMA CITY, THE PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY SAID THE FORMER SHAH WILL NOT BE EXTRADITED FROM PANAMA BECAUSE "NO COUNTRY WHICH HAS GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO A PERSON CAN RETURN HIM TO ANOTHER COUNTRY WHERE DEATH PENALTY CHARGES HAD BEEN MADE AGAINST HIM."

3. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TODAY DECIDED THAT ALL JOURNALISTS OF NEWS AGENCIES AND THE PRESS OF "THE AGGRESSIVE COUNTRY OF AMERICA" WILL BE EXPelled FROM IRAN. THE STATEMENT ADDED THAT JOURNALISTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES LIKE BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY AND OTHER STATES WILL BE WARNED THAT IF THEY ADOPT A "BIASED APPROACH" TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN IN THE FUTURE AND "DISTORT NEWS" THEY WILL ALSO BE EXPelled IMMEDIATELY. THE DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN PRESS IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD REUTERS THAT THE ORDER MEANS THAT NON-AMERICANS EMPLOYED BY US NEWS ORGANIZATIONS WOULD NO LONGER BE ALLOWED TO WORK FOR THOSE ORGANIZATIONS IN IRAN. THE NUMBER OF ACCREDITED AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING NETWORK TECHNICIANS AND FILM CREWS, IS ESTIMATED TO BE AT LEAST 100.

4. ON THE ORDER OF KHOMEINI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TODAY ISSUED A STATEMENT REJECTING REMARKS REPORTEDLY MADE BY THE SOVIET CHARGE IN MEXICO TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO PROVIDE IRAN WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN CASE OF A US ATTACK ON IRAN. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT IRAN REJECTED BOTH EAST AND WEST AND WAS NOT "STRUGGLING TO FREE ITSELF FROM DOMINATION BY ONE SUPER POWER ONLY TO FALL UNDER THAT OF ANOTHER."

5. [redacted] SOVIET EMBASSY HAS SENT HOME TWO PLANELOADS OF STAFF AND DEPENDENTS ON CHARTERED AIRCRAFT.

6. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS APPOINTED DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER HOJATOLESAN SEYYED ALI KHAMENE TO REPLACE AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI AS SPIRITUAL LEADER OF TEHRAN. HOJATOLESAM KHAMENE IS KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. HE IS ALSO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND VIRTUALLY RUNS THE MINISTRY. AS TEHRAN'S SPIRITUAL LEADER HE WILL LEAD MASS PRAYERS AT THE UNIVERSITY MOSQUE ON FRIDAYS, PRAYERS NORMALLY ACCCOMPANIED BY A POLITICAL ADDRESS. MONTZAERI IS TO RETURN TO TEACHING AT QOM THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE. HE EXPRESSED SUCH A DESIRE THIS PAST WEEKEND. THE MOVE FURTHER ENHANCES KHAMENE'S POLITICAL STRENGTH. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE NO REPORT THAT MONTZAERI HAS FALLEN OUT OF FAVOR.

7.

[REDACTED]

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD VERIFY THAT IRAN IS PLANNING SUCH AN OPERATION AT THIS TIME.

8.

[REDACTED]

10. THE PROVINCIAL SCENE IS RELATIVELY QUIET. TABRIZ IS QUIET AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSMEN APPEAR TO BE IN CONTROL OF THE CITY. SHOPS AND THE BAZAAR ARE REPORTED TO BE OPEN. THE USE OF FORCE APPEARS TO HAVE QUELLED THE REBELLIOUS AZERBAIJANIS FOR THE MOMENT. IN THE KURDISH AREA, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS DISPATCHED A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MEET WITH THE KURDS' SPIRITUAL LEADER IN AN EFFORT TO GET STALLED NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON TRACK. A SIT-IN CONTINUES IN SANANDAJ, WITH 5000 KURDS DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSMEN FROM THE AREA.

11. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY HAS REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES FROM 106 TO 16, AFTER CRITICISM FROM MANY, INCLUDING KHOMEINI. ALL TOOK THE LINE THAT MANY OF THE CANDIDATES WERE ONLY STANDING TO BRING RIDICULE ON IRAN, WHICH WAS ALL PART OF AN AMERICAN PLOT. MEANWHILE, THE MAJOR CANDIDATES CONTINUE TO CAMPAIGN, BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY CANDIDATE JALELEDDIN FARSI IS THE FRONT-RUNNER. WE WILL PROVIDE A LIST OF THE REMAINING CANDIDATES WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE.

12.

[REDACTED]

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MSG264
140900R JAN 80

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TO DELTA
1 SOW

H-#161

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 13526
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI NMCC
 DECL OR DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON 0 APR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. CONTACT WITH A HOSTAGE

A. JOHN THOMAS, A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, HAS VISITED THE COMPOUND TODAY AND MET WITH ONE OF THE HOSTAGES. THOMAS DID NOT REVEAL THE NAME OF THE PERSON HE MET. HE INDICATED HIS PAGE LOOKED LIKE A PERSON HE KNEW. HE IS ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THOMAS IS A KIOWA INDIAN.

B. [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT THE RECENTLY RELEASED AMERICAN HOSTAGE IS IN TURKEY. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE IN TURKEY FOR SEVERAL DAYS. [REDACTED]

2. THE TWO AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD BY IRANIAN MILITANTS ARE SPENDING SEVERAL DAYS WITH CHARGEAZADEH AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THEY REMAIN IN THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRY LOCATION. THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER WORD ON ANY POSSIBLE MOVEMENT.

3. AFP REPORTS IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH AS SAYING EARLIER TODAY THAT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD BY MILITANTS AT THE TEHRAN EMBASSY COULD BE RELEASED ONLY "AFTER TOTAL ACCEPTANCE" OF THE DEMANDS PRESENTED TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM LAST WEEK. GHOTBZADEH ALSO IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THIS MORNING THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SEE THE 10-WEEK-OLD U.S. HOSTAGE CRISIS GO ON "MORE OR LESS FOREVER" IF THE DEMANDS ARE NOT MET. ACCORDING TO REUTER, GHOTBZADEH LEFT SHORTLY AFTERWARS ON A CAMPAIGN TOUR; HE IS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

4. "WE WILL PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, USING WHATEVER ACTION IS REQUIRED," PRESIDENT CARTER SAID IN A REMARK INJECTED INTO A PREPARED TEXT OF A SPEECH HE GAVE TO THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON SMALL BUSINESS YESTERDAY. "WE ARE OUTRAGED THAT HALF A WORLD AWAY, 50 INNOCENT AMERICANS ARE HELD HOSTAGE IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON DECENCY," THE PRESIDENT SAID. "YET FOR ALL OUR ANGER, THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPORTED WITH RESTRAINT AND WITH FIRMNESS," HE NOTED, ADDING, "AMERICA WILL NOT GIVE IN TO TERRORISM OR INTERNATIONAL INTIMIDATION, WHATEVER ITS FORM OR WHEREVER IT OCCURS."

5. [REDACTED] SITUATION REMAINS UNCHANGED SINCE THE TURMOIL YESTERDAY, THE CLASHES BETWEEN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY CONTINUE. THE MPPR WILL MOST LIKELY SEEK RETALIATION FOR THE FRIDAY NIGHT TAKEOVER OF THEIR HQS BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, DURING WHICH TWO MEMBERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED AND 30 ARRESTED. OF THOSE ARRESTED, 11 WERE TRIED, CONVICTED AND EXECUTED WITHIN FOUR HOURS. YESTERDAY THE GUARD EVACUATED THE MPPR HQS AND UNDAUNTED MPPR SUPPORTERS MOVED BACK IN AND BEGAN REPLACING POSTERS OF SHARIATMADARI. TODAY THE HQS REMAINS HEAVILY GUARDED.

~~SECRET~~

THOUGH THE SOVIET MOVE HAS NOT CHANGED KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN, HE NOW REALIZES THE SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN IS MORE IMMEDIATE THAN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED. HE ALSO REALIZES THAT HE CAN AFFORD TO ANTAGONIZE THE SOVIET UNION WHILE ENCOURAGING INTERNAL RESISTANCE AGAINST THE US.

THEREFORE KHOMEINI HAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO END THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE US AND RELEASE THE HOSTAGES FOLLOWING THE 25 JANUARY ELECTIONS. ONCE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION HAS BEEN RESOLVED HE PLANS TO STRIKE HARD AT INTERNAL DISSIDENCE IN IRAN AND TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE AFGHANI REBELS WITH ARMS AND SUPPLIES. KHOMEINI HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY QUIET REGARDING THE SOVIET MOVE, AND IT IS POSSIBLE HE IS WAITING FOR THE SOVIETS TO VETO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE PUBLICLY EXPRESSING HIS TRUE FEELINGS.

7. THE QUESTION REMAINS, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY WILL BE WILLING TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE NOCKNOWLEDGE OF IRAN'S 11TH HOUR MESSAGE TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WHICH LED TO A POSTPONEMENT OF A VOTE ON SANCTIONS. THEY ALSO CLAIM THAT THE SHAH MUST FIRST BE TRIED BY AN IRANIAN COURT.

A. LAST EVENING, THE SOVIET UNION, AS EXPECTED, VETOED A US SPONSORED RESOLUTION TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. NINE MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL -- BRITAIN, FRANCE, JAMAICA, TUNISIA, NIGER, NORWAY, ZAMBIA, PORTUGAL AND THE PHILIPPINES -- SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. CHINA DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTE. EAST GERMANY VOTED AGAINST ALONG WITH THE USSR. BANGLADESH AND MEXICO ABSTAINED. THE RESOLUTION MAY NOW BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

B. FOUR FORMER ARMY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING TWO BATTALION COMMANDERS, AND ONE NCO, WERE EXECUTED ON 12 JANUARY FOR THEIR ROLE IN COMBINING AN ANTI-SHAH DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH 126 PROTESTERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED. THIS INCIDENT IS REFERRED TO AS "BLACK FRIDAY" BY THE REVOLUTIONARIES. [RVW:14JAN00]

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED TO 1225
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DECLASSIFY BY DDCI NMCC
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REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG261
131010R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA
1 SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

A H-8169
SAC SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. ON 12 JAN THE DOS/IWG SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH CHARGE BRUCE LAINGEN AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THEY ARE ALL WELL AND REMAIN OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CRISIS WILL BE RESOLVED SOON. VICTOR TOMSETH, TOLD THE IWG THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF THE IRANIAN "PROPOSAL" OR THE DELAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON SANCTIONS IN THE IRANIAN NEWS.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IN A LETTER TO PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ROYO HAS REQUESTED THAT THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT ARREST THE FORMER SHAH IN ACCORDANCE WITH PANAMANIAN DOMESTIC LAW ON EXTRADITION, PENDING A FORMAL SUBMISSION OF AN EXTRADITION REQUEST WITHIN 60 DAYS.

GHOTBZADEH IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE SENT ROYO AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TRANSLATION OF A WARRANT FOR THE FORMER SHAH'S ARREST WHICH WAS ISSUED RECENTLY IN TEHRAN BY THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.

3. SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM HAS RECEIVED A REPLY TO HIS LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH ASKING FOR A CLARIFICATION OF IRAN'S COMMUNICATION OF LAST FRIDAY. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR MCHENRY IN NEW YORK, THE LETTER DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ANSWER THE QUESTIONS PUT TO GHOTBZADEH BY WALDHEIM; IT IS, HOWEVER, THE FIRST WRITTEN COMMUNICATION FROM THE IRANIAN REGIME SINCE WALDHEIM UNDERTOOK HIS COOP OFFICES ROLE.

AMBASSADOR MCHENRY HAS AGREED TO A FURTHER 24-HOUR POSTPONEMENT OF THE VOTE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO GIVE WALDHEIM TIME TO SEND ANOTHER LETTER SEEKING A MORE SPECIFIC RESPONSE FROM THE IRANIANS. MCHENRY HAS STRESSED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THE COUNCIL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT AND NOT GRASP AT STRAWS TO AVOID TAKING AN UNAMBIGUOUS STAND ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE.

4. MILITANTS HOLDING 50-AMERICANS IN THE US EMBASSY SATURDAY ARE REPORTED TO HAVE REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE HOSTAGES COULD BE FREED FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN THE EXILED MONARCH'S EXTRADITION. "OUR FIRST POSITION IS, NONE OF THE HOSTAGES ARE GOING TO BE RELEASED UNTIL THE SHAH IS RETURNED FOR TRIAL IN TEHRAN," SAID A SPOKESMAN FOR MILITANTS OCCUPYING THE US EMBASSY FOR THE 70TH DAY. THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF A REPORT THAT THE ISLAMIC REGIME MIGHT LET THE CAPTIVES GO IF PANAMA AGREES TO "CONSIDER" THE SHAH'S EXTRADITION AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL GUARANTEES THAT NO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WILL BE IMPOSED ON IRAN. ASKED WHETHER IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAD CONTACTED THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY

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SECRET CITE J3 00047

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE ANNOUNCEMENT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NY mce

DECLASSIFIED TO [REDACTED]

REVIEW ON 0 ADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

H-#171

1. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED ON MONDAY 21 JANUARY. TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NO INTELLIGENCE REPORTING TO SUBSTANTIATE OR DENY THE REPORT.
2. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH ARE FORCING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND SOME OF HIS ADVISORS TO SEEK A POLITICAL RESOLUTION TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION, IT IS DOUBTFUL BASED UPON THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THIS TYPE THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED ON THE ANNOUNCED DATE.
3. TO DATE, EVEN WHEN ACTIONS HAVE FOLLOWED SUCH ANNOUNCEMENTS, THE INITIAL TIME TABLE HAS NOT BEEN ADHERED TO AND THE ACTUAL ACTION HAS NOT FULLY CONFORMED TO THAT INITIALLY ANNOUNCED.
4. THE JUDGEMENT OF THIS OFFICE IS THAT THE REPORTED ANNOUNCEMENT, IF IN FACT AUTHORIZED BY KHOMEINI, IS A DEVICE (A) TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL TIME TO ACQUIRE "EVIDENCE OF THE USG COMPLICITY IN THE SHAH'S TRANSGRESSIONS AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF IRAN" (B) TO FORESTALL USG ACTIONS TO PUSH FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, (C) AND POSSIBLY TO BUY ANOTHER SEGMENT OF TIME TO CARRY THE INCIDENT PAST AN HISTORICAL MILESTONE (DEPARTURE OF SHAH IS JAN 79) AND INTO PROXIMITY OF ANOTHER POTENTIAL STAGE (THE IRANIAN ELECTIONS 25 JAN 80). THIS TURN COULD BE USED TO PROJECT ANOTHER DELAY PENDING THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS. (45 DAYS HENCE WHICH THEN BRINGS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE RETURN OF KHOMEINI ON TO THE HORIZON). IN ANY EVENT, THIS OFFICE DOES NOT EXPECT ALL THE HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED ENMASSE AND ANTICIPATES THAT AT LEAST FIVE HOSTAGES WOULD BE HELD FOR TRIAL AS ESPIONAGE AGENTS.

RWV 12 JAN 00

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY [REDACTED]
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
INITIATIVE Q. IN DDO NMCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO [REDACTED]
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

FM JTF
TO [REDACTED]
SUB [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET

H-
174

SUBJECT: DIA ANALYSIS OF READINESS POSTURE OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY

1. OVERALL, THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES ARE STRETCHED THIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO COPE WITH PERCEIVED THREATS INTERNALLY FROM MINORITY GROUPS AND EXTERNALLY FROM IRAQ AND THE US. THIS PROBLEM IS ESPECIALLY ACUTE WITH THE GROUND FORCES. ALL OF THE SERVICES SUFFER FROM A CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM WHICH IS PLAGUED WITH INTERFERENCE FROM REVOLUTIONARY KOMITEHS. A RECENT PURGE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES TO ELIMINATE ANTI-KHOMEINI PERSONNEL IS EXACERBATING THE ALREADY POOR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. IN VARYING DEGREES, THE SERVICES ARE TROUBLED BY A LACK OF PERSONNEL, SHORTAGE OF SERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT, DEMORALIZED TROOPS AND POOR DISCIPLINE. ALREADY BESET WITH MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE TAKING OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, EVENTS SINCE 4 NOVEMBER HAVE HAD MIXED EFFECT ON THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES.

2. THE GROUND FORCES, INCLUDING THE GENDARMERIE, ARE MOST AFFECTED BY PERSONNEL SHORTAGES, DEMORALIZED TROOPS AND POOR DISCIPLINE. AS A RESULT THEIR READINESS POSTURE IS POOR. GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT IS BELIEVED TO BE IN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION ALTHOUGH CONTINUED HARD USE DURING RECENT ACTIONS HAS SEVERELY TAXED THE MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES. IT APPEARS THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT IS DECLINING AND IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO GIVEN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY. OVERALL PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES UNITS VARIES GREATLY, HOWEVER, A NOMINAL FIGURE OF 50 PERCENT IS HELD WITH SOME UNITS AS LOW AS 10 PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE GROUND FORCES ABILITY TO FIGHT DISSIDENT MINORITY GROUPS AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THEIR LOYALTY IS IN QUESTION. BECAUSE OF THESE RESERVATIONS, THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS USING THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (PASDARAN) TO TAKE THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHTING AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS. IN THE AZERBAIJAN, KURDISTAN, KHUZESTAN AND BALUCHISTAN AREAS IN WESTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN IRAN, USE OF THE ROADS IS DENIED TO GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN MANY INSTANCES, PLACING A GREAT DEAL OF RELIANCE ON HELICOPTERS FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND TROOP MOVEMENT. THIS IS HAVING A DISASTEROUS EFFECT ON THE AVAILABILITY RATE OF THE IRANIAN HELICOPTER FLEET. REPEATED PLEAS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT HAVE GONE UNHEEDED IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS FOR AS LONG AS TWO WEEKS. ARMY TROOPS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN NOTED ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-KHOMEINI DEMONSTRATIONS IN AZERBAIJAN AND KURDISTAN. IN AN ATTEMPT TO BOLSTER MORALE, MANY GROUND FORCES UNITS ARE OFFERING TO PAY A BONUS TO TROOPS STATIONED IN HOSTILE AREAS, HOWEVER, PROBLEMS WITH PAYMENT HAVE NEGATED MANY OF THESE POSSIBLE BENEFITS. ROTATION OF TROOPS ON THE SMALL UNIT LEVEL (COMPANY OR BATTALION) IS NORMALLY CARRIED OUT IN HOSTILE AREAS, HOWEVER, THESE ROTATIONS ARE OFTEN DELAYED FOR PERIODS UP TO TWO WEEKS DUE TO LACK OF TRANSPORTATION. PERSONNEL SHORTAGES ARE EXACERBATED BY A LACK OF RECRUITS WHICH HAS NECESSITATED THE INVOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF PERSONNEL DUE FOR RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY.

3. THE AIR FORCE READINESS RATE HAS DETERIORATED SINCE THE REVOLUTION IN FEBRUARY 1979. HOWEVER, AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS SINCE THE TAKING OF THE EMBASSY MAY HAVE MARGINALLY IMPROVED THEIR CAPABILITY.

THE ABILITY OF THE AIR FORCE TO CONDUCT NIGHT OPERATIONS REMAINS POOR. OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES FOR THE AIR FORCE ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE, HOWEVER, WE ESTIMATE THE F-5 OPERATIONAL READINESS (OR) RATE TO BE APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT, THE F-4 OR RATE APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT AND THE F-14 OR RATE APPROXIMATELY 10 PERCENT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT ALL AIR FORCE BASES MAINTAIN AT LEAST TWO AIRCRAFT ON 24 HOUR ALERT.

IRANIAN PILOTS ARE WELL TRAINED AND CAPABLE, HOWEVER, THEIR SKILLS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY DETERIORATED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE REVOLUTION DUE TO A LACK OF TRAINING.

GENERALLY

SPEAKING, AIRCRAFT CAN DEPLOY FROM NORMAL BASE AREAS TO ANY OTHER BASE IN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS AND DISPERSAL BASES. F-4S ARE THE MOST VERSATILE AIRCRAFT IN THE INVENTORY AND EMPLOY A 20-MM CANNON, A VARIETY OF IRON BOMBS AND ROCKETS, PROBABLY SIDEWINDER AAM AND POSSIBLY SPARROW AAM. IT IS UNLIKELY THE LASER GUIDED AND T.V. GUIDED MUNITIONS IN THEIR ARSENAL CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED. THE F-5 IS THE MOST EASILY MAINTAINED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT EMPLOYING A 20-MM CANNON, VARIOUS IRON BOMBS AND ROCKETS AND PROBABLY THE SIDEWINDER AAM. THE F-14 SUFFERS FROM MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS DUE TO ITS COMPLEX DESIGN.

LESS THAN 100 PILOTS AND INSTRUCTOR PILOTS HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO FLY THE F-14. OF THESE, REPORTEDLY SOME 20 INSTRUCTOR PILOTS HAD COMPLETED INTERCEPT TRAINING, AND ONLY THREE HAVE FINISHED THE COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE/AIR SUPERIORITY COURSE AND WERE OPERATIONALLY QUALIFIED. ONLY SOME 15 OTHER INSTRUCTORS HAD COMPLETED THE INITIAL TRAINING AS WEAPON SYSTEMS OFFICERS, AND NONE OF THESE HAD ADVANCED BEYOND THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH COVERED ONLY SIMPLE INTERCEPTS, I.E., FIRING ONE MISSILE AT A TIME AGAINST A SINGLE TARGET. THE OPERATIONAL F-14S MAY HAVE A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE OPPONENTS WITH PHOENIX MISSILES. WE ESTIMATE SOME PHOENIX MISSILES ARE OPERATIONAL,

THE F-14 IS ARMED WITH THE PHOENIX AAM AND A 20-MM CANNON. THE MIDWAY TASK FORCE HAS BEEN RECONNOITERED BY P-3 AS WELL AS F-4 AIRCRAFT SINCE ITS DEPLOYMENT. SINCE THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER, THE TASK FORCE HAS NOT BEEN RECONNOITERED BY THESE AIRCRAFT BUT RATHER BY IRANIAN C-130S. THIS MAY INDICATE THE P-3 ORION IS EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS AND THE FEAR OF ATTACK AGAINST IRANIAN AIRCRAFT HAS DISSIPATED. THE ORIGINAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WERE F-4S EQUIPPED WITH SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW AAM.

DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING THE SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR ROUTINE CALIBRATION, IT IS LIKELY THE HAWK SYSTEMS ARE NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL. IRAN ALSO HAS THE RAPIER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM, HOWEVER, THE ONLY KNOWN DEPLOYMENT IS AT TABRIZ AIRFIELD. NONE OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ARE LIKELY TO BE MAINTAINED 24 HOURS A DAY, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE HAWK. LACK OF TRAINING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO SEVERELY HAMPER THESE SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK. MANY OF THE RADARS IN THE AIR DEFENSE RADAR NETWORK PROBABLY ARE PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY INOPERATIVE, BUT MOST ARE STILL ACTIVE. DUPLICITY OF RADARS AT MANY SITES ALLOWS THE IRANIANS TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE RADAR COVERAGE. THE IRANIANS PROBABLY HAVE COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE AT ALL ALTITUDES OF THE SOVIET BORDER AREA. COVERAGE OF THE BORDERS WITH TURKEY AND IRAQ IS COMPREHENSIVE, BUT THE MOUNTAINS MASK SOME RADARS AT LOW ALTITUDES. THE IRANIANS HAVE COMPREHENSIVE RADAR COVERAGE OF THE GULF AREA IN THEORY, HOWEVER, TEMPERATURE INVERSIONS OVER THE GULF AND COASTAL AREA (CALLED DUCTING) CAUSES MULTIPLE TARGETS OR FALSE TARGETS TO APPEAR ON RADAR SCREENS. THIS PROBLEM IS SEVERE (A 95 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE) BELOW 2,000 FEET AND SERIOUS (A 70 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE) ABOVE 2,000 FEET. IRAN'S AIR DEFENSE RADAR COVERAGE IS WEAKEST ALONG ITS EASTERN BORDERS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.

IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT BUT IS INDICATIVE OF THE TYPE OF PROBLEM. THE PROLONGING OF THIS CRISIS IS HAVING ON THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

6. THE NAVY HAS BEEN MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT TO IMPROVE ITS READINESS SINCE THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO ITS ANTI-SHIP GUIDED MISSILES. OVERALL THE NAVY'S READINESS POSTURE IS FAIR.

COMBATTANTE IS EQUIPPED WITH THE HARPOON ANTI-SHIP MISSILE AND POSES THE LA MOST VIABLE THREAT IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. IRANIAN MAJOR COMBATANTS -- THREE GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYERS AND FOUR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES.

"ENERGY DETERMINATION" IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ ON 13 DECEMBER 1979, ONE OF THESE FRIGATES DEPLOYED FROM PORT, TRAVESED TO THE SCENE AND WAS NOTED PICKING UP A LIFE BOAT ONLY SIX HOURS AFTER THE EXPLOSION. READINESS OF THE LA COMBATTANTE AND ITS HARPOON ANTI-SHIP MISSILE IS PROBABLY GOOD WHILE THE REMAINDER OF THE IRANIAN ANTI-SHIP MISSILES ARE PROBABLY IN POOR CONDITION. FOUR ACTIVE NAVAL PATROL AREAS ARE EVIDENT AND THESE ARE PATROLED ON A FREQUENT BASIS BY THE LA COMBATTANTE, PATROL FRIGATES, HOVERCRAFT AND GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES. MINESWEEPING CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO BE MINIMAL WITH NO IMPROVEMENT LIKELY. OPERATIONS OVERALL IN THE NAVY CONTINUE TO BE HAMPERED BY A LACK OF TRAINED CREWMEN AND EXPERIENCED OFFICERS. WHILE THE NAVY WAS LEAST INVOLVED IN THE REVOLUTION AND APPEARED TO BE SUFFERING THE LEAST OF ALL THE SERVICES FROM DISSENTION FROM WITHIN, LATEST REPORTS INDICATE THERE ARE SOME PERSONNEL PROBLEMS.

RWV 12JAN10

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MSG254
120950R JAN 80

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TO DELTA
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H #175

SUBJECT: NAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD ANALYSIS

(1) GENERAL: [NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY UNITS ARE NORMALLY STATIONED IN NAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD.]

(2) GENDARMERIE: [THE MAIN GENDARMERIE COMPANY HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 40 KM SOUTHWEST, THE NAIN POST LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 40 KM SOUTHEAST, AND THE ANARAK POST LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 35 KM NORTH EAST OF NAIN AIRFIELD ARE WITHIN REASONABLE DISTANCE TO RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT THERE. DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, THE GENDARMERIE COMPANY COULD HAVE AS MANY AS 60 PERSONNEL AVAILABLE WITH ABOUT 3 TRUCKS AND A JEEP FOR TRANSPORTATION TO MEET A THREAT. AFTER DUTY HOURS, THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS 20 AVAILABLE. FROM NAIN THE RESPONSE TIME WOULD PROBABLE BE BETWEEN 40 MINUTES TO ONE HOUR TO NAIN AIRFIELD. THE OUTPOSTS WILL NORMALLY HAVE 6-10 PERSONNEL AND ONE VEHICLE AVAILABLE. THEREFORE THE ANARAK OUTPOST WOULD PROBABLE RESPOND IN 35 MINUTES TO AN HOUR AND THE NAIN OUTPOST IN 50-75 MINUTES.] GENDARMERIE CAN BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A RADIO AND/OR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS. THEY OPERATE ON THEIR OWN RADIO NET AND DO NOT NORMALLY ENTER MILITARY NETS. THEY ARE LIGHTLY ARMED WITH G-3 AND UZI RIFLES, PISTOLS AND POSSIBLY A GRENADE LAUNCHER AND ARE NOT KNOWN FOR THEIR MARKSMANSHIP.

(3) GROUND FORCES: [NO IRANIAN GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE LOCATED WITH 100 KM OF NAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD. HOWEVER, AT ISFAHAN, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 165 KM WEST-SOUTHWEST OF NAIN, IS A GROUND FORCE TRAINING CENTER WHERE GENERAL SUPPORT AVIATION BRIGADE AND TWO ARTILLERY GROUPS ARE LOCATED. PERSONNEL FROM THIS BASE COULD BE AIRLIFTED TO NAIN BY HELICOPTER IN APPROXIMATELY 2-3 HOURS.]

(4) AIR FORCE: [FIGHTER AND HELICOPTER ASSETS LOCATED WITHIN 200 KM OF NAIN ARE FOUND ONLY AT ISFAHAN. THE SERVICEABLE IRANIAN F-14A TOMCAT AIRCRAFT HAVE PROBABLY BEEN CONCENTRATED AT KHATAMI AIRBASE AT ISFAHAN. THE NORMAL F-14 COUNT AT KHATAMI IS 61 AIRCRAFT. THE EXACT NUMBER NOW LOCATED THERE IS NOT KNOWN. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE NOT EQUIPPED FOR GROUND SUPPORT MISSIONS, EXCEPT FOR 20 MM CANNON. THEIR OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE IS ESTIMATED TO BE LESS THAN 10 PERCENT. THESE AIRCRAFT COULD REACH NAIN WITHIN 10 MINUTES AFTER TAKEOFF. THERE COULD BE 4 ALERT AIRCRAFT AT KHATAMI AB. AT ISFAHAN APPROXIMATELY 125 UH-1/IROQUOIS, 31 AB-206 JET RANGERS, AND 37 CH-47/CHINOOKS HELICOPTERS ARE LOCATED. THESE HELICOPTERS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE AN OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE OF 30 PERCENT. THEY COULD RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT AT NAIN IN APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 HOURS DURING DUTY HOURS WHILE PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE.] AFTER DUTY HOURS, THE AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL AND THE ISSUING OF EQUIPMENT COULD TAKE SIGNIFICANTLY LONGER. RVW 12 JAN 80

D. M. Smith 2/7 Feb 82
Detachment 4000
U.S. Army Forces
D.C. 20330-0000

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TO DELTA

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/MCC
 DECL OF CONFIDENTIALITY TO ALL C
REVIEW ON OADR
DEANED FROM multiple sources

H - #176

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. THE US AGREED YESTERDAY TO A 24-HOUR DELAY IN THE UN VOTE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN AFTER THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK CONVEYED A "PROPOSAL" TO SYG WALDHEIM. THE PROPOSAL IS VAGUE AND ITS AUTHORITY IS NOT CLEAR ALTHOUGH IT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI. THE PROPOSAL MAY INVOLVE A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION DISCUSSING IRAN'S GRIEVANCES WHICH MIGHT THEN LEAD TO THE BEGINNING OF THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. AMBASSADOR MCHENRY HAS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT ANYTHING WILL COME OUT OF THIS IRANIAN ACTION BUT SAID THAT THE US REMAINS EAGER TO EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. NEWS REPORTS SAY THAT THE VOTE IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR 6:00 PM TODAY.

2. [REDACTED]

3. BETWEEN 0100 AND 0230 12 JAN (SATURDAY) THE DOS IRAN WORKING GROUP MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO CALL BRUCE LAINGEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ANSWERED THE PHONES AT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND EITHER IGNORED REQUESTS TO SPEAK TO LAINGEN OR SAID THAT THE NUMBER CALLED WAS A "MISTAKE." PREVIOUS DOS SITREP REPORTED THE THREE AMERICANS WELL AND STILL PRESENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

4. REUTER REPORTED FROM TEHRAN THAT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT A FORMAL REQUEST FOR THE SHAH'S EXTRADITION HAS BEEN SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE REQUEST INCLUDES AN ARREST WARRANT FOR "MR. MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI" WHO IS WANTED ON CHARGES OF MASS MURDER, TORTURE AND EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS. REUTER REPORTED FROM PANAMA CITY YESTERDAY THAT A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SHAH SAID HE HAS NO PLANS TO LEAVE PANAMA. THE SPOKESMAN DENIED AN EARLIER ABC REPORT THAT THE SHAH WAS PLANNING TO LEAVE.

5. THE LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTED FROM ANKARA YESTERDAY THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS TOLD UK FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON THAT IT FEARS THE INSTABILITY IN IRAN COULD LEAD TO SECESSION THERE BY THE KURDS AND AZERBAIJANI. THE TURKS FEAR THAT THESE SECESSION MOVEMENTS COULD THEN FALL INTO SOVIET INFLUENCE, CAUSING SEVERE REPERCUSSIONS AMONG THE KURDS IN EASTERN TURKEY.

SECRET

ALLEGED CRITICISMS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT BY SAUDI STUDENTS IN IRAN. THE STUDENTS REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "FOR WELL OVER 50 YEARS THE SAUDI REGIME HAS BEEN OPPRESSING THE PEOPLE." THE BROADCAST CALLED THE RECENT FIGHTING IN MECCA A "DARING UPHEAVAL BY RELIGIOUS ULEMA AND MUSLIM REVOLUTIONARIES." IT URGED ALL MUSLIMS "TO SUPPORT THE MASSES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA" AGAINST "SAUDI DESPOTISM AND US IMPERIALISM."

SECRET

7. A TASS REPORT FROM WASHINGTON YESTERDAY SAID THAT THE US STILL CONSIDERS A COMBINATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PRESSURING IRAN. A TASS REPORT FROM NEW YORK, CITING A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE, SAID THE PENTAGON IS "HASTILY ELABORATING DIFFERENT SCENARIOS OF PUNITIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAN." THE US INTENDS TO USE AIRFIELDS IN THE AZORES, BASES IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA IN THESE OPERATIONS, THE REPORT SAID. THE NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN YESTERDAY ALSO DELIVERED A DIATRIBE CENTERED ON THE THEME OF "US IMPERIALISM" AND ITS PREPARATIONS FOR "MILITARY AGGRESSION" AGAINST IRAN.

8. [REDACTED] SOVIET UNION WOULD PROBABLY INTERVENE IN IRAN IF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS EITHER HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION OR TOO IMPOTENT TO CONTROL ITS NORTHERN REGION OF AZERBAIJAN.

9. THE TELEVISION CAMPAIGN OF IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAS BEEN DELAYED BY DISPUTES OVER THE APPORTIONMENT OF BROADCAST TIME. AYATOLLAH MOUSAVI KHOYENI, A MEMBER OF THE ELECTORAL CONTROL COMMISSION, SAID AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY THAT MINOR CANDIDATES MAY BE BARRED FROM RADIO AND TELEVISION. HE SAID, "IF THE NATION PERMITS, [REDACTED] WILL OMIT THOSE WHO ARE NOT 100 PERCENT COMPETENT TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT." AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI EARLIER REFUSED TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE CANDIDATES, URGING IRANIANS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ELECTING A COMPETENT MAN.

10. A SAUDI MAGAZINE AL-YAMAMA REPORTS THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI INTENDS TO CALL A PEACEFUL MARCH BY WORLD'S MUSLIMS FROM TEHRAN TO JERUSALEM AT THE END OF THE CURRENT US-IRANIAN CRISIS. KHOMEINI BELIEVES ISRAEL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REPULSE THIS MARCH BY FORCE BECAUSE OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PUN-12 JAN 80

NNN

SECRET

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]
MSG237
090909R JAN 82

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 012205
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON MCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources
[REDACTED]

FM JTF

TO DELTA

SOU

H-X 186
S-017
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI HAVE REPORTEDLY ORGANIZED A MOTORCADE OF MORE THAN 100 VEHICLES TO GO TO QOM ON THE FEAST OF ASHA'AIN (9 JANUARY). THEY PLAN TO CONDUCT DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE HOMES OF SHARIAT-MADARI AND KHOMEINI.

2. UNREST CONTINUED IN TABRIZ YESTERDAY AS 20,000 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY RALLIED IN SUPPORT OF AYATOAAH SHARIATMADARI. SCHOOLS AND SHOPS REMAINED CLOSED FOR THE THIRD CONSECUTIVE DAY, BUT THERE WAS NO REPETITION OF THE VIOLENT CLASHES WHICH OCCURRED IN TABRIZ LAST WEEKEND.

3. IN THE KURDISH REGION, LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND KURDISH REBELS.

4. IN SANANDAJ, ALL PUBLIC BUILDINGS REMAIN CLOSED, AND THE SIT-IN AT THE GOVERNOR GENERALS OFFICE TO DEMAND WITHDRAWAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ENTERED ITS SEVENTH DAY.

5. [REDACTED]

6. MEANWHILE, IRAN CONTINUES TO WATCH IRAQI MILITARY AND POLITICAL MOVES WITH SUSPICION. IRAQI AUTHORITIES RECENTLY WILL ARREST ANY IRANIAN, OTHER THAN KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS, WHO ENTER IRAQ, WHILE THE IRANIANS HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PERMIT THE REOPENING OF ONE OF IRAQI SCHOOLS IN SOUTHWEST IRAN WHICH WAS CLOSED LAST MONTH.

SECRET [REDACTED]

✓ C 1. (U) FLEW THEIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE US
TASK GROUPS

✓ C 11. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS:

✓ C A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER IS MONITORING THE USS
MIDWAY TASK GROUP, WHILE AN AUXILIARY CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE USS
KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP. AN OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP AND AN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR WERE SIGHTED YESTERDAY MORNING APPROX 90 NM
SOUTHEAST OF THE USS MIDWAY.

✓ C 12. ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF DIEGO GARCIA: NOTHING TO REPORT

✓ C RVW 29 JAN 88

MSG231
080930R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA

TSOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H - H190
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 13526
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/NMCC
 OECI DOWNGRADED TO OADR
REVIEW ON [redacted]
DEERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

3. IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND COMMITTEES REMAIN THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF IRRITATION AMONG BOTH KURDS AND THE ARMY.

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

6. EIGHT WESTERN JOURNALISTS WERE CONFINED TO THEIR HOTEL AND THEN EXPelled FROM THE CITY OF TABRIZ ON THE ORDERS OF THE LOCAL ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURT. THE EXPULSIONS COINCIDED WITH A MOUNTING CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH, WEST GERMAN AND AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN IRAN, ORCHESTRATED BY THE PROCLERGY PRESS.

7. THE UPCOMING IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN HAS ALREADY BEEN MARRED BY VIOLENCE. MASDUD RAJAVI, A RADICAL ISLAMIC CANDIDATE AND FOUNDING MEMBER OF MUJAHEVIN WAS ATTACKED AND SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN TEHRAN.

8. FURTHER UNREST IN KURDESTAN WAS HIGHLIGHTED WHEN PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR GENERAL HASSEIN SHAHVESSI RESIGNED TO PROTEST THE KHOMEINI REGIME'S REFUSAL TO HONOR ITS PLEDGE TO REMOVE THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FROM SANANDAJ, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.

9. KHOMEINI HAS CANCELLED ALL APPOINTMENTS FROM 12 JANUARY TO 27 JANUARY OSTENSIBLY DUE TO TIREDNESS. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE AYATOLLAH HAS TAKEN SUCH A RESPITE.

10. IN TABRIZ IN NORTHWEST IRAN, UNREST CONTINUED ON 7 JANUARY. ALMOST 150 SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI ATTACHED SHOPKEEPERS IN THE CITY'S BAZAAR, SMASHING WINDOWS AND BURNING VEHICLES. IN THE WAVE OF

~~TOP SECRET~~

12. POSSIBLY IN ANTICIPATION OF CLASHES BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI FORCES OR TERRORIST ACTIVITES.

13.

A MINESWEEPER AND A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP, WHILE AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND AN AUXILIARY REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE USS KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP. AN OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. AT LEAST ONE NAVAL SUBORDINATED TANKER IS SUPPORTING THE ABOVE UNITS.

14.

A.

B.

15. THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS WILL PARTICIPATE IN OR HAVE BEEN INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE OF LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS IN TEHRAN:

- 1. THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
- 2. THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
- 3. THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
- 4. THE NATIONAL ?CONGRESS? OF SOUTH AFRICA
- 5. THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (NAMIBIA)
- 6. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZIMBABWE)
- 7. THE OMANI LIBERATION FRONT
- 8. THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SAHARA (POLISARIO)
- 9. THE ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT
- 10. THE SUDANESE RESISTANCE
- 11. THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF FTANI (INDONESIA)
- 12. THE ARABIC WORKERS' ORGANIZATION IN IRAQ
- 13. INDIVIDUALS FROM SOUTH LEBANON
- 14. " "
- 15. THE LEFTIST GROUP IN EL SALVADOR
- 16. THE ARGENTINE LEFTIST GROUP
- 17. " ", POLITICAL GROUP
- 18. ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZANU)
- 19. ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLES' UNION (ZAPU)

RWV 08JAN00

~~TOP SECRET~~

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MSG226
061015R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA

A [REDACTED] TOP SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMIC
 DECL ASSISTED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0 APR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

H-A 193

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. ON 5 JAN. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IMPLICITLY REJECTED MILITANT DEMANDS THAT CHARGE LAINGEN AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES BE TURNED OVER TO THEM AT THE COMPOUND. IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO KHOMEINI, GHOTBZADEH INDICATED THAT THE THREE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN PLACED UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AT THE MINISTRY WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF BOTH KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. GHOTBZADEH ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF THIS ORDER FROM KHOMEINI.
2. MORE THAN ONE MILLION SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI JAMMED THE STREETS OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN YESTERDAY IN A MASSIVE SHOW OF STRENGTH OF THE LEADER OF IRAN'S MOSLEM REVOLUTION. OFFICIALS BILLED THE DEMONSTRATION, THE LARGEST IN MORE THAN A MONTH, AS A SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR DEMANDS THAT THE DEPOSED SHAH BE RETURNED TO IRAN, AND A CONDEMNATION OF FOLLOWERS OF RIVAL RELIGIOUS LEADER, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADRARI.
3. OTHER PRO-KHOMEINI MARCHES WERE REPORTED IN THE CITIES OF YAZD, KERMANSHAH, HAMADAN, AS WELL AS IN TABRIZ AND QOM, WHERE ANTI-KHOMEINI DEMONSTRATIONS ERUPTED FRIDAY. IN TABRIZ, AT LEAST ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND AS MANY AS 150 WERE INJURED IN CLASHES. TWENTY-EIGHT PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 100 WOUNDED IN THE GOLD COAST PORT OF SEANDAR LANGUEH YESTERDAY.
4. ON 5 JAN AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADRARI STEPPED BACK FROM HIS APPARENT CONFRONTATION WITH KHOMEINI BY ISSUING A STATEMENT URGING HIS FOLLOWERS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIVITY CONTRARY TO "ISLAMIC UNITY." SHARIAT-MADRARI ALSO CALLED FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF HIS PARTY AND THE CLOSURE OF ALL ITS OFFICES. THE STATEMENT CAME IN THE WAKE OF SERIOUS CLASHES IN BOTH QOM AND TABRIZ BETWEEN FOLLOWERS OF THE TWO AYATOLLAHS.
5. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT DENOUNCING A REPORT AIRED BY CBS CORRESPONDENT MARVIN KAPL QUOTING GHOTBZADEH AS SAYING THAT KHOMEINI IS "OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY". THE NEWS OF GHOTBZADEH'S ALLEGED REMARKS APPARENTLY HAS PLACED HIM IN A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION.
6. A GROUP OF AFGHAN EXILES SUNDAY SEIZED AND OCCUPIED THE AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, DEMANDING THE EXPULSION OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM THEIR COUNTRY. IRANIAN POLICE ARRIVED SHORTLY AFTER THE NOON ATTACK BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO FORCE THE GROUP TO LEAVE.
7. REGARDING THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS CONVENED TO JUDGE THE CRIMES OF THE US IN IRAN, THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE BEGAN YESTERDAY AND WILL LAST FOR FIVE DAYS. MEMBERS SUPPOSEDLY INCLUDE THE PLO, THE POLISARIO AND ONE OTHER GROUP.
8. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTING, THE HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC "KOMITEHS" IN ISFAHAN WAS GUNNED DOWN BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 6 JAN 80. THIS LATEST KILLING CAME AFTER WEEKS OF UNREST IN THE CITY OVER THE ROLE OF THE "KOMITEHS" IN ADMINISTERING THE CITY.

~~SECRET~~

t-12

12. [REDACTED] IS LIKELY THAT SOVIET UNITS IN THE HERAT AREA
WOULD HAVE DEPLOYED AT LEAST SOME UNITS TO THE BORDER TO
PRESENT CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY.

13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]

16. "SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY:
DESTROYER CONTINUES SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP WHILE
AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR, AN AUXILIARY AND A MINESWEEPER, WITH AN
AVIATOR IN SUPPORT, ARE IN THE VICINITY OF THE MIDWAY TASK GROUP.

NW 08 JAN 80

INNN

~~SECRET~~

FM JIE
TO DELTA

~~TOP SECRET~~

H - 8/92

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. THERE HAVE BEEN NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITANTS' DEMAND THAT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAND OVER THE US CHARGE FOR QUESTIONING. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN SILENT ON THE ISSUE. WHEN THE CAPTORS MADE SIMILAR DEMANDS SOME TIME AGO, THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES REJECTED THEM ON THE BASIS THAT THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE THREE.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP TO THE MILITANTS' ANNOUNCEMENT OF YESTERDAY THAT AIR FORCE LT COL DAVID ROEDER WOULD BE TRIED FOR HIS ACTIVITIES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12255
CONDUCTED ON 22 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
 CECI DOWNGRACED TO _____
REVIEW ON DAOC
EINDED FROM multiple sources
BY WSP/DP/ED

10. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS:

WHILE THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR CLOSED WITHIN VISUAL RANGE DURING THE EVENING HOURS OF 04 JAN AND SUBSEQUENTLY FADED FROM MIDWAY RADAR DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS TODAY.

11. ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF [REDACTED] NOTHING TO REPORT

FM JTF
TO DELTA

H-196

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1226
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON Mcc
 DECL EXEMPTED TO Secret
 REVIEW ON OADR
 DERIVED FROM multiple sources

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. THE STUDENT CAPTORS HOLDING 50 US HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN LOOK EXHAUSTED BUT APPARENTLY REMAIN FIRM IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH. A CARACAS CORRESPONDENT HAS SAID AFTER HAVING CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS AT THE EMBASSY.

2. U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM LEFT TEHRAN TODAY AT THE SUDDEN AND UNANNOUNCED END OF A THREE DAY VISIT TO TRY TO SOLVE THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. HE DID NOT SEE THE HOSTAGES AT THE EMBASSY OR THEIR STUDENT CAPTORS AND HE DID NOT MEET AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. HE DID MEET WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. DURING A VISIT YESTERDAY TO PEOPLE CRIPPLED IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WALDHEIM PROMISED TO TAKE THEIR MESSAGE OF SUFFERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BEEN FRUITFUL, ADDING THAT "THE PROBLEM OF THE RETURN OF THE SHAH TO IRAN REMAINS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR IRAN."

4. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH ALSO IS QUOTED TODAY IN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS AS SAYING THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS "OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY" AND UNAWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT US - IRANIAN CRISIS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO REPORTEDLY TOLD VISITORS TO TEHRAN THAT KHOMEINI HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT PROMPTED THESE REMARKS.

5. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN MET WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN QOM YESTERDAY TO PROTEST TUESDAY'S ATTACK ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY. PRESS REPORTS STATED THE AMBASSADOR DROPPED BROAD HINTS THAT THE LEFTWING FEDAYEEN GUERRILLAS IN KURDESTAN AND REBELS IN OTHER MINORITY AREAS, SUCH AS AZERBAIJAN, MAY APPRECIATE A LITTLE HELP. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO REPORTEDLY INDICATED THAT THE ARM OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN "MIGHT DEVELOP PARALYSIS AT A MOMENT INCONVENIENT FOR IRAN DURING THE VOTE ON SANCTIONS ON 7 JANUARY."

6. AFGHAN RESIDENTS OF IRAN STORMED THE SOVIET EMBASSY TODAY FOR THE SECOND TIME IN THREE DAYS, DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE CROWD, WHICH REPORTEDLY NUMBERED 250-300, WAS TURNED BACK BY ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BEFORE THEY COULD ENTER THE COMPOUND.

7. [AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, STATED THAT IRAN SHOULD BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ANY COUNTRY IMPOSING SUCH SANCTIONS.] BEHESHTI IS CHAIRMAN OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

8. REUTERS REPORTS THAT PROFESSOR FARSI, THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, HAS SAID THAT THE 50 AMERICANS BEING HELD AT THE US EMBASSY ARE NOT HOSTAGES BUT DETAINEES CHARGED WITH OFFENSES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW. FARSI IS ALSO QUOTED HAVING SAID THAT THE TRIAL OF THE "DETAINEES" IS PART OF THE TRIAL OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND THE REGIME OF THE FORMER SHAH.

9. ON 3 JANUARY, THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN ADVISED ALL ITALIAN NATIONALS TO LEAVE IRAN UNLESS THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE WAS ESSENTIAL.

10. IT WAS ANNOUNCED IN TEHRAN YESTERDAY THAT VICE ADMIRAL MAHMUD ALAWI WAS APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN NAVY REPLACING REAR ADMIRAL MADANI WHO RESIGNED HIS POST TO RUN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

~~SECRET~~

12. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS: [REDACTED]

THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR WAS IN THE VICINITY OF TG 70.1 YESTERDAY, BUT DEPARTED THE MIDWAY GROUP AND WAS SIGHTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE KITTY HAWK GROUP THIS MORNING. AN OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP CONTINUES PROBABLE RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN AN AREA 100 NM SOUTHEAST OF THE MIDWAY TG.

13. ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF DIEGO GARCIA: NOTHING TO REPORT

15. [REDACTED]

16. SOVIET SATELLITES IN ORBIT. AS OF 2100Z TODAY THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE FROM THE STATUS REPORTED ON 3 JAN 80.
RVW 04JAN80

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1225Z
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
INVESTIGATIVE UNIT DDO-Nmc
CO-DIRECTOR/DEBRIEFER CANT
REVIEWER OADR
COMMISSIONER multiple firms
[REDACTED]

MSG219
040900R JAN 80
FM 31F
(NO SENSITIVE
INFO)

H-#198

SUBJECT: COMPOUND OBSERVATIONS

(A) SEVERAL APARTMENT BLDGS NORTH OF EMBASSY COMPOUND WERE NEW AND UNOCCUPIED. OTHERS WERE OCCUPIED BY CIVILIAN FAMILIES.

(B) PARKING OF PRIVATE VEHICLES ON THE COMPOUND SIDE OF ROOSEVELT IS RESTRICTED. PARKING ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE IS ROUTINE AS IS PARKING IN SIDE STREETS.

(C) TAKHT-E-JAMSHID IS ALMOST ALWAYS ACTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY VEHICLE MOVEMENT.

(D) TAKHT-E-JAMSHID (SOUTH SIDE) OPPOSITE EMBASSY IS THE SCENE OF MANY STREET VENDORS DURING ALL HOURS.

(E) MANY BUSINESSES ALONG THE SAME AREA ARE OPEN DURING NORMAL HOURS BUT AT LEAST TWO, POSSIBLY THREE, BLDGS ARE VACANT. TWO OF THESE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS:

- (1) THE AMERICA HOTEL-DIAGONALLY ACROSS FROM COMPOUND
- (2) A 3 STORY BANK-DIRECTLY ACROSS FROM COMPOUND ENTRANCE
- (3) THE 3-M BLDG-ACROSS FROM THE CHANCERY.

2. VEHICLE MOVEMENT INTO AND THROUGH TEHRAN IS BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY PRIVATE VEHICLE, TAXI CAB, AND MERCEDES INTERNATIONAL DIESEL MINI-BUS. THESE VEHICLES ARE THE MOST COMMON AND DO NOT ATTRACT ATTENTION. BUS SIGNS CAN BE PURCHASED FOR USE ON THESE VEHICLES. VEHICLES WHICH ARE UNUSUAL IN AREA AND ATTRACT ATTENTION ARE AMBULANCES, FIRE TRUCKS, AND MILITARY/POLICE VEHICLES.

3. THIS SHOULD CONFUSE DEFENDERS AND MAKE THEM THINK A RIVAL IRANIAN ELEMENT IS CONDUCTING THE ASSAULT AND DELAY/PRECLUDE RECOGNITION OF FORCE AS UNITED STATES, THUS REDUCING THE LIKELY HOOD OF THE INTERIOR GUARDS KILLING THE HOSTAGES.

ARE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES IN TEHRAN.

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG213
021655R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA

~~SECRET~~

5011
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12283
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 80
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI NMCC
A DDCI CL ALLEGRIATED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0402
REMOVED FROM multiple source

SUBJECT: SOVIET SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY IN ARABIAN SEA

I. FORCE COMPOSITION:

THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF SOVIET SURVEILLANCE UNITS IN THE ARABIAN SEA INCLUDES:

- [A KRIVAK-CLASS GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE]
- [A SAM KOTLIN-CLASS GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER]
- TWO EXPEDITIONARY OCEANOGRAPHIC SHIPS (AGOR)
- A NATYA-CLASS OCEANGOING MINE SWEEPER
- [A MOMA-CLASS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP (AGI)]

II. SENSOR CAPABILITY:

ALL OF THE ABOVE SHIPS, [EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE NATYA] ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE SUFFICIENT SENSOR CAPABILITIES TO DETECT U.S. FLIGHT OPERATIONS (ASSUMING STANDARD U.S. TACTICS/SOI ARE USED), BEYOND VISUAL RANGE TO AT LEAST RADIO LINE-OF-SIGHT. THIS DETECTION WOULD BE BASED ON DETECTION OF U.S. AIRBORNE RADARS, TRANSPONDERS, AND/OR COMMUNICATIONS.

THE MAJOR COMBATANTS ARE ASSESSED TO HAVE A FULL SIGINT CAPABILITY WHICH IS PROBABLY ORIENTED TOWARD TACTICAL SIGINT AND WOULD BE CAPABLE OF DETECTING AND RECOGNIZING U.S. AIR OPERATIONS.

THE SOVIET FISHING FLEET IS KNOWN TO HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MISSION, [INCLUDING SIGINT], AND COULD PLAY A POTENTIAL ROLE IN DETECTING LARGE SCALE AIR OPERATIONS.

THE SENSOR CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET LOGISTICAL AUXILIARIES WOULD APPEAR TO BE LIMITED [IN THEIR VISUAL AND RADAR COVERAGE].

III. OPERATIONS:

THE GENERAL PATTERN OF SOVIET SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. UNITS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA HAS BEEN TO POSITION AT LEAST ONE SURVEILLANT WITHIN VISUAL RANGE (3 - 12 MILES) OF EACH CARRIER. THE SURVEILLANT HAS OCCASIONALLY DROPPED OFF FOR A FEW HOURS TO REPLENISH FROM ONE OF THE SUPPORT SHIPS.

IV. GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

SURVEILLANCE FORCE NIGHT OPERATION WITHOUT LIGHTS AND AT LOW ALTITUDE WOULD BE NEEDED TO REDUCE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION. SIGINT CAPABILITY OF SOVIETS CAN BE AVOIDED ONLY THROUGH FULL EMCON PROCEDURES, INCLUDING RADIO SILENCE AND DEACTIVATION OF ALL EMITTERS INCLUDING RADIO ALTIMETERS, IFF TRANSPONDERS, AND RADARS.

CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AT THIS HQS, BUT WE WILL UNDERTAKE NECESSARY
ACTIONS TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN IT.)
RW 02JAN10

RVW 02JAN10

BT

223

• • • • •

TOK Jan
73 & —

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
 DEC¹ DDONMCC TO _____
REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG215
021000R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA

TOPS SECRET

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

2. MORE ANTI-FOREIGN DEMONSTRATIONS WERE STAGED IN TEHRAN ON 2 JANUARY WHILE UNREST IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE COUNTRY CONTINUED.

ACCORDING TO PRESS, STUDENT MARCHES TO PROTEST SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM'S VISIT WERE TO BE HELD IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN ALSO ON THE 2ND. IN THE NORTHEAST REGION OF IRAN, SANANDAJ REMAINED THE SCENE OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE; HOWEVER, SOME SEMBLANCE OF PEACE MAY SOON RETURN TO THE STRIFE-TORN TOWN.

3.

4. IN THE PAST TWO DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN TWO UNSUCCESSFUL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN IRAN. TODAY, TWO PERSONS WERE REPORTEDLY APPREHENDED FOLLOWING AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF AYATOLLAH SADDEQL, FORMER PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC COURTS. YESTERDAY, TEN PERSONS REPORTEDLY ATTACKED THE HOUSE OF AYATOLLAH ROHANI, WHO WAS THE FIRST TO RENEW IRANIAN CLAIMS TO BAHRAIN. WHO THE ATTACKERS WERE AND WHETHER THESE ATTACKS WERE COORDINATED IS NOT YET KNOWN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ATTACKS ARE THE WORK OF THE ANTI-CLERIC FOMGHAN GROUP WHICH HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR SEVERAL OTHER ASSASSINATIONS.

5.
6.
OTHER REPORTS OF C-130 OVERFLIGHTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND COULD INDICATE AN INCREASING MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE ROLE FOR THESE AIRCRAFT. THE ABSENCE OF RECENT REPORTS OF F-4 AND P-3 AIRCRAFT RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM THIS INDICATION. C-130 AIRCRAFT ARE NORMALLY BASED AT TEHRAN/MEHRABAD (27 EA) AND SHIRAZ (23 EA) PATROLLING THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

POLICE AT HAVE ALSO RECEIVED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OF AT LEAST
SOME OF THEIR SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CITY.

8. ON 2 JANUARY, THE IRANIAN JURISTS' ASSOCIATION FURNISHED THE PRESS WITH A LIST OF CHARGES AGAINST THE SHAH SAYING THERE IS INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT TO JUSTIFY HIS EXTRADITION FOR TRIAL IN IRAN. THE LIST INCLUDED THE SPECIFIC CHARGE THAT THE SHAH HAD ORDERED THE BURNING DOWN OF THE REX CINEMA IN ABADEM IN 1978 IN WHICH SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE WERE KILLED. THE JURISTS CLAIM THAT THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SHAH IS NOT A POLITICAL REFUGEE OR AN IMMUNE DEPOSED KING BUT RATHER AN ORDINARY CRIMINAL WHO HAS COMMITTED EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE CRIMES AND MUST BE TRIED BY A NATIONAL COURT AT THE PLACE WHERE THE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.

9. REFLECTING INCREASED TENSIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIETS HAVE CANCELLED A REGULARLY SCHEDULED AEROFLOT STOPOVER IN

NNNN

DATA ENTERED IT'S THIRD DAY OF SURVEILLANCE OF USS KITTY HAWK

C THE AUXILIARY AND AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR WERE OBSERVED CONDUCTING REPLENISHMENT OPERATIONS IN THE AREA YESTERDAY FROM NAVAL ASSOCIATED MERCHANT TANKER YEGORYEVSK.

B. AN OILER, WHICH WAS SIGHTED YESTERDAY BY USS FANNING, HAS AUGMENTED THOSE SUPPORT SHIPS OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA.

C. A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER CONTINUES TO MONITOR USS MIDWAY OPERATIONS INTO TODAY. A FLEET MINESWEEPER PARALLELED USS JOUETT'S COURSE BRIEFLY YESTERDAY TO OBSERVE UNREP BEFORE GOING DEAD-IN-THE-WATER.

D. [REDACTED]

E. AN OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP CONTINUES PROBABLE RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN THE AREA APPROXIMATELY 110 NM SOUTHWEST OF USS KITTY HAWK

F. [REDACTED]

G. [REDACTED]

RW 03JAN00

SECRET [REDACTED]

MSG212
021600R JAN 80

~~SECRET~~

FM JTF/J2
TO DELTA//S2
INFO [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: COMPOUND INFORMATION

H-
K 203

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CLEY DDO NMCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO Delta
REVIEW GM JADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

1. THE FOLLOWING NOTES ARE FROM A 31 DEC FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH AN INDIVIDUAL WHO PREVIOUSLY DID SECURITY DESIGN WORK IN THE COMPOUND. SEVERAL SHEETS OF PLANS WERE PROVIDED DURING THIS INTERVIEW AND WILL BE PASSED TO DELTA BY COURIER.
2. IN MAY 79, THE SOURCE OBSERVED A SANDBAGGED POSITION ON TOP TO THE EAST WALL OF THE COMPOUND. THIS HAS ALSO BEEN MENTIONED IN AT LEAST ONE REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY A POSITION WOULD BE BUILT ON A WALL ONLY A COUPLE OF FEET WIDE, OLD DRAWINGS OF THE COMPOUND MAY PROVIDE ANOTHER EXPLANATION. IN A 1946 DRAWING, AN EAST GATE IS SHOWN APPROX 100M NORTH OF THE ROOSEVELT/TAKHTE-JAMSHID INTERSECTION, WITH A SMALL GUARD HOUSE. A 1952 DRAWING SHOWS AN "OFFICERS QUARTERS" AND "RADIO OPERATOR OFFICE" IN THIS AREA. WHILE THESE STRUCTURES ARE NO LONGER THERE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS SOME TRACE OF THIS CONSTRUCTION, SUCH AS A WIDE POINT IN THE WALL WHICH COULD PROVIDE A BASE FOR A POSITION.
3. THE 1946 DRAWINGS ALSO INDICATE A FORMER GAP IN THE EAST WALL, APPROX 50M SOUTH OF THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE COMPOUND. THE GAP APPEARS TO BE APPROX 3-5M WIDE AND IS MARKED, "FILL IN GATE OPENNING WITH TEMPORARY MUD WALL". THIS AREA MAY HAVE BEEN PROPERLY REBUILT SINCE, OR MAY BE AN AREA OF SUBSTANDARD CONSTRUCTION MORE VULNERABLE TO BREACHING THAN OTHER PARTS OF THE WALL.
4. THE SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT IN MAY 79 HE HAD SEEN A SANDBAGGED POSITION ON TOP OF A SMALL GUARD SHACK AT THE EAST SIDE OF THE SOUTHEAST GATE, JUST INSIDE THE COMPOUND.
5. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, IN MAY 79 THERE WAS A SANDBAGGED POSITION ON THE NW CORNER OF THE ROOF OF THE CARAVANSERY RESTAURANT, THE BUILDING WEST SIDE OF THE CONSULATE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THERE WAS A LARGE PROPANE STORAGE TANK ON THIS ROOF; ALONG WITH SKYLIGHTS INTO THE KITCHEN AND REST ROOM, ROOF VENTILATORS, A RAISED AREA WITH ACCESS INTO THE UTILITIES AREA, AND AN ACCESS DOOR INTO THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE CONSULATE.
6. AFTER DISCRETELY CONSULTING AN ASSOCIATE WHO HAD BEEN IN THE AREA WITH HIM IN MAY 79, THE SUBJECT REAFFIRMED THERE WERE NO WINDOWS ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE "SAVAK" BUILDING, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE WEST WALL OF THE COMPOUND.
7. USING AN AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH, THE SOURCE GAVE MORE PRECISE POSITIONS OF BUILDINGS WHICH WERE USED TO FIRE INTO THE COMPOUND IN MAY 79. THE BUILDINGS POINTED OUT WERE:
 - (A) THE BUILDING ON THE EAST SIDE OF MATEK - USH - SHOARAY-E, APPROX 80M SOUTH OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID. (MATEK-USH-SHOARAY-E IS THE FIRST STREET EAST OF ROOSEVELT). THIS BUILDING IS IDENTIFIABLE AS THE TALLEST BUILDING IN THE AREA.
 - (B) THE BUILDING ON THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ATAROD AND ROOSEVELT. (ATAROD IS SPELLED OTAROD ON SOME MAPS. IT IS THE FIRST STREET NORTH OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID).
 - (C) THE BUILDING ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID, SOUTHEAST OF THE MOTORPOOL GATE TO THE COMPOUND. IT IS THE TALLEST OF THE BUILDINGS ON THIS PORTION OF THE STREET.
 - (D) THE BUILDING ON THE NW CORNER OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID AND AMERICA ALLEY.
 - (E) FIRE RECEIVED FROM THE NORTH WAS FROM AN AREA NORTH OF THE BASKETBALL COURT AREA, NORTH OF THE COMPOUND.

RVW 02JAN10

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H-204

TO GTF
TO DELTA
INFO

DATE (MM-DD-YY) 1-21-82
CONCERNED [REDACTED]
PRIORITY [REDACTED] S
URGENT [REDACTED] S
REVIEW BY [REDACTED] 3/1/82
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] S

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. (A) CONTRADICTING EARLIER REPORTS, THOSE CAPTURING THE U.S. HOSTAGES HAVE REPORTEDLY STATED THEY HAVE NO PARTICULAR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT AND WILL ABIDE BY KHOMEINI'S DIRECTIVES.

(B) AN "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" HAS BEEN CALLED BY THE MILITANTS AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE CONFERENCE, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR 3-9 JANUARY, WILL REPORTLY BE "TO REVEAL WASHINGTON'S 'CRIMES'". REPRESENTATIVES FROM 15 LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN INVITED, INCLUDING THE PLO, THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION (ZAPU) AND THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO).

IN TEHRAN... SEVERAL NATIONS, MOST RECENTLY PORTUGAL AND WEST GERMANY, HAVE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRY OUT OF FEAR OF REPRISALS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ONE IS, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT TEHRAN WAS CALM AND ATTRIBUTED THE "FACT" TO THE FACT THAT THE IRANIANS ARE NOT AWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION.

4. YESTERDAY IRAN'S INTERIOR MINISTRY ANNOUNCED THE OFFICIAL RESULT OF LAST MONTH'S REFERENDUM IN WHICH IRANIANS APPROVED THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION. OF THE SOME 22 MILLION ELIGIBLE VOTERS, 15,752,956 CAST BALLOTS. OF THAT NUMBER, ONLY 72,516 VOTED AGAINST THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION.

5. INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, MAY BE GROWING. ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THERE IS DISSENT WITHIN THE MILITARY WAS NOTED RECENTLY WHEN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRESUMABLY TO PRACTICE SUCH RESISTANCE, MORE OFFICERS, MANY OF WHOM ARE OF THE MINORITY SHI'AH, REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN RETIRED.

6. KURDISH OPPOSITION TO THE KHOMEINI REGIME HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF IN RENEWED VIOLENCE IN THE NORTHWEST. FIGHTING BROKE OUT BRIEFLY IN SANANDAJ ON THE 29TH AFTER KURDS DEMANDED THE EVACUATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; A 48-HOUR CEASE-FIRE WAS NEGOTIATED. FIGHTING MAY BE IMMINENT IF PROBABLY KURDISH PEOPLE DO NOT

842

(A)

(B)

SATCOM DATA TO FOLLOW BY SEPARATE
MESSAGE.

COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TG'S
GROUPS: A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. KITTY
HAWK (TG 70.2) IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA, FOLLOWING UPDRAW
REPLENISHMENT YESTERDAY BY THE NAVAL ASSOCIATED OFFICER TANKER
EGORYEVSK. A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER IS IN SURVEILLANCE OF
USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) AND WAS JOINED BY AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
YESTERDAY. A FLEET MINESWEEPER IS OPERATING TO THE NORTHWEST OF
THE CARRIER MIDWAY, WHILE A MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARY [REDACTED]
CONTINUES SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE [REDACTED]

ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF DIEGO [REDACTED] THIS REPORT.

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206

Item Number: _____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Identification of Soviet Trucks in CONUS to
Support [REDACTED] Planning.

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

A

1. (S) On several occasions, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. (U) Survey of US holdings of Soviet vehicles focused
on:
 - a. USA 11th MI Battalion, Aberdeen Proving Grounds
(APG).
 - b. Field Support Division (FSD)/USA Foreign Science and
Technology Center (FSTC), APG.
 - c. USAF Soviet Awareness Museum, Bolling AFB.
3. (S) J2 representative contacted Cdr, 11th MI Bn and
represented himself as a member of ODCSOPS, DA, who was
looking for Soviet vehicles - primarily trucks - for a
DA-conducted emergency deployment exercise. 11th MI Bn
refurbishes Soviet vehicles - primarily combat vehicles -
and transfers them to field units for their use. Trucks
held by the 11th MI Bn were non-operational and would have
required massive maintenance to bring them up to an opera-
tional status.

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DDONMC
2256
Classified By:
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded to Secrecy
7.9.81

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. (U) Cdr, 11th MI Bn suggested that Soviet vehicles held by FSD be inspected. FSD vehicles were in better condition than those of 11th MI Bn, however, several had been loaned out for testing.

A
[redacted] requested through its DA POC and FSD agreed to provide vehicle familiarization, driving training, and 1st echelon maintenance instruction on Soviet vehicles for approximately [redacted]

5. (U) J2 representative contacted USAF Directorate of Soviet Awareness, Bolling, AFB, on the suggestion of the JTF J2, who had formerly been assigned there. The Directorate's museum maintains one Soviet truck in acceptable condition.

6. (U) Description of Soviet vehicles identified in December 1979 for possible use are at Attachment No. 1. Use of these vehicles in RICEBOWL was eventually discarded in favor of [redacted]

7. (U) In October 1980, upon request of COMJTF, subject of Soviet trucks was again researched. Memorandum summarizing results is at Attachment No. 2.

8. (U) In December 1980, [redacted] requested availability data on Soviet trucks. J2 representative introduced [redacted] representative to FSD/FSTC and Soviet Awareness POC's.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) US military is primarily concerned with Soviet combat vehicles vice utility-type vehicles. Those utility

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vehicles that are available are generally in an extremely poor state of repair.

2. (U) FSD can only be responsive if tasked by FSTC. Therefore, the system had to be accessed in following sequence: DA POC - USA Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) - FSTC - FSD.

(S) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the viability of using [REDACTED] a source of Soviet vehicles/equipment be researched.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Major [REDACTED] ODCSOPS, DA
LTC [REDACTED] USA TRADOC,
Ft. Monroe, VA

POINTS OF CONTACT:

a. 11th MI Bn: VON 283-4685/2806
b. FSD/FSTC: Mr. [REDACTED] VON 283-5295
c. USAF Soviet Awareness Directorate: [REDACTED] Comm
767-4266

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Soviet Vehicles
2. Memorandum: [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ H 201
Item Number:

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Hydrological Data

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. () J2 developed the requirements for hydrological data in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman.
2. () DMA/HTC provided all available charts of the areas and latest notice to Marines reports of change not depicted on the charts.

COMMENTS:

1. () Exact positioning of oil drilling/exploration and pumping platforms is not available through DMA.
2. () No one agency is responsible for noting changes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. () Utilize ~~any~~ available intel collecting agency to obtain hydrological data.
2. () Provide DMA/HTC with any and all data and they can provide updated maps.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: (PG oil req study)

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - [REDACTED] HQ DMA, 254-4426

DMA - [REDACTED] DMA/HTC, 227-2734

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Assorted Hydrological Charts
2. [REDACTED]

*Declassified by
DDO NMCC
22 Jul 92
JCS
OAOR*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

H-
#208

Item Number:

Intelligence Historical Report

J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Air Defense (AAA, SAM)

TIMEFRAME: July 1980 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (S) J-2 utilized [REDACTED] to provide the current air defense (AAA & SAM) picture.
2. (S) Basic types of equipment was identified and countermeasures were devised.
3. (S) J-2 directed that DMA produce [REDACTED] products which allowed placement of threat rings for ADA and SAMs.
4. (S) J-2 maintained a file on equipment parameters, contacts, possible countermeasures and threat areas.
5. (S) Component units received pertinent changes in ADA and SAMs, equipment parameters, films and any other information as soon as it became available.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) Specific parameters on western ADA and SAM systems were available but the systems were not previously targeted for exploitation or analysis.
2. (S) Rapidly moving war requirements outdated most of our previously held data on ADA and SAM positions.
3. (S) The Iranians continually upgraded their ADA and SAM threat (and possibly their capabilities) during the war.

Classified By: JCS
Declassification On: OADR

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (u) 1. (AS) An office be established to gather and analyze western ADA systems.
- (u) 2. (AS) J-2 maintain contact with air defense sources, both at the Pentagon and at operational sites.
- (u) 3. (AS) J-2 establish a parameter and system description file of both western and communist bloc systems.

C [REDACTED] (AS) J-2 require a monthly update on AAA/SAM Systems from DIA and [REDACTED]

J-2 personnel involved: Major [REDACTED]
Major [REDACTED]
Captain [REDACTED]

(AS) Points of contact: LtCol [REDACTED]

Maj [REDACTED] (AFINER) Ext 45261

Maj [REDACTED] (XOXXM) Ext 72889

Mr. [REDACTED] INYX) Ext 57267

Maj [REDACTED] (Iran PAI) Ext 51161

Maj [REDACTED] (1SOW A-2) Autovon 872-6498

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~~TOP SECRET~~H#209
Item Number:Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79~~ATTACK~~SUBJECT: Attack Helicopter Training RangeTIMEFRAME: October 1980 - November 1980SUMMARY:

1. (U) Several SNOWBIRD options relied heavily on attack helicopters to destroy Iranian AAA/SAM positions in Tehran at H-Hour. COMJTF directed J2 to determine the types of AAA/SAM systems to be attacked ^{and} to develop a realistic training range for attack helicopters.
2. (U) The types of targets were already contained in the J2 data base: ZU-23-2, Oerliken 35mm, Rapier, ^FHAWK.
3. (U) J2 identified four categories of training targets that could be used in developing the attack helicopter training range:
 - a. Real equipment
 - b. Foam/wooden/metallic mock-ups
 - c. Inflatable devices
 - d. Target cloth with silk-screen reproductions of the equipment
4. (U) Details of J2 research and recommendations for development of training range are contained in a 30 October 1980 memorandum to COMJTF, at Attachment 1.
5. (F) SNOWBIRD ³³ eventually organized and operated attack helicopter range at Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ. Plywood mock-ups arrayed to represent AAA/SAM positions at Mehrabad Airport and in/around Tehran were ~~simply~~ used as targets.

Declassified by DPNMCC
23 Jul 92~~TOP SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY COMJTF
DECLASSIFICATION: OAIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENTS: None.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Major [REDACTED] (USA),
ODCSOPS, DA

POINTS OF CONTACT:

1. Mr. [REDACTED] FSD/FSTC/DARCOM, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, MD

Tel: 8-283-7504/5

(Soviet equipment)

2. Mr. [REDACTED] pronounced [REDACTED]
Redstone Arsenal, AL

Tel: 8-746-3485/7559

(HAWK equipment)

3. Mr. [REDACTED] MERADCOM, Ft Belvoir, VA
Tel: 8-354-6741

(Inflatable HAWK equipment)

4. Mr. [REDACTED] USA Training Support Center,
Ft Eustis, VA

Tel: 8-927-2560/3264

(Silk screen reproductions,
and mock-ups)

ATTACHMENT:

1. Memorandum for MG Vaught, 30 October 1980

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

30 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MG VAUGHT

Subject: Helicopter Training Against AAA/SAM's

(U)

1. (TS) The primary AAA/SAM threat to US forces in Iran will consist of:

- a. ZU-23-2: Soviet, towed, dual-barrel, 23mm gun, optical tracking.
- b. Oerlikon: Swiss, towed, dual-barrel, 35mm gun, radar controlled (Superfledermaus).
- c. Rapier: British short-range, point defense SAM (4 missiles per launcher), optical tracking.

d. HAWK: US SAM

(U)

2. (TS) The following quantities of the above items, real and mock-up, are available in CONUS and can be borrowed by the JTF:

a. ZU-23-2: real: 4, (Aberdeen Proving Grounds/Nellis AFB).

mock-up: 0

b. HAWK: real: 1 system consisting of a launcher, dummy missiles, radars and shelters.

mock-up: 2 inflatable launchers/missiles.

c. Oerlikon: real: 0; mock-up: 0.

(U) d. Rapier: real: 0; mock-up: 0.

3. (U) The US Army Training Support Center (ATSC), Fort Eustis, VA, can have foam mock-ups made of these systems. A new contractor will have to be acquired to build them, and the ATSC estimates 60-90 days for production. The ATSC also estimates that this would be an "expensive" option.

(U)

4. (TS) The ATSC can make silk screen reproductions on target cloth of the AAA/SAM weapons and related equipment. ATSC estimates that 500 targets (12' x 12') can be produced at Fort Huachuca in 3 weeks for approximately \$12,500.

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~~C. TOP SECRET~~

5. (U) (TS) Recommendations:

(U) (TS) a. That two ranges be established at White Sands Missile Range/Fort Bliss for use by 1SOW and 101st Airborne Division helicopters:

(1) Target identification range: HAWK system (including real and inflatable items), real ZU-23-2's, target cloth versions of Oerlikon and Rapier.

(2) Live fire range: target cloth versions of all 4 systems.

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Comments: _____

(U) b. (C) That DAMO-ODP be tasked to acquire the equipment listed in paragraph 2 and the target cloth reproductions described in paragraph 4. Coordination will be effected with JTD J-3 and J-4.

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Comments: _____

(U) c. (TS) That DAMO-ODP and J-3 effect coordination with White Sands Missile Range/Fort Bliss for property on which to establish the ranges and permission to conduct training.

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Comments: _____

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d.(v)(S) That JTD J-3, ~~ISOW~~ and 101st Airborne Division representatives establish the ranges and conduct the AAA/SAM recognition and helicopter gunnery training.

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Comments:

6. (C) This memorandum has been coordinated with J-3, J-4, and DAMO-ODP.

G

[REDACTED] Major, USA [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

MSG 051

221251

DTG: 221130Z APR 80

FM: JTF/RC-J2

TO: SITE ALFA/J2

H-210

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 0258
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
 DECLARED DERIVED FROM SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM

REF ID: AUF 1000 MSG 220805Z APR 80, SAB

SUBJ: UNUSUAL SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

THE IVAN ROGOV TASK GROUP CONTINUES A NORTHWESTERLY TRANSIT OF
THE ARABIAN SEA,

~~Classified By: SCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

13
REF ID: A69262
S70: L214124Z APR 82

~~SECRET~~

FBI: JTF/RC-JL
FBI: CTF ALPHA

1052209582

~~SECRET~~ SUBJ: SOV NAVAL ACTIVITY

REF ID: E12912 AND E206152 APR 82, SAB

1. APOLLOIES, UP INFO NOW CONFIRMED. HOWEVER PICTURE CONFOUSED
AND STILL BEING SORTED OUT. CIA ANALYST PRESENTLY WORKING UP
INITIAL REPORT WHICH WE WILL PUT ON WIRE IN A FEW HOURS.

2. ALL ANALYSIS/REPORTING REGARDING THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE
PROVIDED AS RECEIVED HERE.

~~SECRET~~
Classified by JCS
Declassified 2020-04-01

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12350
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 92
INITIATIVE QM BY DDCR RMCC
D D C R C O M M U N I C A T I O N S
REVIEWED BY DA AC
RELEASER [REDACTED]

SECRET

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2008-08-2122124-201-17, 40

1. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMINT FLEET COMMANDER, FOURTH PROTECTION DIVISION
SOVIET UNION & BALTIC STATES, REQUESTS THAT THE FOLLOWING DATA IS
PROVIDED FOR YOUR ATTENTION:
a) SOVIET SURFACE UNIT OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE
BALTIC SEA.

• THE LAST INCLINE OF 500 FEET

~~CERTIFICATE TO STATE THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS ARE
PROTECTED BY LAW~~

7. UNABLE TO DETERMINE ESTIMATED LENGTH OF THIS FISH. SEEN
AN ESTIMATE. APPROXIMATELY FORTY-FIVE INCHES LONG. IN A COASTAL
AREA FLOOR OF THE ADULTURAL ATTACHED SEA THE REGION WOULD
BE MEASURED IN HUNDRED DAYS.

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT UTILIZED THE SURVEILLANT RADAR WOULD HAVE TO BE POSITIONED ON THE [REDACTED] FLIGHT ROUTE TO DETECT A/C FLYING AT [REDACTED] AND BELOW.

1451

~~Classified By: DADR~~
~~Declassified ON:~~

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

© 2011 nra

~~SECRET~~

1456245
MTO 210212Z APR 92
FM: MTS ALTMARIC
TO: JCS/RC-12

H-214

1. [REDACTED]
2. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY
3. OFF MUG 210212Z APR 92 BY HELICOPTER. JAE.

4. REQUEST FOR VIEWS ON SOVIET VESSELS [REDACTED]

5. HOW OFTEN HAVE THEY DONE THIS IN THE PAST?

6. HOW LONG AGO WAS THE LAST INCIDENT?

7. SIGNIFICANCE TO RECEPTION PLANNING IF RE-POSITIONING OF FORCES IS TAKING PLACE?

8. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH [REDACTED] EXERCISE?

9. CONCERNING HEADNET RADAR: HOW CLOSE TO THE [REDACTED] ROUTE MUST THE ARRIVAL BE IN ORDER TO DETECT THE [REDACTED] FLIGHT AND RELOC?

10. PERHAPS WE LIASO THIS TO THE "CRY WOLF" LIST.

11. NO OFFENSE INTENDED, ON SATPAN COVERAGE FONECON. JUST ANTICIPATING [REDACTED]

BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12856

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

CL DECL SECRET UPGRADED TO SECRET

REVIEW ON OADR

DELETED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~H#216~~

DIA WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Unusual Soviet Naval Activity

The IVAN ROGOV Task Group continues a northwesterly transit of
the Arabian Sea [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON MCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO DRAFT
REVIEW ON 20 ADR
DERIVED FROM 20 ADR
[REDACTED]

The KIEV Task Group has separated from the Baltic Fleet Task
Group northwest of Ireland. Both groups continue to head in a
northerly direction [REDACTED]

Classified By JCS
Declassified On 0 ADR

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

O
OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIJC 0131 1491330
ZNY TTTT
0281315Z MAY 80
FM JTF//SNOWBIRD/J2
TO RUEAIIF/
BT

RECORDED IN CITE J3 00131

SUBJ: HELICOPTER DATA

1. THIS OFFICE HAS A NEED TO REVIEW DATA ON THE AVAILABILITY AND OPERATIONAL STATUS OF IRANIAN HELICOPTERS BOTH IN AND OUT OF IRAN, WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST ON THE BELL 214 ALPHA AND CHARLIE MODELS.

2. HAVE REQUESTED [REDACTED] SUPPORT ON DETERMINING OPERATIONAL HISTORY OF [REDACTED] AND DIA PHOTO SUPPORT ON DETERMINING [REDACTED]

(S) IN ADDITION CONSIDERING MEETING WITH [REDACTED] NEXT WEEK TO SOLICIT THEIR SUPPORT.

PAGE 2 RUEIJC 0131

RW 28 MAY 80

BT

0131

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1336
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC N MCC
 DECL X DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0 APR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCOVA285

OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0143 1561105

ZNY TTTT

O 041100Z JUN 80

FM JTF/J2A

TO [REDACTED]

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

H27

SUBJ: MEETING ON [REDACTED] DOD ASSETS TO BE INSERTED
INTO IRAN; SUMMARY AND AGREEMENTS.

(TS) ON 3 MAY A MEETING WAS HELD AT JTF SNOWBIRD. ATTENDEES
INCLUDED REPRESENTATION FROM J-2 (MA).

(COL BECKWITH) AND COMJTF SPECIAL ASSISTANT (SA).

2. (TS) THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS WERE DRAWN BY THE CONFEREES
FROM AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE:

A. INTELLIGENCE HOLDINGS ARE ADEQUATE TO CONDUCT A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], BUT INSUFFICIENT FOR A [REDACTED]
IN SUPPORT OF A RESCUE OPTION.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0143 [REDACTED]

C. HOWEVER, IT WAS AGREED THAT [REDACTED] MIGHT WELL
BE FEASIBLE.

D. COVER DOCUMENTATION FOR DOD ASSETS OUGHT TO BE SOME-
THING OTHER THAN [REDACTED]

(S) THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED:

A. [REDACTED]

B. [REDACTED]

C. DOD WILL ARRANGE FOR BOOKING OF ONE (1) ASSET

D. DOD WILL PROVIDE TWO (2) ASSETS

NLT 11 JUNE 1980.

E. [REDACTED]

F. BOTH THE [REDACTED] WILL BE LAUNCHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

RVW 24 JUN 80

BT

#0143

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235
CONDUCTED ON 22 JULY 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC-NMC
 DECL X DECLASSIFIED TO Secret
REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

H228

OT

VZCZC295

OO RUEAIIF

DE RUEIZJC #0147 1981015

ZNY TTTT

O 061300Z JUN 80

FM JTF//J-2//

TO [REDACTED]

BT

~~TOP SECRET CJCS JS #0147~~

SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. (S) REF [REDACTED] JTF MEETING 6 JUNE 1980 SUBJECT: INFILTRATION OF DOD ASSETS INTO IRAN.

2. (S) DURING THE CONDUCT OF REF MEETING, INFILTRATION OF AT LEAST TWO (2) DOD ASSETS WAS DISCUSSED - [REDACTED]
THE FOLLOWING EEI IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ENHANCE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS IN THIS MISSION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2.

[REDACTED]

3.

[REDACTED]

4.

RWV 06 JUN 80

BT

#0147

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1228
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCORRCC
 CCL EXCERPT GRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOT 161300Z

H231

VZCZCDVZ352
OO, RUEAIIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0170 156164Z
ZNY TITTY
O 141640Z JUN 00
FM JCS/SRQ/JD/IRG/J2

TO [REDACTED]

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE JU 0170

SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL INDICATES THAT
DOD HAS A MINIMUM OF TWO, HOPEFULLY FOUR, PERSONNEL THAT
WILL REQUIRE

VW ON 14 JUNE 00

BT

#0170

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO N MCC

COMBINED TO Secret

~~SECRET~~

16 13 2 7 2

H232

MEMORANDUM
TO: [REDACTED]
DE: [REDACTED] 1000 1001 1002
ZMY 11111
U 101207Z [REDACTED]
FM: [REDACTED] 1000 1001 1002
TO: [REDACTED]
BT

~~C~~
~~1. SENDER IS NOT COMINTIV.~~
SUBJ: FOREIGN ACTIVITY
1) THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN CONTACTED
ADR ADVISOR [REDACTED]

(v) 2) BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SUBDIV. I. BE
STRUCTURED TO ADVISE OF THE VAILIDITY OF INFORMATION
OF ANY FUTURE PLANS ALONG THIS LINE.
(v) 3) FOR THE PURPOSE OF SIGNING ANY CONTRACT
NG VAUGHN, THE [REDACTED],
SI
#0171

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: ADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DIA DDCMC
 DECL COMINTEC TO Dec 97
REVIEW ON ADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources
[REDACTED]

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

H 234

REF ID: A657

CC: 100117
CIA DDCI Review 1991-06
SAC: 100117
SAC: 100117
DDC: 100117
DDC: 100117

[REDACTED] CITE DO 5102

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2010 BY [REDACTED]
BY [REDACTED] WITH THE CAPABILITY AND
EXPERIENCE TO CONDUCT AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND UPHE-
LIFT AND ASSESS. TO DATE, [REDACTED] HAS REVIEWED
[REDACTED] PAGES OF INFORMATION VIEWED BY [REDACTED] PERSONNEL.
THE INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED, UNMARKED, AND MAY BE USED
BY [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2010 BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2010 BY [REDACTED]
BY [REDACTED] WITH THE CAPABILITY AND
EXPERIENCE TO CONDUCT AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND UPHE-
LIFT AND ASSESS. TO DATE, [REDACTED] HAS REVIEWED
[REDACTED] PAGES OF INFORMATION VIEWED BY [REDACTED] PERSONNEL.
THE INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED, UNMARKED, AND MAY BE USED
BY [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 02/28/92
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDOR/MCC
 DCL DOWNGRADING TO Secret
REVIEW BY OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

JTF

CJ

P

JS

J2
CH
CB

VZCZCDVA224

OO RUEAIIF

DE RUEIZJC #0117 1411859

ZNY TTTT

10 201900Z MAY 80

FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/J2

TO RUEAIIF/

BT

T-S P-S O-R-E? CITE J3 00000

SUBJ:

THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES

PROPOSED ACTIONS.

POSSIBLE ACTION AGENCIES ARE NOTED IN PARENTHESIS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0117 ~~SECRET~~

RVW 20 MAY 80

BT

#0117

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12338

CONDUCTED BY 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECLASSIFIED/DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REVIEW BY OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

NNNN



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9 SEP 1980

S-215/JSJ

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
HQ, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Active Duty Assignment of [REDACTED] 1st Lieutenant, USAR (X)

(C)

1 (8)

(C)

2 (5)

3 (U) Preliminary contact has been made with Lieutenant Colonel Scharef, DCSPER, DA who has prepared the necessary paper work and is awaiting formal approval. Request Department of the Army conduct necessary coordination with Department of State and initiate action to bring the subject on active duty for two weeks beginning 8 September 1980.

EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL SC DOWNGRADED TO CONF
REVIEW ON 0402
DERIVED FROM DIA

Classification: [REDACTED]
Declassify on [REDACTED]XCS
26 Aug 1986~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STAFF SUMMARY SHEET S-215/JSJ

ROUTE TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Grade and Surname)	ORIGINATOR (Symbol)	TELEPHONE NO	DATE
[1] DR.	Signature	J SEP 1980	JSJ	51032	
ACTION OFFICER					
SIGNATURE					
JSJ	CO-020	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
TYPE GRADE AND SURNAME					
C,6 [REDACTED] USA bwg					
SUBJECT					
Active Duty Assignment of [REDACTED] 1st Lt, USAR ^(U) [REDACTED]					
REMARKS					
1. (U) PURPOSE: In response to a request for assistance received from JCS JTF on 25 August 1980.					
2. (U) DISCUSSION:					
[REDACTED]					
b. [REDACTED]					
[REDACTED]					
c. (U) LTC Scharef, DCSPER, has already prepared orders and is awaiting official word to order [REDACTED] to duty commencing 8 September 1980.					
d. (U) SOD, JCS, asked that DIA work as a cut-out in the coordination of this effort.					
3. (C) CONCLUSION					
[REDACTED]					
4. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That the letter to ACSI DA be signed requesting assistance in effecting the necessary coordination with Department of State.					
 JAMES L. BROWN Major General, USAF Assistant Director for JCS Support					
Classified by JCS					
Declassify on 26 Aug 82					
SECRET					

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION PAPER

H243

DAPE-MBP
23 July 1980

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Briefing by Richard Queen, 22 July 1980

-- Former hostage Richard Queen briefed hostage families in DC area at State on 22 July. Army family members present were [REDACTED]. LTC Shadur, DA family POC, also attended.

-- Format was general info briefing followed by individual discussions with family members. Queen has talked by phone with some families and will call all not at the meeting.

-- Key points from general briefing:

- o Contrary to media reports, has either seen or at least received reports on most hostages.
- o November 79 was chaotic; "Students" disorganized. Hostages moved frequently; handled differently (some were tied, blindfolded, not allowed to talk; others were relatively less restricted).
- o Moved late November to large underground room call "mushroom inn;" remained there till March. About half of hostages, including all military officers, there at one time or another. Not allowed to talk, guarded around-the-clock. Allowed outside 15-20 min/wk. Conditions grim.
- o "Mushroom inn" closed in March. Queen moved into chancery, where he remained until hospitalized just before release. He and most others had one or more roommates. Were locked in room; blindfolded when allowed to use bathroom or leave for any reason. No "students" inside room; could read, play games, talk. Little contact with anyone but roommates, who were (at various times) Joe Hall (Army WO1), Charlie Jones (State), Don Hohman (Army SP6), Bob Ode (State). Conditions much better than "mushroom inn".
- o At first, had only Iranian food; then western style prepared by Pakistani and Italian cooks. Not great but adequate in quality and quantity. Typical meals: breakfast - Iranian bread with butter and jam; noon - main meal (stew, spaghetti, etc); evening - soup & bread.

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by

DDO NMCC
22 Jul 92Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: DADR

CLOSE HOLD

~~SECRET~~

- o Individual guards treated very differently. Mentioned 3: 1st was a good guy; 2d (Habib) an SOB; 3rd (Akbar) was superb.
- o Biggest problem was mail, which captors clearly used against hostages. Some got mail early as December; others, like Queen, got 1st letter in January. Until he got letter, didn't know he could write; then told could send 3 two hundred-word letters weekly. Later learned others has different or no restrictions. Knew many letters were not mailed and much incoming mail, including food packages, not delivered. Mentioned a critical letter that slipped thru censor screen and was published in US media; "students" were upset and clamped down for some time thereafter.
- Info provided by Army families whom Queen has contacted or who have received info based on Queen's reports.
 - o COL Holland: Saw occasionally before left "mushroom" in March. Looked good, attitude good.
 - o COL Scott: Iranians liked his sense of humor; apparently didn't consider him a "spy" because of short time in Iran.
 - o COL Hall: One of Queen's roomates. Good health, good spirits. [REDACTED]
 - o SP6 Hohman: Also a Queen roommate, also doing very well. Hardheaded and stubborn - had a physical confrontation with SOB guard.
 - o MSG Ragan, SSG Subic: No info available yet.
- Queen appears not to have first-hand information on:
 - o Rescue attempt
 - o Current location of hostages other than roommates.
 - o Any physical or mental abuse of hostages by captors.

[REDACTED]
LTC Shauf/55022

~~SECRET~~

CLOSE HOLD

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG250
110959R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA
SUBJ SOW

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-A 178

SUBJECT: IRANIAN SITUATION REPORT

3. IRANIAN MANEUVERING TO FORESTALL THE IMPOSITION OF AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OR TO AT LEAST REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS CONTINUES. TO THIS END, THE IRANIANS ARE TRYING TO GARNER THE SUPPORT OF THE AFRO-ARAB CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO CONVENE NEXT WEEK BUT HAS BEEN POSTPONED, THE IRANIANS HOPE TO INSERT A CLAUSE OPPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE CONFERENCE'S FINAL RESOLUTION.

4. IN A PERSONAL NOTE OF FRIENDSHIP, BABRAK KARMAL, AFGHANISTAN'S NEW PRIME MINISTER ASSURED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON 9 JANUARY THAT AFGHANISTAN'S NEW LEADERSHIP DESIRES CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ITS ISLAMIC NEIGHBORS. HE ALSO ASSURED KHOMEINI THAT SOVIET FORCES ARE IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE AFGHANS' REQUEST, AND PROMISED THAT THEY WILL RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION ONCE INTERNAL OPPOSITION IS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL.

5. ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL FIGURE, THE SUPREME JUDGE OF JORDAN, HAS URGED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. CITING THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, THE JORDANIAN OFFICIALS CALLED FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS SO THAT IRANIAN OFFICIALS CAN DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO RESOLVING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

6. MEANWHILE, THE TURMOIL THREATENING TO DIVIDE THE NATION CONTINUES WITH THE NORTHEASTERN CITY OF TABRIZ REMAINING THE SCENE OF THE MOST SERIOUS UNREST.

ACCORDING TO PRESS OF THE 10TH, TABRIZ IS APPARENTLY IN GOVERNMENT CONTROL, AND SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IS IN THE HANDS OF A JOINT DEFENSE COMMITTEE (UNCLASSIFIED). RESIDENTS OF SANANDAJ CONTINUED TO DEMAND THE EXPULSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AND ALTHOUGH NO VIOLENCE HAD OCCURRED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, FIGHTING WAS EXPECTED TO ERUPT AGAIN SOON. TWO OTHER TOWNS IN THE

7. WHILE UNREST CONTINUES IN THE NORTHWEST, UNITS SERVING THERE ARE FACING GROWING PROBLEMS.

13. AMBASSADOR TO THE UN MCHENRY HAS DISCUSSED NEXT STEPS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS WITH THIRD WORLD MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAS STRESSED IN HIS CONVERSATIONS THAT INITIATIVES TAKEN BY SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM AND THROUGH VARIOUS OTHER CHANNELS OVER THE LAST SIXTY DAYS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED. HE HAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT WHILE OUR POSITION IS THAT THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES, SUCH ISSUES, WHETHER LEGITIMATE OR NOT, HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

A. THE IRANIAN INSISTANCE ON THE IMPOSSIBLE DEMAND OF THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND APPARENT REJECTION OF MEDIATION FORCES THE US TO CONCLUDE, AMBASSADOR MCHENRY EXPLAINED FURTHER, THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY ADDITIONAL DELAY IN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS FORESEEN IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 461 OF DECEMBER 31. HIS REPORT NOTES THAT THE THIRD WORLD REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM HE SPOKE CONFIRMED THEIR BASIC SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION.

B. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS EXPECTED TO TAKE UP THE IRANIAN CRISIS AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON.

~~TOP SECRET~~

14. [REDACTED] IRANIAN TELEVISION IS MAKING TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS, ASSEMBLING EQUIPMENT AND ASSIGNING CREWS, FOR COVERING THE TRIAL OF ONE AMERICAN HOSTAGE WHICH IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE IN FOUR OR FIVE DAYS.

TODAY RECEIVED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE MILITANTS. THE CONFERENCE ENDED TODAY. A PUBLIC STATEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

16. ACCORDING TO REUTERS, THE FOUR TOP AYATOLLAHS IN QOM, INCLUDING KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADRJ, ARE SCHEDULED TO HOLD A SUMMIT MEETING IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS CONCERNING THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN TABRIZ.

17. TABRIZ RADIO HAS URGED SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO ATTEND MASS PRAYERS TODAY IN WHAT MAY BE A TEST OF SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY LEADER IN AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE. THE REPEATED CALLS WERE BROADCAST FROM A HILLTOP RADIO STATION SEALED OFF BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE TAKEOVER BY FOLLOWERS OF IRAN'S SECOND MOST POWERFUL RELIGIOUS CHIEF, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI. TABRIZ WAS REPORTED TENSE LAST NIGHT AFTER A WEEK OF SPORADIC FIGHTING BETWEEN THE KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTERS.

N
MSG240
100930R JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA

I SOW

A *H-X 184*
SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL NOT GRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON OADC
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

C
1. U.S. SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM EXPRESSED DEEP PESSIMISM
OVER THE SITUATION IN IRAN AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRIVING AT A
SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON
7 JANUARY.

2. [REDACTED]

3. AS THE U.N. DEBATE ON IRAN NEARS, SEVERAL NATIONS ARE WITHDRAWING OR PLANNING TO WITHDRAW ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FROM IRAN.

4. IN IRAN, SOME DIPLOMATS ARE VIEWING THE INCREASE IN FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTIONS AS THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR. ONE SOURCE NOTED THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS LOSING POPULARITY WHILE LEFTWING GROUPS ARE GAINING INFLUENCE. THE FOLLOWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, THE LEFTISTS ARE SIMPLY AWAITING AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE POWER.

5. A PART OF NORTHWESTERN IRAN APPARENTLY IS IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF DISSIDENTS. AS OF THE 7TH, TROOPS WERE UNABLE TO REACH SANANDAJ FROM FATHER NORTH. ELSEWHERE, ARDABIL WAS TENSE AND A KURDISH INTERFACTIONAL DISPUTE ERUPTED IN PIRANSHahr. THE

CLERGIC FOR COUNTRYWIDE PROTESTS AGAINST "AMERICAN AND SOVIET IMPERIALISM." DESPITE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE MARCHES IN IRAN'S MAJOR CITIES, MOST OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING TEHRAN AND QOM WERE RELATIVELY CALM. THE RUMORED BUS-CARAVAN OF SUPPORTERS OF SHARIATMADARI WHICH POSED A THREAT OF RENEWED VIOLENCE IN QOM DID NOT MATERIALIZE.

8. IN TABRIZ, VIOLENT CLASHES CONTINUED YESTERDAY DESPITE APPEALS BY SHARIATMADARI FOR CALM. EIGHT PERSONS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED AND 100 WOUNDED. RELIGIOUS CELEBRATIONS TURNED INTO BLOODY CLASHES AS SUPPORTERS OF SHARIATMADARI REPORTEDLY SET FIRE TO VEHICLES AND BUILDINGS, INCLUDING SIX BANKS.

9. AYATOLLAH BEHESTI, SECRETARY OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, HAS CHANGED HIS OPINION ON THE "HOSTAGE ISSUE" ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. BEHESTI STATED THAT IRAN'S OPINION OF THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM HAS CHANGED AND THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE QUALIFIED HIS STATEMENT BY INDICATING THE RESULTS OF THIS MOVEMENT WERE STILL WEEKS AWAY AND BY MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY OF A TRIAL OF THE HOSTAGES. THE AYATOLLAH ALSO SAID THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRS WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE US EMBASSY AS REQUESTED BY THE MILITANT CAPTORS OF THE HOSTAGES. AYATOLLAH BEHESTI IS AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND A CLOSE AIDE TO KHOMEINI, AND HIS STATEMENTS ARE THEREFORE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION TO BEHESTI'S STATEMENT BY THE MILITANT CAPTORS OR KHOMEINI.

10. EARLIER IN THE DAY THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ISSUED A PROCLAMATION CONDEMNING THE SAUD FAMILY OF SAUDI ARABIA AS "PUPPETS" OF THE US. THE PROCLAMATION CALLED FOR THE MUSLIMS OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA TO RISE UP AND OVERTHROW THE SAUD FAMILY.

11. IRAN APPEARS INCREASINGLY CONERNED OVER SECURITY AROUND TEHRAN AND QOM.

12.

13.

14. THE IRANIAN ARMY, WHICH SO FAR HAS STAYED OUT OF THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND KURDS, TODAY ISSUED A STATEMENT WARNING PEOPLE THAT THE ARMY WOULD RESIST ATTACKS AGAINST MILITARY TROOPS OR REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. THERE HAVE BEEN CONTINUING SKIRMISHES IN KURDISTAN AND OFFICES, SCHOOLS, AND UNIVERSITIES REMAINED CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE AS THE DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CONTINUES.

SECRET

16. THE CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS TAKING PLACE IN TEHRAN AT THE INVITATION OF
THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES HAS BEEN GIVEN VERY
LITTLE PUBLICITY IN TEHRAN.

17.

18.

RWY10JAN00

SECRET

IME
IRAN

5 2005

~~TOP SECRET~~
EVENT/SITUATION

1/MC-130 with 50
DELTA Dep [Masirah]
- MC-130 Aborts

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

Lead DELTA Team
late or unavailable

~~TOP SECRET~~
DECISION/OPTIONS

H-256
- Abort
- Have spare MC-130
ready; transload
DELTA continue

NOTE: Maximum delay for
MC-130 launch, 1+00.

5 2025

1/MC(50 DELTA) & 1/EC OK
(FUEL) T/O from Masirah

5 2026

- MC-130 ABORT

DELTA unavailable

- Transload DELTA
to spare -
continue.

- EC-130 ABORT

Require 2/EC-130's at
refuel point.

- Use 3rd EC-130 as
primary fuel A/C

NOTE: 1+00 delay acceptable

NOTE: Any delay of these
A/C beyond 10 min requires
notification to Helos for
possible delay.

5 2026

7/Helos dep carrier
<7 airborne

Insufficient helos for
mission. ABORT

2/3/4

1/MC-130 (21/DELTA)
2/EC-130 (FUEL) T/O
from Masirah
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA
unavailable

Transload to spare
MC-130, if un-
available .. ABORT
and recall all
forces.

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel
for helos

- If no refueling
available for
MC-130 ... ABORT
- If refueling
available, con-
tinue give 5000#
from each of 3/
MC-130s to helos,
plan a 5 helo
launch out of
refueling.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By:
Declassified On:

DDO NMCC
22 Jul 92

Downgraded to Secret
DDO NMCC 22 Jul 92

IE
IRAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

A
1/MC-130 (DELTA) lands at refuel point.

OK

Continue

- [REDACTED]

Blind landing

E
A.G
- Major [REDACTED] guides pilot to landing by the road
- CCT jumps in and [REDACTED]

- A/C damaged or breaks through crust on landing

A/C will have to be destroyed in place

A
- [REDACTED] and burn it, continue

Helos pass turn around
≥ 6 helos OK

Sufficient force to support extraction.
Insufficient helos

Continue

< 6 helos OK

ABORT

2nd/MC-130 lands at refuel point

OK

Continue

- A/C damaged or breaks through crust

Same as above

Same as above

1st/EC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Same as above

Continue
Same as above

Continue, bring crew out on MC-130
Continue

3rd MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Same as above

Continue
Same as above

2nd/EC-130 lands

OK

Continue

- A/C damaged

Same as above

Same as above

- Because of damage or malfunction,
unable to pass fuel

Land 3rd EC-130

Continue

~~TOP SECRET~~

ME
IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECISION/OPTIONS

3rd EC-130 enters orbit over landing site

Provide terminal guidance for helos

Continue

Helos arrive at landing site

OK

Continue

- If helos are more than 45 min late

Will not be enough darkness to reach hideout

- Helos refuel and move north to desert hide location

Helos depart refuel point with DELTA
 ≥ 6 OK

Sufficient helos for operation

Continue

< 6 OK

Insufficient helos for operation

Good helos return to carrier, rest of force return to [REDACTED] on C-130's!

NOTE: Max headwind from desert 1 to dropoff is 15 knots.

NOTE: If there is a problem with any A/C departing the refuel point, it will be destroyed in place and

A
[REDACTED]
Helos arrive at dropoff with DELTA
- No reception party

OK

[REDACTED] DELTA unable to move to city

Continue

- DELTA moves to hideout with helo
- DELTA remains at dropoff to wait for trucks

A
- Helo breaks at dropoff

Possibility of discovery

- Leave Farci speaker at Helo with [REDACTED]
If possible, capture discover keep with helos hideout, release when helos leave continue.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ME
IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

TUI

CONSEQUENCES

(8) DECISION/OPTIONS

Helos depart dropoff
<5 Helos OK

OK
Insufficient helo
support

Continue
ABORT - load DELTA
hide till next nite
return to desert
one.

Helos arrive hideout

OK

Continue

Helos must be in the
hideout by 0016Z to
arrive in total
darkness

~~HOT~~
TIME
J IRAN

~~HOT~~
EVENT/
SITUATION

~~HOT~~
CONSEQUENCES

~~HOT~~
DECISIONS/OPTIONS

7/9

3/MC-130 depart

OK

Continue

1 MC-130 w/
Rangers aborts

- Spare available
- No spare

Delay for transload

Reduced force to
secure Manzariyeh

Transload Rangers,
continue
Continue

2/MC-130 w/Rangers
abort

- Spare available
- No spare

Transload ~~Rangers~~,
reduced security force
~~Rangers/CCT not~~
available at
Manzariyeh

Continue

1/MC-130 w/fuel
aborts

No rescue fuel at
Manzariyeh

Alert ~~force~~ force
(1 MC/2 EC-130) for
1620 launch

- 3/MC-130s abort

No security force or
reserve fuel

- Continue, order MC/EC-
130s from ~~to~~ to
proceed to Manzariyeh
without security, CCT
will set lights for
C-141's.
- 24 hour hold

~~HOT~~
TOP SECRET

~~HOT~~
CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISIONS/OPTIONS
	3/AC-130 depart - 1 Depart	OK Minimum support	- Go - 24 hour hold, recall force - Continue
	1 Depart	No gunship support	- Continue, advise <u>DELTA</u> , - 24 hour hold, recall force
	2/KC-135 depart for MC-130s - KC-135 aborts, launch spare - No KC-135	OK OK No Refuel	- Continue - Continue - MC-130s continue, get fuel at <u>Manzariyeh</u> , alert force.
	3/KC-135's depart for AC-130s - 1/KC-135 Abort - 2 or 3/KC-135 abort	OK Insufficient Fuel for A/C 130 Insufficient fuel for A/C 130	- Continue Launch spare - Immediately launch force to provide fuel for 2/AC-130s at <u>Manzariyeh</u> , continue

NOTE: If this launch requires the use of spares we will affect the return refuelings ie A/C will have to land in [REDACTED]

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IRAN

SITUATION

2/MC-130s refuel

- 1/MC-130 unable to receive fuel

OK

Reduced security force for [Manzariyeh]

- KC-135 unable to pass fuel or MC-130s unable to receive

MC-130s will require fuel from EC-130 at Manzariyeh

3/AC-130's refuel

- 1 A/C 130 unable to refuel

OK

Minimum AC-130 available to support [DELTA]

No AC-130s able to refuel

No gunship support for [DELTA]

2/C-141 depart for
[Manzariyeh]

1/C-141 OK

[REDACTED] will not let C-141s launch

Sufficient airlift to carry out 307 personnel

Max load departing [Manzariyeh] using MC-130 support

No heavy airlift available to extract personnel

NOTE: At this point we have absolute minimum airlift to extract if we use 3 MC- & 3 AC-130s.

AC-130 arv at Embassy OK

NOTE: AC-130s will have 2+00 station time available.

CONTINUE

- Continue

- Continue
The MC-130 that cannot refuel will continue to [Manzariyeh] to get fuel either from 3rd MC-130 or [REDACTED] force.

- Continue rest of mission on schedule, land both MC-130s at [Manzariyeh], take fuel from EC-130. Launch [REDACTED] force immediately.

- Continue

- Continue

- Continue, have one AC-130s land at [Manzariyeh] refuel and launch for Tehran.

- Continue, AC-130s return to [REDACTED]

- ABORT, recall all forces

- Continue

- Continue

- Utilize 3 MC-130s or launch alternate rescue party from [REDACTED] (MC/EC-130)

- Continue

NOTE: If EC-130s from [REDACTED] with fuel are at [Manzariyeh] and the other forces (MC-130s) have sufficient fuel, an AC-130 can land and take on fuel at [Manzariyeh] to extend station time.

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ME
IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

2/MC-130s land at
Manzariyeh

- Find R/W blocked

OK

- Continue

2/C-141 arrive
Manzariyeh

- 1st/C-141
crashes on
R/W

Unable to airland

OK

Jump in Rangers to clear
runway then land.

- Continue

R/W particully
blocked if 2nd C-141
cannot land,
insufficient airlift to
evacuate all forces.

- Land the 2nd/C-141 and
use him to extract
hostages, use MC/EC-
130s to extract combat
force.

- Send 2nd/C-141 back, use
MC/EC-130s to extract
entire force.

NOTE: C-141s will require
at least 5000' to operate
at moderate loads.

all Helos start up

DELTA execute
at Embassy (approx
time)

OK

- Continue

all Helos arrive at
Embassy

≥ 5 OK

Sufficient helos for
extraction

- Continue

≤ 4

Will require helos to
shuttle to Manzariyeh

- Consider fuel for AC-130
to provide extra station
time.

Zero helos

Unable to extract by
helicopter

Will have to reach
Manzariyeh by ground
vehicle

2/C-141s depart
Manzariyeh

- Only 1/C-141
able to depart

OK

Some of force will
have to come out on
MC/EC-130

- Continue

Transload force to MC/EC-
130 for extraction.

- Zero C-141s
depart Manzariyeh

Entire force must
come out on MC/EC-130

Transload force to MC/EC-
130s

ME
IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

3 MC-130s depart
Manzariyeh

OK

Continue

- 3 MC/EC-130
depart

OK

Continue, Plan sufficient
force out on C-141s so
1/MC-130 can carry out
last of force.

- 3 MC/EC-130
depart

Insufficient lift for
entire force if no
C-141s

Force transition to E&E
plan, make pickup at
predetermined location
next night.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 February 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

#259
H

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Hostage Debriefing

(u) 1. (TS) There is a requirement for JTF intelligence personnel to have debriefing access to any hostages released as a result of the current negotiations. This requirement would take one of two forms.

(u)(a) (TS) The first would be accomplished if all fifty-three American hostages are released in one group (crisis terminated). In this case, there is a requirement for JTF intelligence representatives to attend the debriefing sessions in Europe under DIA auspices, and subsequently conduct supplemental debriefings of selected hostages for the purposes of validating other intelligence sources and determining the completeness and accuracy of previous hostage location assessments.

(u)(b) (TS) The second form would be required if only some of the hostages were released. If this situation were to prevail, there would be an imperative operational requirement for JTF intelligence representatives to conduct immediate debriefings in Europe under DIA/EUCOM auspices of those hostages physically and mentally capable of providing data.

(u) 2. (TS) In either case, there is a requirement for JTF intelligence representatives to be on-scene in Europe at the reception location (to cover the eventuality of either requirement).

(u) 3. (TS) JTF has developed a basic debriefing mechanism which will allow a four man team to rapidly exploit any released hostages


CLASSIFIED BY: JCS, J-3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 20 Feb 2000
EXTENDED BY:
REASON: 5200.1R 381c

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO CONF
REVIEW ON 0 APR
DERIVED FROM DIA

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without materially prolonging the period of decompression envisioned in current planning. We see our role in the debriefing process as being distinct and not duplicative of the general debriefings currently planned.

4. (pS) Because of the in-depth knowledge of JTF intelligence personnel regarding the compound, its buildings, the captors and the hostages, it is vital that they personally participate in any debriefing activities.



JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
Commander, JTF

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OUTGOING

PAGE 01 NSS # 7726

IMMEDIATE -- SECRET -- GENSER MESSAGE -- 3710 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-0A//, SSM 1829 AT 16 1716Z FEBRUARY

ROUTING ASSIGNED BY NSS:

CCF2 MEAF AIRR DUMI

PRINTER ASSIGNED BY NSS:

AR20 (1), AB03 (1), AB16 (1), AB17 (1), CG14 (1),
DS18 (1),

SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY NSS:

DS, DIA, IRAN, ABS IR, IRAN TF, ECONOMIC, TERRORIST,
TERRORISM, HUMINT RPT, MIDDLE EAST, POSS CCF ACT,

MIDDLE EAST BRANCH, GENSER TASKING TIPOFF,

DICTIONARY: GS, PROFILE:

67 72 85 127 164 220 239 267 278 311 363 385

NNIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:

88-021676

ZCZC01C698

ZYUV

NNIC

ACTION

DIA:

01878

REF ID: BIA1G01 ERIC FILE

0100

TRANSIT/161716Z/161744Z/880:28GRP#533

EZ01:

DE RUEKJCS B1829 0471744

EMB 55555

EZ02:

REF ID: BIA1G02 ERIC FILE

0100

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31 October 1980

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(H 260)

JOINT DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME: _____ HOSTAGE # _____

DATE: _____ TIME: _____

DEBRIEFERS: _____

SECTION ONE

Introduction

This debriefing is designed to assist in the collection of information which will assist in reconstruction of the events of your captivity and hopefully provide insights to better handle situations of this type in the future. Naturally, you do not have to answer a question unless you want to, but your assistance will be greatly appreciated.

The briefing will cover six major areas to include:

- (1) Circumstances of Your Release. (SECTION TWO)
- (2) Your Treatment as a Hostage. (SECTION THREE)
- (3) Details About the Militants and the Security Conditions Under Which You Were Held. (SECTION FOUR)
- (4) Details about the Initial Takeover. (SECTION FIVE)
- (5) Data on the Hostages That Were Not Released. (SECTION SIX)
- (6) Embassy Security Procedures (MARTINE GUARDS ONLY). (SECTION SEVEN)

SECURITY NOTE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY JCS
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 92
DERIVATIVE OF DYNAMIC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW BY OADR
VERIFIED FROM DIA

This form is for Official Use Only and will be classified SECRET when filled in.

Classified By JCS
Declassify On ODR

ECDF

Circumstances Of Your Release

1. Where were you held immediately prior to release? When were you notified of the impending release?

—

2. What was the reason given, if any, for your release? For the other hostages?

3. In your opinion, why do you think you were selected for release?

4. To gain release, were you required to sign a letter or form requesting amnesty? Requesting amnesty? To whom was the letter addressed? Were you required to prepare other documents or make special statement(s)? When? Provide details and circumstances.

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5a. Were you given any instructions as to how you were to act or what you should say when you were returned to US control? **~~SECRET~~**

~~SECRET~~

5b. Did any of your captors establish with you a plan to renew acquaintances in the future? Provide details of the plan.

Handwriting practice lines for the letter 'a'.

5 November 1980 ch.

1 to page three to be used
in lieu of all previous
page three

PAGE 03 OF 20 PAGES

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~~SECRET~~

Your Treatment as a Hostage

6. Where were you and other hostages held during your captivity? When? How long? Describe in detail those locations not on the Embassy Compound. (Debriefer: utilize attachment one (1) to aid in completing this question).

(continue on back)

7. Describe the procedures that were followed when you were moved, both between locations (i.e. Embassy Compound to a prison or residence) and within a location (i.e. Chancery to [REDACTED] Prison cellblock to prison cellblock).

(continue on back)

8. Did you receive adequate food/sleep/exercise?

STREET

9. Describe your daily routine.

~~SECRET~~

10. What type of procedures did you follow for:

a. Toilet/shower? _____

b. Entertainment? _____

c. Exercise? _____

d. Medical care (and quality)? _____

e. Meals? Type food? _____

f. _____

g. _____

h. _____

i. _____

j. _____

k. _____

l. _____

11. What types of communications system did the hostages use? Which hostages?

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18. Were you or any hostages threatened with trial/harm/death?

19. Did you fear for your life? Ever? Sometimes? Constantly?

20. Did you observe anyone mistreated/harmed? Was anyone led away for solitary confinement? Who? Were they taken away repeatedly?

21. What conditions of your captivity, good or bad, do you think influenced your physical and psychological condition the most?

22. What significant events occurred during late April-early May (immediately after rescue attempt?)

23. Were you aware the State Department was talking with the students?

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~~SECRET~~

24. What were you told of US efforts at securing your release?

~~SECRET~~

Details About the Militants and the Security Conditions
Under Which You Were Held

25. Who were your captors (nationality, age group, sex, political leanings, organization affiliations, profession, leaders)? Name and describe any individual captors or other personnel whom you can recall. Did you have the same guards throughout your captivity? Were your guards always militants, or were some Revolutionary Guards, Police, or others?

26. Were the guards armed? What type weapons? When did they carry their weapons?

27. How many militants were in charge of your group(s) at each location?

28. Describe the militant command, control, and communications structure.

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29. Describe militant reaction to unusual occurrences.

30. What security procedures did the captors use? (Restraints, guards, weapons, locked doors, sentries, alarms, etc...)

31. Were you aware of the existence of a "special" reaction force?

32. How did the militants interact with the Revolutionary Guard, the police, the Mullahs, the Regular Army?

33. What were the inside and outside lighting conditions of the different detention locations?

34. Were you aware of any type of booby-traps being emplaced in the Embassy Compound?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Details About The Initial Take-over

35. Where were you when the take-over took place? What do you recall of the events during the take-over? What did you do? Did you help destroy classified? If so, what did you destroy?

36. During the take-over, did you hear radio conversation between RSO and Charge Laingen? What was said? Between the Marines and RSC? What actions did you observe the Marines taking?

37. Who appeared to be in charge? Who ordered you to surrender?

38. Do you know how entry to the compound was gained, and to the Chancery?

39. Do you know of anyone working on the compound whom you suspect of helping the attackers gain entry?

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40. When the students were let in, did you see any weapons?
Describe.

41. Did you learn who planned the assault; when it was planned; and why it was timed for November 4?

42. In your opinion, was the attack well organized?

43. Did the students appear to be familiar with the compound, its layout, the buildings, or the weapons they had seized?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Data on the Hostages That Were Not Released

44. Did you know before hand that some of the hostages would not be released?

45. Do you have any knowledge concerning the future release of hostages? Provide details, if appropriate.

46. Were you asked by other hostages or your captors to bring out any messages or letters? Were they openly given to you or smuggled to you?

47. Pertaining to the hostages who were not released:

- a. Who, by name, were not released?
- b. Where did you last see them?
- c. When did you last see them?
- d. Their physical/emotional condition at the time?

e. Circumstances?

- a. (Name) _____
- b. (Where) _____
- c. (When) _____
- d. (Condition) _____
- e. (Circumstances) _____

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

(CONTINUE ON LOWER HALF OF PAGE 14)

~~SECRET~~

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48. What do you think will happen to those hostages who were not released?

49. In your opinion, what could be done to gain the release of other hostages?

=====

QUESTION 47 (Continued).

a. (Name) _____

b. (Where) _____

c. (When) _____

d. (Condition) _____

e. (Circumstances) _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

NOTE: If additional space is required see Attachment 2.

~~SECRET~~

Embassy Security Procedures (MARINE GUARDS ONLY)

50. Indications/Warnings that Embassy was going to be attacked:

- a. Did local security services provide any indicators or warning of an attack?
- b. Did indigenous Embassy employees provide any warning of an attack?
- c. Did Embassy officials provide any warning of an attack?

NOTE: If answer is YES to 5a, b, or c, provide details.

51. Instructions from Department of State/Embassy officials concerning the defense of Embassy personnel and property:

- a. Were instructions you received consistent with contingency plans?
- b. Were the duties that were assigned to you consistent with your perceptions of your role as an MSG?

~~SECRET~~

52. Destruction/Compromise of Classified Material:

- a. Were you successful in destroying all classified material and equipment?
- b. Did you have adequate time and equipment to destroy all the classified material and equipment?
- c. Do you have any other comments and recommendations concerning the emergency destruction of classified material?

53. Training for Marine Security Guard Duty:

- a. Do you believe that you were adequately trained for the conditions you experienced as a hostage?
- b. Are there any subjects which were taught that should be omitted, increased in scope, or added?

54. Equipment of Marine Security Guards:

- a. Provide an assessment of equipment, i.e., communications and weapons you had available to use.
- b. What restrictions, if any, were placed on you in the use of the equipment?

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~~J. RET~~

55. Describe the reaction of the indigenous Embassy employees to the attack on the Embassy.

56. Provide an assessment of how the other American employees conducted themselves as hostages.

57. Do you have any suggestions to improve the Corps capability to meet the Embassy security mission?

СТАДИЯ

NAME: _____
DATE: _____
TIME: _____

HOSTAGE #: _____
DEPRIEFS: _____

PRE-RAID

POST-RAID

ATTCH 1 TO
JOINT
DEBRIEFING
QUESTIONNAIRE

~~SECRET~~

MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
AM PM
FEB 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
MAR 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
APR 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
MAY 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
JUN 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
JUL 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
AUG 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
SEP 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
OCT 19 19 19 19 19 19 19

MISC NOTES:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- a. (Name) _____
- b. (Where) _____
- c. (When) _____
- d. (Condition) _____
- e. (Circumstances) _____

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

- a. _____
- b. _____
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- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

JOINT DEBRIEFING
QUESTIONNAIRE
Attachment 2

~~SECRET~~

Question 47 (Continued).

a. (Name) _____

b. (Where) _____

c. (When) _____

d. (Condition) _____

e. (Circumstances) _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

a. _____

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a. _____

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a. _____

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d. _____

e. _____

JOINT DEBRIEFING

QUESTIONNAIRE

Attachment 2

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H 261

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79SUBJECT: Planned RICEBOWL DebriefingTIMEFRAME: February 1980 - April 1980SUMMARY:

1. (U) Upon successful execution of the hostage rescue, it was planned to transport the hostages to Wiesbaden, Federal Republic of Germany, where they would undergo thorough debriefings and medical treatment. Activities in Germany would be under control of the Department of State (DOS).

2. (U) Initial debriefings of the hostages, however, were to take place on the extraction aircraft enroute from Iran to Germany. Two USAF personnel, [REDACTED] and Maj [REDACTED] accompanied the J2 forward element to [REDACTED].
(Both individuals had served in Iran. [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]
These individuals were prepared to fly on C-141's into the extraction airfield and return with the hostages to Germany. J2 provided both of these individuals with identical loose-leaf binders containing debriefing forms annotated for each hostage (Attachment 1). Section A of the debriefing form focused on hostages who might have been left behind. Section B questions concerned the overall captivity environment.

3. (U) J-2 also developed a basic questionnaire for the debriefings in Wiesbaden (Attachment 2). This questionnaire could be used during a normal face-to-face debriefing, or it

Item Number: _____

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 JULY 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMC

 DECL DOWNGRDED TO CONF

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

could be given to a hostage to be completed as time allowed.

The questionnaire included a graph paper representation of

the hostages' period of incarceration. [REDACTED] hostage would

have been asked to annotate the chart with the locations at

which he was kept on specific dates. With this information,

J2 could eventually reconstruct the movement patterns of the

hostages and evaluate earlier intelligence reports. The

remaining questions concerned [REDACTED]

(4) Included with this questionnaire was another short

questionnaire (Attachment 3) that would have been used at

the Wiesbaden debriefings [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: None.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

LTC

(USAF); SOD, J3, OJCS

Cpt [REDACTED] (USA); DIA

Maj [REDACTED]

(USA); ODCSOPS, DA

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Initial debriefing binder (Original) (SEP)

2. Basic debriefing questionnaire

3. Debriefing questionnaire for [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HOSTAGE ROSTER
(Alphabetical)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE/DISTING CHARAC</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
1-AHERN, THOMAS	48	CIV		
2-BARNES, CLAIRE	34	CIV		
3-BELK, WILLIAM	43	CIV		
4-BLUCHER, BOB	52	CIV		
5-COOK, DON		CIV		
6-DAUGHERTY, BILL	32	CIV		
7-ENGLEMAN, ROBERT		MIL		
8-GALLEGOS, WILLIAM	21	MIL		
9-GERMAN, BRUCE	43	CIV		
10-GILLETTE, DUANE	23	MIL		
11-GOLASCINSKI, ALAN	29	CIV		
12-GRAVES, JOHN	52	CIV		
13-HALL, JOSEPH	31	MIL		
14-HERMENING, KEVIN	20	MIL		
15-HOHMAN, DONALD	37	MIL		
16-HOLLAND, LELAND	52	MIL		
17-JONES, CHARLIE	BLACK [REDACTED]	CIV		
18-KALP, MALCOMB	41	CIV		
19-KENNEDY, MIKE	50	CIV		
20-KEOGH, WILLIAM		CIV		
21-KIRTLEY, STEVEN	21	MIL		
22-KOOB, CATHY	41/FEMALE	CIV		
23-KUPKE, FRED	33	CIV		
24-LAUTERBACH, STEVEN	28	CIV		
25-LEE, GARY	37	CIV		

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IN THE SPACE BELOW, PLEASE LINE-
OUT AND LABEL TIME SPENT IN EACH OF THE
VARIOUS LOCATIONS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.
UNDER EACH LOCATION, PLEASE LIST OTHER
HOSTAGES IN THE SAME LOCATION, AS BEST
YOU CAN RECALL. EXAMPLE BELOW:

*****INSTRUCTIONS*****

SC= STAFF COTTAGE #1,2,3,4 (#1 CLOSEST
 AN= AMB RES TO CHANCERY
 DC= DCM RES
 CO= CONSULATE
 CH= CHANCERY
 WH= WAREHOUSE (MUSHROOM)

*****STANDARD INCUBATION NAMES


Legend:
MATURE CONSUMERS
JUNIOR CONSUMERS
FUTURE CONSUMERS

Date	Mature Consumers	Junior Consumers	Future Consumers
NOV 10	10		
NOV 20	20		
NOV 30	30		
DEC 1	10		
DEC 10	20		
DEC 20	20		
DEC 31	31		
JAN 1	10		
JAN 10	20		
JAN 20	20		
JAN 31	31		
FEB 1	10		
FEB 10	20		
FEB 20	20		
FEB 29	29		
MAR 1	10		
MAR 10	20		

~~SECRET~~

...CONTINUED...

PMW-10 X 10 GUN
HEAVY WEATHER



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HAF262
Item Number: _____

Intelligence Historical Report

J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Escape and Evasion

TIMEFRAME: Oct - Dec 1980

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/NMC
 DDCR DOWNGRADED TO April
REVIEW BY USAF
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

SUMMARY:

1. The E&E package was initiated to be an Annex for SNOWBIRD Option XII (Heavy Option).
2. The document was produced both as an active annex and to provide a framework for further operational E&E annexes.
3. Meetings with the prime Users (1SOW) [REDACTED] 101st [REDACTED] (DELTA) produced the major requirements for the annex.
4. Initial meeting covered the assumptions needed to produce the document. After approval of the assumptions by [REDACTED] a second meeting was held to flesh out the requirements.
5. [REDACTED] J2 collated all inputs and wrote a draft document. The draft was submitted to the prime users for comments. Final product was produced with annexes and distributed.
6. [REDACTED] J2 developed tabs to the annex (see attach 1) using previously produced documents (see attach 2) adopting them to this annex.
7. 7602nd produced a [REDACTED] area study guide. The [REDACTED] guide contains the essential information required for pre-study.
8. [REDACTED] J2 produced 1000 MAP packets for E&E. Unmarked, unclassified maps, a pointee-talkie and blood chit (letter of explanation) were included. DMA is producing a reduction of four TPC's, printed front and back, to be included.
9. DMA produced celluloid maps for inclusion in the first raid kits. These maps were extremely tough and durable.
10. The full E&E kits were produced by [REDACTED] Most of the essential items are contained in the standard Air Force survival vest.

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DDCNMCC
Classified BY GES 1994
Declassified ON 01 APR
Holding [REDACTED] to Secret

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COMMENTS:

1. There are few, if any, specialist with a broad range of knowledge in Escape and Evasion.
2. While expertise in E&E is limited, there are a number of documents that are pertinent (see attach 2).
3. Escape and Evasion planning has historically been put off to be "done later," a serious error in planning.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. J2 establish a single POC for Escape and Evasion.
2. Active participation by the prime users in the E&E annex is a valuable tool. These groups should be included in any revision.
3. J2 must pay attention to E&E as early as possible in operational planning. The plan must not be finalized sooner than the development of the full operational plan.
4. E&E training is seriously lacking. A minimum of three to five hours training on basic E&E concepts should be required. Individual unit should provide their own training.
5. Include Medics on planning sessions.
6. E&E kits be produced (see E&E plan, annex 3) as soon as possible to provide off-the-shelf capability.

A C -2 Personnel Involved: Major [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

LtCol [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Pentagon	[REDACTED]
Col [REDACTED]	JSOD	Pentagon	697-0991
Capt [REDACTED]	JSOD	Pentagon	697-0991
Maj [REDACTED]	101st	Ft. Campbell (AV)	635-4546
Maj [REDACTED]	DELTA	[REDACTED] (AV)	[REDACTED]
		Ft. Belvoir	[REDACTED]

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Maj [REDACTED]

1SOW

Hurlburt Fld (AV) 872-6498

Maj [REDACTED]

Maj [REDACTED]

7602nd

Ft. Belvoir

664-3234

A
G
T

ATTACHMENTS:

1. ESCAPE AND EVASION ANNEX
2. VINYL MAP OF IRAN
3. COUNTRY STUDY (7602nd) (draft)

REFERENCE:

1. JCS PUB SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE AND RECOVERY (draft)
2. AF RESEARCH PAPER "REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE: PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. SERVICEMAN CAPTURED BY IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY REGIME"
NOT INCLUDED DUE TO ORCON CLASSIFICATION.

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H24

NEW

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/NMC
 DECLASSIFIED DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON 2 APR 93
DELETED FROM DDC/NMC

AT 263
H

VV EIA685NCA404
OO RUEIZJC
DE RUEIZTT #0112 1191410
ZNY TTTT
O 281410Z APR 88
FM DELTA/ADVANCE//S-2
TO RUEIZJC/JTF//J-2
[REDACTED]

BT

[REDACTED] 281410Z APR 88 CITE DELTA/ADVANCE H1123

SUBJECT: UPDATED EEI

1. (S) PER CONVERSATION WITH NCA AT THIS LOCATION 27 APRIL 1988,
IT APPEARS THAT A MILITARY OPTION IS STILL OPEN AND THAT DELTA WILL
PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE PLANNING/EXECUTION OF THAT OPTION.
2. (S) PURSUANT TO THIS DECISION, THE FOLLOWING EEI IS SUBMITTED:

PAGE 2 RUEIZTT #0112 1191410Z APR 88
C.

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d. Due to the accelerated expansion of the IIAF, with multiple programs in implementation phases simultaneously, long range planning capability remains a significant problem. However, the advent of the Program Management Office (PMO) system, which provides for establishment of the PMO at the outset of planning actions for new procurement and the early involvement of senior personnel in the IIAF, is alleviating some of the difficulty. Recently, the IIAF has established a centralized plans office to provide coordinated management for all ongoing projects, and the integration of personnel, training, and facilities requirements on a logical, prioritized basis, to develop the logistics base and support an operational air force on sustained basis.

14. (C) In addition to the broad areas of concern reflected above, four specific items require considerable thought and attention:

a. Flying Safety: The IIAF has experienced a sharp increase in the number of aircraft accidents/incidents over the past 15 months. A total of 6 F-4Es, 2 RF-4Es, 1 F-4D, 2 F-5Es, and 2 F-14s have been destroyed and 4 C-130s, 1 RF-4E, 1 F-5E and 1 F-5F seriously damaged since March 1977. While 3 or 4 of these accidents/incidents have been attributed to new/advanced training (such as night, over-water weapons delivery and low level electronic warfare tactics training) or materiel failure, the vast majority have clearly been the result of pilot error and/or inability to handle the aircraft near the edge of its performance envelope. In August 1977, at IIAF request, a Blue Ribbon Safety Team was dispatched from the USAF Safety Center at Norton AFB to determine what actions could be taken to enhance the IIAF Safety Programs. Although this team clearly identified many problems with major safety implications, there was a lack of aggressive response to the recommendations by the IIAF, and the upward accident trend continued. In February 1978, the Supreme Commander's Staff, acting upon guidance from His Imperial Majesty, directed the IIAF, with AFSEC/MAAG assistance, to conduct a IIAF-wide Safety Survey to determine why the IIAF is having so many accidents and how the accidents can be stopped. While this survey, which was completed in mid-June, has revealed nothing really new, the concentrated, high-level attention brought to bear on the same old problems may well serve to resolve some of the basic training, policy, and materiel problems which now contribute to IIAF pilot inadequacies. However, strong supervision and interest in flying safety must continue at all echelons of the IIAF in order to hold down the accident rate. Continued MAAG oversight and assistance with instructor pilots is also indicated.

b. Follow-on Education for Officers: It is a matter of concern that the IIAF currently has no directed policy or plan regarding the advancement of the academic qualifications of its young officers, particularly the pilots. Although some few of the support officers attain degrees and even advanced degrees, this is done primarily through self initiated requests. The majority of the young line pilots remain at the same academic level as when they entered pilot training, and few possess any education past high school. A planned program, particularly for the

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intelligence function at IIAF headquarters was performed along with two other functional areas in a single directorate. Now, as a separate organizational entity, the Director of Intelligence reports to the Deputy Commander for Operations -- a significant organizational step forward. Unfortunately, the director has not yet accepted the responsibility for tasking IIAF intelligence collection assets to support IIAF combat operational requirements. These collection assets (primarily photographic reconnaissance aircraft and ground based and airborne SIGINT sensors) represent formidable capabilities which are largely self-directed, self-serving, and self-evaluated. While a number of analysts are assigned to the Intelligence Directorate, only a minimal production capability exists. Within the last six months, the directorate began producing and disseminating its first recurring intelligence publication, a monthly tactical intelligence digest. To help alleviate the military personnel shortage in intelligence, a career civilian personnel program has been started. Continued emphasis on acquisition and training of intelligence personnel is needed.

d. IIAF Physical Security: During 1977, the USAF conducted a Physical Security Survey of 32 IIAF installations. This four-month effort by a ten-man team resulted in a 700-page, two volume report, which is to become the foundation for a dynamic five-year IIAF security improvement program. The first volume of the report addresses organization and management, training, equipment, facilities, personnel security clearances, security standards, and air base ground defense. Volume II contains specific recommendations for each of the installations surveyed. The IIAF has formed a security improvement planning committee; but tangible results are not yet visible, even though six months have passed since the survey was completed. We should plan aggressive follow-up action for the foreseeable future.

*Possible
SOD*

15. (U) In the foregoing paragraphs on areas of concern, there is no intent to gloss over the difficulties. There is no question that problems exist in these areas, and will continue. The burgeoning Iranian economy is making ever increasing demands for engineering talent, management expertise, construction materials, and raw manpower; and the IIAF is hard-pressed in such a competitive area. A key, however, is that the problems are recognized, not only by Air Force Section, but by the IIAF themselves, and many actions are being taken toward resolution.

16. (U) As noted at the beginning of this summary, it has been my privilege to observe the start and finish of many programs, and significant portions of others. This period has seen the delivery of the last of the F-4E and most of the RF-4E aircraft, all but the last few F-14

JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISESHISTORY:

1. (U) Prior to late 1975, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) was very hesitant to involve themselves in major joint/combined exercises either with CENTO or within the Iranian Armed Forces. Their internal joint exercise program with the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces and the Imperial Iranian Navy was very elementary with all exercises being scenario driven. It was evident that unless the IIAF expanded their training programs to include a viable and realistic exercise program they would stagnate at a very superficial and elementary level of performance. Thus, in November and December of 1976 the MAAG, with the valuable assistance of United States Element CENTO, began working with the GOI and USG to arrange a bilateral training exercise between the IIAF and the US Navy. The exercise, code named "Taj" was to be conducted under the CENTO umbrella and was to consist of anti-shipping operations and air defense on the part of the IIAF and interdiction and fleet defense on the part of the USN Nuclear Carrier Task Group (USS Enterprise, USS Truxtun and USS Long Beach). The exercise was conducted in February 1977. The USN invited three high ranking Iranian officers aboard the Enterprise as official observers.

a. (C) For the IIAF's part, a basic three pronged attack was conducted using three KC-707s simulating airliners each masking a flight of four F-4Es. In addition to the three tankers, the attack was supported by a fourth KC-707 acting as an ABCCC (first time attempted), a P-3F surveillance aircraft, a flight of two F-14s for CAP (first time exercised) and a flight of five F-4Es carrying jammer pods. Considering this was the IIAF's first excursion into this type of operation, they did extremely well. In the area of air defense, a transportable tactical radar (TPS-11) was successfully deployed to Iran's southern coast. Additionally, 19 F-4E's were deployed to Bandar Abbas, which, along with four F-14s from Khatami, provided the air defense assets. Again, considering this was a first effort at a realistic air defense exercise, the IIAF did a noteworthy job.

b. (U) On 15 March 1978, the IIAF conducted a mass flyby in honor of the 51st Anniversary of the Pahlavi Dynasty.

(1) In the thirty day period prior to the formal flyby, the IIAF reduced its NORS rate from nearly twenty per cent (20%) to approxi-

ARMED MAAG
LOG NO 573-C45

COPY 3 of 6 Contin

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KC-707 ground abort during employment but the mission was refloated on a later day.

b. (C) Dissimilar air combat tactics (DACT) went well beyond our Shahbaz 77 effort. A total of 22 IIAF/F-4E, 22 USAFE/F-4E and 31 IIAF/F-5E sorties were flown. The IIAF F-4 pilots were able to refresh their training in two versus one (2V1) and received their first indoctrination in 2V2. Additionally, one more IIAF F-5E pilot was upgraded to full DACT IP status. The use of gun camera film during each mission has provided some excellent training materials for future DACT work. The ground control intercept (GCI) fighter controllers at Bushehr did an excellent job controlling all DACT missions.

c. (C) The air-to-ground gunnery involved both live and practice ordnance and was highly successful. 24 Mavericks (AGM-65A) were fired resulting in 21 targets destroyed. The USAF and IIAF flew 50 live bomb and strafe range missions. These were very successful with only three DUD bombs out of 200. Eighty-eight (88) practice ordnance, scorable missions were flown as scheduled.

d. (C) Thirty-five (35) electronic warfare (EW) sorties were flown against the Anarak EW Range. Again, as in Shahbaz 77, both the aircrues and the EW Range personnel received excellent training.

e. (C) On 19 June, a mixed flight of 24 IIAF/USAF F-4Es conducted a simulated attack against the IIN destroyer Babr. The fighters were under the control of a KC-707 airborne command and control center (ABCCC). The airborne commander was Lt Gen Kamyabipour (IIAF/DO). He was assisted by a combined IIAF, MAAG and USAFE operations staff. The IIN Babr was defended by four IIAF/F-14s which, for the first time, were under the operational control of the ship's captain. This training mission was most realistic and successful for both the IIAF and the IIN.

f. (C) All missions were jointly briefed and debriefed with the lead being alternated between USAFE and IIAF. The conclusion was that the major goal of the exercise; i.e., side-by-side advanced tactical training was accomplished. Of equal importance, an excellent rapport was established between two professional air forces.

4. (C) The final exercise of this major effort was MIDLINK 77. MIDLINK has historically been a combined CENTO maritime exercise involving

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H266

Item Number:

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Special Maps II

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) At J2 Request DMA produced several special maps.
2. (U) Special maps produced included joining sheets to produce 1 map, scale reduction, special overprinting and special material priority of special maps.
3. (U) Special material maps were plastic pull offs a celluloid backing for initial E&E.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) The special maps were created as time allowed.
2. (U) The special maps assisted in planning and saved time that could have been used assembling adjoining map sheets or coloring maps.
3. (U) The plastic peel off maps requires a requirement for the material's manufacture to produce the material as needed available stocks were completely depleted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) That creating special maps be used if operationally, necessary and feasible, time permitting.
2. (U) That generic special overprints of various areas of interest be continually studied (e.g., radar overprints).

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: 0ADR 1-1982

Upgraded to CONF
By DDO NMCC
1-1982

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OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED]

Cpt [REDACTED] Cpt [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - [REDACTED] HQ DMA, 254-4426

[REDACTED] DMAAC - (314) 263-4806 (AV 693)

ATTACHMENTS:

1. 1:50,000 Tehran Special (Reduction/Combination of 1:25,000) (S.P.)
2. 1:250,000 Tehran Area (S.P.)
3. ONC, G 4/5 H 5/6 (PLASTIC)
4. JNC (S.P.)
5. JNC w/Radar Overprint (S)
6. Plastic Maps

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	<u>Cys Per Unit</u>	<u>Running Totals</u>
DIA (JS)	100	100
SAC (IN)	100	200
MAC (IN)	100	300
TAC (IN)	50	350
PACAF (IN)	50	400
USAFE (IN)	50	450
REDCOM (J2)	50	500
RDP (J2)	50	550
PACOM (J2)	50	600
EUCOM (J2)	50	650
COMMEFOR	50	700
CINCPACFLT	50	750
CINCNAVEUR	50	800
CINCLANTFLT	50	850
<i>(S)</i> JCS/J3	250	1100
<i>A</i> EISOW USA (REL) SFOD <i>[REDACTED]</i> JTF	100 50 10 10 80	

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VZCZCMAY333
MULT
ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

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H269

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DISTR

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J3:NMCC C3S(05) DIC REVW(01) SECDEF(07) SECDEF/ ASD:ISA(18)
ASD:PA&E(01) ASD:PA(01) CIA: :DIA(15) NMIC AIRFORCE(03) NAVY(05)
ARMY(04) NIDS
CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
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ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
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DE RUEHMO #5616 3181342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141341Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4097
INFO RUFLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7684
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8286
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 25616

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: FEPF, IR, US, UR

SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET PRESS ON SITUATION IN TEHRAN

1. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS THUS FAR AVOIDED DIRECT COMMENTARY ON THE SITUATION SURROUNDING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, BUT HAS PRINTED DAILY TASS REPORTS FROM TEHRAN AND WASHINGTON. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NOVEMBER 14 ISSUE OF PRAVDA REPORTS, UNDER THE HEADLINE "RELATIONS ARE WORSENING" THAT:

PAGE 1

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Declassified by
DDO NMCC
22 Mar 97

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2

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PSOPS

98WAS

-- PRESIDENT CARTER ANNOUNCED THE CESSATION OF OIL PURCHASES FROM IRAN;

-- THE AMERICAN PRESS IS PUBLISHING INFLAMMATORY CALLS TO USE ECONOMIC AND OTHER PRESSURE AGAINST IRAN;

-- THE WHITE HOUSE CONTINUES TO RULE OUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO FREE THE HOSTAGES, BUT THE AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS THE ACTIVIZATION OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE U.S., INCLUDING MANEUVERS BY THE "QUICK REACTION FORCE" AT FORT HOOD;

-- IRAN REQUESTED THE CONVENING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN AN OPEN LETTER TO THE UNSYG WHICH EMPHASIZED THAT THE "U.S. IS STEERING THE MATTER TOWARD WAR" AND "A THREAT IS HANGING OVER THE SECURITY OF IRAN AND PEACE IN THE ENTIRE REGION"; ✓

-- THE IRANIAN LETTER CALLS THE ATTENTION OF THE UNSYG TO THE ANTI-IRANIAN CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S., ARRESTS OF IRANIAN CITIZENS, ATTACKS ON IRANIAN DIPLOMATS AND REQUESTS MEASURES TO HALT THIS "WAR HYSTERIA";

-- THE U.S. HAS SENT THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER MIDWAY AND OTHER NAVAL SHIPS INTO THE ARABIAN SEA FOR JOINT MANEUVERS WITH THE BRITISH NAVY.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS NOT YET REFERRED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S MENTION OF U.S. PROTESTS OVER SOVIET RADIO BROADCASTS ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION, ALTHOUGH THIS SUBJECT WAS REPORTED BY TASS ENGLISH ON NOVEMBER 12.

GARRISON

BT

#5616

ANNOTES

HAC 392/725

Classified By: TGS
Declassified On: 6/1/04

PAGE 2

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ACOLEASP/NC12/S02 SSA 72 PING

FM:

TO:

INFO:

~~SECRET~~

16 JAN 80

THE FOLLOWING IS A REPORT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

SUBJECT: SOVIET ALLEGATION OF PLANNED U.S. INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAN

1. JANUARY 16 PIUTERS ITEM 'PEFTEL' ACCURATELY REPORTED VREMENYA PROGRAM COMMENTARY. MAJOR SOVIET PAPERS TODAY CARRY TASS REPORTS FROM NEW DELEI AND BEIRUT ALLEGING U.S. PREPARATION FOR ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN. PRAVDA ADDS A COMMENTARY BY ITS MIDDLE EAST SPECIALIST PAVEL DEMCHENKO. ONE TASS ITEM QUOTES A PARIS NEWS AGENCY ('NEW DELEI') REPORT THAT THE U.S. AIM IS TO 'FREE THE HOSTAGES BY FORCE, OR AT LEAST MAKE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPT UNCONDITIONALLY THE AMERICAN TERMS.' THE INTENTION WOULD BE LAUNCHED ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, FROM BASES IN EGYPT OR PAKISTAN AND OMAN AND IS LIKELY TO LAND IN THE BANDAR ABBAS AREA OF IRAN. THE U.S. IS SAID TO HAVE DEMANDED THAT ITS NATO ALLIES PLACE THEIR FORCES ON HIGH ALERT AND TO BE AIRLIFTING 'LARGE CONTINGENTS' OF U.S. AIRBORNE TROOPS AND AIR FORCE TO BASES IN THE FPG, SPAIN, TURKEY, AND CYPRUS IN CONNECTION WITH ITS PLAN'S FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN.

2. THE TASS REPORT FROM PIPIUT CLAIMS THAT KISSINGER'S RECENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO PREPARE U.S. ALLIES FOR A POSSIBLE PREMATURE ARMED ATTACK AGAINST IRAN. THAT BASIS IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD BE USED, AND THAT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE IN EGYPT HAS BEEN PUT ON HIGH ALERT FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST IRAN.

3. OUR TRANSLATION OF THE DEMCHENKO COMMENTARY FOLLOWS:

--REPORTS COMING TO THE EDITORS TODAY ONCE AGAIN SHOW HOW DANGEROUS THE ADVENTUROUS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD IRAN IS FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

--THE REPEAT OF AN 'ARMED AMERICAN INTRUSION' INTO THIS COUNTRY HAS IN REALITY HUNG OVER IT LIKE A SHIELD OF DARKNESSES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. SPECIFICALLY, THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN POSITION IN IRAN HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE PENTAGON AS ONE OF THE 'MOST WEIGHTY' ARGUMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH TO THE PERSIAN GULF OF A MILITARY FORCE AND THE ACCELERATED FORMATION OF THE 'RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE'. THE APPEARANCE OF THE BOSTON PROBLEM IN NOVEMBER 1979 WAS USED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON IRAN.

IN EVALUATING THE EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THEN, MANY FOREIGN OBSERVERS HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT POSSIBILITIES TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM HAVE APPEARED MORE THAN ONCE. HOWEVER, WASHINGTON DID NOT USE THEM. IT PREFERRED TO RAISE ITS SABERS AND EVEN UNDERTOOK THE SO-CALLED 'RESCUE OPERATION' IN SPITE OF THIS STATE. THIS WAS IN ESSENCE AN AGGRESSIVE INVASION INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY BY ITS AIR FORCE AND AIRBORNE UNITS. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, IT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12258

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 72

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IMBIE. AS IS WELL KNOWN, IN COMBINED FAILURE, AND ON THE POLITICAL PLANE, IT STILL FURTHER COMPLICATES AMERICAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

"WASHINGTON" HAS NOT STOPPED ITS DISMISSEMENT GAME AROUND THE HOSTAGES. ALTHOUGH "WEST" IS AT STALE, OF COURSE, IS NOT ONLY THEM. IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS HAVE APPEARED THAT THE PENTAGON IS PLANNING A NEW MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST IRAN UNDER THE COVET OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PEACEFUL. THIS DANGEROUS ADVENTURE COULD BE CARRIED OUT AT ANY MOMENT. WARFARE, APPARENTLY HAS BECOME PART OF THE STRATEGY OF THE ACCUMULATION OF FORCES HAS COME TO AN END, AND IT IS TIME TO USE THE ALREADY EXISTING AMERICAN-IRANIAN CONFLICT TO SET THEM INTO MOTION.

IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ANY KIND OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. THE PROBLEMS OF THIS REGION SHOULD IN NO WAY BE TACKLED WITH THE AID OF FORCE.

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JTF

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J2 R2

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REF ID: A148
DTG 172100Z NOV 89
FM AGENCIES/USCIA/DPB/JP
TO CIO FOR
ICINT

ADVISER
AMASS

CHIEF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS/PROPAGANDA

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SOVIET PRESS ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW ON 30 OCT 89, WHICH WAS FILED BY ITS WASHINGTON D.C. TASS CORRESPONDENT.

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ABANDONED THE PLANS OF PREPARING A MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAN, SIMILAR TO THE ONE WHICH FAILED IN DISGRACE LAST APRIL. WELL-INFORMED MILITARY OBSERVERS OF THE NEWSPAPER WASHINGTON POST WILSON REPORTED TODAY, QUOTING U.S. GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES, THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONTINUES TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO RELEASE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES MILITARILY. THE OBSERVER STRESSES THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT MAY ORDER AT ANY TIME ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES BY FORCE DESPITE THE HIGH RISK OF THE OPERATION.

B. AN ENGLISH JOURNALIST ANDERSON WROTE ABOUT WASHINGTON'S SINISTER PLANS TWO MONTHS AGO. U.S. OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, VASTLY AND "CATEGORICALLY" DENIED THE REPORT. AT PRESENT, AS IT IS NOT CLEAR BY THE ARTICLE IN THE WASHINGTON POST, THE ONLY THING WHICH KEEPS WASHINGTON FROM A NEW MILITARY OPERATIONAL IS "UNCERTAINTY" OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE BODIES AS TO THE LOCATION OF SOME AMERICAN HOSTAGES. THE CIA AND THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE BELIEVE THAT NOT ALL OF THEM ARE HELD AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. THE OPINION IS EXPRESSED THAT UNDUE CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IS FOUGHT WITH IRADISSIBLY WITHIN THE AMERICAN CIO.

C. WILSON'S ARTICLE SHED LIGHT ON THE SINISTER ROLE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SETTING UP U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS ADVENTURE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA IN THE WAKE OF THE IRAN-Iraq CONFLICT. THIS, AT THE EARLY STAGE OF THE CONFLICT, THE CIA STARTED WORKING IN SECRET REPORTS OF POSSIBLE USE OF THE TURKISH BORDER AS A ROUTE THROUGH WHICH THE WESTERN SUPERPOWER COULD OIL ITS TANKER ACTION. ALLEGEDLY, TO PROTECT THE NAVY, BUT, IN FACT, TO IMPLEMENT ITS FAR-REACHING IMPERIALIST DESIGN, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATED IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION THE LONGEST AND FINEST ONE. THE AIM OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS CONCENTRATED BY THE TOP REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, IS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS LARGE-SCALE MILITARY POSITION IN THE REGION ON A PERMANENT BASIS, AS WELL AS GUARD THEIR IRON "VITAL" INTERESTS, PRIMARILY OIL RESOURCES, AGAINST OTHER STATES.

D. (U) THE ABOVE ARTICLE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE ATTENTION WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS WATCH THE U.S. MEDIA REPORTING. LEAKS AND SPECULATIVE REPORTS UPON IRANIAN VIOLATIONS AND LOSS TALK PROVIDE A PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE (CRITICAL) CRIST FOR THEIR INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA. PRESS REPORTING OF THIS TYPE IS OFTEN REBROADCAST ON SOVIET PROPAGANDA NETWORKS INTO EASTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. RUMORSCASTS OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED TO HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON THE IRANIAN SECURITY POSTURE.

E. (U) THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE USED TO REINFORCE UNIT CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
LEAD 17 NOV 89
BT

Reproduced to conform to
by DDCI NMCC
22 Jul 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by
DDO/NMCC 22 Jul 92
Declassify on: DADR



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 September 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Briefing of FBI Representatives (U)

1. (U) [redacted] On 24 September 1980, two key officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were briefed by the undersigned on intelligence needs in support of operations against Iran. Mr. Ed O'Malley, Deputy Assistant Director (Intelligence), FBI, responsible for coordinating use of non-US persons in the United States for intelligence purposes and Charles P. Monroe, Deputy Assistant Director (Criminal), FBI, responsible for anti-terrorist activities and under whose purview the Iranian activities in the US are monitored.

2. (TS) The officials were informed that the DOD was continuing to plan for hostage release operations against Iran and this is extremely sensitive information. They were informed that they were the only representatives of the FBI privy to that information. The purpose of the discussion was to solicit their assistance in developing information relative to the hostage situation which they may have surfaced through their internal information program; seek their help in establishing bona-fides of potential leads surfaced in DOD operations; and seek any potential Iranian leads that they may spot for exploitation in the conduct of their programs. The FBI representatives asked when and if operations were planned and were informed that we have to plan for six days, six months or six years. That the intelligence operations must be professionally developed for near or long term utilization. [redacted]
they had informants within the [redacted]

CONDUCTED BY [redacted] 22 Jul 1980
DEBRIEFED BY [redacted] DDCI NMCC
C: [redacted] DEBRIEFED BY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
REVIEWED BY [redacted] DADR
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3. (S) Several hypothetical situations were described to examine the types of assistance which the FBI may be capable of providing.

Concepts were discussed and ideas voiced; however, no decisions were made nor agreements established. The FBI representatives voiced their full support, however, cautioned that certain outlined actions would require prior approval.

4. (U) I stated that any requests for formal tasking would be approved at DOD prior to passing to the FBI. Mr. O'Malley stated that it would be necessary for him to brief Judge Webster, Director FBI.

5. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to review the discussions with the FBI and outline potential operational opportunities which could be developed through existing FBI resources.

G
[REDACTED]

COLONEL, USA

Copy to:
MG VAUGHT
✓ MG SECORD
BG ARMSTRONG

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Item Number: *(H# 287)*

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Soil Penetrometers

TIMEFRAME: December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) J2 surfaced the availability, use and types of hand-held soil penetrometers.
2. (U) They can be used to determine soil shearing strength (load carrying ability) for a given soil plane.
3. (U) There are several types and sizes commercially available other than the one currently used by the military.
4. (U) They must be used in conjunction with other soil analysis methods for maximum reliability in determining soil load carrying capacity.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) Generally the smaller and simpler penetrometers are less accurate and versatile.
2. (U) Training in basic use of simpler soil penetrometers is relatively easy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) That soil penetrometers other than the standard military issue test set, soil (trafficability) be identified and acquired.
2. (U) That personnel training for special operation or unconventional operations be trained in their use.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Cpt [REDACTED]

1 G

Declassified by
DDO NMCC
20 Jan 92

Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *OADR*

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POINTS OF CONTACT:

1. Soils Lab, USA Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, VA,
Ph 664-3075/2527 [REDACTED]
2. USA Engineer School, Ft Belvoir, VA (Cpt) [REDACTED]
Ph 664-2889
3. Soiltest, Inc.; 2205 Lee St., Evanston, IL 60202
(312) - 869-5500
4. LABCO, Inc., Labquip Div; (Local Soiltest Distribution)
3711 E. Monument St (P.O. Box 2137), Baltimore, MD 21203;
(301) 342-9225 ext 210 (Mr. [REDACTED])

ATTACHMENTS:

1. MFR, Subj: Soil Penetrometer, 15 December 80.
2. Pages 3 and 4 SOILTEST Catalog.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 December 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Soil Penetrometer (U)

A C 1. On 11 Dec 80, ██████████ conducted a liaison visit to the Engineer School Ft. Belvoir, VA to determine use of soil penetrometers.

2. The Cone Penetrometer is the principle instrument used in evaluating soil trafficability. The amount of force required to move the cone slowly through a given plane is indicated on the instrument and considered to be an index of the shearing resistance of the soil and is called the cone index of the soil in that plane.

3. Even though soil penetrometers can provide an accurate measure of soil shearing strength (CBR - California Bearing Rating), more accurate classification can be obtained through the use of piston samples and augered holes. Penetrometers can be used in conjunction with these techniques to determine shearing strength for soil layers below the surface. An expedient method to determine shearing strength below the ground plane would be to excavate holes with a shovel or entrenching tool and take penetrometer readings progressively at the bottom of the holes. Depth below surface and readings must be carefully recorded for analysis. Piston samples and loose samples obtained by auger can be analyzed for compaction and strength when wet or dry. The use of all three methods, soil penetrometer, piston samples, and loose sample from auger is the ideal method for analyzing the strength of the soil in a given general area.

4. The US Army Corps of Engineers has and teaches the use of the Cone Penetrometer supplied in their TEST SET, SOIL (TRAFFICABILITY) (NSN 6635005241284).

5. Additional soil penetrometers are available through SOILTEST, INC., 2205 Lee St, Evanston, IL 60202. Two particular models with possible application are the Pocket Penetrometer Model CL-700 and the RM 165 Geostick.

Capt, USA

SECRET

SOILTEST DIRECT READING

POCKET PENETROMETER

for CLASSIFICATION of SOILS

POCKET PENETROMETER MODEL CL-700

Shipping weight: 1 pound

Net weight: 8 ounces

The SOILTEST Pocket Penetrometer greatly reduces the human element in classification of cohesive types of soils. Using the penetration principle, it is extremely practical in evaluating the shearing strength of soil on field exploration or construction sites and in preliminary laboratory studies.

The principle and accuracy of the SOILTEST Pocket Penetrometer have been proved by over ten years of use. Thousands of Pocket Penetrometers are in use throughout the world, giving testimony to the usefulness and acceptance of this instrument. In fact, many organizations have supplied all of their field and laboratory engineers with the SOILTEST Pocket Penetrometers to insure uniformity in soil classifications.

DEVELOPMENT:

The penetrometer was originally developed for use by field engineers in checking visual classifications of soils. SOILTEST compiled data on several thousand unconfined compressive strength tests of silty clays and clayey soils against the penetrometer reading to develop the penetrometer scale.

In classifying soils by consistency, a close relationship exists between the penetrometer reading and the soil type.

The Pocket Penetrometer is an aid to uniform classification of soils; it does not replace field and laboratory testing and analysis.

Rugged — Direct-Reading

The new design of the Pocket Penetrometer features a lightweight case and handle assembly and a polished and ground steel loading piston. The direct reading scale is etched into the piston barrel for permanence.

The calibrated spring is heat treated and plated for rust resistance. The complete penetrometer weighs only 7 ounces (213 grams); the diameter is 3/4 inches and the length 6 inches. Supplied with a plastic carrying case with belt loop.

OPERATION:

The technique of operation is extremely simple. Push the piston into the soil up to the calibration groove (machined on the piston 1/4 inch from the end). The penetration reading is shown on the scale by the indicator sleeve which automatically holds its position after the piston is released. The scale on the new Pocket Penetrometer is direct reading in Tens of Psi., Foot or Kilograms per Square Centimeter (Unloading Compressive Strength).

- **Fast**
- **Economical**
- **New Design**
- **Direct Reading**
- **Maintains Test Result Automatically**

USED BY:

Soils Engineers
 Structural Engineers
 Civil Engineers
 Soil Scientists
 Highway Engineers
 Sanitary Engineers
 Public Health Engineers
 Agricultural Scientists
 Chemical Laboratories

TYPICAL USES:

Checking failure or slide areas.
 Checking degree of soil compaction.
 Evaluating chemical solidification of soils.
 Checking soil strata to determine pile lengths.
 Classifying soils at boring or construction sites.
 Correlating field and laboratory compaction studies.
 Correlating unconfined compressive strengths of soils.
 Analyzing consistency of soils for agricultural purposes.
 Verifying classification of boring samples in the Laboratory.

CL-175 SOIL CLASSIFICATION SET

A specially designed set for use in both the field and laboratory. The CL-175 includes indicator instruments for rapid testing of soil penetration, shear, gradation of sands, and density of cohesive soils. All items come in light weight carrying case with tray. CL-175 includes:

CL-700	Pocket Penetrometer
CL-701	Foot Adapter for Low Shear Strength
CL-600	Vane Adapter, Sensitive
CL-604	Torsion Shear Device
CL-602	Vane Adapter, High Capacity
A-26	Soil Color Chart
A-27	Gley Color Chart
A-28	Tropical Color Chart
A-17	Sand Grading Chart <i>see Page 22</i>
CN-940	Hair Volumeter for Density
CL-180	Carrying Case with Tray

All these indicator instruments can provide useful data in the field and the laboratory. However, they are not intended as substitutes for more complete testing procedures.

CL-175 1" diameter foot adapter for CL-700 Penetrometer. For low shear strength soils.

Shipping weight: 7.5 lbs. (3.4 kg.) Net weight: 1.75 lbs. (0.79 kg.)

CN-970 PROVING RING PENETROMETER

The Proving Ring Penetrometer is a cone type penetrometer which is used for the determination of bearing capacity of subgrades or for compaction control. The penetrometer also serves as a rapid means for determining the penetration resistance of soils in shallow exploration work.

To determine the penetration resistance at the soil surface of desired depth, the penetrometer is firmly pushed into the soil at a uniform rate. When the top of the penetration cone is reached, the proving ring dial is read. The corresponding penetration load can be determined from the calibration chart supplied with the proving ring. Readings are easily made since the proving ring dial indicator is equipped with a maximum load pointer.

CN-970

The penetrometer is lightweight and compact and is supplied with a handle and a three foot extension. The single proving ring has a capacity of 250 pounds. The extension rod is graduated every 6 inches. The cone points are removable and easily replaceable.

Shipping weight: 25 pounds. Net weight: 12 pounds.



CN-970

CN-988 TVA PENETROMETER

The TVA Penetrometer has been widely used in analyzing compacted fills. It is used in the same manner as the conventional soils penetrometer. The penetration readings are taken on a hydraulic gage reading 0 to 210 pounds total load. Penetration readings are correlated with laboratory data in the usual manner.

The device operates on the principle of a closed hydraulic system and bellows arrangement. All parts are sealed to prevent entry of dust and dirt. Easy to use and to maintain. The penetrometer is supplied complete and ready to operate. Four needles having 1/20, 1/10, 1/5 and 1/3 square inch areas are included.


Shipping weight: 25 pounds. Net weight: ... pounds.

RH-165 GEOSTICK

The new Geostick® is a combination long-handle, soft-rock geologist's hammer, surface cone penetrometer and a soil sampler. It can also be used as a walking stick. Overall length is 34". It carries four 1 1/8" O.D. by 6 inch long sample tubes and eight caps. The cone penetrometer has a range of from 69.5 to 5560 psi bearing pressure.

Its geologist's hammer can be used for sampling rock formations and mineral deposits. It has a chisel point and extra-long handle. Hammer end is chrome-plated, forged steel. The easy-to-read penetrometer chart is imprinted on the side of the aluminum handle. A steel shoe is fitted on the bottom of the Geostick for soil sampling.

Shipping weight: 4 pounds. Net weight: 2 1/2 pounds.



CN-433

CN-419 PROCTOR PENETROMETER, BASIC SET

The penetrometer consists of a special calibrated spring dynamometer with a pressure scale on the stem of the handle. The pressure scale is calibrated to 130 pounds in one pound subdivisions. There is a major division at each 10 pound interval. A sliding ring on the stem indicates the maximum load obtained in the test.

The standard penetrometer is supplied with interchangeable needles having end areas of 1/20, 1/10, 1/4, 1/2, and 1 sq. in. Complete and ready to operate. Includes a sturdy carrying case with individual compartments.

Model meeting ASTM requirements for sizes of needles is listed below.

Shipping weight: 18 pounds.

Net weight: 8 pounds.

CN-433 PROCTOR PENETROMETER ASSEMBLY


ASTM D-1558

This assembly complies with the requirements of the ASTM specification noted above. Supplied with Penetrometer assembly and seven needles: 1, 3/4, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5, 1/10, and 1/20 sq. in. end areas. All other specifications same as CN-419.

Shipping weight: 19 pounds. Net weight: 8 pounds.

Spare Penetration Needles for CN-419 and CN-433

Model Number	Needle Size sq. in.	Model Number	Needle Size sq. in.
CN-419-1	1/20	CN-419-10	1
CN-419-2	1/10	CN-419-11	1/3
CN-419-3	1/4	CN-419-12	1/5
CN-419-5	1/2	CN-419-13	3/4



RH-165

From: ~~THE CHIEF OF STAFF~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

14288

MEMORANDUM

Date 20 May 80

To: M G Vaughn

Subject: Night Time Recce

Sir

Atchd is Memo
from CJCS to SECDEF
Requesting assistance
in fielding a night-
time surveillance capability

JL

RL
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12358
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO
 DECL SL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADA
DERIVED FROM None

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

JK1145

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: SNOWBIRD Reconnaissance (U)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
	X	X			

REMARKS

1. (U) Attached memorandum request SECDEF advise Dr. Dinneen of the need to field a night time reconnaissance capability to support SNOWBIRD planning.
2. (U) If approved, I have directed my J-2 to coordinate the specific needs with such personnel as Dr. Dinneen deems appropriate.
3. (U) Request the attached memorandum be approved by CJCS and forwarded to SECDEF for consideration.

Classified By: *JCS*
 Declassified On: *0ADR*

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] USAF J-3 SOD Ext 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE J-P	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
EXEC							
TIM CHF							
VCOPD							
COPD							
DATE OF PREPARATION 20 May 80	JTF	<i>[Signature]</i>					

TOP SECRET



GENERAL DAVID C. JONES
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO:

Ken Vaught DATE 28 May (80)

Jim - see note.

D.C.J.
57178
3 E 1014

FBI
30 / 1530





OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE _____

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dr Hansen

Gerry - any thoughts on
this. might be worth
examining; however, we
would want to go slow
on spending big money.

Dave

28 MAY 1980

Dave -

It is certainly important to
try to obtain this information -
It's going to be tough even with
the SR 71 and ASARS¹ because
of range limitations unless we
over fly ^{1'll be} ~~it~~ ^{it} with your
over fly ^{1'll be} ~~it~~ ^{it} with your
Then Ken

DAVID G. JONES, GENERAL
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

as appropriate
Gerry

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Reconnaissance Support (U)

1. (TS) As a result of our rescue attempt [REDACTED]

2. (U) (TS) [REDACTED]

However, we are concerned that it may be placed in effect on a nightly basis.

(U) 3. (TS) Reliable HUMINT reporting which could allow us to clarify the night time status of various potential landing air-fields does not exist.]

(U) 4. (TS) It is essential to ongoing planning efforts that the night time usability of several locations in Iran be determined soonest by whatever means we can apply.

5. (TS) One such technique could be the use of [REDACTED]

6. (U) Request Dr. Dinneen be apprised of the requirement on a close hold basis and that he be authorized to pursue this possibility to a practical conclusion.

CLASSIFIED BY CJCS
REVIEW ON: 20 MAY 2000

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed SR-71 Leaflet Capability

On 26 June 1980, I contacted Lockheed ADP [REDACTED] (SR-71/U-2 Program Manager) and requested a feasibility study, cost estimate and schedule, for an OSD proposal to equip the SR-71 with a leaflet dispensing capability. I further advised Lockheed that the capability was under active consideration at a very high level and their estimate should reflect a schedule that carries the highest possible corporate priority.

On 9 July 1980, [REDACTED] provided me with the following information:

- The capability is certainly achievable but requires surprisingly complicated modifications
 - Close tolerances required in the canister and door
 - Design must be capable of withstanding high temperature environment
 - Large force required to ensure that the package penetrates the boundary layer and clears the aircraft
- Description
 - System would be designed for internal installation in the existing TROC camera bay
 - Would be capable of dispensing approximately 10,000 leaflets
 - System would be activated by air-charged initiators and powered by 1000-lb force actuators
 - Total of four systems would be built
 - Two systems would be flight-tested
 - Two systems would be available for operational use
- Cost and Schedule
 - Lockheed would design, develop, modify one aircraft, install, flight test, and deliver system in 12 weeks using the highest possible priority
 - Cost \$2.2 million



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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
3 November 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER

Subject: SR 71 Mission Request

1. (U) (TS) Request consideration be given to conducting several SR 71 surveillance missions of the Persian Gulf during the next 3-6 weeks.
2. (U) (TS) Purpose of mission is to determine locations of major oil rig concentrations and typical flow pattern of Gulf shipping to assist in selection of low level air penetration routes.
3. (U) (TS) Recognize that missions could raise Soviet/Iran/ME speculation; however, given irregular scheduling, direct association with any US military planning will probably be low. On the other hand, periodic SR 71 missions would provide "reason" for increased tanker support in the area prior to the execution of any US military contingency action.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

A
CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3
DECLASSIFY ON 3 NOV 2000

TOP SECRET

2C820

~~TOP SECRET~~

Item Number: (A28)

Intelligence Historical Report

J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256
CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMIC

 DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON DAOR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

SUBJECT: SR-71 High Resolution RadarTIMEFRAME: June - July 1980SUMMARY:

A (U) 1. (TS) J2 surfaced the concept of utilizing SR-71 High Resolution Radar (HRR) to detect obstructions during hours of darkness on Iranian runways.

(U) 2. (TS) J2 coordinated with J3, Air Staff, and Cdr, 9th RTS to test the ability of the SR-71 HRR to detect runway obstructions.

3. (TS) Condron AAF, NM was blocked by a team from [REDACTED] Rangers.

(U) 4. (TS) SR-71 HRR missions were collected before and after blockage for comparative coverage.

(U) 5. (S) J2 personnel were on hand during runway blocking to provide complete and accurate accounting of blockage to compare with HRR collected.

6. (TS) [REDACTED]

7. (TS) [REDACTED]

COMMENTS:

A, B 1. (TS) While SR-71 HRR [REDACTED] used in [REDACTED] it would be a good method to determine if major items of blockage [REDACTED] removed at night or changed.

C 2. (S) J2 personnel read out [REDACTED]

~~CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256~~
~~CONDUCTED ON~~
~~DERIVATIVE CL BY~~
 ~~DECL DOWNGRADED TO~~
~~REVIEW ON~~
~~DERIVED FROM~~~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: ADR~~~~TOP SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

(PS) That if [REDACTED] other source indicates runways blocked with vehicles or other items of general high radar signature the SR-71 HRR be used for confirmation of blockages at night.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

POINTS OF CONTACT:

G
1. [REDACTED] - AF/XOORZ - 697-9282
2. [REDACTED] - AF/RDPJ - 695-6242
3. [REDACTED] Beale AFB, CA - AV 368-2296

ATTACHMENTS:

1. J-2 MFR; Subj: SR-71 HRR Test dated 9 July 80
2. SLAR PM MFR; Subj: System Selection for Night Detection of Runway Obstructions for DOUBLESTAR, undated

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

9 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: SR-71 HRR Test

1. By direction of the [JTD, Condron AAF, White Sands, NM, was blocked by a combination of vehicles, steel drums, tires, rocks, wire cable and logs. Dirt piles were heaped along the South edge (not on the runway since the bulldozer clearing them would have caused surface damage).] See Atch 1 and Photos 1-3.
2. SR-71 HRR coverage was flown [27 Jun 80 when runway was clear and again on 30 Jun 80 when blocked so that comparative coverage could be used for analysis.] See Photos 4-9.
3. A PI qualified officer was at CAAF throughout the blocking and subsequent clearing. Upon completion of the blocking and clearing, he proceeded to Beale AFB, California to conduct analysis of HRR imagery.

4 [REDACTED]

A, B

HRR technicians at Beale AFB felt that the [REDACTED]

A, B 5.(S) Recommendation: [That SR-71 HRR only be used if no other systems are available/capable for detecting runway [REDACTED]]

G [REDACTED]

Captain, USA

SECRET
Eyes Only

Memo for the Record

Subject: System Selection for Night Detection of Runway Obstructions
for DOUBLE STAR.

1. [REDACTED] The CAPRE system is capable of detection of runway obstructions expected to be of concern for project DOUBLE STAR. Special attention must be given to mission planning and specific equipment selection. Goodyear Aerospace Corp support should be used during all phases of the mission. Collection of comparative collateral [REDACTED] a key to the success of the mission.

2.(u) (S) Consideration was given to acceleration of existing ASARS efforts and/or modifications to CAPRE for improved performance. An acceleration of ASARS efforts to meet the DOUBLE STAR schedule constraints was not feasible. Modifications to CAPRE for improved performance beyond careful mission quality assurance and "tweaking" would not significantly improve its performance for this mission.

[REDACTED]
G

1 Atch
Point Paper (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAPRE RADAR
CAPABILITY TO DETECT
TARGETS OF INTEREST FOR DOUBLE STAR

TARGETS OF INTEREST (8) ^(v) Runway obstructions

- Permanent
 - Dirt mounds/rubble
 - Cratering/trenching
 - Oil drums/metal debris
- Semi-permanent
 - Rolling stock/vehicles
 - Cables

DETECTION ASSESSMENT

- Permanent
- [REDACTED]
- Semi-permanent
- [REDACTED]
- Cables
- [REDACTED]
(mission planning factor)
- [REDACTED]
(Presumed to present no obstacle in this condition)
- [REDACTED]

A, B

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MANDATORY ACTIONS (S)(U)

- Hand Select CAPRE component LRU's.
- Obtain comparative imagery (simultaneous coverage if possible)
 - Day photo/collateral
 - Reference CAPRE imagery
- Use best available correlator-processor
- Augment existing service capability with Goodyear Aerospace personnel for all elements of mission:
 - Mission planning
 - Maintenance
 - Processing
 - Exploitation

DESIRABLE ACTIONS (S)(U) Redundant systems/platforms

BOTTOM LINE

- CAPRE is capable of detection of all DOUBLE STAR targets
- Mission planning, Goodyear support, comparative [redacted] keys to success.

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TOP SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

K290

THE JOINT STAFF

16 May 80

MEMORANDUM TO MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

Subject: Background Option Papers

Attached for your consideration are a series of short background/
option papers on the following subjects:

- a. Hostage Location Assessment
- b. Ross Perot Considerations
- c. Interim Non-Violent Options
- d. Prospective Timing Considerations
- e. Infiltration Possibilities
- f. Closure Options
- g. Extraction Considerations

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 13526
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DCL DECLASSIFIED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 1 ADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

TOP SECRET

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 MAY 1980

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT

ALTHOUGH THIRTEEN CITIES/TOWNS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, THIS NUMBER IS DEEMED EXCESSIVE. IT IS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF SOME PURPOSEFUL DECEPTION COMBINED WITH THE SPREAD OF RUMORS AND SPECULATION.

IN THE PAST THE MILITANTS, CLERICS, AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE EMPLOYED MISLEADING STATEMENTS AS A MEANS TO ENHANCE SECURITY MEASURES REGARDING THE HOSTAGES. IN ADDITION, THE ACTUAL SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING THE HOSTAGES AND KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR SPECIFIC LOCATION HAVE ALWAYS BEEN RIGIDLY CONTROLLED BY THE MILITANTS. THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION THE MILITANTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO LOSE OR SHARE CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES WITH ANY EXTERNAL ENTITY.

THIS OFFICE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN RELOCATED. IT IS EQUALLY IMPROBABLE THAT DISPERSION, IF IT HAS OCCURRED, WOULD BE AS WIDE AS ADVERTISED.

RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING HOSTAGE LOCATIONS BE ACCEPTED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

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~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

Subject: Perot Meeting 6 May 1980

1. During the course at a three and half hour discussion with Mr. Perot, the following support actions were suggested as possible by Mr. Perot. The first two are unilateral private citizen actions that Mr. Perot will be undertaking in the near future.
2. All the other actions would be taken as a private business person but only after Mr. Perot had received the concurrence of a senior government official such as Dr. Brown that the project or projects are essential. The list of projects/capabilities that were ventured by Mr. Perot:
 - a. College education for children of the deceased in the name of the rest of the force.
 - b. Family financial support fund to permit relatives of the hostages to travel and engage in private diplomacy and/or public appeals on a coordinated basis.

c.

[REDACTED]

d.

[REDACTED]

e.

[REDACTED]

f.

[REDACTED]

g.

[REDACTED]

h.

[REDACTED]

3. Mr. Perot advised that he would call Friday afternoon (9th May) to arrange a follow on meeting if any of these ideas seemed useful.

G

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTERIM NON-VIOLENT OPTIONS

1. Initiation of rumor campaign that some hostages have been killed, kidnaped by dissident elements, escaped with the help of Royalists. U.S. could call for accountability by IRC.
2. Overflight leaflet drop stating case for release of hostages and restatement of U.S. military capability and examples of the restraint that have been applied to date.
3. Interdiction of Tehran power grid by use of carbon filament chaff drop (this could be accomplished in conjunction with above or separately).
4. Supersonic overflight by SR 71 accompanied by detonation of photo flash bombs over selected Iranian military, government, and Industrial facilities.
5. Periodic semi-overt probe of Iranian air space

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PROSPECTIVE TIMING CONSIDERATIONS

Recognizing the following timing factors recommend that for planning purposes the 3rd and 4th weeks of June be considered the next opportune operational window.

FACTORS:


- It will probably take in excess of 30-40 days to properly reconstitute the forces, develop perfect and train for a new concept.
B1 C [REDACTED] and an equivalent time span for the in-country environment to stabilize to a point whereby Iranian reactions are again predictable.
- Based upon current projections the Iranian Parliament can be expected to convene the 2nd week of June at the earliest, with a decision to either consider the hostage issue early on or put it off to be announced by the 3rd week of June.

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
INFILTRATION POSSIBILITIES

A.



NOTE: These three actions would be totally independent and used to check each other.

B. Logistic Support Structure



C. Main Force Elements:

A - Long Range Insertion will most probably be accomplished by fixed wing aircraft; transporting personnel, vehicles and possibly [redacted] during vehicle egress). Insertion may have to be time/distance phased. (i.e., Main Force landed w/vehicles within 90 minutes driving time from objective. Extraction/covering force landed at

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

more distant location (approx 75 NM). The extraction/cover force arriving in time to provide extraction lift and/or top cover during vehicle movement to extraction location. The extraction air head which might be either the force insertion [REDACTED] or a closer location.

- For shorter range infiltration [REDACTED], a combination of helicopters and pre-positioned vehicles might be appropriate.

CLOSURE OPTION

Principal closure options revolve around the use of ground vehicles. Indigenous civilian vehicles will be the least conspicuous for use by RECON/blocking/and support elements. Closure of main force would in most cases be made using larger vehicles (vans, or trucks; either commercial or military, or armored cars).

Extraction.

Although military air is the most controllable and theoretically the most reliable, two other means are worth consideration if for nothing more than emergency alternates and/or diversions - These are: (a) [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ VI
BRIEF FOR CJCS & JC'S

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

H 291

THREE PART BRIEF

- HOSTAGE LOCATIONS
- SIXTY DAY PROJECTION
- ONGOING/FUTURE ACTIONS

[REDACTED]

PLANNING ESTIMATE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355
CONDUCTED ON 02 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDP NMCC
 DECL ASSIGNED TO Agent
REVIEW ON 0 ADR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] multiple sources

(U) DO NOT FORESEE ANY IMMINENT CHANGE -

- SPECIFICALLY, IF NO POSITIVE ACTION (I.E., RELEASE OF SOME) HAS TAKEN PLACE BY 14 JULY WHEN RAMADAN BEGINS - DO NOT FORESEE ANY IN THE ENSUING THIRTY DAYS (MID-AUGUST) - UNLESS SOMETHING HAS OCCURRED TO CONVINCE THE CLERICAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: YES
Declassified ON: 0 ADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARDLINERS THAT IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES,) THEN THE ATTRACTION OF PROLONGING THEIR CAPITIVITY UNTIL 4 NOVEMBER WILL GROW AS THAT DATE TAKES ON A SYMBOLIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE...

REVOLUTIONARY IRAN WAS ABLE TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE GREAT SATAN, HOSTAGE FOR A YEAR. BEFORE ACCEPTING THIS SCENARIO AS THE BASIS FOR FUTURE PLANNING IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HIGHLIGHT TWO CONDITIONS OVER WHICH WE HAVE NO CONTROL THAT COULD UNEXPECTEDLY PUT THE HOSTAGES IN HIGH RISK.

A. THE FIRST OF THESE WOULD BE THE UNEXPECTED DEATH OF KHOMEINI, PARTICULARLY IF HIS DEATH WAS THE RESULT OF A REAL OR ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. IF THIS WERE TO OCCUR, EMOTIONS WOULD RUN HIGH AND SHORTLY AFTER THE INITIAL THREE DAYS OF MOURNING, THE HOSTAGES COULD BECOME THE TARGET OF REVENGE.

B. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY, FAR LESS LIKELY BUT STILL A POSSIBILITY, WOULD BE THE IMMERSION OF AN ARMED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN TEHRAN WHICH WAS VISITED BY THE CLERICS AND MILITANTS AS A THREAT TO THEIR CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES.

TURNING NOW TO ONGOING AND FUTURE INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS I WILL COVER THESE BY TIME SEQUENCE FROM PRESENT ONWARDS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SEARCHING FOR NEW INSERTION LZ

5 POSSIBILITIES -

- HELO

- C-130

~~CSX~~ --ALL APPROXIMATELY 110 MILES EAST. [WE HAVE
[REDACTED] ON TWO SHOWING THEM TO BE HIGHLY
SUITABLE IN LATE SUMMER AFTER GROUND HAS DRIED.

WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF USING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO DETERMINE CURRENT STATUS. ENOUGH DATA SHOULD BE IN
HAND WITHIN TWO WEEKS TO WARRANT AN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF IT IS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.]

DOD/DR DINEEN REVIEW OF CAPABILITY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

IGI DATES COKUS TEST 24 JUN OCONUS TEST MID JUL

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LIMD IS

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DOD - - SURVEY FOR

- IRAN/IRANIAN AMERICANS
- JEDBURH TEAMS

205

- INFLUENCE ON NEWS RELEASES
- ACCESS TO FLAG
- FINANCIAL "ANGEL"

CONCERNED INTERESTS

COUPON ALIQUOT ON AND 10 ONS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~REF ID: A6111~~

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE (16 Jun 80)

4292

(U)3)

- a) DOD has one asset [REDACTED] who claims such a capability.

b) [REDACTED]

(U)4) Confirmation that Iranian military is blocking runways at some airfields.

a) Manzariyeh blocked as of 19 May 1980.

b) Semnan New still unobstructed as of 12 Jun 1980.

a) [REDACTED]

b) [REDACTED]

c) JTF, [REDACTED] and INSCOM working to identify personnel to [REDACTED]

d) JTF, [REDACTED] INSCOM deadline for all outstanding actions is 30 Jun 80.

6) JTF/J2 staff screening DOD personnel or possible in-country support missions is ongoing.

a) Screening status as of 16 Jun 80, screening is continuing.

1) 80 (+) records reviewed.

2) 30 (+) personnel interviewed.

3) [REDACTED] personnel nominated [REDACTED]

b) Future intentions:

1) Overland route surveys

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12358
CONDUCTED ON 20 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD NMCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO Scut
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 2) Acquisition of vehicles and safe houses
- 3) Investigation/recon of rumored locations
- 4) Infiltration of equipment
- (u)7) Contact with DOS/IWG continuing on weekly basis.
- (u)8) Meeting with financial angel to support hostage family.

- (u)9) Meeting with [redacted] is in planning for Thursday or Friday to coordinate support program.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

INTELLIGENCE STATUS UPDATE

H293

(1)

~~SECRET~~ - Analysis indicates [REDACTED] has occurred.

- Limited activity evident at [REDACTED]
- None noted elsewhere.
- Extensive efforts underway to develop and field technical means to obtain locational data.

~~C, E~~ -- Long Haul Relay test from [REDACTED]
scheduled for 5-15 July 1980.

(2)

~~SECRET~~ - Test of existing SR-71/High Resolution Radar's ability to discern these objects on a runway is scheduled for 30 Jun/1 Jul. Results will determine degree of emphasis to be placed on mating U-2 ASARS system with SR-71 for follow-on test, and possible future overflight.

(3) - DOD is continuing to screen personnel for in-country missions.

~~SECRET~~ personnel have passed all screening and will begin training under DOD auspices o/a [REDACTED] Principle missions will

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDDMC

DECL DOWNGRADING TO SECRET

REVIEW ON JAD 2

PREVIOUS REVIEWS multiple days

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: OTDR

Classification Review

be to [redacted]

(4) -
~~(S)~~
[redacted]
[redacted]

(5) - DOD has recently provided [redacted] data on several facilities
in Tehran which hold prospects for acquisition/use as
[redacted]

later.

C ~~Add:~~ -

#294
(20 JUN 1987)

SNOWBIRD INTELLIGENCE

1. ~~(TS)~~ Problems. As a result of the aborted rescue attempt on 24 April, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(TS)~~ Assets. In early May, the only substantial intelligence assets that remained were overhead photography [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 14 May, the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 17 June, the Secretary of Defense reiterated this request. Throughout this time frame, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(TS/CWT)~~ Actions. The JTF has initiated a number of actions to produce useful intelligence. These are summarized below:

a. ~~(TS/ew)~~ The JTF in cooperation with [REDACTED] USAINS COM and [REDACTED] is pursuing a number of technological actions.

First, it is believed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is hoped that this capability will be available by 14 July.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON MCC

DECL DOWNGRDED TO SECRET

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

b. (TS/CW) There is also the possibility of obtaining [REDACTED]

This

effort is targeted to begin on a coordinated basis in early June.

c. (u) (S) When it was learned that the Iranians might be attempting to block runways of the airfields that could be used in a rescue attempt, the JTF initiated action to investigate the feasibility of an SR-71 overflight using high resolution radar to define obstructions. If found to be feasible, a mission would be planned to occur after 14 July.

d. (S) Recognizing that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would face a similar problem in SNOWBIRD, the JTF initiated a personnel search of active duty and retired DOD personnel with foreign language, intelligence, or special operations background for possible use. To date, more than [REDACTED] records have been screened, [REDACTED] individuals interviewed, and [REDACTED] nominated to [REDACTED]. This effort is continuing.

4. (S) Forecast

[REDACTED]
we believe the situation is entering a new phase in which we may see release of some hostages within the next 30 days.

SECRET

However, we do not see the release of all or even a majority of the hostages prior to the first anniversary of the Embassy take over. Of continuing concern is the possibility that the hostages' lives could be put at a risk if Khomeini were to die unexpectedly, and an assassination was alleged, or if one of the exile groups initiated armed dissident activity in the capital which was viewed by the militants and the clerics as a major threat to their control of the situation. Recognizing these possibilities, it is absolutely essential that a maximum effort [REDACTED] define their security conditions, and establish an in-country support structure continue.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

295

THE JOINT STAFF

2 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIGHE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status

(V)1. This memorandum provides a summary of the current intelligence and operational support requirements of Project SNOWBIRD. The requirements have been divided into three major categories:

- a. Category One: Locating and tracking the hostages.
- b. Category Two: Establishing an in-country support structure.
- c. Category Three: Maintaining a cognizance of political, military, and civil events in the region which could have an impact on mission planning.

2. The balance of this memo will address the status of the individual requirements contained within each category:

a. Category One

b. Category Two

- (1) Acquire in-country assets.
- (2) Establish in-country communications base.
- (3) Acquire transportation means.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EN 17736

CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 92

PERMEABILITY TESTS

DECL PENDING UPDATES TO [REDACTED]

REVIEW ON DAOB

DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

~~TOP SECRET//SI~~ SENSITIVE

~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4) Acquire in-country safehouses.]

(5)

c. Category Three

(1) Environmental data [REDACTED]

(2) Military/political activity [REDACTED] DIA Photo).

(3) [REDACTED] DIA Photo).

Other special programs being coordinated by SNOWBIRD/J-2:

C. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Interface on DOD agents.

e. Identification and screening of DOD support assets.

f. Establishment of field training office for DOD SNOWBIRD support assets.


[REDACTED]
h. Test of SR 71-HRR capability.

i. Radar planning chart (DMA).

j. LZ search project.

k. Imagery transformation (DARPA).

(u) 4. Request DIA review the above and advise of any assistance or additional capabilities that could be used.


JAMES B. VAUGHN
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

FF 296

3 July 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Update

(U)

1. This memorandum provides situation update and summary of the current intelligence and operational support actions and requirements.

2. Situation Update:

SC

[REDACTED]

- Activity noted at Tabriz Consulate continues.

- No significant activity noted at other reported locations.

- Air defense posture increased at many active airfields by deployment of AAA assets. (ZU 23-2/Oerlikon 35mm/Rapier).

- Static runway blocking activity noted at six inactive airfields.

C

[REDACTED]

3. The balance of this memo addresses the status of individual requirements within three major categories:

a. Category One (Locating and Tracking Hostages)

(2)

(3)

(4)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12358

CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONRCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple sources

Classified By: JC5
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Category Two (Establishing In-Country Support Structure)

- (1) Acquire in-country assets.
- (2) Establish in-country communications [REDACTED].
- (3) Acquire transportation means.
- (4) Acquire in-country safehouses.
- (5) [REDACTED]

c. Category Three (Maintaining Area/Event Cognizance)

- (1) Environmental data [REDACTED]
- (2) Military/political activity [REDACTED] /DIA Photo).

d. Other special programs being coordinated by SNOWBIRD/J-2:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED] interface on DOD intelligence HUMINT sources.

e. Identification and screening of DOD personnel for use as support assets. (~~TRANSTALLED~~ to ~~OL~~ (R) 7/7/85) ~~DU~~

f. Establishment of field training office for DOD SNOWBIRD support assets. (~~TRANSFERRED~~ to ~~OL~~ (R) 7/7/85) ~~DU~~

g. Test of SR 71 HRR capability.

h. LZ location and verification project.

i. Imagery transformation program.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY

"RICEBOWL"

NOV 79	DEC 79	JAN 80	FEB 80	MAR 80	APR 80
?	?	?	?	?	?

"SNOWBIRD"

MAY 80	JUNE 80	JULY 80
?	?	?

A.C.

~~Top Secret~~

30/10/80

PURPOSE: REVIEW SITUATION SINCE MID-SEP

- HOSTAGE STATUS

-- CONSOLIDATION JULY-AUG-SEP

-- STABILITY IS KEY 3-4 WEEKS

- TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT

-- SERVICES

-- FOOD

-- FUEL / WX

-- TRAFFIC

-- CURFEW

- EFFECTS OF WAR

-- INTERNAL PROPAGANDA

-- NATIONAL MOBILIZATION

-- SHIFT OF RESOURCES

-- UPGRADE OF AIR DEFENSE

-- CHANGE IN CIVIL AIR

-- PARTS RESUPPLY [-K + FR + LIB]

- IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 91

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO or mcc

DECL AS DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON BADR

DERIVED FROM 100-111-1111

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: BADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

-- OUTLOOK QUESTIONABLE

-- DICHOTOMY OF VIEWPOINTS

-- REQUIRED REEVALUATION OF CONCEPTS

-- UNDETECTED STRATEGIC INSERTION

-- RAPID-RELIABLE FORCE CLOSURE

-- SAFE-EXTRACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OSI

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

H # 302

REPLY TO
INFO CCR

IVO

1 JUL 1981

SUBJECT: Request for Support (Yr Memo, 22 Jun 81)

Chief, Special Operations Division
OJCS/J3

1. The referenced memorandum relates to the request of John T. Bohn, HQ SAC Command Historian, for data concerning the Iranian Rescue Attempt.
2. Inasmuch as this relates to a command security problem, we have referred the matter to HQ SAC/SP. Should HQ SAC determine that an investigation is required, AFOSI will coordinate the matter with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has primary jurisdiction over civilian employees of the Defense Department.

RICHARD F. LAW, COL, USAF
Director of Counterintelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by
DIA DMC
20 Jul 92

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 20 ADR

G 799
Briefing for CJCS, 20 November 1980

The following intelligence update was provided to the CJCS during a formal SNOWBIRD (5) briefing in the COMJTF's office. Briefer: LTC [REDACTED]
Personnel Present:

1. GEN Jones
2. LTG Pustay
3. VADM Hanson
4. MG Johnson
5. RADM Watson
6. MG Vaught
7. MG Secord
8. RADM Gureck
9. BG Scholtes
10. COL [REDACTED]
11. COL Pittman
12. COL [REDACTED]
13. COL [REDACTED]
14. COL [REDACTED]
15. COL [REDACTED]
16. LTC [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL UPGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple service
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

20 Nov 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 Nov 1980.

INTELL UPDATE

RELEASE ASSESSMENT

TRANSFER PROBABILITIES

EVENT INDICATORS

SITUATION FORECAST

THREAT ASSESSMENT

COLLECTION OUTLOOK

RELEASE ASSESSMENT

"PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE USG REPLY"

- KHOMEINI CHARGED MAJLIS
- MAJLIS SET TERMS
- SECULAR GOV'T RESPONSIBLE
 - . BOUND BY "WILL OF PEOPLE"
 - . CONCERNED ABOUT IRP
- OPTIMISTIC :

- . PARTIAL RELEASE O/A 27 NOV
- . FOLLOW ON VIA 3RD PARTY

- REALISTIC:
 - . LIMITED RELEASE O/A 27 NOV
 - . PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS
 - . SEGREGATION & TRANSFER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HOT~~ - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TRANSFER PROBABILITIES

~~SECRET~~
STATUS QUO "TARGETS"

- EMBASSY AND MFA
- DETENTION AND RESIDENCE
- GOVERNMENT CONTROL

~~C~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] - MFA : MFA BLDG

EVENT INDICATORS

- FORMAL GOI REPLY
- DOMESTIC (IRP) COMMENTS
- RELEASE - NON-RELEASE

SITUATION FORECAST

- "IF" NO POSITIVE ACTIONS O/A 1 DEC
- NEGOTIATIONS PROTRACTED
- DETENTION INDEFINITE

THREAT ASSESSMENT

- POPULAR SUPPORT
- MILITARY STRENGTH
- RG LAX BUT STABLE
- AIR DEFENSE LATENT
- 2 OF 3 HAWK "HOT"

~~TOP SECRET~~

- RAPIER OPTICAL

- OERLIKON

- ZU - 23 - 2

C - CIVIL FLIGHT LIMITED

C - AIR PENETRATION POSSIBLE

- DESERT - SE

- TURKEY - NW

COLLECTION OUTLOOK

- PHOTO - WX LTD

C - HUMINT - "HOPEFUL"

- DOD: AGENTS:

IN-COUNTRY LZ SURVEY

- SUSAN

- MANZARIYEH

- SEMNAN NEW

- ANNE



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

HOSTAGE DETENTION OPTIONS

SCALE OF LESSER PROBABILITIES

<u>STATUS -Quo</u>	<u>MAJLIS</u>	<u>MINISTRY of JUSTICE</u>	<u>MINISTRY of FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALGERIA</u>
<u>Location</u>  	EMBASSY → → → → → →		
<u>Guards</u>	MILITANTS → REV. GDS. →	MIN. OF JUST. DEC - MFA BLDG - NAT'L POLICE →	MIL. GDS. →

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

11301

TO: SOD	CLASSIFICATION <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE			
THRU:	DJSM NO.		ODJS SUSPENSE DATE		
	DJSM DATE				
SUBJECT: Request for Support	ACTION				
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER	
		X			

REMARKS

60

1. (C) Attached memo to AFOSI requests they review the security situation regarding the SAC Command Historian due to his persistent efforts to obtain data on the Iran rescue effort and apparent daily monitoring of the SAC force disposition.
2. (U) Recommend SOD approve and sign attached memo, which will be hand carried to AFOSI/IVO.

Declassified by
D.D.O/NMC
22 Dec 92

CLASSIFIED BY: Ch, SOD
DATE FOR (/) DECLASSIFICATION
~~OR (X) REVIEW~~
IS: 22 Jun 2001
EXTENDED BY:
REASON: 5200.1R 2-301c5&6

ACTION OFFICER LtCol, USAF SOD/J-3	COORDINATION/APPROVAL				
	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME & DATE
	SOD	<i>Stans</i>	X55814		
EXT 72650					
DATE OF PREPARATION 22 Jun 1981	CLASSIFICATION <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>				



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO AFOSI/IVO

22 JUN 1981

Subject: Request for Support

1. (C) On 27 May OJCS/J3 received letter from SAC Command Historian requesting access to documents and information regarding SAC participation in the Iran rescue attempt of April 1980 (attachment 1).
2. (C) OJCS/J3-SOD coordination with SAC DO 8 (Tanker Ops) revealed the SAC Command Historian had several times sought to obtain data on SAC involvement in the rescue attempt and was told each time the information was restricted on a need-to-know basis.
3. (C) This office has forwarded a formal denial of access to SAC (attachment 2) but is concerned by the persistent efforts of the individual involved and the indications in the second paragraph of his requesting letter that he maintains at least an awareness of the ongoing disposition of the SAC tanker fleet.
4. (C) Request AF/OSI review this situation and insure there is no basis for security concerns.

CL Stearns

C. L. STEARNS
Colonel, USA
Chief, Special Operations
Division

2 Attachments
a/s

CLASSIFIED BY: Ch, SOD
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 Jun 2001
EXTENDED BY:
REASQN: 5200.1R 2-301c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: HO

19 May 1981

SUBJECT: Historical Coverage of Iran Rescue Attempt

TO: JCS/J-3

1. This office is in the final stages of the preparation of our CY 1980 command history. To date we have not been able to get any information on SAC participation in the Iran rescue attempt of April 1980.
2. When the event occurred it was evident to us from the current disposition of our aircraft that SAC air refueling elements were involved. In September 1980, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, congratulatory letters were issued to several SAC units that had participated in some way.
3. Request this office be given access to whatever documents and information are available on what SAC was tasked to do in the hostage rescue attempt. We would like to put such information in our annual history which is Top Secret/Restricted Data. If you would like, we could put it in a special access supplement.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John T. Bohn".

JOHN T. BOHN
Command Historian
Office of the Historian

MA 367-81
SAC-Appropriate Action
cy: J-30-31-33

Peace . . . is our Profession

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATCH # 1



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

J3B-2071 '81

16 JUN 1981

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMAND HISTORIAN, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Subject: Request for Historical Data (U)

(C) Appreciate your desire to include data on SAC participation (in the Iran rescue attempt) in the SAC Command History. However, due to the unique nature of many of the tactics, techniques, and equipment that were used and their continuing value to future operations, your request for access must be denied.

Philip C. Gast
PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations

Classified By: O JES/J3
Declassified On: 17 JUN 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - 11 47

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

#302

TO: J-3	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE			
THRU:		DJSM NO.		ODJS SUSPENSE DATE	
		DJSM DATE			
SUBJECT: SAC Historian Request (U)	ACTION				
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER	
	X	X			

REMARKS

(U)

1. (U) On 27 May, J-3 tasked SOD to draft a reply to SAC Historian Request for data on SAC tanker involvement in the Iran rescue attempt.
2. (U) The facing letter responds to SAC Historian Request and denies access to data due to the unique nature and continuing value of many of the tactics, techniques, and equipment that were developed.
3. (U) Recommend J-3 approve and sign the response.

*Policy Denial
Signed out by: 6/6/81
JG GEN GAO of SAⁿ fixed
in DIAW of SAⁿ fixed
summary of DIAW on 6/6/81
Jack Neel
SAⁿ signed 13/6/81*

*Classified by: DIAW
Declassify on: 5 June 82*

ACTION OFFICER LTCOL, USAF SOD/J-3 Ext 72602	COORDINATION/APPROVAL				
	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME & DATE
	SOD	<i>[Signature]</i>	55814		<i>Declassified by: DDO Office 22 June 82</i>
	MILSEC	<i>[Signature]</i>			
	J-33	<i>[Signature]</i>			
EXEC J-31	<i>[Signature]</i>				
DATE OF PREPARATION 5 June 81	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL				



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

J3-2071 81

THE JOINT STAFF

16 JUN 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMAND HISTORIAN, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Subject: Request for Historical Data (U)

(U)
~~(C)~~

Appreciate your desire to include data on SAC participation
(in the Iran rescue attempt) in the SAC Command History. However,
due to the unique nature of many of the tactics, techniques, and
equipment that were used and their continuing value to future
operations, your request for access must be denied.

Philip C. Gast
PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: OJS/J3
Declassified On: 17 JUN 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA, 68113



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: HO

19 May 1981

SUBJECT: Historical Coverage of Iran Rescue Attempt

TO: JCS/J-3

1. This office is in the final stages of the preparation of our CY 1980 command history. To date we have not been able to get any information on SAC participation in the Iran rescue attempt of April 1980.
2. When the event occurred it was evident to us from the current disposition of our aircraft that SAC air refueling elements were involved. In September 1980, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, congratulatory letters were issued to several SAC units that had participated in some way.
3. Request this office be given access to whatever documents and information are available on what SAC was tasked to do in the hostage rescue attempt. We would like to put such information in our annual history which is Top Secret/Restricted Data. If you would like, we could put it in a special access supplement.

JOHN T. BOHN
Command Historian
Office of the Historian

MA 367-81
501-Appropriate Action
cy: J-30-31-33

Peace is our Profession

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
OJCS SUMMARY SHEET #304

TO: J-3	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE			
THRU:		DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE		
SUBJECT: SAC Historian Request	DJSM DATE				
	ACTION				
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER	
	X	X			

REMARKS

(U) 1. On 27 May, J-3 tasked SOD to draft reply to SAC Historian request for data on SAC tanker involvement in the Iran Rescue Attempt.

2. (U) Facing letter forwards a sanitized and abbreviated summary of tanker involvement (extracted from the OPG/Air Staff After Action Report) to Air Staff for transfer to SAC.

3. (U) Recommend J-3 approve and sign the forwarding letter.

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3
 DATE FOR (X) DECLASSIFICATION
 OR (X) REVIEW
 IS: 8 June 2001
 EXTENDED BY: Director, J-3
 REASON: 5200.1R 2-301c 5&6

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 201200

CONDUCTED ON

DETERMINED CL BY

 DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON

DERIVED FROM

When Enclosure is Detached
 This document is downgraded
 to Confidential

Downgraded to CONF
 DDO N MCC
 22 Jul 9

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSIO
LtCol, USA SOD, J-3 geo EXT 72602	SOD	<i>Stans</i>	55814			
	J-33	<i>Watson</i>	52608			
	J-31					
DATE OF PREPARATION 8 June 1981	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL				



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS,
PLANS AND READINESS, USAF

Subject: SAC Historical Data Request (U)

1. (U) ~~(C)~~ On 27 May 1981, this office received a request from the SAC Command Historian for data on SAC involvement in the Iran Rescue Attempt of April 1980.
3. (U) Attached is a copy of the request and a summary of the SAC tanker involvement based upon the JCS/Air Staff After Action Report.
3. (U) Recommend the summary be provided to the SAC Historian through SAC/D08 after review and concurrence by your staff and SAC/D08.

Attachment
a/s

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (XX) REVIEW
IS: 8 June 2001
EXTENDED BY: Director, J-3
REASON: 5200.1R 2-301s 5&6
07C

When Enclosure Is Detached
This document is downgraded
to Confidential

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: SAC Support to Project RICEBOWL (S)(U)

(S)(U)
1. (S) CINCSAC, as a supporting commander, provided air refueling support to the Commander, Joint Task Force, through a designated tanker task force commander.

(U)
(a) (S) For training and deployment operations, the HQ SAC Tanker Single Manager's Office maintained firm control designating task force commanders when required and providing a member of the SAC staff on-scene for continuity of efforts.

(b) (S) For mission operations, the overall tanker task force commander was located at the forward deployment site. Subordinate to him and located at [REDACTED] was a deputy task force commander responsible for operations from that site.

(U)
2. (S) Administration: Administrative procedures included back channel SSO message traffic and secure telecon taskings. No administrative problems were encountered.

(U)
3. (S) Intelligence: Intelligence gathering activities for the air refueling portions of the mission were primarily centered at JCS (DIA) and HQ SAC; no unit involvement occurred. Of prime concern, from a tanker point of view, was refueling undetected. During the course of planning, intelligence data was integral to determining air refueling tracks and altitudes. These flight characteristics were further refined at the forward deployment site on the day preceding the mission to incorporate the most current information.

(U)
4. (S) Operations Security: Operations security was paramount throughout the planning, training and execution phases of the mission including logistic buildup at the forward deployment site. The primary contributors to operations security were the limited number of people knowledgeable (trusted agents), and the direct involvement of the HQ SAC tanker staff for each mission, and the unobtrusive manner in which each mission was handled.

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3

DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION

OR (X) REVIEW

IS: 8 June 2001

EXTENDED BY: Director, J-3

REASON: 5200.1R 2-301c 5&6

07-

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(1) (S) The trusted agent system was utilized throughout. Even as trusted agents, individuals were only knowledgeable on that portion of the mission which included air refueling.

E (2) (S) In the deployment phase, aircrews were not briefed until just prior to the mission and all paperwork was confiscated upon landing. For employment, crews were not briefed on the mission until arrival at the forward deployment site and [REDACTED]

(U) 5. (S) Training: Air refueling training for this mission included standard boom refueling for C-130 series aircraft and probe and drogue refueling for Navy fighter aircraft. Approximately 500 tanker missions (3000 hours) were flown in the November 1979 to April 1980 time frame by approximately 100 different tanker crews from 15 different locations around the world.

E (U) 6. (S) Actual Activity: Nine KC-135s were launched on 24 April for direct mission support. Seven tankers from [REDACTED] and two from the forward deployed site. The [REDACTED] KC-135s remained in their orbits to provide extended on-station time and fuel availability. However, they were not used. The two forward deployed tankers, one standard and one ART, were launched from strip alert status to provide refueling support for possible Navy RESCAP activity. The standard tanker refueled the ART and recovered. The ART tanker proceeded to the area of CTF-70, and remained until fuel reserves required him to recover at [REDACTED]. This tanker also was not used.

(U) 7. (C) From a pure "accomplishment point of view", the confidence factor for SAC tanker support reached a high level by the first week of December 1979 and remained there throughout the crisis.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(A-202)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SAC KC-135 HISTORICAL SUMMARY

PART I Chronology

1. (TS) Preliminary planning for AC/MC-130 options requiring air refueling support began on 8 November 1979. Initially a variety of deployment routes and beddown locations were looked at from a tanker support point of view. The prime limiting factor from the onset and throughout a multitude of planning iterations was the limited KC-135 offload capability at distance ranges. For this reason, the air refuelable tankers (ART's) were planned for deployment/employment support. Within the first week of planning, the AC-130's supported by twelve KC-135's, deployed non-stop to [REDACTED]. Further deployment to [REDACTED] and employment scenarios were planned and five ART's deployed to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to provide support, if executed. The total tanker support package for 2 AC-130's employing from [REDACTED] was 10 KC-135's. Base parking and fuel pumping capability approached its maximum. Several MC-130 options were also in the planning stages which called for additional tanker support from [REDACTED]. The missions were preliminarily planned from [REDACTED], however, tanker base loading prohibited employment of sufficient mission aircraft. Maximum base loading for KC-135's was established at fifteen and it required 10 KC-135's to support either 2 AC-130's or 2 MC-130's. Planning continued and MC/AC-130 operations shifted to [REDACTED] basing for employment, first [REDACTED]. Deployment/employment planning for these aircraft was accomplished before November's end with the [REDACTED] tanker support package reaching 16 KC-135's. Aside from AC/MC-130 support options in November, 31 KC-135's provided air refueling support to the four C-5's carrying the helo's to [REDACTED].

2. (TS) During the remaining months, many iterations to the employment plan were made. The size of the tanker package was of definite concern in maintaining a low visibility and in arriving at a supportable plan at [REDACTED]. All avenues were explored in attempting to reduce the size, to include alternate tanker basing, which was discarded. The basic plan for [REDACTED] operations from December through the first of April called for 9 KC-135's on night one and fourteen on night two. Air refueling training activities during this period utilized this employment scenario.

Classified by DOD NMCC
22 Jul 92

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. (TS) The final plan eliminated air refueling requirements altogether on night one from [REDACTED] but added a requirement for 4 KC-135's from [REDACTED] to possibly refuel the EC/MC-130 aircraft if they were low on fuel during egress. The night two tanker package at [REDACTED] was reduced to 11 KC-135's and was based upon employing 2 MC-310's and 3 AC-130's. As mission aircraft moved in place, MC-130 mission aircraft were increased to 3 and then 4 aircraft for night two. One additional MC-130 could be accepted in the tanker plan without additional KC-135's. However, the second add-on required that one of the two spare tankers be utilized as a primary mission aircraft. Also during this time frame, a Navy TF-70 TACAIR air refueling requirement entered the planning stages which called for KC-135 support on both nights. A vigorous air refueling training program commenced on 18 April and was supported by [REDACTED] tankers. The mission refueling requirements increased the [REDACTED] tanker support package from 4 to 7 KC-135's, two of which were ART's.

Part II KC-135 Deployment/Employment/Redeployment Operations

A. Deployment Operations.

1. (TS) KC-135 deployment operations consisted of base buildup at [REDACTED] deployment refueling support of mission aircraft, and establishment of Tanker Task Forces at [REDACTED]

(a) (TS) To increase the aircraft footprint at [REDACTED] a total of seven KC-135's were deployed from [REDACTED] between 14 and 16 April. Two aircraft redeployed to [REDACTED] on 17 April. Four aircraft were replaced by mission task force KC-135's, while one aircraft remained at [REDACTED] to be part of the task force.

(b) (TS) Deployment refueling support for EC/MC/AC-130 aircraft was provided by twenty-three KC-135 sorties from Pease AFB. Refueling support activity is summarized as follows:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET

<u>DATE</u>	<u># / TYPE ACFT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TANKER BASE</u>	<u># TANKERS</u>
15 Apr	3/MC-130s	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	3 3
19 Apr	1/MC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	1
19 Apr	1/MC-130 3/EC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	2
20 Apr	1/MC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	1
21 Apr	1/MC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	1
21 Apr	2/AC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	2 2 2
22 Apr	2/AC-130	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	Pease	2 2 2

(c) (S) To protect operations security, HQ SAC trusted agents were at Pease and [REDACTED] to coordinate requirements for the Atlantic area. Tanker crews and unit planners were given only the minimum required air refueling information, and were not aware of the receivers launch base, destination, or specific - 130 type.

(d) (S) Due to the uniqueness of the AC/MC-130 employment air refueling rendezvous planned from [REDACTED] only crews which had practiced with the AC/MC-130s at [REDACTED] or during dress rehearsals were selected for the [REDACTED] Tanker Task Force. Aircraft and crews began staging from Plattsburgh (five standard tankers/six crews) and Grissom (five ARTs) on 18 April to [REDACTED] and were all in place at [REDACTED] by 22 April.

(e) (S) Four standard KC-135 and crews were in place at [REDACTED] when deployment was directed. These were augmented by an additional standard tanker and crew and two KC-135 ARTs and four ART qualified crews. All aircraft and crews were in place by 23 April.

(f) (S) It is noteworthy that the seven air refuelable tankers at [REDACTED] represented SACs entire ART capability - of nine total aircraft, two were in PDM, the other seven deployed.

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

B. Employment Operations

E 1. (TS) On 23 Apr, there were eighteen total tankers in place at [REDACTED] to support this mission. At [REDACTED] there were five ARTs (Air Refuelable Tankers) and six standard tankers (non-air refuelable); [REDACTED] had two ARTs and five standard KC-135s.

Planning:

E (a) (TS) For the first night, the final plan required seven tankers to launch from [REDACTED] for possible air refueling of EC-MC-130 aircraft and CTF-70 TACAIR. Actual refueling was only to be accomplished if MC-EC-130s were low on fuel during egress, or if Navy TACAIR had launched. Because of the transit time from [REDACTED] to the air refueling areas, the night one tankers were required to launch before firm refueling requirements could be established. [REDACTED] was to have drogue-configured KC-135s on strip alert for contingency support of Navy TACAIR.

E (b) (TS) The second nights planned activity included ten tankers launching from [REDACTED] for refueling support of AC/MC-130 ingress/egress operations. Three tankers were planned from [REDACTED] to support Navy TACAIR refueling. Sustained support for the Navy, if required, was to be provided by [REDACTED] tankers as they recovered from AC/MC-130 support and were regenerated to launch status.

Actual Activity.

E (TS) There were nine KC-135s launched on 24 April for direct mission support. The seven planned tankers launched from [REDACTED] as well as two strip alert KC-135s from [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] KC-135s, two of which were ARTs, remained in their orbits for extended on-station time and fuel availability. However, they were not used. The two [REDACTED] tankers, one standard and one ART, were launched from strip alert status to provide refueling support for possible Navy RECAP activity. The standard tanker refueled the ART and recovered at [REDACTED]. The ART tanker proceeded to the area of CTF-70, and remained until fuel reserves required him to recover at [REDACTED]. This tanker also was not used.

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Redeployment Operations:

(*U*) After mission termination, [REDACTED] KC-135s redeployed from 27-29 April, staging through [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] augmentees redeployed on 28 Apr, supporting the [REDACTED] MC-130s enroute. Four KC-135s remained at [REDACTED] for a continued presence. The following KC-135 support was provided for AC/MC/EC-130 redeployment.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>#/TYPE RCVR</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TANKER BASE</u>	<u>#TNKRS</u>
26 Apr	2/AC-130	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2
27 Apr	2/AC-130	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2
27 Apr	2/AC-130	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	Seymour Johnson Pease	2
28 Apr	2/MC-130	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	Griffiss	3
28 Apr	3/MC-130	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	4
28 Apr	2/AC-130	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	Seymour Johnson Pease	2
					1

PART III Assessment of Tanker Capability to Support Assigned Mission:

(*U*) From a pure "accomplishment" point of view, the confidence factor for SAC tanker support for all options began at and remained at a very high level (100%). The confidence factor to accomplish assigned tasks in a covert environment, maintaining radio silence, etc., reached a high level in early December for the AC-130's after many face-to-face briefings and training sorties utilizing the special radio out rendezvous and refueling procedures. The covert accomplishment confidence factor for the MC/EC-130s reached a high level in the mid-January time frame, after these procedures were briefed to the participating aircrews. Navy refueling procedures were standard and in accordance with existing regulations.

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PART IV Lessons Learned

(u) 1. (S) All employment options were very tanker dependent, and in many cases, due to range or loiter time required, the standard KC-135 was either not adequate or required in large numbers. The need exists to improve air refueling capability at long ranges.

(a) (S) Could only employ 2 AC-130s or 2 MC-130s from [REDACTED] because of tanker (and ramp space) limitations.

(b) (S) Could not have employed any AC-130 from [REDACTED] without the use of the air refuelable tanker (ART).

(c) (S) Could not have supported the time on station and offload requirements for TF-70 TACAIR aircraft on night one without the ART from [REDACTED].

(d) (S) Could not have launched a standard tanker from [REDACTED] on night one to provide extended loiter over TF-70 for possible RESCAP operations (ART was required).

(e) (S) Could not have supported the TF-70 TACAIR night two mission into the Persian Gulf without the ART from [REDACTED].

(f) (S) Poor tanker takeoff performance capability at [REDACTED] (short runway/high temperature) generated a large tanker support package.

NOTE: (S) of SAC's nine air refuelable tankers, seven were deployed [REDACTED]-5, [REDACTED] and the remaining two were in Programmed Depot Maintenance.

(u) 2. (S) Limited basing and inability to overfly Saudi Arabia made employment options for Iran very difficult (simply too far).

(u) 3. (S) The secure communications capability of the tanker forces need to be improved.

(u) (a) (S) SAC borrowed KY28 UHF secure units for installation on supporting tankers.

(u) (b) (S) Secure HF capability also required for this mission, but done without. Second night operations called for target

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data to be passed in-the-clear on HF to the tanker for relay to escorting Navy TACAIR on secure UHF.

(c) (S) AFSATCOM capability, even as a temporary installation, would also provide the KC-135 with a needed C3 capability in contingency/unconventional operations.

PART V Organization for Combat

(u) 1. (S) CINCSAC, as a supporting commander, provided air refueling support to the Commander, Joint Task Force, through a designated tanker task force commander.

E (c) (S) For mission operations, the overall tanker task force commander was located at [REDACTED] Subordinate to him and located at [REDACTED] was a deputy task force commander responsible for that portion of the refueling mission.

(u) (b) (S) For training and deployment operations, the HQ SAC Single Tanker Manager's Office maintained firm control designating task force commanders when required and always providing a member of the SAC staff on-scene for continuity of efforts.

(u) A. (S) Administration: Unusual administrative procedures included all back channel SSO message traffic and secure telecon taskings. No administrative problems were encountered; however, portions of the overall effort, to include base buildup actions and early deployments, may be difficult to racapitulate due to the covert manner in which they were accomplished.

E (c) (S) B. Intelligence: Intelligence gathering activities for the air refueling portions of this mission were primarily centered at JCS and HQSAC; no unit involvement occurred. Of prime concern, from a tanker point of view, was refueling undetected. During the course of planning, intelligence data was integral in determining air refueling tracks and altitudes. These were further refined at [REDACTED] on the day preceding the mission to incorporate the most current information.

E (c) (S) C. Operations Security: The Strategic Air Command held operations security paramount throughout the planning, training and execution phases of this mission and all related efforts of force presence in the area to include base buildup at [REDACTED] The primary contributors to operations security

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were the limited number of people knowledgeable (trusted agents), the direct involvement of the HQ SAC tanker staff for each mission, providing the interface with the tanker task force staff and aircrews, and the manner in which each mission was handled.

(1) ~~(S)~~ The trusted agent system was utilized to the utmost. Even as trusted agents, individuals were only knowledgeable on the portion of the mission which included air refueling. In the deployment phase, aircrews were not briefed until just prior to the mission and all paperwork was confiscated upon landing. For employment, crews were not briefed on the mission until arrival at [REDACTED]. Briefings for all tanker involvement were accomplished by a HQ SAC tanker staff individual having trusted agent status.

(U) (2) ~~(S)~~ Considering that approximately 500 tanker missions (3000 hours) were flown in the November 1979 to April 1980 time frame by perhaps 100 different tanker crews from 15 different locations around the world and that no leaks occurred, the KC-135 staffs, aircrews and ground crews did an outstanding job in preserving the operational security of this effort.

(U) D. ~~(S)~~ Training: Air refueling training for this mission included standard boom refueling for C-130 series aircraft and probe and drogue refueling for Navy fighter aircraft. Both refueling training programs accomplished all objectives and were very successful.

(U) (1) ~~(S)~~ USAF C-130 series aircraft: Due to the unique air refueling requirements of the C-130 series aircraft (low altitude and airspeed) and additional requirements brought about when refueling in a covert environment (night-low light and communications out) special unconventional tactics had to be developed and practiced.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Initial development, refinement and practice occurred in the November-December 1979 time frame when the AC-130's and KC-135 ART's (Air Refuelable Tankers) were deployed to [REDACTED]. During this period, approximately 80 air refueling practice missions and 400 tanker flying hours were flown. Unconventional tactics included air refueling with the flaps down, tobogganing (descending) during the refueling, and special rendezvous procedures. The flaps down/low airspeed air refueling tactics proved to be extremely

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effective; 1st SOW HQ SAC are taking action to formalize and incorporate them into the C-130/KC-135 refueling manuals.

(3) (S) Lessons learned from this training were brought to an air refueling tactics seminar at the Pentagon on 10 January 1980. Participants included representation from the SAC tanker staff, AC/MC-130 planning staff and the JCS planning staff. The purpose of this meeting was to standardize AC/MC-130 air refueling tactics, adapt lessons learned in the Pacific to the proposed MC-130 operations in the Middle East, and to develop an MC-130 training program.

(4) (S) Subsequent to the seminar (15 January), a day/night air refueling training mission was flown with the MC-130 air refueling qualified aircrews at Hurlburt AFB to employ these tactics in a pure training environment. Aircrew and staff face-to-face briefings and debriefings were accomplished. The finalized procedures were those employed on the dressed rehearsals and those to be employed on the attempt. Tanker aircraft from Plattsburgh AFB deployed to Eglin AFB to support the mission.

(5) (S) Three dress rehearsals which included air refueling were accomplished in the late January, February and March time frames. All air refueling missions were accomplished successfully except for the first night of the January exercise. That mission was unsuccessful due to a tanker abort after takeoff and a replacement ground spare tanker not being available. Normally, SAC would have deployed an extra KC-135 to provide backup support; however, air refueling information (offload and timing) did not indicate additional tanker assets were required until late on the day preceding the mission. Additional increases in fuel offload requirements at the pre-takeoff briefing ruled out the possibility of one tanker satisfying all requirements. Throughout the CONUS training effort, approximately 220 tanker flying hours were expended.

(6) (S) Tanker aircraft participating in all practice missions were from Grissom AFB, Indiana and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Grissom was selected early-on to provide the long range - high offload capability with their air refuelable tankers and Plattsburgh was selected because of the talk-through-the-boom capability of their modified aircraft. Training continuity throughout was insured by the SAC tanker staff, as was the continual availability of qualified aircrews

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to support the mission on any given date. Through the close involvement of the SAC Staff, OPSEC was maintained during the entire operation.

E (7) (B) Navy Fighter Aircraft: A vigorous inflight air refueling training program for Navy pilots attached to the NIMITZ and CORAL SEA commenced on 18 April, with USAF KC-135 aircraft from [REDACTED] and continued on a daily basis until 23 April. During this period, the majority of F-14 A-6, and A-7 pilots received day and/or night refueling training. In all, more than 150 fighters joined on the tankers, making more than 700 contacts (plugs). A total of eight tanker sorties were flown from [REDACTED] logging 9½ hours of flying time.

E (8) Logistics: As a rule, tankers deploy with support personnel, aircrews, bulk equipment, and WRSK aboard to the maximum extent possible. However, some equipment is not transportable on the KC-135 and requires airlift support.

Equipment of this nature required for mission support at [REDACTED] included: three water trucks for demineralized water transportation; one water plant for demineralized water production; and a tug for ground towing operations. A limited amount of the demineralized water capability was moved to [REDACTED] in December 1979 when the KC-135's first began operations from that location. The remainder of the equipment had been identified for shipment but not moved until March.

E (1) (B) Fuel storage, transport and pumping capability at [REDACTED] was insufficient to support the fuel requirements of the mission at the onset of planning. Total fuel requirements varied from 492,000 gallons to 240,000 gallons as the mission changed from a two day operation to a one day operation from that location. To fully meet the most demanding scenario, additional storage, transport and pumping capability was inserted (2 R-14 portable refueling hydrant systems, 4 R-9 refueling trucks, and 4 tractor trailer bulk transfer trucks). This equipment was pre-positioned throughout the course of [REDACTED] buildup, always working towards satisfying mission requirements.

E (2) (B) To support KC-135 operations at [REDACTED] 100 maintenance support personnel were deployed TDY from [REDACTED] Plattsburgh and Grissom. This included one maintenance officer, 33 crew chiefs (3 per aircraft) and 2 POL specialists for base support.

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(U)

(3) (S) There were some difficulties early in the buildup identifying and sourcing mobility gear requirements for deploying personnel. These were resolved, however, and by the time of the operation, all SAC personnel had cots, sleeping bags, mosquito nets, etc.

(U)

(4) (S) Other Equipment: The KC-135 aircraft selected for mission support were, in themselves, non-standard. The Grissom tankers which deployed (all 7) were the air refuelable tankers and the Plattsburgh tankers had been previously modified with the talk-through-the-boom communications system. Aside from aircraft differences, the following equipment was utilized:

(U)

(a) (S) Night vision devices: Obtained for each tanker crew and utilized during training. Verbal reports indicate that they worked exceptionally well, facilitating aircraft rendezvous in a night-low light environment and thus contributing to covert operation accomplishment.

(U)

(b) (S) KY28 UHF Secure Communications: Obtained for each tanker. The borrowed units were utilized during the training exercises and the mission and provided secure communications capability for the KC-135.

E
~~(c)~~ (S) Palletized VHF communications system: utilized on each of the eleven tankers located at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] VHF radio capability was made available by SAC for Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC) considerations enroute to and within [REDACTED] air space. Several of the ARTC Centers operate on VHF only and the KC-135 is not currently VHF equipped.

(U)

(d) (S) Palletized Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS): utilized on KC-135 aircraft which have not yet been modified with permanent installation. Accurate navigational information was required for the type of air refueling rendezvous planned.

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OP SEC 10 Apr 92

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307

SG 0863

DIGRISB10Z APR 92

FM: JTF/J2

TO: SEDD/SAC

RE: [REDACTED]
HELICOPTER.

A

SUBJ: OPSEC

1. RECENT OPSEC VIOLATIONS OCCURRED IN ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL ELEMENTS. INDIVIDUALS DETERRED ALL ASPECTS OF HIS ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF RECENT OPERATIONS. THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT, A TOTAL OF 5 UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS HAD MEMBERSHIP OF THAT DIVISION OF OPSEC.
2. COMINT CONSIDERS OPSEC TO BE CRITICAL TO TERMINAL MISSION SUCCESS. ALL ELEMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS OPSEC IN ALL ASPECTS OF MISSION PLANNING AND EXECUTION.
3. ALL COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE TO TAKE IMMEDIATE AND PERSISTENT ACTION TO MAINTAIN FORCE READINESS AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY WITHOUT CREATING UNDUE SPECULATION.
4. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS TASK IS BLOODY WORK AND MAYBE DIFFICULT IN THE FACT OF THE APPROXIMATE IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND CHANGING PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND MILITARY OPINION.
5. AS EVER AS THE MISSION DEMANDS AND CALLS FOR A POSITIVE EMPHASIS ON OPSEC AND COMINT ANALYSIS OF ANY POTENTIAL OPSEC VIOLATION IS ABSOLUTELY MANDATORY.

BT

Classified By: ~~ADR~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: 22 Jul 92

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Upgraded to CONF
DDO NMCC

22 Jul 92

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SF 308

45
J2 R2

MEMORANDUM FOR MG VAUGHT

SUBJECT: OPSEC VIOLATION

1. Following information received from MAJ JAMES H. SCHAEFER, USMC, of the Helo Det.

2. Petty Officer [REDACTED] (probable spelling) was a member of the Helo Det since its inception. Due to his habit of talking about his classified activities, he was released from the Det [REDACTED] during the first week of Dec 1979. He was reassigned to one of the aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. He is currently stationed on the USS NIMITZ.

3. While on emergency leave in Jan/Feb, he probably told his wife [REDACTED] about his activities in the Helo Det and the mission of that element. [REDACTED] wife is also known for being somewhat of a gossip.

4. [REDACTED] wife then told Petty Officer [REDACTED] wife about [REDACTED] activities. [REDACTED] had been a member of HM-16, but he is now a civilian.

5. [REDACTED] wife then contacted Petty Officer [REDACTED] wife. [REDACTED] is a member of the Helo Det who is now undergoing medical treatment and is not an active participant in the Det's activities. [REDACTED] wife told [REDACTED] wife about [REDACTED] activities with the Helo Det. Prior to this time, [REDACTED] wife had known nothing about her husband's activities with the Helo Det.

6. [REDACTED] wife then told her husband everything she had been told by [REDACTED] wife.

7. [REDACTED] contacted his former [REDACTED] HEL SEA CONTROL WING #1). [REDACTED] then wrote to the Ops Officer of HM-16 and informed him that there was apparently a security leak in HM-16 activities.

8. The commander of HM-16 called in [REDACTED] and read him his rights under Article 31, UCMJ. [REDACTED] denied any wrongdoing at that time.

9. [REDACTED] Knowledgeability:

--Helo Det msn (i.e. hostage rescue in Tehran)

--Type helos to be used

--Fact that helos will launch from carriers

--Fact that a desert airdrop of fuel will be used for the helos

--Existence of SFOD-D

--Had been to [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235

CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE CLS BY DDO NMCC

 DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON 0 APR 92

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JC S
Declassified On: 0 APR 92

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10. RECOMMENDATION: That no further investigation of the personnel allegedly involved in this violation be conducted at this time. To do so now, particularly in relation to [REDACTED] who is now a civilian, would increase the visibility of the rescue option. Further investigation could be conducted once the hostage situation is resolved. That [REDACTED] be restricted to his ship or to another isolated location.

G
That attached message to
RivBowl Command, be approved. For
release

PL

~~SECRET~~

5. (S) IT CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED THAT RELEASE OF THE FORMER HOSTAGES DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ANY PERSON INVOLVED IN SNOWBIRD TO DISCUSS HIS/HER RECENT OR DISTANT PAST INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RESCUE MISSION OR PLANNED FOLLOW UP MISSION, HAD IT BEEN REQUIRED. PROTECTION OF THE SOPHISTICATED CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCH SPECIAL OPERATIONS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE SO AS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE FUTURE EFFORTS, IF AND WHEN REQUIRED.

6. (S) THE ABOVE PROHIBITION INCLUDES ANY DISCUSSION OR SPECULATIONS ON CONCEPTS, PLANS, FORCE CAPABILITIES, UNIT IDENTIFICATION, UNIT ASSOCIATIONS, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, COMMAND STRUCTURE, PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL, UNIQUE TECHNIQUES, CAPABILITIES AND PROCEDURES. ALL MEDIA INQUIRIES OR MEDIA APPROACHES WILL BE REFERRED/REPORTED TO THE [REDACTED] PAO,

7. (U) FOR [REDACTED] DIA: IT IS ASSUMED THAT YOUR ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ESTABLISHED INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR PERSONNEL DEBRIEFS AFTER SPECIAL PROJECTS ARE COMPLETED. FOR OUR CLARIFICATION IN THIS CONTEXT, WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON YOUR PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SUCH ACTIONS.

RECOMMENDED ADDRESSEES:

TO: 1 SOW
[REDACTED]
101ST
[REDACTED]
AWACS
JCSE
MAC
CCT (COURIER)
SAC (COURIER)
[REDACTED] (COURIER)
INFO [REDACTED] DDC
[REDACTED]
DIA 77JSJ77

REVW 21 JAN 87
BT

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00 RUEAIIIF RUEIZTT
DE RUEIZJC #0102 1172235
ZNY [REDACTED]
O 262230Z APR 80
FM JTF/RICE BOWL
TO RUEIZTT/DELTA ADVANCE
SITE ALPHA
1ST SOW/A2-262316Z
HEL10/DET
[REDACTED] S2 RANGERS
INFO RUEAIIIF
BT

CITE J3 000102 SF

#309

SUBJECT/ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

1. THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION TO FREE THE HOSTAGES OPSEC HAS BEEN A MAJOR PROFESSIONAL, MISSION ESSENTIAL CONCERN. IT NOW BECOMES A MONUMENTAL PERSONAL PROBLEM FOR EVERY MEMBER OF THE JTF RICESBOWL. WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT FIFTY-THREE AMERICANS REMAIN HOSTAGE IN IRAN. THE LIVES OF THOSE AMERICANS AND THE HOPE OF ANY FUTURE ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE COULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY INADVERTANT

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0102 ~~TOP SECRET~~
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO RICE BOWL.

2. EACH AND EVERYONE OF US WHO PARTICIPATED IN RICESBOWL WILL BE FACED WITH QUESTIONS FROM RELATIVES AND FRIENDS. WE WILL INvariably BE INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE MERITS OF THE OPERATION. IT MAY BE THE GREATEST CHALLENGE OF PROFESSIONALISM AND PERSONAL CHARACTER ANY OF US HAS FACED. WE MUST MEET THAT CHALLENGE.

3. EACH COMMANDER IS REQUESTED TO HAVE HIS SECURITY OFFICER CONDUCT A SECURITY BRIEFING AND INITIATE A SECURITY DEBRIEF STATEMENT TO BE SIGNED INDIVIDUALLY BY ALL KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL IN HIS UNIT. THESE MEASURES, HOPEFULLY, WILL SERVE AS A REMINDER TO ALL.

4. PLEASE EXTEND THANKS FOR YOUR CONTINUING HELP.

REV 26 APR 10
BT
#0102

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235
CONDUCTED ON 22 July 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMC
 DCL DEXCLGAR TO _____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources
[REDACTED]

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

~~SECRET~~

191250Z JAN 81

JDC/J2

TEL STATIONS

~~C-8~~

A

FEB 14

URGENT SECURITY ADVISORY (U)

(S)(U) DUE TO THE POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS
MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE INITIATED:

(S)(U) ALL MISSION UNIQUE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS (NOT DMA-
PRODUCED PHOTO GRIDS) ARE TO BE INVENTORIED AND HELD FOR DE-
STRUCTION UPON ORDER.

(S)(U) THE COMPLETE INVENTORY (SUBJECT, NUMBER, SIZE) IS TO
BE PROVIDED JDC/J2/JDC AS SOON AS COMPLETED.

(S)(U) THIS OFFICE WILL NOTIFY UNITS WHEN AUTHORIZATION FOR
DESTRUCTION IS RECEIVED.

SUN 19 JAN 81

RINN

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

Classified by
DDO, NMCC 22 Feb 92
Declassify on: OADR

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MSG 154

DTG 212145Z JAN 81

FM [REDACTED] DDC//MAJ [REDACTED]

TO [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED]

AC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1236
CONDUCTED ON [REDACTED] 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY [REDACTED]

DECL DOWNGRADED TO [REDACTED]

REVIEW ON [REDACTED] D A R

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] multiple copies

X 315

SUBJ: FOLLOWING IS RCMD SECY GUIDANCE MSG. REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS REVIEW & DISSEM FM UR LOCATION.

1. (S) NOW THAT THE RELEASE OF THE FORMER HOSTAGES IS FACT, THE FOLLOWING CONSOLIDATED SECURITY GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR ALL SUBORDINATE FORCES, SUPPORTING ELEMENTS, AND OTHER ASSOCIATED COMMAND/AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE SNOWBIRD PROJECT.

2. (S) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE SPECIFIED IN THE JIF I-79 CLASSIFICATION GUIDE "AFTER RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES" COLUMN IS VALID AND IN EFFECT SINCE THE HOSTAGE RELEASE WAS THROUGH NEGOTIATED MEANS. THIS DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW AT [REDACTED] BY ELE-

MENTS NOT IN RECEIPT. ALL SUCH INFORMATION IS STILL CONSIDERED SENSITIVE AND NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE WHO HAS NOT HAD THE REQUIRED SPECIAL ACCESS, UNTIL A REVIEW CAN BE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE WHAT MATERIAL SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM SPECIAL ACCESS TO FACILITATE TRAINING AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES.

3. (S) SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE ARE TO DEBRIEF, AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, ALL PERSONNEL WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS BRIEFED FOR EC-79 ACCESS. MESSAGE NOTIFICATION TO [REDACTED] //J2// WILL BE PROVIDED UPON COMPLETION OF THE DEBRIEFING. RQM AND ALL BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING PAPERWORK WILL BE MAILED VIA ARFCOS TO [REDACTED] REQUEST [REDACTED] RANGER'S DEBRIEF [REDACTED] PERSONNEL. REQUEST [REDACTED] ASSIST MAC AND SAC IN THIS EFFORT.

4. (S) ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE DIRECTED TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE INVENTORY OF ALL EC-79 MATERIAL HELD TO INCLUDE MAPS, CHARTS, PLANS, PAPERS, REPORTS. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS ALL SNOWBIRD MISSION UNIQUE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS WHICH MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR ACCURATELY. A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF HOLDINGS (TO INCLUDE SUBJECT, DESCRIPTION, SIZE, IDENT NUMBER, NUMBER OF COPIES OF EACH) IS TO BE SENT BY MSG TO [REDACTED] //J2// NLT 30 JAN 81. THIS HQ WILL THEN FOLLOW WITH DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

MSG NO 0154
DTG 231345Z JAN 81

FM [REDACTED]
TO (1ST SOW)

DETA
101ST

AWACS
JCSE
MAC
ZEN/CCT (COURIER)
ZEN/SAC (COURIER)
ZEN [REDACTED] (COURIER)
WDC

SECRET
[REDACTED] WDC PASS TO DIA JSJ

G C-1
H 316

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12815

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON 0 APR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] multiple strands

SUBJ: SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING CONSOLIDATED SECURITY GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR ALL SUBORDINATE FORCES, SUPPORTING ELEMENTS, AND OTHER ASSOCIATED COMMAND/AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE SNOWBIRD PROJECT.

2. (S) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE SPECIFIED IN THE JTF I-79 CLASSIFICATION GUIDE "AFTER RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES" COLUMN IS VALID AND IN EFFECT SINCE THE HOSTAGE RELEASE WAS THROUGH NEGOTIATED MEANS. THIS DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW FM [REDACTED] BY ELEMENTS NOT IN RECEIPT. ALL SUCH INFORMATION IS STILL CONSIDERED SENSITIVE AND NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE WHO HAS NOT HAD THE REQUIRED SPECIAL ACCESS, UNTIL A REVIEW CAN BE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE WHAT MATERIAL SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM SPECIAL ACCESS TO FACILITATE TRAINING AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES.

3. (S) SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE DEBRIEF, AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, ALL PERSONNEL WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS BRIEFED FOR EC-79 ACCESS. MESSAGE NOTIFICATION TO [REDACTED] WILL BE PROVIDED UPON COMPLETION OF THE DEBRIEFING RQMT, AND ALL BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING PAPERWORK WILL BE MAILED VIA ARFOCS TO [REDACTED] REQUEST [REDACTED] RANGERS DEBRIEF PERSONNEL. REQUEST 1 SOW ASSIST MAC AND SAC IN THIS EFFORT.

4. (S) ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE INVENTORY OF ALL EC-79 MATERIAL HELD TO INCLUDE MAPS, CHARTS, PLANS, PAPERS, REPORTS. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS ALL SNOWBIRD MISSION UNIQUE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS WHICH MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR ACCURATELY. A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF HOLDINGS (TO INCLUDE SUBJECT, DESCRIPTION, SIZE, IDEN NUMBER, NUMBER OF COPIES OF EACH) IS TO BE SENT BY MSG TO [REDACTED] MLT 30 JAN 81. THIS HQ WILL THEN FOLLOW WITH DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

5. (S) IT CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED THAT RELEASE OF THE FORMER HOSTAGES DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ANY PERSON INVOLVED IN SNOWBIRD TO DISCUSS HIS/HER RECENT OR DISTANT PAST INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RESCUE MISSION OR PLANNED FOLLOW UP MISSION, HAD IT BEEN REQUIRED. PROTECTION OF THE SOPHISTICATED CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCH SPECIAL OPERATIONS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE SO AS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE FUTURE EFFORTS.

6. (S) THE ABOVE PROHIBITION INCLUDES ANY DISCUSSION OR SPECULATIONS ON CONCEPTS, PLANS, FORCE CAPABILITIES, UNIT IDENTIFICATION, UNIT ASSOCIATIONS, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, COMMAND STRUCTURE, PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL, UNIQUE TECHNIQUES, CAPABILITIES AND PROCEDURES. ALL MEDIA INQUIRIES OR MEDIA APPROACHES WILL BE REFERRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES AND WILL BE REPORTED TO COM [REDACTED] POC IS

BT

REVIEW FOR SECURITY: REQUEST YOUR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN
ESTRICTED AREA DEBRIEFED IAW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE THE
PERSONNEL BE [REDACTED] AND 6, ABOVE. REQUEST NAMES OF DEBRIEFED
REVIEW 23 JAN 87 BY [REDACTED] MLT 1 FEB 81.

~~SECRET~~

REF ID: A651922
P 001922 JAN 81
FM [REDACTED] 1121

A

X311 See outgoing
from [REDACTED] same
subject. Attached

AVAILABILITY
MAILING ADDRESS
EMBASSY WDC//J2//

SUBJECT: CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)
REF ID: CEREF JTF 1-79 CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (TS)

2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING CHANGES BE MADE TO THE CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, AND THAT ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS BE SO NOTIFIED:

(1) SECTION I - GENERAL: REVEALING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. ADD: (MAY BE DECLASSIFIED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS).

(2) RATIONALE: THIS WILL PERMIT BETTER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AWARDS/EFFICIENCY REPORTS FOR THOSE WHOSE NAMES CAN BE REVEALED, WHILE STILL PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR THOSE WHOSE LIVES COULD BE ENDANGERED OR WHOSE UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN REVEALED AS PARTICIPATING IN RICEBOWL.

(3) SECTION III - JTF OPERATIONS: INFORMATION REVEALING DETAILS OF JTF 1-79 BUDGET OR EXPENSES.

CHANGE CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES FROM "SECRET" TO "TOP SECRET".

ADD: (CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THE BUDGET MAY BE DOWNGRADED/DECLASSIFIED, BASED ON THE ELEMENT OF EXPENSE, ORIGIN OF FUNDS AND THE USER).

(4) RATIONALE: SOME FUNDING WAS MADE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS FOR ROUTINE EXPENSES AND MAY BE UNCLASSIFIED. OTHER FUNDS, I.E. THOSE FROM [REDACTED], THOSE USED TO SUPPORT [REDACTED] OPERATIONS ETC, MUST REMAIN TOP SECRET. STILL OTHERS, MAY BE CLASSIFIED SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL. THE OVERALL JTF 1-79 BUDGET REMAINS TOP SECRET.

EW 39 JAN 81

T

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 201255

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DISSEMINATED BY DDO NMCC

DSC DRAFTED TO Secret

REVIEW ON DADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

NNN

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	OPC CONTROL NUMBER CONFIDENTIAL 6F 322
SUBJECT: Strategic Political	ACTION	
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE
		X

REMARKS

Attached at TAB A is a strategic [redacted] proposal designed to enhance the execution of a rescue option. The proposal provides a concept designed to [redacted] by indicating to them that their [redacted]

Downgraded to CONF
by DDO NMCC
22 Jul 92

Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR 22 Jul 92

ACTION OFFICER [redacted] LtCol, USAF SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE J-P	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
EXEC							
TM CHF							
VCOPB							
COPB							
DATE OF PREPARATION 6 Mar 80							

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~(S)~~ Subject: Strategic/Political [REDACTED] RICE BOWL OPS

~~(S)~~ PURPOSE: To put [REDACTED] during USG operational window.

~~(S)~~ CONCEPT: Statement(s), and supporting actions that would convey

A
to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ PROPOSAL: A series of statements by State Department spokesman or other government officials (non-attributable) tuned to coincide with the decision to execute the rescue option. The statements would be of two varieties - with the first surfacing as interviews/statements early on in indicating the hopelessness of the situation by reviewing the measures taken and options not available.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A

The second phase would be initiated to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The second phase would consist of a statement by State Department spokesman that the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A

[REDACTED] The statement would explain this action is prompted by the administration's overriding concern for the future safety of the hostages. This action is

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

under consideration due to the failure of the UN commission and Khomeini decision to leave the question of the release of the hostages to the Iranian Parliament which would could substantially delay the release of the hostages.

- ANTICIPATED GAIN: If employed and timed to [REDACTED]

A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE JOINT STAFF

TO: [REDACTED] - 6752 -
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/NMCC
 DECL & DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 1 ADR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] multiple sources H 333

29 May 1980

Com ✓
DJ ✓
CJ ✓
J2 122

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Intelligence Collection Coordination (TS)

1. (TS) On 29 May 1980, an intelligence coordination meeting was held [REDACTED] for the purpose of exploring and developing technical means of locating the hostages. Five subject areas were discussed. A brief statement of technical and operationally feasibility follows:

a. (TS) [REDACTED]

- Technically feasible
- Physically achievable

b. (TS) [REDACTED]

- Technically feasible
- Physically achievable

c. (TS) [REDACTED]

- Technically feasible
- Operational limitation that applies is [REDACTED] can be accomplished.

- Technically feasible

- Set to be initiated [REDACTED]

(v) e. (TS) Identify if possible the residence, telephone numbers of Ahmad Khomeini and Habibollah Peyman who appear to be key figures in controlling the hostages.

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

TOP SECRET

~~(S)~~ (U) 2. (TS) Following on meeting is set for next Thursday, 5 June at which time progress on each specific action will be reviewed. The meeting adjourned with all parties continuing to move out in their areas.

Det Col, USAF

G



~~SECRET~~


04 AUG 1980

H324

S-1563/RSS-1

TO: Distribution List

~~SUBJECT: Iranian Related Violence (S/NFOUR)~~

1. (u) ~~(S/NFOUR)~~ The following information is based primarily on conversations with FBI authorities involved in investigating Iranian dissident activities in the U.S.
2. (u) ~~(S/NFOUR)~~ Background: Recent events have called into question the possibility of an Iranian directed terrorist campaign being conducted in the U.S.


- On 22 July, a former Iranian press attache during the reign of the Shah, Ali Akbar Tabatabai, was assassinated at his home in Bethesda, Maryland. Tabatabai was the leader of the Iran Freedom Foundation, an anti-Khomeini organization.

- On 31 July, another prominent anti-Khomeini Iranian in Los Angeles may have been the intended victim of a shooting incident as described below.

3. (u) (S/NFOUR) Current Situation:

- a. (u) ~~(S/NFOUR)~~ The FBI is investigating the 31 July 80 shooting of Kahaili Kaveh in Los Angeles. Information obtained to date indicates Kaveh was sitting in a car in front of the home of Cambyses Shahrais at approximately 2215 hours when he noticed a black male approaching on foot. Kaveh allegedly confronted the approacher who in turn, pulled out a weapon and fired three times. Kaveh was wounded in the abdomen and has been hospitalized.

Classified by Multiple Sources
Review on 4 August 2000

4/10/92
Classified by: SP 5 ci (FBI)
Declassify on: OADR

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 02 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON 0 APR
DELETED FROM _____
Multiple Sm

~~SECRET~~

(u)

b. (S//~~REFORM~~) The FBI recognizes that Kaveh could have been the victim of an attempted armed robbery. Robberies in the area of the incident have recently increased to a noticeable extent. Other information developed, however, indicates a possible political motive:

- Kaveh prominently participated in the 27 July 80 anti-Khomeini demonstration in Washington, D.C.

- Shahrais is reportedly the leader of a newly formed pro-Bakhtiar organization called GAMA (National Front for the Liberation of Iran).

C [REDACTED]

- At a time unspecified but prior to the incident, Shahrais reportedly received a phone call from a Thompson who claimed to be a member of the U.S. Labor Party. Thompson indicated that he had obtained a copy of a hit list which included Shahrais's name along with others such as the Labor Party's presidential candidate, Lyndon LaRouche.

(u) c. (S) The FBI is currently exploring the possibility of a connection or relationship between the Kaveh and the Tabatabai incidents.

(u)
4. (S//~~REFORM~~) Assessment:

a. [REDACTED] Due to the paucity of evidence currently available, it is appropriate to consider these incidents as part of an organized terrorist campaign led by the government of Iran.

C [REDACTED]

(u) b. (S//~~REFORM~~) There is no evidence of any terrorist campaign, led by the GOI or otherwise, against U.S. Military personnel in CONUS (or elsewhere). While the possibility cannot be denied, the probability at this time is low.

G
Prepared by: MAJ [REDACTED]
RSS-1, X59986.

Approved by: GEORGE A. ZACHARIAS
Acting Deputy Assistant
Director for Security
Services

~~SECRET~~
DISTRIBUTION LIST

OIA
CS, DO, DR
RS
JS (NMIC)
JSJ-1 (ATTN: LTC [REDACTED])



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

1E H385
BY LIAISON

Date: September 16, 1980

To: Chief
Counterintelligence Division (RSS-1)
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony J. Kowalewski

From: *OB* Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

Subject: IRANIAN HOSTAGE SITUATION

Reference request from Lt. Colonel Anthony J. Kowalewski to Assistant Section Chief James F. Price, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on August 12, 1980. (U)

Enclosed is information obtained by the FBI concerning the Iranian hostage situation, which your Agency recently requested. *SAT(U)*

C

(S)

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

Classified and Extended by 538
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2(2 & 3)
Date of Review for Declassification September 16, 2000

4/7/92
Classified by: Sp-5 Ci/d/j (FBI)
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1229
CONDUCTED BY [REDACTED] 331
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI-MCC
 DEM DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 0402
REFINED FROM [REDACTED]

ICD
IADPS - ICC

12 May

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S) (SI)

1. [REDACTED] On 12 May,
I met with representatives from [REDACTED] and
the New York [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) The
purpose of the meeting was to collect data
relative to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Th
discussions revealed numerous operational constraints
concerning [REDACTED] efforts.

[REDACTED] Salient points of the discussions are
as follows:

a. From a technical viewpoint, the most
vulnerable points of attack are the [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

located in the [REDACTED] but it is possib
the guard post is not manned during the period
2400-0600

[REDACTED]
It is
possible that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may possess this
data but [REDACTED] is reluctant to con-
tact them. Apparently an [REDACTED] "old boy" network
exists within [REDACTED] and the potential exists for
an inquiry of this nature to become common knowl-
edge [REDACTED]. With this situation

In mind, Source indicated that he would make
the inquiries if we desired. As an alternative,
Source suggested that we contact State Department
personnel formerly associated with [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]
It is possible that they could
identify [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Also, it is "possible they may know
[REDACTED]
decision is made to continue with plans


~~TOP SECRET~~

REF ID: A67107
CIA SECRET

3



c. Certain factors place operational constraints on the [redacted]



(3) It is not unusual for [redacted]

Source indicated that he would not recommend [redacted]

TOP SECRET

(S)

c
2

Source surfaced
what may be an attractive alternative to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based on Source
Knowledge, these stations are lightly guarded (1 per
or not guarded at all.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

C [REDACTED] this could be an equally lucrative operation. Source indicated a willingness provide technical expertise if we need additional data concerning this [REDACTED]

(g)

C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

THE JOINT STAFF

JUN
5 May 1980

5 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Intelligence Collection Coordination (TS)

1. On 5 May 1980, an intelligence meeting was held at [REDACTED] for the purpose of coordinating progress on developing technical means to locate the Hostages. Three subject areas were discussed.

INSCOM rep advised efforts still underway to obtain additional insight in the inner working of the target facility.

was evaluated as measure.

2. The meeting was scheduled for Thursday, 12/1000 (same room
(POC is Winnie) (3rd mtg)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA NMCC
 DECL ~~CH~~ UPGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON QAAR
DERIVED FROM [Redacted]

Lt Col, USAF

2

~~Classified By: OADR~~
~~Declassified ON:~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

H-14335

EXCON
1024

PASSED 12 JUN 00
TO [REDACTED] 12 JUN 00
FBI [REDACTED]

VV 314802310429
OO RUEIZJC
DE RUEAIIID #0010 1001200
ZNY TTTT
O 121200Z JUN 00
FM [REDACTED]
TO [REDACTED]
INFO/DCS/SNOBS/IND/J2
BT

R [REDACTED] CITE [DELTA] 00010
SUBJECT: 12 JUNE TECHNICAL MTG

G 1. REGRET UNABLE TO ATTEND WOON MEETING. [REDACTED] WILL
REPRESENT THE 30 CUSTOMERS.

2. REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA AND INVENTORY OF FORECAST CAPABILITIES
FAILED TO REVEAL ANY THAT HOLD AS MUCH CONTINUING POTENTIAL
AS OLEANDER.

3. REQUEST FULL SUPPORT AT MEETING AND IN COMING WEEKS. ESSENTIAL
THAT NO TIME IS LOST IN FIELDING THIS POTENTIAL. IN TERMS OF THE
MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS WE ARE SIX MONTHS LATE.

REVW 12JUN00

BT

#0010

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12355
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL SV DDW/MCE
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO OADR
REVIEW ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

16 JUL 80

H - 339

IAOPS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDCI/NMC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
BERNED FROM [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Collection Operations (U)

1. [REDACTED] On 3 July 1980, I

visited [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with a representative from the New York [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The purpose of the visit was to obtain information relative to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Source was unable to supply this data, however, he did provide a large number of related documents (DD). An inventory of these documents is at Tab A.

2. [REDACTED] Although I was apparently unable to satisfy the basic collection requirement - detailed review of the documents listed at Tab A will support or deny this support other items of interest were discussed at this meeting. They are:

a. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] obtains additional data concerning [REDACTED] and it will be forwarded to the New York DCD

~~TOP SECRET~~

F.b.

C Their only contact with Iran is through their lawyer. [REDACTED] have been discouraged from maintaining contact with former Iranian friends/acquaintances who remain in Iran.

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED] had extensive operations in Iran. It is possible that they may retain assets/contracts in Iran.

e. [REDACTED]

C Source feels that this program is still in effect.

S We discussed the [REDACTED] at length. Source is not a technic and consequently his knowledge is general in nature. Pertinent points concerning this discussion are:

a. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] b. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] reduce the time required for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and significantly [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. Source was not familiar with [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED] He will attempt to identify [REDACTED] who may possess this knowledge for further contacts.

d. Source will search his private photo collection to ascertain if he has photos of [REDACTED] If so, he will forward them via the [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. Route Maps (4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

342

14

We are most appreciative of the data concerning [REDACTED] provide by [REDACTED] In view of their familiarity with the [REDACTED] it is possible they may able to provide additional information required for our data base. Specific questions are:

a. During periods

b. What procedures did they follow?

c. What type locks were used to

Secure

What type locks were used in the various doors of

Please describe

c. What were the normal duties?

hours for

4. Who was present

After warm dry hours

9. What type shifts did guards
work eight hours shifts. At what
intervals occur.

b. Were the guards armed? with
what weapons?

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Did the guards normally remain at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or did they perform frequent checks throughout the building? [REDACTED]

h. Was the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] equipped with any type of alarm system? If so, please describe.

i. Describe exterior lighting of the building at night.

j. Were all floors of [REDACTED] normally lit at night? The stairway between floors?

k. What was the vehicle and pedestrian flow in the area of [REDACTED] at night and during daylight hours?

l. What type debris would one expect

[REDACTED] Are vehicles parked in this lot at night? What types?

m. Were sources ever on the roof of [REDACTED] Were they ever in the [REDACTED]

n. Are sources familiar with the [REDACTED]

o. Could sources provide detailed diagrams of the basement or any floors of the [REDACTED]

p. Do sources know who constructed the [REDACTED]? Please identify.

~~TOP SECRET~~

342

1. We are in the process of refining our data relative to the [REDACTED] in more detail. In this regard, we would like to walk through the [REDACTED] through the eyes of someone who has had access to the building. For this reason, we felt that a meeting with our birth of the [REDACTED] in California may be very beneficial. The type data we propose to discuss if this meeting(s) was held are as follows:

a. Locations of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as well as colors

b. Locations of heating/cooling ducts

c. Locations of lights and switches

in stairwell from first floor to [REDACTED]

d. Details of [REDACTED] it

appears that this structure may be more than

A [REDACTED] due to its size, i.e. [REDACTED]

e. Any information concerning pedestrian/vehicle movement in the area of the [REDACTED]

during day/evening/night

f. Locations of fire extinguishers/

hoses

g. location(s) where vehicles or

and [REDACTED] vehicles are

parked during periods personnel are inside the [REDACTED]

h. Any details of vehicle/pedestrian traffic along with the [REDACTED] building.

i. nothing else worth [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Type debris, if any, found in [REDACTED]

c. Details concerning shift changes,
particularly guard personnel

K. Security practices, e.g., frequency
of guard inspections of building, patrol of [REDACTED]

l. Lighting habits at night, e.g., what
lights are normally on at night on each floor

m. Security devices in building, e.g.,
locks, bars, alarms, lights, etc.

2. These are the major areas proposed
for discussion. We feel that the walk through of
the building will surface additional subjects for
discussion. These discussions could provide our
personnel responsible for [REDACTED] with the
most realistic feel of the building possible short of
physically gaining access to the [REDACTED]

3. Additionally, we are interested in any
details [REDACTED] may provide concerning the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It appears to
be a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There are two features of this structure,
however, that suggests the structure may serve
another purpose. One is the size of the structure.
It is [REDACTED]

Secondly, there is a [REDACTED]
from the structure. If needed con-
cerning this structure is as follows: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

a. Does this structure serve any purpose other than a [REDACTED] Please provide details.

b. Is the [REDACTED] of the structure a [REDACTED] or does it serve any other purpose? If so, please explain.

c. How is this structure lit? Where are the light switches?

d. Does any [REDACTED] enter or exit this structure? Where?

4. We have reviewed [REDACTED] connects concerning access to the [REDACTED] floor from the roof and are most appreciative. We are now considering the [REDACTED] as an attractive alternative for [REDACTED]

Consequently, we need any details he can provide concerning its construction. Pertinent aspects of construction are:

a. What material was used in the construction of the rest of this structure? How thick is the roof? Is there any type of false ceiling in this structure? Describe. What color is the ceiling?

b. How thick are the walls of the structure. Are the interior walls finished? What color?

c. Are there power lines in the structure. Are they in conduit or is the power cable attached to the walls. How many lights are in the structure?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. If possible, provide a diagram of
the structure.

5. We are contemplating [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We
G would welcome any recommendations [REDACTED] may
make concerning the [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

#344

IAOPS-1CD

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Collection Operations (U)

H- CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON 0ADR

DERIVED FROM

1. [REDACTED] On 6 August 1980, we met with a [REDACTED] and a representative from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We met in Sacramento, CA after normal duty hours and without the knowledge of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] a subordinate element [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] The purpose of the meeting was to debrief the sources concerning the [REDACTED] Iran. This debriefing was conducted utilizing the guide at Tab A. Data provided by the sources is as follows:

a. The [REDACTED] is located in a quiet, residential neighborhood. There are 1 or 2 "Mom & Pop" commercial stores in the neighborhood but commercial activity for the neighborhood is concentrated on [REDACTED] The neighborhood is definitely lower middle-class. During daylight hours, there is a high volume of vehicle traffic transiting the [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] alley is one way — [REDACTED] and vehicles use this alley as a means to reach [REDACTED] and avoid the [REDACTED]

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(2)

The traffic tapers off drastically after normal business hours and is very limited during the hours of darkness. Traffic is also limited on weekends. Pedestrian traffic generally follows vehicle traffic patterns.

b. Parking is permitted on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Parking is also permitted on both sides of the street on the [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the building is also used for limit parking during daylight hours. Parking in the area is on a first-come, first served basis. Any [REDACTED] employee that drive to work would park in these areas. Vehicles are never parked [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] Vehicles unloading supplies at the [REDACTED] back is through the [REDACTED] unload and leave. (Occasionally on weekends, vehicles would be brought [REDACTED] to be washed. All types of vehicles are normally parked in the neighbourhood and the presence of cars and/or trucks of all types would not create undue interest.

c. The types of vehicles that would cause the least amount of interest in the neighbourhood would be the GMC manufactured "Ponytail", both trucks and cars, older Mercedes sedans, small Citroen older Chevrolet's and Ford LTD station wagons. The vehicles should be slightly bent-up and dirty.

d. Sources were unsure about the

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for the exterior of the building. They recalled that the area was well lit with street lights and a street light or exterior light was located at the [REDACTED] This light was illuminate a portion of the [REDACTED] of the building.

e. The [REDACTED] of the building is owned by [REDACTED] it is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is limited pedestrian traffic through the [REDACTED] during daylight hours.

f. Since the neighbourhood is the vicinity of the [REDACTED] is lower middle-class, only a small number of residents have private telephones. Consequently, local residents rely on the [REDACTED] to telephone service.

g. The south side of the [REDACTED] is bordered by a [REDACTED]

h. The area between the [REDACTED] building was used for storage. [REDACTED] employees who rode motorbikes/mopeds to work parked their two-wheeler inside the [REDACTED] in the area between the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
was also used for storage. The loading at the [REDACTED] was used for storage as well as the stairs. An area from the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was kept open for supply vehicles. In the entrance to the [REDACTED] The doors are [REDACTED] and open outward.

and the main entrance to the [REDACTED] are locked normally in the [REDACTED] time frame. The [REDACTED] is secured with a chain and padlock and the [REDACTED] are secured with a cylinder lock. The [REDACTED] of the basement is locked at all times. Source were unsure if there was a door to the basement on the [REDACTED] of the building.

3. [REDACTED] The sources also supplied additional data pertaining to the interior of the building. An updated floor diagram is at Tab I

a. No [REDACTED] personnel are assigned full time duties in the basement. The basement contains the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and a restroom. (The guard and personnel from the 1st and 2nd floors occasionally use this restroom since it is the most reliable one. It is normally operational when other restrooms in the building are out of service) The walls in the basement are solid floor-to-ceiling. Doors in the basement

~~APP SEC~~

doors to the [REDACTED] These doors are normally locked. There is a [REDACTED] from the wall of the [REDACTED] of the building to a [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED]

There are basement windows on the [REDACTED] of the building but the sources were not sure if there were basement windows on the [REDACTED] of the building.

b. Stairsteps in the building are constructed of [REDACTED]. There are lights on each landing but the sources were not aware if these lights were turned on at night.

c. Walls on the ground floor were solid floor-to-ceiling. The doors to the [REDACTED] were solid and always closed but not locked. The guard, when seated at his desk or in the entranceoyer cannot see into the [REDACTED]. Personnel are not assigned to the [REDACTED] on a full time basis during the day or at night. Personnel are present in the [REDACTED] during normal duty hours only on an infrequent basis. There are windows, larger than the windows in the basement, [REDACTED], on the side wall of the [REDACTED]. These windows face the [REDACTED]. The windows are normally closed at night but the sources were not aware if the windows were locked during non-duty hours.

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(6)

4. [REDACTED] Data provided by the sources expanded our knowledge of the guard force.

a. The guards assigned to the [REDACTED] were members of the police department, not [REDACTED]. They were dressed in dark blue suit with peaked hats with black bills. The presence of guards at the [REDACTED] was to deter sabotage efforts. The guards were not top caliber policemen. The typical guard was in his 40's - 50's, frequent over weight, friendly, easy going, not ambitious and not overly suspicious. In all likelihood, assignment to guard duties at the [REDACTED] was considered a "cushy" job. The guards ate, drank and slept on duty.

b. There were either [REDACTED] guards assigned to the building for a 24 hour period. The first shift was from 0700-0800 to 1600-1700. The second shift was either from 1600 to 2300-2400 or to 0700-0800 the following morning. The guards were not integrated into the [REDACTED] work force and their primary duty was to guard the main entrance to the [REDACTED]. The guards however, normally locked the gate in the [REDACTED] and the doors in the front entrance around [REDACTED] and then slept at the desk or possibly one of the [REDACTED] Other than using the kitchen [REDACTED] to prepare food

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(7)

were confined to the 1st floor.

c. The guards rotated duties at the exchange but on an infrequent basis. During an eight month period, three separate guards were on duty at the [REDACTED] during daylight hours.

d. The guards were armed with .38 revolvers.

e. The guards were not equipped with two-way radios. There were no consoles installed at the guard's desk to control lights, telephones, etc. A single telephone was installed at the guard's desk and it was his primary means of communications.

5. [REDACTED] The Sources indicated that, during their assignment to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] were assigned to the [REDACTED] during the hours of darkness. (There is some confusion concerning this matter. We were originally advised by the [REDACTED] representative that there were two shifts at the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One was present during the 0700-0800 and 1600-1700 time frame and a second was present during the 1600-1700 to 2300-2400 time frame. During the 6 Aug meeting, the Sources indicated the [REDACTED] may be manned 24 hours per day, seven days per week. [REDACTED] Sources however, previously indicated that operations at the [REDACTED] was an eight hour per day, five day per week operation.) The Sources, during the 6 Aug meeting, indicated that technicians were assigned duties [REDACTED] BNC buildings at night and on

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(B)

weekends. The [REDACTED] technicians assigned these duties would work on the [REDACTED] floors. [REDACTED] attempted to implement procedures where the technicians would be responsible for pulling routine maintenance on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during duty at nights and on weekend but they were unsuccessful. Personnel assigned duties in the [REDACTED] during these hours basically responded to major alarms on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The sources indicated the technicians were lackadaisical about their duties and were not responsive to major or minor alarms. The technicians also ate and slept on duty. The source emphasized that this was the situation when [REDACTED] was a driving force in [REDACTED]. Data that has become available to the sources since [REDACTED] personnel left Iran suggests that there have been personnel shuffles in [REDACTED] subsequent to that time.

a. Senior personnel, supervisors and highly qualified technicians have left Iran, been fire or demoted.

b. Lower ranking, unskilled persons have been "elected" to supervisory positions.

c. [REDACTED] has advised [REDACTED] that Iran is desperately attempting to recruit foreign [REDACTED] technicians to provide assistance to [REDACTED]. They have contacted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As of the date of the meeting in Sacramento, the sources

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were not aware of any favorable responses. Some unidentified South Korean firms, however, may be interested in the offer.

[REDACTED]

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Local Environment

1. Describe the area in the vicinity of [REDACTED]. Predominantly residential? Commercial? Mixture of both? Are there commercial religious activities such as restaurants, clubs and bars in the neighborhood?

2. What is the type and density of pedestrian traffic in the neighborhood? (0800-1700, 1700-2300, 2300-0800). What is the general flow of traffic?

3. What is the type and density of vehicle traffic in the neighborhood? (0800-1700, 1700-2300, 2300-0800) Commercial or private? Ratio?

4. What are the on-street parking regulations and practices? It appears that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] building is used for parking. (Is this alley on way for [REDACTED] traffic? Is there any restriction on use of this alley by trucks?) Also, it appears that the alley on the [REDACTED] is used for parking, both along the [REDACTED] in front of the buildings on the [REDACTED] of the alley. Is there any restrictions on parking on either side of the street? For example, is parking on the [REDACTED] of the alley restricted to occupants of those buildings. Is parking along the [REDACTED]

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parked inside the [REDACTED]? Where? What types Where do vehicles park when they are making delivery to the [REDACTED] Additionally, it appears that the [REDACTED] of the building may be used for limited parking. Would it be unusual for a [REDACTED] vehicle to park in this area at night? Day (see & below)

5. What type street lights are in the area Where are they located? How well lit is the area in the immediate vicinity of the [REDACTED] Alley on the [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Alley on the [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED]

6. What is the security in the area? (a) military or police patrols? Vehicle patrols? When? How frequent? Describe. Do they contact exchange guards during their rounds? Describe. Are there any police or military guard posts in the vicinity of the exchange? Where

7. What is the condition of the [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] of the building? [REDACTED] Is there any type fence on this side of the [REDACTED] or is the fence on the [REDACTED] It only [REDACTED] fence? Do pedestrians use this [REDACTED] walkway?

8. Where do [REDACTED] employees park? (b)

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Exterior

1. Describe the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] building! What are the dimensions? Height? Length? What materials were used in construction of the fence? Describe, Solid or see-through? Where is the gate in this fence located? Is it the same construction as the fence? How is the gate secured? Chain and padlock? How big is the chain and what type lock is used? Is there also a bar on this gate? Is the gate usually secured? During what hours? Is there a gap between the [REDACTED] and the stairs on the [REDACTED] of the building leading down to the basement/sub-basement. How wide is this space? How long? Are there any alarms on the fence or gate? Where? Where are the control switches? Can the guard see the gate or fence from his desk inside the [REDACTED]? Is the gate manual or electric?

2. Describe the area between the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] building. Describe the steps leading to the main entrance of the [REDACTED] and down to the basement/sub-basement. Is the area between the fence and building used for storage for the [REDACTED]? What type materials? Is the area used for parking?

3. Available information indicates that there are three entrances to the building:

TOP CRIMES

(1) The main entrance is located on the [REDACTED] of the building. Are there steps leading up to this entrance? How many? How wide? Diagram. Is this entrance recessed? Describe the door(s). Material? Single or double? Do they open inward or outward? What are used to secure the door? Cylinder? Padlock or chain? Bar or bolt? At what times is this entrance normally locked? Describe the lock(s). Are there door lights? Where are they located? Are they lit at night? All night? Can the guard see the entrance from his desk? Is the door alarmed? Airtightness of door?

(2) There is a second entrance to the building located on the [REDACTED] of the building. This is a sub-surface entrance reached via steps from the courtyard. Where are the steps located? Are there lights for this stairway? Where are they located? Are they lit at night? Is the area at the base of the steps used for storage or is it normally clear? How deep is this entrance below ground level? Is this entrance flush with the building exterior or is it recessed? Is this entrance a single or double door? Does it open inward or outward? Is the door(s) metal or wood? What lock(s) are used to secure the door? Cylinder? Padlock and chain? Bar or bolt? Describe locks. At what times is this entrance normally locked?

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his desk. When you enter the [REDACTED] through the entrance, are you in a basement or sub-basement? Describe the surroundings you would encounter when entering through this door. Is the door alarmed?

(3) There is a third entrance located on the [REDACTED] of the building. Where is the door located? Is this entrance located at ground level or is it sub-surface? If sub-surface how wide are the steps leading to the entrance? How deep? If the door is at surface level are there steps leading up to the door or is it at ground level? Describe the lighting associated with this entrance, e.g., lights above the door or along the stairs if the entrance is sub-surface. Is the entrance a single or double door? Is it metal or wood? Is the entrance flush with the building or is it recessed? Do the doors open inward or outward? What locks are used to secure the door? Cylinder? Padlock and chain? Bar or bolt? Describe the locks. At what times is this entrance normally locked? Are the lights for this entrance normally lit at night? Where are the lights located? Is the door alarmed?

4. Are there other exterior building lights? Where are they located? Are they normally lit at night? What areas of the exterior of the building are [REDACTED] and which ones are worn

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First Floor

1. This chart depicts all information we currently possess relative to the first floor.

2. Describe the stairwell. Is the wall between the guard desk and the stairs solid or open?

3. There are [REDACTED] wall. What are they used for? Is the supervisor's elevated?

4. Are the walls on this floor partial floor to ceiling? Height between floor and ceiling?

5. Is there a false ceiling on this floor? Describe.

6. There are numerous windows on this floor. Are the windows low enough for personnel outside the building to see inside? Are the windows fixed or movable? If movable are they normally open during the summer months? Window dimensions? Window Airconditioning?

7. Are the doors on this floor normally open or closed? Day? Evening? Night? Are locks installed on these doors? Type and manufacturer?

8. What is the composition of the floor?

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9. Where are the power runs? Heating and air conditioning runs? Cable runs? Is conduit used?

10. Is there only one entrance to [REDACTED]? Is it locked? Does guard have access? Is door normally left open or closed during ~~day~~ ^{any} & at night?

11. Are there windows/doors on the east wall?

12. Are there windows/doors on the west wall?

13. Where are tools, supplies, ladders stored?

14. In what direction does the guard's desk face?

15. Where are the lights located? Where are the light switches? Are the lights normally lit at night? Which ones? For example, is the lobby and [REDACTED] normally lit at night? Is there a master light switch in proximity to the guard's desk?

16. What is the composition of the interior walls? Both outer load bearing walls and inner partition walls. Are power and cable runs imbedded in the walls or attached to the outside. Heating and air conditioning ducts? How is ductwork and cabling attached to [REDACTED]

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17. Are restrooms located on this floor? When it appears that all restrooms in the building are located in the [REDACTED] of the building above water and sewage pipes pass through the first floor.

18. Describe the [REDACTED] sequence? Left to right? Top to bottom? How are the [REDACTED] Where [REDACTED] Are there [REDACTED] Where are they located. Where are [REDACTED] (what is on them/in with language)?

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1. Although different functions are performed on the [REDACTED] floors, the general room layouts are the same. (See charts). Therefore, the following questions will apply to all floors.

2. What is the height of the rooms? Floor to ceiling. False ceilings? What material? Describe.

3. Where are the power and cable runs? Where are the heating and air conditioning units? Are they imbedded in the walls? If not, how are they affixed to the walls? Type and color of clamps for false ceiling?

4. Are the up and down stairs separated by a wall or railing? How wide are they? How are the stairs lit? Where are the light switches? Cables of west wall? Fluorescent or bulb? Gouged? (see 16)

5. Are the doors on these floors normally open or locked? What type locks? Type and manufacturer

6. Available information indicates that entrance to the [REDACTED] can be gained only through the supervisor's room. Is this true?

7. A large area is designated for air ducts. Describe these rooms. Are there floors in each room? What [REDACTED] other dimensions of the rooms. Comparative

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C of exterior and interior walls of [REDACTED] Is there any conduit in these rooms? Size? type? color? Cable? Are there lights in these rooms? Where are they located? Why are there windows in these rooms? Type ceiling? Thickness? Thickness of walls? Windows movable or fixed?

8. Are the exterior windows fixed or movable. From the floor, how high are the switch. Are there windows in the east end of the building?
9. What is the composition of the interior walls. Plaster? Fibreboard? Color?

10. How are DC and AC power cables differentiated on local frames?

11. Where are the lights located in each room? Where are the switches? Are they normally lit at night? Fluorescent?

12. What is the function of each room? Normal occupancy? Type personnel? [REDACTED]

13. Where are the ladders located? Where are supplies, e.g. cable, solder etc, located? Where are tools located?

14. Floor composition? Carpeted?

15. Are there any [REDACTED]

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through the large room at the top of the stairs? Where? Type? Color? Conduct? Same questions for stairway. Is this even used for storage? Where? What type material?

16. Small room between the air ducts and the supervisors room? What is the function lights? switches? cable and power wire? Conduct type and color?

17. State of cleanliness?

18. Utilities pass through to roof?

19. Are any utilities routed through the stairwell? What colors are the steps, ceilings and walls? Are the stairs carpeted? Are there any doors in the stairwell? Leading to where? Are there any windows in the stairwell? Traffic from [redacted] floor to roof? When? Who? Purpose? State of cleanliness in stairwell

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a. Dimensions

b. Total number of [REDACTED] Specia[REDACTED]

c. Power uses. Location? type?

Color?

d. [REDACTED] Location.

Type? Color? Manufacturer?

e. What is the [REDACTED] equipment

f. Carpetting?

g. Any equipment attached to

walls or ceilings?

h. Availability of [REDACTED]

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1. Does this structure serve any purpose other than a [REDACTED]? Please describe. Any stores? Where? What materials?

2. Interior wall composition? Color? Thickness of walls?

3. Lights. Where located? Switches? Lights on door or exterior of structure? Where? Intermittent?

4. Ceiling. False? Describe. Color? Thickness of composition?

5. Cable and power wires. Conduct? Imbedded, or affixed to wall? Type and color. How affixed to wall?

6. Doors. Open inward or outward? Single or double? Composition. Wood or metal? Has secured? Cylinder? Padlock and chain? Bar or bolt? Is it normally secured? Where would the keys be located?

7. State of cleanliness

8. There is a [REDACTED] on the roof of the structure. Does it penetrate the structure? What is its function?

9. Windows? Movable or fixed?

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11. How do workers as most obtain power
for tools? From where? Type outlet?

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Basement

1. Does the [REDACTED] have a basement sub-basement or a basement only?
2. Information currently available concerning the basement is depicted on this chart.
3. Are the walls floor to ceiling or half walls?
4. Are the interior doors equipped with locks? What type? Are they normally closed and locked?
5. Where are the [REDACTED] entrances to the basement located?
6. What is the function of the room adjacent to the [REDACTED]?
7. Where does the [REDACTED] enter the [REDACTED]? Battery, generator, alternator?
8. How are the power mains routed to upper floors.
9. What procedures are followed with event of power outages? Days? Evening? Nights? If power is lost after hours, what actions does the [REDACTED] take?

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restore power? How? Are personnel assigned to the [REDACTED] on a 24 hour basis?

10. Describe [REDACTED]

Is all of the [REDACTED] affixed to one wall? Which one?

11.

[REDACTED] Do this condition still exist?

12. Describe the routing of heating and air conditioning ducts from the basement.

13. Is the area designated as the vestry on the chart there appears to be two smaller rooms. What is the function of the rooms?

14. Where are lights located in the separate rooms of the basement? Where are the light switches. Are these lights normally left on at night?

15. Where are the lights located in the stairwell between the basement and street level? Where is the light switch located?

16. How wide are the stairs? How do

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Work Force

1. Data available suggests that operations at the [REDACTED] are a routine eight hour activity. What are the normal hours of operation? Start on step. Is this a normal five day per week operation? How unusual is it for one or more members of the [REDACTED] work force to work on the Iranian week. Does the work force promptly leave the [REDACTED] at the end of the work day or do they work off hours?

2. What is the composition of the work force, e.g., supervisors, maintenance personnel, etc. How many personnel, by type, are assigned to the work force? How many are assigned per floor? What duties what offices, work areas.

3. Is it a common practice for repair/maintenance or supervisory personnel to be called to the [REDACTED] after hours in the event of equipment malfunctions? On weekends? What is procedure? How do they enter? What ID is used?

4. What type clothing does the work force wear?

5. What equipment belts do the repair/maintenance personnel wear? What tools are on the belts. Are the belts stored in the [REDACTED] or do personnel take them home? If stored at the [REDACTED]

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6. Is it a common practice for [REDACTED] personnel to handle all equipment malfunctions or are [REDACTED] personnel called in from other locations? Under what circumstances?

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Guard Force

1. Available information indicates that a guard force provides security for the building on a 24 per day basis. What do you feel is the primary reason for the presence of a guard force at the [REDACTED] building? Sabotage? Theft? What is available inside the building that would be the potential target for theft?

2. Are the guards who provide building security [REDACTED] employees, contract or government personnel?

3. Are the same guards assigned to the building on a continuing basis or do they rotate

4. How many guards are assigned per shift? At what times do the shift changes occur? Does the guard relief arrive on foot or by vehicle? Are they assigned from a central office or do they arrive on foot?

5. Are the guards armed? What type weapons, e.g. rifle, pistol, billy club, knife, MACE?

6. Are the guards equipped with two radios? Who are they in contact with?

[REDACTED] Do the guards maintain periodic

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How frequently? With whom?

C 8. Are the guards subject to periodic inspections by supervisory personnel from either the [redacted] or a central office. What is the frequency?

a. Describe the uniforms worn by the guards.

10. What is the age group of the guards? What is their attitude toward this duty, e.g., lax, alert, etc.? What is the morale of the guard force? Do they or are they permitted to eat/drink on-duty?

11. What are the duties of the guard? Day? Evening? Night? What security checks do they perform during these shifts? Do they check all outer doors? Do they inspect the building after the day shift leaves? After the maintenance crew leaves? Do they perform checks outside the building? When? Do they inspect the roof? Do they conduct moving patrols during their shifts? What is the frequency and are covered? Is he responsible for turning lights on/off during

12. Available information indicates that 1 guard has a desk or table inside the main entrance? Is this the area [redacted] he normally stays? Does he have a central console with controls for the lights

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desk face? What is his field of vision when seated at the desk? Is the area where the desk is located lit at night? Overhead or desk lamp?

13. Do the police or other security forces make periodic contact with the guard?

14. What procedures must be followed to gain entrance to the building in the evening/night?

15. Does the guard routine vary over the typical weekend?

16. Does the guard have keys for all doors in the building? Does he carry them or keep them at his desk? How many keys?

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Building Maintenance Work Force

1. At present, we have conflicting information concerning building maintenance at the [REDACTED] One version indicates building clean-up responsibilities are assigned to [REDACTED] employees. Another version says that a maintenance crew from outside the [REDACTED] is responsible for cleaning the building after the day shift departs.

a. Self-help.

(1) What [REDACTED] employ. Are involved in clean-up activities?

(2) During what time period does the clean-up operations occur?

(3) Does the clean-up involve locking all interior doors and windows as well the exterior doors by the clean-up crew and/or guard force?

b. Outside help.

(1) What time does the clean-up crew arrive?

(2) What is the size of the clean-up crew?

(3) Are clean-up operations by this crew on a five day per week basis. Do they ever work on irregular weekends for special tasks such as window washing, floor waxing, etc?

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(4) Is the clean-up crew dispatched from a central location or do they arrive individually? Via vehicle or on foot?

(5) Is this a contract service or is the clean-up crew employed by [REDACTED]

(6) What procedures do they follow to enter the building? What type identification cards?

(7) Is it necessary for the guards to unlock the interior doors for the crew or are the doors left unlocked? Are they locked after clean-up is completed? By whom?

(8) Is the crew spread out to clean all floors simultaneously or are the floors cleaned in succession? Which floor is cleaned first? Basement also?

(9) Does the guard accompany the clean-up crew or does he make spot checks during clean-up operations?

(10) Is the clean-up crew searched on entering or leaving the building?

(11) Does the guard check th

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doors and windows are locked and lights turned off?

(12) Are all offices on all floors cleaned each day? Any exclusions?

(13) What type clothes does the clean-up crew wear?

(14) What does the clean-up crew do with the trash after it is collected? Where is it stored? How frequently is it picked up? Times

(15) What time does the clean-up crew depart? What procedures do they follow to exit the building.

(16) Where cleaning materials for this crew stored?

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to the second floor without being seen from the ground floor? Are the stairs noisy?

18. Does the clean-up crew normally enter and clear the basement or the stairs between the basement and the first floor?

19. Are any areas in the basement used for storage? Where?

20. Where are tools stored? Types?

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Power Distribution in [REDACTED]

1. Rating of Power Available On [REDACTED]

- Type (AC/DC)
- Volts (C = 12V)
- Current (I = 1A)

2. Location of Power on [REDACTED]

- TOP
- BOTTOM
- HOW ATTACHED
- Receptacles
- Wire Runs
- Markings

3. Wire used for Power

AC	- # of conductors - Groupings (2 & 4 wrap) - U.S. equivalents (ROMEX) - Colors - Individual wires
DC	

4. Wire Runs:

- Conduit (Type size)
- BX
- Threatholes
- Terminal Boxes
- ~~Recess~~
- How attach to walls / ceiling
- Points of entry to [REDACTED]

5. Power Switch & Breaker (Draw in)

- Where
- What controlled
- How mounted (B.M.)
- TYPE

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[REDACTED]

Color

1. How are

(T

(Draw if possible)

2. Markings of

(Draw if possible)

(Draw if possible)

3. TYPE

ANSWER

3.

4.

- WHEN
- TYPE
- SIZE

REASON

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5. Cleanliness & Quality of Installation
-DISTURBING THE DENT

6.

[REDACTED]

8. Commit on Installation Position
-Simplifying TO [REDACTED]

9.

[REDACTED]
left in place.

10.

[REDACTED]

11.

[REDACTED]

12.

[REDACTED]
? wanted inside
? when

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTES

By J25
dangler

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12/26
CONDUCTED ON 30 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO OADR
REVIEW ON DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

IACPS - ICD

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Collection Activities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We visited facilities
of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 7 and 8 August.
a. The purpose of the visit to
Chicago was to obtain concurrence from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A secondary purpose was
to ascertain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We met with the [REDACTED]. We
were accompanied by a representative of the Chicago [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED]
Source readily agreed to a visit to [REDACTED]
on 8 August and immediately telephoned the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to make necessary
arrangements. (The Source requested that the Chicago [REDACTED]
Field Office forward a short general letter to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] requesting concurrence
for DOD representatives to visit the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Source was also agreeable to the
proposed [REDACTED] He recommended that a court
order be served on [REDACTED] By J25
dangler

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] in the interest of timeliness.

b. We visited the [REDACTED] on 8 August for a walkthrough of a [REDACTED] facility. The [REDACTED] assigned [REDACTED] his [REDACTED] escort and we conducted a thorough inspection of the [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] should provide an excellent site for a test of the Project CLEANTHER equipment due to similarities with the [REDACTED], e.g., climate, size, [REDACTED] etc.

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED
CUSTODIAN: 22 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY: DDON/MCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO:
REVIEW ON: 04/01/ [REDACTED]
DRAFTED FROM:

-TOP SECRET-

JEWEL

H - 348

Memorandum For Record

SUBJECT: Cleander Training Site Assessment
- Fort Gordon - [REDACTED]

L [REDACTED] ON 22 Aug 80
we visited the U.S. Army Signal Center and School
at Fort Gordon, GA.

a. The purpose of the visit was to assess
the suitability of the [REDACTED]
for preparation of the DoD Cleander team.

b. The visit and all discussions were
arranged and conducted on the pretense that
USA INSCOM had a requirement to train
selected contractor personnel on [REDACTED]
for maintenance of an [REDACTED]

c. Key personnel visited:

- (1) [REDACTED]
- (2) [REDACTED]
- (3) [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 [REDACTED] The facilities and selected portions of the [REDACTED] were found to be ideal for the purpose of training the Cleaveler installation team. Although the training equipment is of U.S. origin and not identical to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The installation practices and techniques are compatible with our training objectives. The specific portion of the [REDACTED] that meet our needs are identified below. Copy of the complete POF is attached (TAB A).

Lesson Title L.P. No. Length(hrs) TI

[REDACTED] 14. 5

[REDACTED] 8-14 51

[REDACTED] 8-14 SP

3 [REDACTED] Prior to entering the training sessions world wide we will have the following preparatory training

Length(hrs)

4 - 8

2

8-16

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

The [redacted] The Okavango Team would need approximately 18 to 30 hours of preparatory training and 30 to 42 hours of training at the [redacted] facility. To maximize the effectiveness of this training, the Okavango personnel should visit the [redacted] facility immediately following the training. This phase of the training could be organized as follows:

Segment	Length(hrs)	Location
Preparatory Training	18-30	FT Devens, MA
[redacted]	30-42	[redacted]
[redacted]	58 hrs	[redacted]
Total	58-80	

5. Security will be a problem at Fort Devens and measures will have to be taken to insure that ONLY key personnel are fully briefing on purpose. For this reason, recommend that all future contacts employ PSD to arrange the training. It further recommends that the personnel to be trained be identified and checked upon.

Done this 10th day of March 19

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

by someone fully knowledgeable of
all aspects of Olimander and the
Technical requirements of the mission.

G


Line 1

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AUT 80 - 3020 // 3905



UNITED STATES ARMY SIGNAL
CENTER AND FORT GORDON
FORT GORDON, GEORGIA 30901

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
FOR

Items of interest are marked (#)
See pp 6, 8, 33, 55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

US ARMY SIGNAL CENTER AND FORT GORDON
Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

FOR

Length: Peacetime - [REDACTED]
Mobilization - [REDACTED]

Approved by:
Commanding General
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
[REDACTED]

This POI supersedes POI for [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Section III - Body (Cont)

	Hours	Annex	Page
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
[REDACTED]	31		
[REDACTED]	36		
Examination [REDACTED]	7		
[REDACTED]	14		
[REDACTED]	7		
Examination [REDACTED]	3		
[REDACTED]	24		
[REDACTED]	32		
Examination [REDACTED]	7		
[REDACTED]	36		
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
[REDACTED]	32		
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
[REDACTED]	36		
Examination [REDACTED]	3		
[REDACTED]	27		
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
[REDACTED]	48		
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
Annex Total	489		

G 37

[REDACTED]	6		
[REDACTED]	15		
[REDACTED]	12		
Examination [REDACTED]	4		
[REDACTED]	8		
[REDACTED]	8		
[REDACTED]	16		
[REDACTED]	8		
Examination (Part A) [REDACTED]	3		
[REDACTED]	5		
[REDACTED]	4		
Examination (Part B) [REDACTED]	2		
[REDACTED]	10		
[REDACTED]	20		
[REDACTED]	14		
[REDACTED]	5		
[REDACTED]	3		
[REDACTED]	4		

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Section III - Body (Cont)

	Hours	Annex	Page
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	35		
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	16		
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	8		
Examination [REDACTED]	1		
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	10		
Annex Total	365		

I 52

[REDACTED]	4		
Examination [REDACTED]	14		
[REDACTED]	2		
[REDACTED]	4		
Examination [REDACTED]	14		
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	8		
Examination [REDACTED]	1		
Examination [REDACTED]	14		
Examination [REDACTED]	2		
Examination [REDACTED]	8		
Examination [REDACTED]	8		
Annex Total	91		

Page 55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Section IV - Annexes (Cont)

File No	Clas	Type of Instruction
---------	------	---------------------

Ref: Para 9, 15e, 41 thru 49, [REDACTED] para 28, 31, 42, 43, [REDACTED]
para 6 thru 16, 19 thru 31, [REDACTED]

F06 - Examination

Hours -	4	U	4E1
---------	---	---	-----

Objective: Student will demonstrate the ability to troubleshoot [REDACTED]

Ref: All Previous References

F07 - [REDACTED]

Hours -	31	U	2C,14.5PE1,14.5PE3
---------	----	---	--------------------

Objective: Student will troubleshoot [REDACTED]

Ref: Para 43, [REDACTED] para 18 thru 21, [REDACTED]

F08 - [REDACTED]

Hours -	36	U	1.3C,20.7PE1,14PE3
---------	----	---	--------------------

Objective: Student will troubleshoot [REDACTED]

Ref: Para 42, 43, [REDACTED] para 22, 23, [REDACTED]

F09 - Examination

Hours -	7	U	7E1
---------	---	---	-----

Objective: Student will demonstrate the ability [REDACTED]

Ref: All Previous References

A

F10 - [REDACTED]

Hours -	14	U	2C,10PE1,2PE3
---------	----	---	---------------

Objective: Student will troubleshoot [REDACTED] to identify faulty components.

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Section IV - Annexes (Cont)

File No	Clas	Type of Instruction
---------	------	---------------------

I11 -

Hours - 8

U

1C,6PE1,1PE3

Objective:

Ref: Table 5-1, para 61 thru 63, 78, 79, 81 thru 85, 88 thru 90, 92, 93.

I12 -

Hours - 8

U

1C,6PE1,1PE3

Objective: Student will

Ref: Para 3-20

I13 - Examination

Hours - 4

U

4E1

Objective:

Ref: All Previous References

I14 - Signal Security (SIGSEC)

Hours - 6

U

2C,2PE3,2TV

Objective: Student will define the terms EW, ECM, ECCM, SIGSEC, COMSEC; state operating procedures when jammed. End-of-course critique.

Ref: FM 30-102; TVR 159-70; MP 11-9342; Special Material

Annex Total 91

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~~TOP SECRET~~

8X

349

H-
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1258
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
SERIALIZED FROM [REDACTED]

IADPS - (C)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Collection Activities (Atlanta)

1. [REDACTED] We visited Atlanta on 23 August 1980 for a meeting with a Source employed by [REDACTED]. We were accompanied by a representative from the Atlanta [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] The Source was able to provide the following operational data concerning the [REDACTED]

a. Source worked in the [REDACTED] building 2-3 times during [REDACTED]. He normally entered the building in the 2300-2400 time frame. There were only 1-2 lights on in the building when he arrived and the only occupant in the building was the guard. (This was true of other [REDACTED] he visited late at night.) The local neighborhood was also relatively deserted. There were few street lights in the neighborhood and limited pedestrian traffic. The [REDACTED] was unlocked and unattended.

b. Source was not sure but thought that there may be windows on the northern side of the basement facing the [REDACTED] (He recalled that some of the [REDACTED] he visited had windows in the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not.)

Classified By [REDACTED]

Declassified On 07/07/2023

~~TOP SECRET~~ (2)

c. The doors on the [REDACTED] were metal and relatively tall. The doors are secured with cylinder locks.

d. We questioned the source about the possible existence of a tunnel.

[REDACTED] Source could not recall with a high degree of certainty if there was a tunnel [REDACTED]. He stated, however, that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were of the same vintage as the [REDACTED] tunnels from the [REDACTED] to the closest manhole to the [REDACTED] building were installed at both [REDACTED]. It is probable, therefore, that a tunnel was also installed at the [REDACTED]

The tunnels at the [REDACTED] were constructed of concrete block or poured concrete. The tunnels were approximate three feet below ground and capped with a concrete slab 4-6 inches thick.

e. In addition to the Econoline vans that [REDACTED] had purchased for shipment to [REDACTED] they also purchased 12 utility trucks. The utility trucks are in storage at Independence, Missouri. These vehicles had been painted in [REDACTED] colors and were being readied for shipment to Iran when [REDACTED] rolled out of the country. Action is [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3)

✓ currently underway to liquidate the vans and the utility trucks. Source stated that only 26 of vans remained unsold and a corporate decision had been made to sell the utility trucks.

C f. Source surfaced another lead who may be knowledgeable of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He is currently employed by [REDACTED] Source
maintains periodic contact with [REDACTED] and will ascertain his knowledgeability during his next contact.

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1A0PS - ICD

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Leads

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E0 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON 0 ADR
DERIVED FROM

1. [REDACTED] On 23 August, we met with a [REDACTED] in Atlanta. We were accompanied by a representative from the Atlanta [REDACTED]. Discussions with the Atlanta-based Source produced both operational data concerning the [REDACTED] and operational leads. Two memos will be prepared relative to this meeting. One will pertain to operational leads and the second will contain operational data collected concerning the exchange.

2. [REDACTED] Operational lead information provided by the source is as follows:

is a business phone and the other is residential. The source could identify which number was business and which was residential. Both numbers are served by the [REDACTED] He has married [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

6

confirmed the data above during a recent visit to

This image shows a dark, heavily damaged page from a manuscript. The paper is severely stained with water damage, appearing dark brown and almost black in many areas. The text, which was likely written in ink, is completely illegible due to the damage. The edges of the page are frayed and uneven, suggesting it has been handled or exposed to harsh conditions.

C who volunteered to work for the new [REDACTED] supplied by Source, is at TAB A.
C.

C.

Address presently unknown.

1

1

~~TOP SECRET~~ (3)

[REDACTED] (See paragraph
5c of our memo concerning the 6 August meeting
with [REDACTED]

3.

place telephone calls to

Source volunteered to

[REDACTED] telephone call to [REDACTED] would be a normal occurrence. During the course of a business call, Source would attempt to obtain current information pertaining to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had previously formally expressed interest in [REDACTED] and inquiries concerning him would not be unusual. Concurrently, the source would attempt to ascertain if [REDACTED] was aware of [REDACTED]

b. The source has enjoyed both a business and personal relationship with [REDACTED]. Because of this relationship, all [REDACTED] telephone call to [REDACTED] would not be out of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

ordinary. While keeping the conversation in a business/personal context, source would attempt to ascertain [REDACTED]

(6)
JL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

H-351

IAOPS-ICD

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Project OLEANDEr (U)

DISSEMINATION NUMBER [REDACTED]
DATE PREPARED 22 AUG 92
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NMIC
 THIS IS A PUBLISHABLE DOCUMENT
REVIEWED BY [REDACTED] 04 APR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Project OLEANDEr
has the potential to be the primary source of
intelligence relative to the hostages in Iran
during various conditions, i.e., pre-raid, raid and
post-raid. [REDACTED]

an. Pre-raid.

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED]

(6) [REDACTED]

Classified By JGS

Declassified On OADR

.(7)

(8)

(b) Raid (Full-scale or limited objectives)
(i) [REDACTED]

60

(2)

(c) Post-oral

(1)

2. [REDACTED] is not in a US controlled area and there are inherent risks in AS operation

[REDACTED], i.e., the capture of personnel and equipment. While this potential must remain paramount, there are a number of factors that must be carefully weighed when assessing the risk of the operation versus the potential gains outlined in paragraph I above. They are:

quiet residential area. [REDACTED] is located in a

b. [REDACTED] is afforded limited security. One policeman is assigned to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] provide const. 1.1.1.

(3)

Indicates the profile of a typical guard was a male in his 40's-50's. The guards were not overly vigilant or ambitious. Eating, drinking and sleeping on-duty was a common occurrence. No alarms were installed on the [REDACTED] gate in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] was normally locked [REDACTED] and the main door to the [REDACTED] And opened [REDACTED]

c. The level of occupancy/activity in [REDACTED] at night or on weekends has not been totally resolved. Some sources indicate that the building is occupied [REDACTED] Other sources indicate that a [REDACTED] during these hours. If the [REDACTED] during this time frame, sources have indicated they engage in a low level of activity, i.e., they only

[REDACTED] During late night hours they also eat, drink and sleep. In view of intelligence reporting that suggests major shake-ups in the supervisory hierarchy of governmental and quasi-governmental organizations; i.e., election of relatively low-ranking personnel to supervisory positions and firing or demotion of supervisory personnel, there may have been major changes in manning of the [REDACTED] months. All [REDACTED]

~~(4) SECRET~~

C

reporting indicates an increase in the absentee rate in governmental and quasi-governmental organizations. Both of these factors could impact on the level of occupancy/activity in [REDACTED] Since the level of occupancy/activity will impact on the degree of [REDACTED] operation, surveillance of the building during the 1600-0800 time frame should be undertaken to facilitate operational planning.

d. There is limited vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of building on weekends and at night.

~~(4) SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ACTION cell. Personnel Selection &
TRAINING

General Requirements

- One must be a tangent / driver or an oriental / acceptable muslim "TYPE / tangent"

[REDACTED]

- Good Night Vision
- Good upperbody strength
- Good under pressure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REQUIRED TRAINING

and
or

Knowledge & experience

I Non-Technical / Non-Mission Specific Training

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]

6. Surveillance Techniques

II Non-Technical / Mission Specific Training

1. City Orientation
2. Neighborhood Orientation
3. Building Layout
4. Tenant Internal security practices (Per each contractor)
5. Building Security
6. [REDACTED]
7. Cover for station
8. Cover for Action
9. Disguise / Deception
10. INF / Orientation
11. EXP / Orientation
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. Internal (Team) Comm. procedures
15. Rehearsals

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13. Olander
14. Olander
15. Olander
16. Rehseals

C

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90
91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

~~TOP SECRET~~

Required Training
And
Or
Knowledge & Experience

I. Non-Technical / Non Mission specific Training

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]

II. Non-Technical / Mission Specific Training

1. City Orientation
2. Neighborhood Orientation
3. Building Layout
4. Iranian Internal Security Practices (Permitted areas, etc.)
5. Building Security
6. [REDACTED]
7. Cover for Station
8. Cover for Actions
9. Division / Deception
10. INFILTRATION
11. EXFILTRATION
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. INfiltration (Team) COMMO Procedures
15. Rehearsals

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Required Training
and
or

Knowledge & Experience

I. Non-Technical / Non Mission Specific Training

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Magnetic Compass
- 8.
- 9.

II Non Technical / Mission Specific Training

1. City Orientation
2. Neighborhood Orientation
3. Building Layout
4. Transition Internal Security practice (rip control)
5. Building Security
- 6.

7. Cover for status

8. Cover for action

9. Diversion / Deception

10. INFILTRATION

11. EXfiltration

12.

13.

14. INTERNAL (TEROR) Common procedure

15.


16. Refusal

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Training

C

1. City orientation
2. Neighborhood orientation
3. Building layout (Exterior View)
4. Current Plan/Intend security practices
5. Building Security
6. Cover for station
7. Cover for Actions
8. Divisions & Deceptions
9. INFILTRATION
10. EXFILTRATION
11. Emergency Actions
12. External Comm 
13. Internal Comm 
14. Surveillance Techniques
15. Essential Cover vehicle Army style
16. City Traffic rules & practices
17. 

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~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Project OLEANDER (U)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

2 September 1980

H-C 352

1.(U) PURPOSE: To outline the operational parameters of Project OLEANDER, available options to implement the project and additional information collection requirements.

2.

[REDACTED] BACKGROUND:

b. There is consensus within USI that the [REDACTED]

c. Based upon the above,

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED]

(6) [REDACTED]

(7) [REDACTED]

(i) [REDACTED]

(a) [REDACTED]

ATTACHMENT REVIEW ED 02258
ED ON 22 Jul 92
BY THE CLK BY DDON MCC
ECL ☐ DOWNGRADING TO _____
EW ON OADR
SERIALIZED FROM multiple
ORMS

"WARNING NOTICE"
Intelligence

Classified By: JCS

Declassified On: OADR

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

c.

[REDACTED] Available information on these points
is 18-24 months old and fraught with conflicts. In view of the recent purges
and personnel shuffles affecting governmental and quasi-governmental organ-
izations, previously reported manning levels [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] may have been drastically reduced or eliminated. Only through
current observation and reporting can the risks be accurately assessed
and an option selected to minimize these risks.

d. Project OLEANDER offers a potential for information

e.

4. [REDACTED] CONCLUSION. At present, Project OLEANDER
appears to have the best potential for providing specific reliable infor-
mation relative to the hostages.

This information is vital in finalizing the approach to Project OLEANDER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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"WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence
Sources and Methods Involved"

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H-
#366

~~SECRET~~

ACODEASP NC2/S3B/OC/PENT//
25 2120Z JUN 83 ((RETRANSMISSION))

FM: S O C

TC: S O D

M G ATTN
INFO

E SUBJECT: [REDACTED] ENGINEERS

DDC ENGINEERS TO CONDUCT COMSEC SURVEYS OF DAO [REDACTED] FACILITIES
ARE: [REDACTED]

GS16

GS13

BOTH HAVE OFFICIAL PASSPORTS. VISA APPLICATIONS WILL BE PURSUED.

EQUIPMENT IS CONTAINED IN FOUR (4) BOXES, FORTY (40) CU. FT.
TOTAL WEIGHT APPROX 300 LBS. EQUIPMENT CONSISTS OF ELECTRONIC
TEST SETS, PROTECT AS 'SECRET'.

REVW 25 JUN 2010

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Classified 25 Jul 1992

Declassify

Declassify 25 Jul 1992

CONF by
JDS/NMC
22 JUL 1992